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Abstract 
 
The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change was established 
in 1992 to stabilize greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere to prevent 
dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system. The nation states 
of the world have attempted to arrest climate change through a state-centric large 
scale multilateral treaty making process. Yet, over a period of more than twenty 
years, little has been achieved toward that objective. The making of international 
climate change governance required to arrest climate change is falling short. 
Greenhouse gases, which scientists consider to be the main culprit of climate 
change, are increasing rapidly making every subsequent year’s emissions 
concentration a new record.  
Climate scientists say global temperatures rising above 2 degrees Celsius could be 
extremely dangerous. The 1992 Convention, 1997 Kyoto Protocol, 2009 
Copenhagen Accord and subsequent agreements have failed to translate the goal 
and achieve the threshold target as no serious and viable policies are forthcoming. 
Instead, the United Nations’ climate conferences have become a yearly chore for 
diplomats.  
The complexities of climate change governance arise not only from the nature and 
uncertainty of its impact, but also from its embedded relationships with social, 
cultural, political, economic, historical and institutional dimensions. Appropriate 
responses to address the challenges of climate change are difficult in the absence 
of potential solutions in sight. The pre-requisite for any effective policy responses 
is that the decision making process be democratic, transparent, and inclusive so 
that the ultimate addressees can ‘own’ the problem and contribute to solutions. 
A sizable literature focuses on the causes and reasons behind climate change and 
advocates radical actions to arrest it. Other research highlights economic 
implications, alternatives to fossil fuels, consumption and production, scientific 
uncertainty and challenges the perennial North-South politics in seeking to 
explain the lack of progress. There has been little research on why international 
climate change governance is making only incremental progress.  This thesis takes 
as its starting point the paucity of attention to working out how and why progress 
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has not been made, drawing on insights from climate change negotiations, major 
climate agreements and analyses of data on media communications on the issues 
of international climate change negotiations for policy making.  
The research recognizes the complexity of climate change and takes a 
comprehensive approach in considering why has there been little progress in the 
making of an effective international climate change governance to prevent climate 
change. The thesis takes three complementary approaches in addressing the 
central research question. The first develops from the concept of a democratic 
deficit and posits that the failure of progress can be attributed to a lack of the 
democratic processes in grappling with the issues. The second explores the state-
centric framework of UNFCCC and posits that since the environmental issues are 
non-territorial, the challenges postulated by climate change cannot be resolved 
and progress made by solely relying on a state-centric approach. The third is to do 
with media communications and posits the role of the media in public education 
as central to develop the necessary public support for addressing the issues of 
climate change. The Kyoto Protocol and the Copenhagen Accord, and how they 
were achieved are central to this research as these are the two major climate 
change agreements achieved internationally so far.  
This research concludes that the approaches we have adopted so far have been 
inadequate because of the lack of involvement of the main stakeholders in 
decision making processes. The common but differentiated and historical 
responsibilities, pertinent principles in 1992, no longer reflect current economic 
growth and greenhouse gas emission patterns. There is a need to review our state-
centric institutional framework toward a more inclusive, participatory, and 
deliberative accountability whereby the public and businesses can ‘own’ the 
problem. The role of the media is paramount in this because it is the media that 
passes information from the scientists, experts and policy makers to the public. 
The research concludes that the media has a key role to play and needs to be more 
critical in advancing measures to address the problems of climate change. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction: Understanding the Causes of Slow Progress 
1.1 A Preface 
Growing up in the western region of Nepal, the writer was aware of the way 
traditional farming practices were conducted to ensure harmony with nature. 
There was little awareness of, and concern about, environmental and climate 
change issues. Changes in farming practices, pastureland management, and 
surrounding areas became linked to weather patterns, particularly the arrival 
of the monsoons from the Bay of Bengal and its impact on the rain-fed 
farming system. Changing weather patterns brought reductions in the 
harvests of many types of crops with people becoming increasingly anxious 
about food security. To meet the demands of the increasing population, 
forests were cut down in favour of harvesting crops, houses and motorways 
were built, and other land-use practices resulted in reduced local water 
sources, more pollution and fewer carbon sinks. In the villages, there used to 
be abundant fresh water flowing from natural taps, but continued 
deforestation and concrete construction development1 dried up many of the 
natural water sources. Increasingly, poverty forced more and more people to 
leave their farms to find employment in cities and abroad (providing cheap 
labour for the Gulf countries).  
As a school boy, the writer heard about the pristine snow-clad top of the 
world, Mount Everest (Sagarmatha in Nepali). But as the climate changed, 
there were many reports that Everest was losing its sublime beauty. In 2009, 
the government of Nepal held a cabinet meeting in Kalapathar, the Base 
camp of Mount Everest, at an altitude of 5,242 meters to send the message to 
the governments participating in COP-15 (Conference of Parties-15) in 
Copenhagen that Mount Everest was losing its snow as global temperatures 
were rising. Also in 2009 in a similar effort to draw the attention of COP-15 
and the world to the changing climate, the Maldives government held a 
cabinet meeting underwater to send the message of global temperature rise 
                                                 
1 Building cemented houses and poorly planned roads at and around the estuary of the natural 
water sources resulted in the water sources disappearing.  
2 
to motivate the governments of the world to take action against rising 
temperature.  
In preparations for COP-15 there were aspirations that the concerns of Nepal 
and the Maldives, in common with many others, would be addressed by the 
governments of the world. This did not eventuate however, and the writer’s 
interest in the lack of progress in the face of one of the greatest challenges of 
the 21st Century became more focused. It was evident that the discussion 
about climate change typically saw, as the core issue, the North-South divide 
and economic interests, particularly those of the United States (US). To 
reduce the argument to such a limited scope did not make sense in Nepal, 
situated as it is between two of the most powerful developing countries – 
China and India.  
China is the world’s most populous and third largest country in the area. Its 
economy is already huge and growing at an aggregate of 9 per cent per year, 
represented by its Gross Domestic Product (GDP purchasing power parity) 
of US $12.61 trillion in 2012.2 It is one of the members of BRICS (Brazil, 
Russia, India, China and South Africa) and BASIC (Brazil, South Africa, 
India and China). China’s environmental problems are among the most 
severe of any major country and have become major concerns for the 
Chinese people and government. China’s large population, economy and 
size mean that its environmental problems will spill over to the rest of the 
world. After all, the planet, and its oceans and atmosphere, are shared.  
India, the world’s second most populous country, is 22 times bigger than 
Nepal. The Indian economy is currently growing at an average of 7 per cent 
per year, and its GDP purchasing power parity is US $4.735 trillion 
compared to Nepal’s US $40.49 billion in 2012.3 India’s share in world GDP 
is about 5.46 per cent against Nepal’s 0.049 per cent in 2013.4 It is also a 
member of BRICS and BASIC, a group of major emerging economies. Its 
                                                 
2 See CIA Factbook, ‘China’, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/geos/ch.html.  
3 See CIA Factbook, ‘India’, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/geos/in.html. 
4 See CIA Factbook, ‘Nepal’, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/geos/np.html. 
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rapidly accelerating fossil-fuelled based economy is business-as-usual which 
carries environmental costs. Like China, India’s environmental problems are 
enormous and global in magnitude.  
In contrast, Nepal is among the poorest and the least developed countries in 
the world, with about one-quarter of its population living below the poverty 
line. There are many differences between these three countries, yet when it 
comes to climate change, all three are categorized under one umbrella term, 
‘Non-Annex I’. 5  Even South Korea and Mexico which have long been 
members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD), are still listed as Non-Annex I countries. These kinds of 
categorisations, which were meaningful some 20 years ago, are irrelevant 
today as the economic circumstances of some of the developing countries 
including China and India are changing. The problematic is that these 
categorisations are intricately connected with the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change’s (UNFCCC) principles of common but 
differentiated responsibilities (CBDR) and historic responsibility (HR), with 
the politics of and within North and South, and built on the foundation of 
state-centric negotiation frameworks. A deeper understanding of the 
UNFCCC’s institutional framework and its CBDR/HR principles and the 
role of the media reveal why progress on international climate governance 
has not been made. 
1.2 The Thesis 
The central thesis question of this research is: Why has there been little progress 
in the making of an effective international climate change governance to prevent 
climate change?6 The efforts towards international climate change governance are 
falling short in addressing the challenges of climate change. While the 
                                                 
5 In climate change negotiations Non-Annex-I category includes all developing countries 
irrespective of their size, economy and changing status. All developed countries including 
economies in transition are included in Annex-I category. Annex II refers to developed countries 
excluding economies in transition.  
6 Although governance has been defined in different times and number of ways, international 
climate change governance refers to policies negotiated and approved at the UNFCCC—
governance without (world) government. Climate change governance appeared as a term of its 
own during the creation of UNFCCC in 1992. The launching of the Kyoto Protocol at COP-3 
supported the link between climate change governance and a global response in the hands of the 
United Nations institutions. The UNFCCC’s climate governance making process is continuing. 
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governments of the world recognized the urgency, risks and opportunities of 
climate change by establishing the UNFCCC in 1992 little progress has been 
made in mitigating greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions since that time. Given the 
challenges arising from climate change, the question arises as to why the 
Conferences of the Parties (COPs) have not agreed upon actions to limit global 
temperatures.  
Progress on developing climate change policy has also been slow. The pledges 
made at Kyoto 1997 were far from adequate. 7  The pledges made under the 
Copenhagen Accord 2009 to reduce the GHG emissions collectively fell far short 
of what was required to limit global temperature increases to 2 degrees Celsius 
(°C). 8  Helm and Hepburn have noted that international agreement toward a 
credible climate-change framework remains elusive, and while the process 
intensified in the run-up to the end of the first Kyoto Protocol (KP) period, 
emissions have continued to rise rapidly.9 The concentration of CO2 is rising at a 
rate of 3 parts per million (ppm) per year. 10  Given current policies and 
regulations, worldwide energy-related carbon dioxide emissions are projected to 
increase 46 per cent by 2040.11  
Helm, Yamin and Depledge, Ghosh and Woods, Vogler and others agree that the 
outcomes of international climate change negotiations have made little progress 
despite negotiations continuing for quite some time.12 Helm has argued that the 
international climate agreement failed because it did not deal with the issues of 
                                                 
7 See UNFCCC, ‘GHG Data’, http://unfccc.int/ghg_data/ghg_data_unfccc/items/4146.php.  
8 IEA, World Energy Outlook 2010 (Paris: OECD/IEA, 2010), 53.  
9 Dieter Helm and Cameron Hepburn, eds., The Economics and Politics of Climate Change (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 1. 
10 Will Steffen et al., Global Change and Earth System: A Planet under Pressure (Berlin: Springer 
Verlag, 2004). See also Dieter Helm, The Carbon Crunch (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
2012). 
11 Energy Information Administration, International Energy Outlook 2013 (Washington: EIA, 
2013). 
12 Dieter Helm, ‘Climate Changed Policy: Why Has So Little Been Achieved’, in The Economics 
and Politics of Climate Change, eds., Dieter Helm and Cameron Hepburn, 9-35 (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2009); John Volger, ‘Environmental Issues’, in The Globalization of the 
World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations, eds., John Baylis, Steve Smith and 
Patricia Owens, 348-62 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011); Arunabha Ghosh and Ngaire 
Woods, ‘Governing Climate Change: Lessons from Other Governance Regimes’, in The 
Economics and Politics of Climate Change, eds., Dieter Helm and Cameron Hepburn, 455-77 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2009); and Farhana Yamin and Joanna Depledge, ‘The 
Global Climate Change Regime: A Defence’, in The Economics and Politics of Climate Change, 
eds., Dieter Helm and Cameron Hepburn, 433-53 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009). 
5 
carbon consumption.13 Volger has suggested that scientific uncertainty and the 
differential impact of global warming in different countries could be the reason 
for the slow progress.14 Yamin and Depledge, and Ghosh and Woods have argued 
that North-South politics is the climate change regime’s greatest weakness. 15 
Divisions within the developed countries between the European Union (EU) and 
the US have also complicated the process. Bodansky argues the split between the 
US and EU at climate negotiations is more serious than the split between 
developed and developing countries.16 “The lack of progress has been attributed to 
the problems evident in the international system, procedural problems of 
negotiations and characteristic problems of climate change”.17 There are a wide 
range of issues that influence the role of states in climate negotiations.18 This 
thesis argues that the democratic deficit19 surrounding the representation of states 
and stakeholders, coupled with the current state-centric framework of UNFCCC, 
and the uncritical behaviour of media accounts are central to the failure of 
progress toward international climate change governance. 
Although recent scholarship has noted that the UNFCCC has not made much 
progress, there has been little research regarding why international climate change 
governance failed to make greater progress, particularly with reference to insights 
from climate change negotiations, major climate agreements and the data on 
media communications – from both the North and South – about international 
climate negotiations for policy making. The challenge is also to make sense of the 
wide range of different theories and interpretations including the main schools of 
thought in the field of international relations and global environmental politics. 
                                                 
13 Helm, 2009. 
14 Volger, 2011. 
15 Yamin and Depledge, 2009; and Ghosh and Woods, 2009. 
16 Dimitriv Bodansky, ‘The Copenhagen Climate Change Conference: A Postmortem”, American 
Society of International Law 104, no. 2 (2010): 230-240. 
17 Chandra L. Pandey, ‘International Climate Change Negotiations and the Media’, in The 
Refereed Proceedings of the 2012 Australian Political Science Conference, eds., Richard 
Eccleston; Nicholas Sageman and Felicity Gray, 273-300 (Hobart: University of Tasmania, 2012b).  
18 See for details: David Victor, Global Warming Gridlock (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press); David L. Downie, ‘Global Environmental Policy: Governance through Regimes’, in The 
Global Environment: Institutions, Law and Policy, eds., Regina Axelrod; Stacy Vandeveer and 
David Downie, 70-91 (Washington DC: CQ Press, 2011); and Pandey, 2012b.  
19 Here, democratic deficit means democratic representation and participation in deliberative and 
decision making processes with the standard practice of transparency and accountability. There is 
no attempt to translate state-model democracy to the international level but it is argued instead that 
the ultimate addressees (people and industries) should participate in policy deliberations for 
consensual debate and public accountability.  
6 
While much of the research on climate change has focused on particular climate 
negotiations, research on the media is mainly limited to Western countries and has 
focused on the representation of climate change through debates between sceptics 
and believers.20 The communication of climate change knowledge from scientists 
to policy-makers and the public via the media is of major interest because of its 
implications for creating public understanding of global environmental issues.21 
However, to date, no study has assessed the continuing lack of progress of 
international climate change negotiations contextualizing and combining the 
major international climate agreements and the media articulations of major 
parties – India, China, the US and the United Kingdom (UK). The KP and the 
Copenhagen Accord have been the major features of international climate change 
negotiations so far following the establishment of the UNFCCC. This study 
explores these two major climate change agreements and assesses the 
contributions of media to the issues of climate change.  
Over the two decades since the establishment of UNFCCC in 1992, the world has 
seen drastic changes in the social, political and economic circumstances of people. 
The US and the EU used to be the biggest GHG emitters in the twentieth century 
but now China has grown to be a major economic power and its emissions have 
consequently increased dramatically. Although the objective of ‘making poverty 
history’ is far from over, India, Brazil, and South Africa have become major 
global economic powers as well. In short, the economies of the South have 
become major GHG emitters, with China becoming the number one emitter in the 
world.22 These changes in global politics and economic power raise questions 
about whether these shifts need to be reflected in the principles of the UNFCCC, 
which divides countries into two categories as Annex I (developed countries) and 
Non-Annex I (developing countries). Moreover, it is more useful to question 
whether the Annex 1/Non-Annex 1 distinction and state-centric institutional 
structures of climate negotiations are even helpful.  
Indeed, the discussion of climate change policy making has become 
polarised, and this has contributed to the lack of progress. The 
                                                 
20 Simon Billett, ‘Dividing Climate Change: Global Warming in Indian Mass Media’, Climate 
Change 99, no. 1-2 (2010): 1-16 
21 Ibid. 
22 IEA, 2010, 47. 
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manifestations of North South, the EU and US and South, South divisions 
within a state-centric framework neglects the borderless landscapes of 
climate change, which affects people living in transboundary landscapes. It 
is a global problem and it does not matter where CO2 is emitted because it 
ends up in the shared atmosphere. The sources of GHG emissions are deeply 
embedded in industrialized and industrializing societies but countries are 
devising no effective climate policy to arrest concentration of emissions in 
the atmosphere. For all the efforts of negotiators and urgency surrounding 
this issue, the UNFCCC’s treaty making system has consistently failed to 
produce treaties and agreements that effectively address climate change.23  
This thesis argues that there has been a failure to develop and adopt a 
workable framework based on the principles that identify and adapt to the 
changing realities of the world. The failure also comes from a cosmetic 
representation of the stakeholders founded on the state-centric framework of 
UNFCCC combined with the uncritical role of the media. To substantiate the 
arguments, this thesis examines three strongly connected themes, which 
have not received much consideration so far, to determine why international 
climate change governance has not made progress. First are arguments 
attributing the lack of progress to a democratic deficit existing around 
climate change negotiations. Second are arguments which attribute the lack 
of progress to the state-centric framework. Third are the arguments about the 
role of the media in public education, the agenda setting roles, and the 
potential paths forward on climate change and on the negotiations 
surrounding it. These issues will be further contextualized in 1.2.3 section of 
this chapter and explored in subsequent chapters. 
1.2.1 Tracing the Beginning  
Although the environmental impact of CO2 was proposed by the Swedish chemist 
Svante Arrhenius in 1906, and confirmed with more supporting evidence by the 
British engineer Guy Callendar in 1938, these analyses were not highlighted until 
                                                 
23 Matthew J. Hoffman, Climate Change at the Crossroads: Experimenting with a Global 
Response after Kyoto (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011). 
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recently. 24  General environmental issues such as pollution and environmental 
degradation were well reflected in Rachel Carson’s book, Silent Spring, published 
in 1962, which generated a wave of environmental awareness. Since the 1970s 
many more environmental issues and challenges have emerged in support of these 
earlier claims. The first comprehensive high-level talks began with the United 
Nations Conference on the Human Environment (UNCHE), also known as the 
Stockholm Conference, convened in Stockholm in June 1972.  
Formal recognition of the potential threat of climate change dates back to 1988, 
when the UN General Assembly established the International Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC) to report on the state of scientific knowledge on global climate to 
inform policy responses. While there are uncertainties in our understanding of 
climate change and its impacts, scientists have refined their understanding and 
argued that emissions of GHGs must be limited to keep global temperature below 
2°C relative to pre-industrial age, a temperature deemed necessary to avoid 
potential challenges.  
Helm has noted that little progress has been made to reduce the build-up of 
emissions so far. 25  Global GHG emissions have continued to rise since the 
UNFCCC was established to stabilize “greenhouse gas concentrations in the 
atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference 
with the climate system”.26 Recognizing the inadequacy of voluntary emission 
reductions targets, parties to the UNFCCC moved beyond it to KP, a climate 
agreement that included binding commitments for a number of developed 
countries. Although Kyoto was a legally binding agreement and came up with 
flexible mechanisms such as emissions trading, clean development mechanism 
(CDM) and joint implementation (JI), it has not made any visible contribution to 
achieving the objective of emission reductions for stabilizing global temperature.  
In 2007 the Fourth Assessment Report of the IPCC, and governments of the world 
through climate agreements, concluded that the increase in global temperatures 
                                                 
24 Andrew E. Desseler and Edward A. Parson, The Science and Politics of Global Climate Change: 
A Guide to the Debate (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 8. 
25 Helm, 2009, 9-10; Margaret P. Karns and Karen A. Mingst, International Organizations: The 
Politics and Processes of Global Governance (Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 
2011), 497-501; Volger, 2011. 
26 UNFCCC, United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (Bonn: Climate Change 
Secretariat, 1992). 
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should be pegged to 2°C and that CO2 concentration in the atmosphere must not 
exceed 450 ppm. According to National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 
(NOAA), average global levels of CO2 were about 280 ppm before the Industrial 
Revolution and by 2011 they were 390.4 ppm 27  but recent research has 
demonstrated that CO2 concentration in the atmosphere had already reached 400 
ppm by May 2013.28 
Negotiations have been continuing for a post-Kyoto climate change agreement 
since 2006. The Bali Roadmap set out for the COPs the steps to be taken to 
finalize an ambitious climate agreement in COP-15 in Copenhagen, only to see 
COPs failing to negotiate the necessary agreement in 2009. The Copenhagen 
Accord was developed by the US, Brazil, China, South Africa and India, only to 
have it blocked from being adopted at the final plenary session. The Durban 
Agreement of 2011 envisaged the adoption of a global climate treaty by the end of 
2015 and its entry into force in 2020. It was expected to include reduction targets 
for countries that had previously blocked international climate protection 
agreements, such as India, China, and the US, and a 2°C limit on the global 
temperature increase.  
The EU succeeded in pushing through a schedule for negotiations intended 
ultimately to produce a comprehensive and ambitious world climate agreement. 
But no concrete steps towards abating GHGs were developed in COP-18 in Doha 
except that it extended the KP for the second commitment period for countries 
that produce only 15 per cent of total global GHG emissions and envisioned to 
continue future negotiations.29 It left a high level of uncertainty about the outcome 
of 2015 conference of the COPs but what is certain is the governments of the 
world would enjoy business-as-usual for at least another 8 years until 2020. 
                                                 
27 NOAA, ‘Carbon Dioxide Levels Reach Milestone at Arctic Sites’, 
http://researchmatters.noaa.gov/news/Pages/arcticCO2.aspx.  
28 See CO2 Home, co2now.org. This data was originally prepared by NOAA: National Climatic 
Data Centre, available at http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/sotc/global/. Also see media report by Paul 
Brown, ‘Carbon Dioxide Climb Speeds Up’, Climate News Network, 
http://tdcplone.dailyclimate.org/tdc-newsroom/2013/03/co2-climb. 
29 UNFCCC, Outcome of the Work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Further Commitments for 
Annex I Parties under the Kyoto Protocol (Bonn: Climate Change Secretariat, 2012). 
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1.2.2 The Debates  
Negotiations over climate change have been contested strongly between and 
within developed and developing countries. At COP-3, developed countries such 
as the US and Australia pressured developing countries to take on specific 
emission targets. They insisted that any emission reduction processes needed 
global participation particularly from key developing countries such as China, 
India and Brazil. What emerged from Kyoto were distinctions between states’ 
interests, between the developed and developing, between great and middle 
powers, as well as the concerns of the small/island states. In Copenhagen in 2009, 
major emitting countries were unable to come to any substantive agreement on 
climate change mitigation or on structural changes to the respective economic 
models on the basis of national interest.  
Areas of dissent included the rights of the developing world to industrialise and 
concerns by the North that long term global climate change was affecting all and 
that this would be accelerated by rapid business-as-usual development in the 
South.30 There were debates on how industrialisation could lift millions out of 
poverty and create a widespread green consciousness. The response was that the 
current precarious environmental condition required new paradigms of green 
growth based on the view that the West had created this problem and was now 
using this point to stifle growth in a resurgent South.  
There have been strategic splits between governments and splits within the Non-
governmental Organization (NGO) community.31 There were concerns from more 
radical viewpoints that collaborating NGOs would be ‘bought off’ and ‘co-opted’. 
One of the slogans in Copenhagen from several civil society groups was “system 
change not climate change” 32  which suggested that climate change was the 
outcome of an ecologically destructive and profit based capitalism. There were 
also splits between Northern environmental NGOs and Southern environmental 
NGOs on the relationship between development and the environment. Some 
                                                 
30 IEA, World Energy Outlook 2011 (Paris: OECD/IEA, 2011). 
31 Aynsley Kellow, ‘Norms, Interests and Environmental NGOs: Limits of Cosmopolitanism’, 
Environmental Politics 9, no.3 (2000): 1-22; Marc Williams and Lucy Ford, ‘The WTO, Social 
Movements and Global Environmental Movements’, Environmental Politics 8, no. 1(1999): 268-
289. 
32 Climate Justice Action, ‘Copenhagen: System Change, Not Climate Change!’ 
http://www.climate-justice-action.org. 
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commentators argued that environmental NGOs should take a self-critical look at 
themselves and ask to what extent they actually contributed to the poor result of 
climate negotiations. 33 
Various arguments have been made about the impasse reached on climate change. 
First, for many in the South the climate change debate is a Western conspiracy to 
prevent the South from competing with the North.34 On this account, the West has 
for centuries both plundered and exploited the South’s resources whilst at the 
same time exported its industrial waste to the South aided by willing and corrupt 
Southern governments with weak environmental regulations. Second, others have 
argued that with faltering economic development and free market trade, an 
environmentally conscious middle-class will fail to emerge, as thoughts become 
focused on post-material issues. Many have argued that there are trade-offs 
between environment and economic growth. 35  Recent scholarship on the 
environment and development has argued that continued economic growth is only 
possible at the expense of the environment,36 and that the poor are most directly 
affected by environmental changes. For their survival the poor are more likely to 
be environmentally conscious than the richer middle classes, but are less able to 
deal with the issue. There is a counter argument that a global environmental 
consciousness is not yet fully developed in the local and poorer communities.37  
Third, the concerns over what is seen as a democratic deficit are highlighted in the 
literature on environmental governance.38 The rules of procedure for the climate 
change negotiations are based on consensus among the COPs under the 
Convention, and the proviso that the COPs can agree to follow another 
approach.39 There are a large number of parties and observers involved which 
                                                 
33 Heinrich Boll Stiftung, ‘The Green Political Foundation’, 
http://www.boell.de/ecology/society/ecology-society-ngos-climate-crisis-12261.html. 
34 Lorraine Elliott, The Global Politics of Environment (Hampshire and New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2004). 
35 Tim Jackson, Prosperity without Growth: Economics for a Finite Planet (Sterling, VA and 
London: Earthscan, 2011). Iain Watson and Chandra L. Pandey, ‘Environmental Security and New 
Middle Powers: The Case of South Korea,’ Asian Security 10, no. 1 (2014): 70-95. 
36 Ibid. 
37 United Nations Sustainable Development, ‘United Nations Conference on Environment and 
Development, Agenda 21, Rio de Janerio, Brazil 3-14 June 1992’, 
http://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/ 
38 See for details: Walter F. Baber and Robert V. Bartlett, Global Democracy and Sustainable 
Jurisprudence: Deliberative Environmental Law (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2009). 
39 See UNFCCC, Kyoto Protocol (Bonn: Climate Change Secretariat, 1998).  
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have also increased the complexities of policy making. Although all the states are 
legally equal at UNFCCC, and accredited NGOs can attend the meetings 
representing global civil society, parties and observers considered that the 
procedures of climate change negotiations were not democratic, resulting in the 
failure to adopt the Copenhagen Accord. Concerns raised are that the powerful 
and major emitters play dominant roles in line with their national interests40 in 
climate change policy making, resulting in weak agreements which ignore the 
concerns of poor and vulnerable countries.  
Volger has argued that the pursuit of power, status, and wealth is rarely absent 
from international environmental cooperation and even some of the more 
mundane deliberations clearly reflect the struggle for national interests.41 Zurn has 
argued that climate change is a highly complex borderless issue which suffers 
from a democratic deficit and in order to successfully tackle this “highly complex 
behind the-border issues with societal actors as the ultimate addressees, these new 
kinds of international institutions require a more sophisticated institutional 
design”. 42  Nye concurred and argued that instead of merely rejecting the 
arguments, more access must be given to global civil society organizations such 
as NGOs.43  
Fourth, recent scholarship has demonstrated that the lack of public education and 
public understanding about the knowledge of climate change and its potential 
risks and impacts is also resulting in slow progress because the media shapes 
public perception, leading to governmental actions. 44  The media provides 
information on climate science and informs the public about overall climate 
change issues, from the negotiations and processes, to the possible outcomes.45  
The scholarship on climate change is extensive making it clear that the lack of 
progress on climate negotiations is not simply explained from North South 
                                                 
40 Volger, 2011. 
41 Ibid, 352. 
42 Michael Zurn, ‘Global Governance and Legitimacy Problem’, Government and Opposition 39, 
no. 2 (2004), 269. 
43 Joseph Nye, ‘Globalizations Democratic Deficits: How to Make International Organizations 
More Accountable’, Foreign Affairs 80, no. 4 (2001):2-26. 
44 A. Walberg and L. Sjoberg, ‘Risk Perception and the Media’, Journal of Risk Research 3, no. 1 
(2000): 31-50 
45 Pandey, 2012b. 
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politics or from any other extrinsic competing perspectives. The responses of the 
COPs to the challenging issue of climate change reveal the difficulties in 
achieving agreement. Organizing international negotiations among more than 190 
heterogeneous states on highly contentious issues to forge a mutually acceptable 
outcome is a difficult and intricate task.46 In sum, climate change concerns are 
shaped by the many complicated interrelationships between economic, political, 
and social dynamics of domestic societies and institutions, as well as the 
credibility of scientific arguments that climate change is due to anthropogenic 
factors. Clearly, the UNFCCC’s state-centric institutional framework, the role of 
media and the concerns of achieving a democratic decision making process in 
global climate change governance has further implications.  
1.2.3 The Challenge 
Although the dynamics of climate change are far reaching and hold overarching 
relationships with several issues, the scientific urgency for making a more 
adequate response is growing. 47  An OECD report in 2012 stated: “Delay in 
alleviating these environmental pressures will impose significant costs, undermine 
growth and development and run the risk of irreversible and potentially 
catastrophic changes in the future”.48 The World Bank report in 2012 stated that 
under current emission pledges and commitments, global temperatures would 
most likely result in 3.5 to 4°C and the 4°C scenarios are devastating.49 An OECD 
environmental outlook reported that global GHG emissions continued to rise and 
in 2010 global GHG emissions reached an all-time high of 30.6 gigatonnes 
despite the recent economic crisis.50 In 2011 the GHG emissions further increased 
                                                 
46 Joanna Depledge, The Organizations of Global Negotiations: Constructing Climate Change 
Regime, (London, Sterling, VA: Earthscan, 2005). 
47 IEA, 2011. 
48 Alex Morales, ‘OECD Predicts ‘Grim’ Outlook for Global Environment by 2050’, Bloomberg, 
March 15, 2012, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-03-15/oecd-predicts-grim-outlook-for-
global-environment-by-2050.html.  
49 World Bank, Turn Down the Heat: Why a 4°C World Must Be Avoided (Washington DC: World 
Bank, 2012),  
50 Virgine Marchal et al., The OECD Environmental Outlook to 2050 (OECD, November 2011). 
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by 3 per cent.51 In 2012, global GHG emissions hit another new record of 35.6 
gigatonnes, a 2.6 per cent increase from 2011 and 58 per cent above 1990 levels.52  
As noted above, data shows that global GHG emissions have been rapidly 
increasing ever since industrialization began. The IPCC has estimated that global 
warming of more than 2°C could be dangerous. 53  The EU adopted the 2°C 
threshold above pre-industrial level global temperature as a goal to limit 
anthropogenic warming,54  and recent research and analysis from a number of 
think-tanks including NASA suggest that humanity must aim for even lower 
levels of GHGs emissions.55 The governments of the world also agreed to limit 
global temperatures below 2°C by ratifying the UNFCCC and adopting 
subsequent negotiating documents. While governments around the world have 
reiterated the importance of limiting global temperature below 2°C, they have 
lagged behind in imposing the ambitious pledges and achieving their self-imposed 
goals. 
The non-tangible results of KP and the limited outcomes of the COP-15 reflected 
that some of the major polluting states did not support any globally legally 
binding treaty. India’s Environment and Forests Minister, Mr. Jairam Ramesh 
said, “China, South Africa, Brazil and India bonded very well together at 
Copenhagen. We are united in our desire not to have a binding agreement thrust 
upon us which will constrict our development options”.56  The chances that a 
global deal on carbon would ever be reached were always slim and it was 
affirmed by the collapse of the 2009 Copenhagen summit at which the US, Russia 
and Japan all said they would not agree to any new binding carbon pact while 
India and China were not included in the first place. 57  As Victor notes, few 
countries will do much to control emissions unless they are sure that their 
                                                 
51 Jos Oliver et al., Trends in Global CO2 Emissions: 2012 Report (The Hague: PBL Netherlands 
Environmental Assessment Agency, 2012). 
52 Mark Kinver, ‘Carbon Emissions are Too High to Curb Climate Change’, BBC News, December 
2, 2012, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/science-environment-20556703.  
53 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), Climate Change 2007, eds., Solomon S, 
Dahe Q, Manning M,  et al. (Cambridge Univ Press: New York, 2007g) 996. 
54 European Council, Climate Change: Medium and Longer Term Strategies, no. 7242/05 
(Brussels: EU, 11 March 2005).  
55 James Hansel et al., ‘Target Atmospheric CO2: Where Should Humanity Aim?’ Open 
Atmospheric Science Journal 2(2008): 217-231.  
56 Mary Kissel, ‘Climate Change ‘Quagmire’, WSJ, March 11, 2010, JA17.  
57 Editorial, ‘The Post-Global Warming World’, WSJ, October 25, 2011, 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204618704576640730949448812.html.  
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competitors will bear similar costs.58 These backward steps exemplify the stances 
of major emitters regarding a globally binding climate change agreement.  
The major emitters from the developed world have been unwilling to adhere to 
any binding targets unless developing countries also commit to binding targets 
whereas the major emitters from developing countries stick to the historical 
responsibility of the West and their right to development. Questions raised are 
whether the South should follow, be allowed to follow, or have the right to follow 
a Western model of development. Another issue is whether countries could 
leapfrog from the Western model to another paradigm of development through the 
use of low carbon or carbon neutral technologies. The rise in the GHG emissions 
in the South raises questions whether the earlier agreed UNFCCC’s principles of 
the CBDR and HR and the continued adequacy of the framework, should remain 
immune from revision. 
The principles of CBDR/HR, albeit important, are based on historical emissions 
and economic might in the past and no longer reflect the changing scenario of the 
world’s political and economic realities. The UNFCCC, the institution to tackle 
the climate challenge, is mainly state-centric and the role entrusted to non-state 
actors and global civil society, is cosmetic and symbolic. Thus, in exploring the 
core research question of why has there been little progress in the making of an 
effective international climate change governance to prevent climate change?, 
this research examines three compatible and complementary approaches in 
seeking to account for the lack of progress on such a major issue for the whole 
world. These approaches, as mentioned earlier, are the arguments about the 
democratic deficit, the institutional state-centric framework used in seeking to 
address the issue, and the effect of the media in reporting these developments.  
By examining the making of the KP and the Copenhagen Accord the many 
reasons for the slow progress are highlighted, including the unequal responsibility 
for emissions reductions, the divergent interests of parties and the articulations of 
power by the parties, the greater emphasis on continuing high economic growth 
                                                 
58 David Victor, The Collapse of the Kyoto Protocol and the Struggle to Slow Global Warming 
(Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2001), viii. See also Kathryn Harrison and Lisa 
McIntosh Sundstrom, eds., American and Comparative Environmental Policy: Global Commons, 
Domestic Decisions : The Comparative Politics of Climate Change (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2010). 
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rather than on environmental concerns, the concerns of democratic participation, 
including the unsubstantiated definition of UNFCCC’s principles and the high 
dependence on the state-centric framework to address a non-territorial issue.59 The 
findings from the case studies are compared and contrasted with media accounts 
concerning its role in the communications of climate change issues, the agenda 
setting and potential path forward for international climate governance by 
providing scientific and negotiation information.  
While the print media60 used for this study was found to be playing their role in 
educating the public and policy makers by passing the information on climate 
change debate and negotiations, they were also locked into the contrasting 
perspectives of ‘sceptics and believers’ in the name of balanced reporting. The 
selected newspapers – New York Times (NYT), Wall Street Journal (WSJ), 
Guardian UK (GUK), the Hindu, China Daily – identified with issues of 
democratic deficits, North-South divisions, and problems of existing principles. 
They advocated the potential benefit of research and development of low carbon 
technology. The Hindu, China Daily and the WSJ took similar positions as those 
of their respective governments’ at climate conferences. The Hindu, China Daily, 
NYT and the GUK were playing positive roles towards crafting a new agreement 
by identifying, to some extent, the fast changing political and economic realities 
of the countries of the world. However, these newspapers did not explore how 
climate change responses had become locked into the continued advocacy for a 
Kyoto style agreement and a state-centric approach rather than an approach which 
relied much more on the contribution of non-institutional actors for universally 
enforced cooperation.  
                                                 
59 Climate change is a non-territorial issue: first it is borderless. Second, greenhouse gases from 
one country affect other countries globally. Third, it is not an institution like the nation-state rather 
it is an emerging global challenge. 
60 Five newspapers as discussed in chapter 3 have been used as primary sources of data for this 
study. Other print and audio visual media, internet sources have also been used to follow the 
updates and developments of climate change negotiations but not treated as the primary sources. 
Therefore the research has some limitations since the five selected newspapers do not represent all 
media in the respective countries. However, the newspapers used here are the ‘prestige press’ of 
the respective countries and many other media sources gain major and important informations 
from these ‘prestige press’. See: Maxwell T. Boykoff and Jules M. Boykoff, ‘Balance as Bias: 
Global Warming and the US Prestige Press’, Global Environmental Change 14 (2004): 125-36. 
Also see: chapter 3 for details.  
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1.3 Overview of the Following Chapters 
This section outlines the main themes and concepts of the following eight chapters 
of this thesis. Chapter 2 reviews the literature on the arguments concerning a 
democratic deficit, the state-centric structure used to address the complex issues 
of climate change, and the role of the media in informing the public of the issues 
of climate change and the processes used in efforts to develop international 
climate governance. Chapter 3 sets out the methodology and the research design 
adopted in this study. Chapter 4 examines the Kyoto Climate Conference and the 
KP. Chapter 5 assesses the Copenhagen Climate change conference 2009 and the 
Copenhagen Accord.  
The Copenhagen climate conference and Copenhagen Accord were significant 
elements in the post-Kyoto agreement process. COP-15 was expected to produce 
an ambitious climate agreement however, the two years of negotiations mandated 
by the Bali Roadmap in 2007 turned out to be a fragile Accord. Both these 
chapters analyse the primary documents – the KP and the Copenhagen Accord – 
in the light of what went on during the negotiations and explore the international 
climate change negotiations from various aspects by identifying the many 
significant issues and problems associated with them in accounting for the slow 
progress of climate change governance. These chapters suggest that the UN 
framework and principles of climate change negotiations were insufficient, and 
argue that they need to be reframed and redefined to meet the changes taking 
place in GHG emissions consistent with the transition occurring in the economic 
and political conditions of the developed and developing countries.  
To assess the media’s contribution in promoting public understanding of the 
issues and potential paths forward surrounding climate change and governance, 
editorials and other commentaries (articles) on climate change were analysed from 
five major daily international newspapers involved in the climate change issue – 
the Wall Street Journal, the New York Times, the Guardian, the Hindu and the 
China Daily – each of which covered the stories of the four main emitters in the 
global climate change debates – the US, the UK, China and India. Chapter 6 
outlines and summarises the data derived from these newspapers.  
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Chapter 7 analyses the media data using Entman and the de Vreese framework of 
textual analysis of newspaper articles in terms of shaping the perceptions of 
climate change science, the identification of issues and the agenda for climate 
change negotiations and, finally, the evidence of a democratic deficit surrounding 
these negotiations.61 The chapter also addresses the propositions developed from 
the relevant literature in chapter 2. The chapter concludes that the media’s 
contribution has left the public confused mainly in the US.62 Only the Guardian 
offered a few detailed analyses to break the confusion and shape sound public 
understanding of the climate change science and debate. On the role of setting the 
agenda and strategy, the media played an important role in identifying the issues 
and proposing ways forward for solutions but were also found to have been 
advocates of the national positions of their respective countries working within 
the domestic and international political system. Chapter 8 draws the thesis to a 
close with a summary of the chapters and the conclusions of the thesis. The final 
chapter concludes that the present efforts to gain support for and commitment to 
reducing emissions are far from being adequate. More engaged contributions of 
societies (local and global), a more critical media, more flexible and workable 
frameworks and principles consistent with longer term issues of technology 
developments which need to be incorporated in a fundamental way. 
 
                                                 
61 See chapter 3. 
62 See chapter 7 of this thesis; this argument is broadly supported by previous research. For 
example see: Boykoff and Boykoff, 2004. 
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Chapter 2 
Literature Review 
2.1 Introduction 
Climate scientists warned an increase in global temperatures of more than 2 
degrees Celsius would have major and potentially negative, effects on ecosystems 
across the globe. It has already been one of the most important drivers of 
ecosystem changes.1 The leaders of the world confronted climate change in the 
early 1990s by signing the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC). Over these two plus decades, they have attended 
innumerable conferences and made countless speeches spending a great deal of 
energy and time to achieve a serious climate agreement, but the outcome is 
painstakingly poor with the concentrations of global greenhouse gases (GHGs) 
rising alarmingly in the atmosphere.  
The UNFCCC process has failed to materialize its goal of stabilizing 
concentrations of GHGs in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous 
anthropogenic interference with the climate system, therefore, it is immensely 
important to figure out why the process has come to an impasse in moving from 
the negative to the positive. If the problem is to be solved, it is essential to focus 
on the nature of the underlying climate change problem: Why has there been little 
progress in the making of an effective international climate change governance to 
prevent climate change? This central question has been simplified for clarity by 
asking three subsets of questions that are tightly connected to the propostions of 
this thesis. They are: 1. Is a democratic deficit slowing the progress of 
international climate governance? 2. Are state-centric institutions up to the 
challenge of addressing climate change? 3. Is there a disconnection between the 
issues of climate change and the role of the media? Strongly connected to these 
questions, this chapter reviews the literature on democratic deficit and the United 
Nations’ (UN) debate on global democracy, the state-centric framework of climate 
change negotiations, and the role of the media in communicating climate change 
issues, agenda setting and offering paths forward. From the literature, five 
                                                 
1 Office of United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, ‘The Relationship between 
Climate Change and Human Rights’, in Green Planet Blues, eds., Ken Konca and Geoffrey D. 
Dabelko 338-51 (Philadelphia: Westview Press, 2010). 
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propositions are derived to examine the core research question and the three 
subset research questions of this thesis.  
Zurn has argued that the “international climate change regime regulates behind-
the-doors issues,” and “the ultimate addressees of the regulations issued by 
international institutions are largely societal actors” whose roles have been 
diminished in the making of international climate change policies.2 Dryzek has 
noted that environmental problem solving is delegated to experts, civil servants 
and bureaucrats who are believed to have information, insight, and knowledge to 
transform political will to action.3 But “Political scientists have pointed out the 
flaws of administrative rationality and some points of criticism are that 
administrative rationality cannot deal with long term problems”.4 Administrative 
rationality has limitations in solving environmental issues.5 “A more recent trend 
in discussions on effective environmental governance is the call for increased 
participation and democratization of existing governance institutions and forms”.6 
It has been argued that the increased “participation, deliberation, accountability, 
communications and multiple actors’ involvement in problem solving and 
decision making will lead to more effective environmental governance”.7  
Baber and Bartlett are direct in their view: “International environmental politics is 
plagued by a democratic deficit”.8 For these reasons, this study will consider three 
main and complementary arguments seeking to account for the lack of progress on 
climate change governance. One concerns the argument that there has been a 
democratic deficit in the attempts to address the issues of climate change. A 
second area of argument is that the state-centric approach is poorly placed to 
                                                 
2 Michael Zurn, ‘Global Governance and Legitimacy Problems’, Government and Opposition 39, 
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tackle the complex issues which transcend states in space and time, particularly on 
climate change and its governance. The third considers the role of the media in 
identifying and discussing the issues surrounding climate change, and in its 
presentation of the negotiations of major conferences seeking agreement on 
climate change policies. 
Regarding the second argument about the state-centric international framework, 
Dunne and Schmidt noted that: “Mearsheimer argued that the ultimate goal of all 
states is to achieve a hegemon position in the international system. States, 
according to this view, always desire more power and are willing, if opportunity 
arises, to alter the existing distribution for power”.9  On environmental issues, 
Paterson argues realists have generated “a research agenda which focuses on the 
potential for global environmental change to produce interstate conflict”.10 He 
claims that in climate change negotiations, states do not behave rationally in the 
sense understood by rational choice theorists.11 States, he says, have simply not 
clearly articulated or consistently ordered preferences with regard to climate 
change.12  
For some, states are seen to have been cooperating in addressing environmental 
issues such as climate change for many years, while others draw attention to the 
time spent by states on negotiating environmental issues, which are not ratified 
subsequently by the most important states. For example, DeSombre comments: 
“the Law of the Sea Convention took eight years to negotiate and ultimately was 
so politicized that it was not ratified by some of the most important states in the 
process of decades”.13 Other examples of complex negotiations include the Bio-
diversity Convention and Kyoto Protocol.  
Zurn argues that the climate change issue is a borderless problem; it is not an 
issue of inter-state relations, but an issue of intra-state relations.14 Barber and 
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Bartlett, and Hurrell and Kingsbury acknowledge the inherent difficulties in 
seeking agreement on complex issues such as climate change and ask whether it is 
“really possible that an international environmental consensus, amounting to a 
collective determination to follow a shared course for reasons held in common, 
can emerge from our disjointed and competitive system of global governance?”15 
The climate change problem is borderless in character and has implications 
globally because of the “interconnectedness and interdependence” of the current 
world order, with the consequence that environmental problems cannot be 
resolved by individual states or regional organizations.16  
The post-Kyoto international climate change negotiations show that only a few 
nation-states played a vital role in the policy building process. Poor and small 
states did play a minor role, but it was the major emitters which dominated 
proceedings and outcomes. Vogler, discussing environmental politics, argues: 
The pursuit of power, status and wealth is rarely absent from 
international deliberations. This is often neglected in discussions of 
international environmental cooperation, even though many of the 
great international gatherings and even some of the more mundane 
ones clearly reflect struggles for national and organizational 
advantage.17  
Thus, it could be argued that there has been lack of progress on climate change 
governance because there are not only the tensions between rich and poor, or the 
newly emerging paradigm of climate change shifting from a traditional approach 
of rich versus poor to strong/powerful versus weak, but also because of the 
tensions inherent in the state-centric approach. On this account, environmental 
concerns can be seen as secondary issues.  
The third argument emerges from the perspective that media has long been an 
important aspect of peoples’ lives. Media informs, analyses and educates people 
on short and long term concerns, simplifying complex scientific and other issues. 
As one of the current significant issues, climate change has featured prominently 
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in the media. The general public does not have a great understanding of climate 
change science and relies on information provided by the media.18 The scientific 
consensus on climate change science is gradually building up to the point where 
most climate scientists are agreed that climate change is real and happening.19 Yet 
the public is confused by balanced but biased media on climate change science 
and unaware of the gravity of the overall impact of climate change.20 Addressing 
climate change calls for global responses which can only be achieved if there is 
widespread support around the world to embrace the necessary measures for 
change. Scientific certainty plays a prominent role in pushing public and global 
leaders to take action against the huge challenge of climate change. 21  Any 
disconnection between scientific knowledge and public education concerning 
climate change science and issues, a role in which the media plays a major part, 
hinders progress on international climate change governance.  
As noted ealier, the three issues outlined above, are closely interrelated in seeking 
to answer the central research question of this study. Calls for much greater 
democratic accountability are linked closely to the state-centric framework of 
international negotiations, and from the role of the media in informing the world’s 
diverse populations of the issues of climate change and the processes related to its 
governance and management. Dryzek, Eckersley, Baber and Bartleet, and 
proponents of deliberative democrats, have argued that environmental problems 
are better solved if the policy process is inclusive and democratic.22  Climate 
change is one of the most challenging inter-state and intra-state environmental 
problems involving states, societies and communities. The roles of individuals, 
businesses and other non-state actors are significant in determining the successes, 
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in the first instance, negotiating agreements and, in the second instance, their 
effective implementation.   
Yet, the framework to respond to this challenge is state-centric that sidelines non-
state actors from decision making processes. The state-centric framework of 
climate change negotiations shapes the arguments for greater democratic 
accountability for the progress in addressing climate change. Media is an 
important source through which information is constructed, disseminated and 
consumed.23 Crow and Boykoff have argued: 
And then there is the obvious point that most citizens around the world 
typically do not read peer-revieiwed literature, nor do they read policy 
documents or negotiate international treaties. Instead, to learn about 
climate change and gain climate information, people in the public 
arena turn to media communications…to link formal science and 
policy with their everyday lives.24 
The role of media in transferring science into policy is significant. The calls for an 
enlightened, active and critical media which provides authoritative and insightful 
analysis and commentary to the public on climate change issues by involving all 
parties rather than adopting and reinforcing the state-centric framework is closely 
connected with the concerns for more democracy and inclusive decision making 
processes.  
In section 2.2 of this chapter the discourse on democratic deficit is examined, and 
section 2.3 focuses on the state-centric attempts to provide governance processes 
for global climate change. Finally, 2.4 examines the role of the media, and its 
contribution to informing and educating the world’s populations about the issues 
of climate change and the processes toward climate change governance. The 
chapter ends with a conclusion. 
2.2 Democratic Deficit 
The issue of democratic deficit is discussed from many different angles, but with 
particular reference to international organisations (international organizations (IOs) 
stands for intergovernmental organizations in this research) such as the UN and 
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the European Union (EU). This section covers the democratic deficit arguments of 
various writers commenting on the UN, the EU and the US.25  Insights from 
cosmopolitan democrats, deliberative democrats and the discourse of the UN 
vision of the global democracy will be presented to identify the democratic 
deficits in building the processes of international climate change governance. In 
terms of global democracy, cosmopolitan democrats urge the creation of a 
transnational parliamentary institution at the global level where the 
parliamentarians are elected by transnational global citizens, and the 
parliamentarians remain accountable to their transnational electorates.  
The deliberative democrats lay emphasis on talking rather than on voting to 
increase legitimacy, accountability and democracy in the process of policy 
making.26  The UN vision of global democracy is slightly different and sees the 
UN promoting greater participation among various actors of world politics such as 
states, IOs, multi-national companies (MNCs), non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs) and civil society organizations (CSOs) to achieve governance without 
government. Although critics may question whether the ideas of cosmopolitan 
democracy and deliberative democracy are driven by normative considerations, 
the European Parliament is a ‘really existing’ example of cosmopolitan 
democracy. The literature on deliberative democracy argues that this form of 
democracy is more useful in solving environmental problems and the patterns of 
practices are gradually emerging.27 
Although many authors have pointed out the increased role of non-state actors in 
international decision making, some commentators raise questions and argue that 
this does not necessarily enhance democracy.28 This thesis recognizes that there 
are many issues associated with the idea of enhancing democracy at the 
international/global level in terms of choosing models and/or enhancing 
deliberation in policy making. Therefore, instead of arguing for exporting a 
particular model of democracy this thesis examines the concerns of democratic 
deficit in the making of international climate governance based on the framework 
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of the UN vision of global democracy, a model of global environmental 
governance without government, which allows participation and deliberation of 
global actors in addressing climate change issues.29 
International climate change policies have been negotiated and formulated under 
the UNFCCC. International negotiations, open to all participating states, are a 
popular means of tackling problems that transcend national boundaries, 30 
including environmental, climate change issues and many others. Critics comment 
that international negotiations for global governance suffer from a democratic 
deficit in the policy processes, both input and output, and in the procedural 
fairness, with the result that they tend not to achieve the goals sought, and in their 
implementation they do not address or represent the ultimate addressees31 who are 
the target groups of change.32 Wallace argues that international politics and global 
governance suffer from a democratic deficit.33  
For Moravscik an emerging central question about global governance is the 
structure and democratic legitimacy of international organizations. 34  He 
acknowledges: “There is a consensus answer to this question, among scholars and 
commentators, politicians and general public, that international organizations are 
normatively suspect.” 35  He has cautiously noted that the global governance 
decision making process is democratically suspect.36 Johnstone notes: “Critiques 
of decision-making in international organizations are often framed in terms of the 
democratic deficit”.37 Habegger writes that these accusations are based chiefly on 
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the gap between their extended influence and the lack of effective controlling 
mechanisms to prevent abuses of power.38 
Dahl, Held, Baber and Bartlett have challenged the ambivalent constitutions of 
IOs which provide membership only to states but make policies of global scope to 
be imposed upon global citizens through states.39 Dahl notes that international 
organizations and processes are not democratic because they lack “a system of 
popular control over governmental policies and decisions and democracy as a 
system of fundamental rights”. 40  Held argues that substantial areas of human 
activity are progressively organized on a global level so the fate of democracy 
cannot be limited within the contours of nation-states.41 States collectively create 
the rules, ratify them and so are bound by them but the question is whether 
citizens are also bound. In Mulligan’s view, “there is a significant problem in 
binding the citizen through the promise of her (sic) state, even in a limited issue-
area, which is why we still need to talk about a democratic deficit”.42  
Inoguchi, Newman and Keane note: 
The increasing prominence of international organizations is the 
question of accountability and democracy within these organizations. 
Traditionally, the concept of democracy did not extend beyond the 
domestic arena and a different sort of norm governed international 
relationships.43  
Archibugi comments: “The United Nations is the most complex and ambitious 
international organization that has ever existed with an ethos of democracy among 
nations. However, the organization itself is not democratic by any standard.”44 
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Many international organizations, including the UN and its agencies, are accused 
of lacking democratic accountability. Critics such as Habegger focus on the 
composition of the UN General Assembly (UNGA), the main executive body, and 
the Security Council among other UN agencies. Critics consider the Security 
Council’s composition is not representative of the global power constellation any 
more, and that more generally, democratic accountability seems to be missing 
throughout the UN system, including the UNGA.45 The representational deficit in 
institutional structures was introduced to the UN from the date of its birth. Schorr 
comments:  
Amid the ruins of World War II, victorious leaders imagined a global 
community. The wartime coalition had been named the United 
Nations; now it would be made permanent. The UN would rest on a 
consensus of two great powers, the U.S. and the Soviet Union; two no 
longer great powers, Britain and France; and China, hoping to be 
great.46 
Archibugi, Held and Kohler argue that international organization and global 
governance must be democratized in order to reflect the recent reconfiguration of 
political forces and the dynamic of international organizations.47 This posits an 
argument for the UN’s institutional and structural reform. Archibugi notes that 
while ‘the people’ are invoked in the preamble to the Charter of the UN, they are 
still excluded from the organization’s decision-making process;48  they are not 
given any opportunities to participate in the UN system. This issue and its 
implication are considered further in sections 2.2.3 and 2.2.4.  
2.2.1 Democratic Deficit – the European Union 
The EU has developed into a new type of international polity, and attracted the 
term ‘democratic deficit’ in its dealings to draw attention to the increased 
executive power in the EU, the weak European Parliament (EP), and an EU that is 
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too distant from voters.49 Most politicians, scholarly commentators and members 
of the European public appear to agree that the EU suffers from democratic 
deficit.50 Only the European Parliament (EP), one of the main branches of EU 
legislature, is democratically elected. The European Commission (EC), although 
unelected, enjoys a powerful role as an agenda-setter and regulatory coordinator, 
and is widely perceived to be a technocracy.51 The European Court of Justice 
(ECJ), the Supreme Court of the EU, is also a powerful institution and has been an 
architect of a united Europe. It has become increasingly visible to the public, with 
its rulings on issues such as the forced Sunday closing of retail stores.52 Most 
powerful of all the EU bodies is the Council of Ministers, which brings together 
national ministers, diplomatic representatives, and administrative officials from 
member states, who often deliberate in secret.53 
The EP is democratically elected, but all other branches of the EU are indirectly 
accountable to the European voters. The EU’s mode of agenda setting and the 
distribution of power in setting the agenda and taking the decisions are too 
diplomatic and too technocratic to satisfy many observers, scholars and citizens.54 
The democratic deficit is seen in the way the EU is lacking adequate means of 
legitimation from the citizens of the Union.55 Whether the EU’s institutions are 
democratic in making collective decisions on behalf of all European citizens or 
whether these institutions are lacking democratic legitimacy is itself a research 
agenda to assess, but is beyond the scope of this research.  
The main parameters of the democratic deficit arguments come from a range of 
issues: the lack of transparency in EU policy making; a weak parliament; 
unaccountable agencies with excessive power. For instance, in the EU, voting is 
more implicit than explicit and decisions are reached mainly by persuading 
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opponents to agree which is quite different from the Senate in the USA and the 
Standerat in Sweden. 56  The EP, despite its growing powers, is too weak to 
compensate for the democratic deficit of other EU institutions. 57  The weak 
parliament is unable to check other key agencies of the EU. In short, the EC has 
been called a politicized bureaucracy.58  
Nonetheless, there is no consensus among social scientists and European citizens 
on the issue of the EU’s democratic deficit. The EP is responsible to voters at the 
international level of public policy and decision making but the power of the EP is 
still limited. The power of the EP is gradually increasing.59 Constitutional checks 
and balances, indirect control via national governments and the increasing powers 
of the EP are sufficient to ensure that EU policy making is, in nearly all cases, 
clean, transparent, effective and politically responsive to the demands of European 
Citizens. 60  The question of what constitutes a democratic deficit is often 
contestable and reflects, at an abstract level, on the specific model of democracy 
one considers to be a yardstick of democracy itself. 
Dahl states that as the size of the polity and the number of citizens’ increase, the 
situation of democracy becomes more and more absurd, as citizens’ participation 
becomes more distant and ineffective.61 The representation of citizens can be an 
alternative in the IOs where the representatives should be able to exercise control 
over the international bureaucracy as in the democratic polity of the nation-states. 
In this sense, the EP is weak because it is unable to exercise control over other 
institutions within the EU. Held argues that cosmopolitan or regional democracy 
is required to meet the dilemmas of democracy beyond nation-states.62 Citizens 
should be able to engage in policy making wherever they are located. The EP is 
based on the model of cosmopolitan democracy where the representatives are 
elected directly by the people, unlike other institutions of the EU. In one sense, it 
upholds the democracy but the controlling power of the EP is limited in policy 
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input and output systems. Citizens are represented through the EP and while it can 
be argued that it is representative, it is not directly participatory. The weak EP 
does not have the power for extensive deliberations among representatives for 
public control and public scrutiny over the agenda of the EU. In a democracy, it is 
intended that policy input and output should reflect the wishes of the public. The 
EU is a most unlikely case for observing policy responsiveness because of the 
lack of institutional mechanisms that directly links the European public and EU 
policy makers.63 
Although there are some contestations about the level of democracy in the EU, the 
existence of an elected EP makes it pivotal in the practice of cosmopolitan 
democracy. The decisions made on any issue, including trade or environmental 
regulation, pass through the multi state legislative process of Commission, 
Council, Parliament and domestic implementing authorities thereby making them 
highly transparent, legitimate and democratic.64 “Co-decision has increased the 
Parliament’s role in policy making, resulting in more transparent decision making 
and reducing so-called democratic deficit”. 65  Although scholars still debate 
whether the EU is an inter-state forum or a functional regime that represents 
common transnational interests and actors, it is increasingly regarded as a 
competent environmental actor functioning as a multilevel governance structure.66 
Climate change has arguably become the single most important global 
environmental issue on the EU’s agenda and efforts to address climate change 
have resulted in increasingly ambitous new policies and programs to put Europe at 
the forefront of global efforts to tackle climate change.67 Although it is too early 
to argue that greater democratic governance has resulted in a better environmental 
performance, without question, the EU has made great strides toward 
environmental and climatic protection. 
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2.2.2 Democratic Deficit – the United States  
The notion of democratic deficit is contentious and can be comprehended further 
by considering the US democracy. Although the US is a successful model of 
Western democracy by many standards in the world, the quality of democracy is 
questionable. The yardstick of democracy postulated by Dahl, Held, Keane, Baber 
and Bartlett challenges the US claims to be a democracy given that not all men 
and women were allowed to vote and participate in governmental activities. From 
this perspective the US was a restricted democracy for most of its independent 
history. 68  The US lacked several basic democratic procedures such as free 
elections, free and fair participation, and contestation particularly of African 
Americans and civil rights protections until the passage of civil rights codes in 
1964 and voting rights in 1965.69 Scholars argue that the American constitution 
has implicit within its articles the very idea of democratic deficit. 70  The 
distribution of power for checks and balances among the President, Senate, 
Congress and the Supreme Court are on-going areas of the study related to 
democratic deficit. There is also conflict arising from the ratification debates 
between Federalists and Anti-Federalists. These different perspectives challenge 
the conventional opposition between concentrated power and democratic 
legitimacy and between popular participation and effective government.71 The US 
did not provide equal rights to all its citizens, particularly women and African 
Americans, until the 1970s.  
More recent scholarship of democratic deficit comes from the concept of 
disaffected citizenry. Durant wrote, “The democracy deficits in America 
comprises four interrelated and mutually reinforcing trends that show few signs of 
abating if left unattended”.72 He wrote: the first is the “policy challenged, vocal 
and increasingly impatient citizenry has become energized in America. That 
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citizenry perceives government ineptitude”. 73  The citizenry wants to put 
government aside and effect rule by themselves. The second is the “manufactured 
truths” and “commercially truth” news reporting for contributing to “public 
disaffection with Congress”. 74  The third trend comprising democratic deficit 
involves lack of deliberative democracy. The fourth is about the plebiscitary 
reform agenda and a persistent quest for accountability.75 Durant argues that “a 
truly deliberative democracy requires both dialogue and discussion. Presently, 
however, a pernicious and most debilitating imbalance exists, in our polity, an 
imbalance strongly favouring persuasion – licit or illicit – over illumination”.76  
2.2.3 Debates on UN Democracy 
The discussion of the UN democratic deficit and the democratization of the UN 
present another aspect of the issue. The UN has become a very significant and 
unique IO since its creation. For an organization so unique and important, the UN 
has paid surprisingly little attention to recording and evaluating its own history.77 
“Although the UN continues to enjoy strong recognition for its role as a foremost 
international organization charged with the task of promoting international 
security and democracy, its performance in this respect has been the subject of 
intense debate among scholars and policy makers”.78 Article two of Chapter I of 
the UN Charter maintains the principle of the sovereign equality of all member 
states and the settlement of international disputes by peaceful means.79 The spirit 
of the Charter shows that it is an organization which is associated with both states 
and peoples.  
The great majority of states are members of the UN and participate in addressing 
the challenges of peace, security, trade, development, environment, human rights, 
climate change and much more. At the domestic level public policies are 
increasingly developing to make global governance more prevalent and improving 
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policy outcomes.80 But the lack of input legitimacy and procedural fairness has 
led to a situation in which the agendas of the most powerful states dominate.81 As 
more decisions in more policy areas are taken at the international level, more 
democratic dilemmas unfold.82 
The concept of great power unanimity was an option in maintaining post World 
War II international security. The aim of the Security Council was consistent with 
its structure and the then great power unanimity and thinking about the traditional 
crisis management role of the Security Council where the need for prompt and 
effective action militated against extensive deliberation.83  Hurd argues that by 
adopting the UN Charter, states legitimized the Security Council and reproduced 
the legitimacy of the Council by appealing to its authority and seeking access to 
the Security Council.84 In contrast, critics contend that international decisions, 
even when they are aligned with the wishes of the people concerned, are almost 
always imposed from outside.85  International decision making in international 
organizations is distant, elitist and technocratic, and therefore may undermine 
democracy, but multilateralism can also enhance domestic democracy. 86  The 
process of increased integration in IOs nurtures the problem of legitimacy in 
governance since the lack of a directly accountable set of institutions responsible 
to the public or constituent members creates a democratic deficit.87 It reduces 
legitimacy on the input side as decisions are taken further away from deliberation 
even if it improves legitimacy by producing better outputs.88  
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The concept of democracy and legitimacy of IOs has posed itself as a significant 
issue in global governance,89 with debate about what global democracy is, and to 
what extent its existence is likely or desirable.90 Many authors argue that global 
democracy is not about achieving the precise kind of democracy at the global 
level that many societies practice at the domestic level involving, for example, 
elections and the separation of governmental power. 91  Global democracy for 
global governance is grounded on consensual debate and public accountability.92 
Kofi Annan, a former UN Secretary General, provides his vision of global 
democracy by claiming that the term global democracy is an interstate platform, 
the goal of which is to provide all states, whether large or small, the fullest 
opportunity to participate in global decision making, which is based on the 
constitutional principles of the UN Charter.93  Whether the argument over UN 
democracy ends at this point or whether it broadens its scope from its 
conventional limited membership of states to the needs of peoples as emerging 
actors for participation in the formal system is under perusal.94  
This perusal has been more relevant in the last two decades, when the role of the 
UN as an IO has extended significantly into various areas that includes, but is not 
limited to peacekeeping, humanitarian intervention, and environmental issues. To 
address the problem of democratic deficit Held, Archibuji and Kohler proposed a 
cosmopolitan model of democracy in which there would be a new global covenant, 
a reformed UN with a Second General Assembly of peoples that would represent 
the world’s citizens rather than their governments.95 Realists would not support 
such proposals for creating new structures because of questions over whether 
states would surrender their interests and sovereignty to a second UN Assembly 
for the people and whether these delegates represent the interests of the people or 
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states. Since it would be the people who represent states not the states themselves 
the question arises as to whether such an ambitious reconstruction of the global 
institutions is necessary.96 
Dahl doubts that IOs can be made democratic yet he notes: “To say that 
international organizations are not and are not likely to be democratic is not to say 
that they are undesirable”.97 The UN has played a leading role in most of the 
international concerns from deploying peacekeeping forces to making decisions 
on global public policies. IOs such as the UN are different from states and seeking 
to impose state models of democracy upon IOs is not desirable. Instead, an 
alternative path should be sought such as accommodating the emerging actors of 
international politics to make the policy making process more inclusive. The 
widespread and expanded roles of the UN have transformed the UN from being 
one UN to the concepts of ‘three United Nations’: the first UN as an 
intergovernmental forum; the second UN as an international civil service; and the 
third UN as the UN of NGOs and experts.98  
2.2.4 Democratization of the UN as Global Democracy and Global 
Governance 
According to Therein and Dumontier, global democracy is a highly contentious 
concept in world politics and the idea of global democracy has been a driving 
force in discourse on the UN and its policies for the past two decades.99 Falk and 
Strauss note that global democracy is considered to entail either the 
implementation of a world state or the democratization of all state governments, 
or reforms and innovations within existing nation-states and IOs.100 Holden states: 
“What global democracy is, and to what extent its existence is likely or desirable, 
are matters about which there is considerable controversy”. 101  While Bull 
dismisses the idea of world government, conceding it could not be an actual 
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possibility noting that: “There is not the slightest evidence that sovereign states in 
this century will agree to subordinate themselves to a world government founded 
upon consent”.102 In defining cosmopolitan democracy Archibugi noted that there 
were three related viewpoints on democracy: democracy within states, democracy 
among states, and democratic management of global problems.103  
Democratization at the domestic level is based on the presupposition that political 
communities can, in principle, control their destinies and citizens could come to 
identify sufficiently with each other with a view of the common good.104 Through 
the ballot box, citizen voters are able to hold decision makers to account and, as a 
result of electoral consent, decision makers are able to make and pursue law and 
policy legitimately for their constituents, ultimately the people, in a fixed, 
territorial based community.105 The UN has states as its members, whose decision 
making mode is executive multilateralism.106  Cosmopolitan democrats such as 
Zurn and Held argue that the decision making mode of executive multilateralism 
is no longer able to provide legitimacy for IOs.107 Held notes that the centre of 
political authority and the contours of political communities are in the process of 
being transformed;108 while Higgot and Ougaard concur the globalizing world is 
moving to a “new historical phase” 109  which Archibugi says reflects the 
emergence of democracy at the international level “as a powerful international 
ethos”.110 Held et al. argue: 
In a world where powerful states make decisions not just for their own 
peoples but for others as well, and where transnational actors and 
forces cut across the boundaries of national communities in diverse 
ways, the question of who should be accountable to whom, and on 
what grounds, do not easily resolve themselves. Overlapping spheres 
of influence, interference and interest create fundamental problems at 
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the centre of democratic thought, problems which ultimately concerns 
the very basis of democratic authority.111 
Held also argues: “Political communities are in the process of being transformed. 
Human communities have come into increasing contact with each other; their 
collective fortunes have been intertwined”. 112  Held notes that a political 
alternative may be developed by deepening and extending democracy across 
borders, regions and global networks.113 Cosmopolitan democracy advocates the 
creation of new political institutions which would co-exist with the system of 
states of activity where those activities have demonstrable transnational and 
international consequences. 114  Cosmopolitanism is an argument of reforms to 
existing international organizations by introducing new institutional structures.  
Article one of Chapter 1 of the UN Charter notes that the UN was established to 
maintain international peace and security, to develop friendly relations among 
nations, to solve the economic, social, cultural, and humanitarian problems, and 
promote respect for human and universal rights 115  because “international 
organizations are functional entities established by states on the basis of 
agreements”.116 Article two of Chapter 1 maintains the principle of the sovereign 
equality of all member states and the settlement of international disputes by 
peaceful means.117 In the UN context, the term global democracy is referred to as 
an interstate project, the goal of which is to grant all states large or small, the 
fullest opportunity to participate in global decision making, based on the 
principles of the UN Charter.118 The designers of the UN Charter could not have 
foreshadowed the debates of another century instead focusing on interstate project 
democracy which had been shown to be weak and inadequate. In order to make 
IOs more accountable and reduce globalization’s democratic deficit, Nye stated: 
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“Even so, in a world of transnational politics where democracy has become the 
touchstone of legitimacy, these arguments [anti-democratic deficits] probably will 
not be enough to protect any but the most technical organizations from attack”.119 
Many problems currently on the global agenda cannot be dealt with by an 
individual state or a group of states alone. The UN has raised public awareness of 
environmental issues through a series of thematic conferences such as the 1992 
Earth Summit in Rio, demonstrating that global problems cannot be solved by 
individual state and states alone. 120  Instead, global environmental problems 
amongst others need global responses from states and other actors because “the 
ultimate addressees of regulations issued by international organizations are largely 
societal actors”, 121  raising questions about the inter-state project as global 
democracy.  
In the mid-1990s, Boutros Boutros-Ghali stated: “A few short years ago, no one 
ever spoke of making the United Nations system more democratic. Today, the 
question is on every agenda”.122 Keonig-Archibugi observes: “The end of the Cold 
War brought a resurgence of thinking about global democracy, as well as a new 
barrage of criticisms. Critics can be found among specialists in International 
Relations (IR) as well as experts of democracy and democratization”. 123  In 
endorsing the principles of democratic legitimacy, Kofi Annan declared that the 
most important factor for UN decision making must be the will of the people 
because the states alone cannot do the job.124 This approach was affirmed with the 
official declaration that democratization of the UN was “the central and 
overarching objective of the 2008 session of the General Assembly”.125 The UN 
leaders including Boutros Boutros-Ghali and Kofi Annan argued that international 
democratization was a necessity and could be achieved through restructuring or 
even with the current design by providing new actors with agreed means of formal 
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participation, and developing a culture of democracy internationally through an 
enlarged international civil society, even if there is substantial difference between 
democratization at the international level and democratization at the domestic 
level.126 
As Archibugi has noted: “Peace and federalist movements have for long advocated 
the creation of a Second UN Assembly that would represent world citizens rather 
than their governments. The European and Canadian Parliaments have officially 
supported this proposal”. 127  Therien and Dumontier identify four different 
emerging entities in the field of international relations, the end of Cold War, the 
third wave of democratization, globalization and the rise of international actors, 
which have seen the UN put global democracy on its agenda.128 The cosmopolitan 
democrats and the UN leadership argue that international governance must be 
democratized in order to reflect the recent reconfiguration of political forces.129 In 
the process of democratization, unlike the proposals of the cosmopolitan 
democrats, the UN took up a new mode of governance in which it made a point of 
involving non-state actors including NGOs in the system.  
NGOs have been important participants in the UN system since 1945.130 They 
have access to intergovernmental meetings, present written statements, make 
speeches, and lobby for specific texts to be adopted. For the first twenty five years 
of the UN economic social council (ECOSOC) establishment 400 NGOs were 
registered131 with the UN, and at any particular meeting only a few of these were 
active, mainly behind the scenes. In 2004, the Report of Eminent Persons on 
United Nations–Civil Society Relations 132  noted that the UN should be more 
active in tackling democratic deficits in the 21st century. “The UN should accept a 
more explicit role in strengthening global governance and tackling the democratic 
deficits it is prone to, emphasizing participatory democracy and deeper 
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accountability of institutions to the global public”.133 Better incorporation of civil 
society and strengthening of the role of parliamentarians in international 
deliberations would address a primary inconsistency in today’s political world – 
that the substance of politics is increasingly international, while the process of 
politics (how decisions are agreed upon) remains primarily national.134 The Report 
demanded the UN be more democratic, noting:  
Today’s big issues are very different from those the world faced when 
the United Nations was born. Nations are no longer as unified by the 
imperatives of preventing future world wars, rebuilding devastated 
States and making colonies independent. Now the challenges range 
from terrorism to unilateralism and wars, from pandemics and climate 
change to economic crisis and debt, from ethnic to sectarian tensions 
to international crime, and from universality of rights to respect for 
diverse cultures. Also, there are four times as many Governments 
defining global priorities through their membership in the United 
Nations. The intergovernmental world has thus become more complex 
and diverse.135 
Hence, rather than merely rejecting the discourse and argument of representational 
deficit, the concept of global democracy has been broadened within the UN, 
making it more societal including non-state actors being able to enjoy the “means 
of participation in the formal system”.136 The involvement of non-state actors has 
introduced a new dimension to the UN General Assembly. One major innovation 
has been the holding since 2005 of informal interactive hearings at special 
sessions of the General Assembly and making recommendations on a wide range 
of topics.137 The involvement of civil society at the Security Council has also gone 
through major changes in the past few years and more generally Council members 
rely to a growing extent on the expertise of NGOs in their daily work.138  
Kofi Annan defined the UN and non-state actors partnership as “voluntary and 
collaborative relationships between various parties, both state and non-state, in 
which participants agree to work together to achieve a common purpose or 
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undertake a specific task”. 139  UN special agencies such as United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP), United Nations Environment Programme 
(UNEP), United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS) have been 
working in partnership with non-state actors. The Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs) framework established a clear mandate to develop partnerships with the 
private sector, non-governmental organizations, and civil society in general.140 
The UN Millennium Project notes that indeed, from 2002 to 2005, the Project 
assembled 250 governmental and non-governmental experts whose task was to 
develop a concrete action plan for the world to achieve the MDGs.141  
For the first time in the history of the UN when the special session took place in 
June 1997, NGOs were able to take part in the main plenary debate, and they have 
continued to do so, on a daily basis.142 The evolution of NGOs in the UN from 
consultative status to partnership, with the consolidation of extensive participation 
rights, is evidence that the interstate system has been transformed since 1945, both 
politically and legally, into a multi-actor system.143  The partnerships between 
NGOs in an intergovernmental decision making body with nation-states is a 
contribution to greater democracy in global governance. NGOs can be the voices 
of people of the countries where dictators, military juntas, autocrats, religious 
oligarchies do not allow the citizenry to speak or raise voices against their regime. 
NGOs can play vital roles in raising the voices of people from such undemocratic 
countries. NGOs can also be vehicles of creating awareness at the grass-root 
levels because NGOs and CSOs can communicate with societies better than 
government bureaucrats.  
Yet there are concerns about NGOs which need further elaboration. NGOs should 
make themselves democratic because most of them are not democratic even if 
they work for the advocacy and welfare of the people. They should be more 
transparent and accountable so that the public can trust them as their voices. 
UNEP and UNFCCC have also accepted that the involvement of NGOs and CSOs 
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can make the policy processes more representative, transparent, accountable, 
legitimate and democratic. Almost 1100 NGOs attended the Rio Conference on 
the Environment in 1992 whereas only 134 NGOs had attended the Stockholm 
Conference on the Human Environment in 1972. The level of NGO participation 
in environmental conferences has been gradually increasing over the time, yet 
their attendance is limited to observers whereas governments attend as negotiators. 
NGOs participate to ensure that grass-root levels needs-based priorities are put on 
the agenda. The new global democracy encourages NGO and CSO participation in 
operations and deliberations to increase the level of input and output legitimacy 
thereby making the decision-making processes more democratic.144  
Baber and Bartlett argue that democratic deficit is the most annoying and 
defeating feature of international environmental politics145 because the relevant 
rule is not perceived as legitimate by those to whom it is addressed.146 As noted 
above, Zurn argues that the real addressees of climate change governance are 
national societies and companies but when it comes to international climate 
change policy making the real addressees are not represented.147  
Moravcsik acknowledges that there could be democratic deficit in international 
organizations but argues that any criticism of real-world democratic legitimacy, 
and proposals for its enhancement, must be philosophically coherent and 
pragmatically viable. 148  In his view the EU could be the model for global 
democracy. In the view of Nicholas Low, climate change is the greatest 
government failure ever seen149 because the real power to act on climate change 
does not lie with consumers and markets since markets are not actors, but with 
governments. However, the proponents of global democracy concur that climate 
change is the greatest government failure but dismiss the argument that states are 
the only actors with real power to act.  
                                                 
144 See Carter, 2007. 
145 Baber and Bartlett, 2009, 103.  
146 Thomas M. Frank, The Power of Legitimacy Among Nations (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1999).  
147 Zurn, 2004, 268, 69. 
148 Moravcsik, 2004, 338. 
149 Nicholas Low, ‘Editorial: The (Wedge) Politics of Climate Change’, Urban Policy and 
Research 25, no. 1 (2007): 1-4. 
44 
Clearly, the debate of democratic deficit in global governance has been informed 
from various viewpoints such as the cosmopolitan, deliberative democrats, the UN 
inter-states project and partnership between the IOs and NGOs. Although these 
perspectives on global democracy differ on prescriptive remedies for more 
democratization of global governance, none of them accept that the international 
decision making process should lack for democratic practice. Instead, they search 
for promising pathways for global democratic change which would create more 
space for inclusivity. Yet, the challenge is to make the decision making process 
more inclusive, participatory and deliberative in a way that seriously involves 
individuals, businesses and other non-state actors. In this age of information, 
global public opinion, reverberating globally via online and other digital 
communications, is emerging as a powerful force in shaping policies and priorities. 
This innovation holds promises for making international decision making process 
more deliberative, legitmate, participatory and inclusive.  But in the interim, 
confirming Bull’s observation that no governments in the world are willing to 
surrender their sovereignty in the foreseeable future, and the UN vision of global 
democracy that advocates greater participation of global actors at deliberations, 
the yardstick developed by Payne and Samhat could be more helpful to examine 
democracy at the global level. They note:  
We are not concerned with achieving the precise kind of democracy at 
the global level that many societies practice at the domestic level 
involving, for example, elections and the separation of governmental 
power. In global politics, the challenge is to create open and 
representative procedures in specific institutional contexts. Our view 
of global democracy is thus grounded in principles of consensual 
debate and public accountability. Where decision making power is 
concentrated, as many different voices as possible should be heard and 
the result of their collective deliberations about the appropriate course 
of action should carry the day. Clearly then, the democratization of 
global politics represents an ideal – one that is quite difficult, if not 
impossible, to achieve in practice. Yet, we would argue that working 
towards such an ideal matters a great deal. 150  
As this study is focused on why international climate change governance has not 
made good progress, the emphasis is on “democratic management of global 
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problems” considering that the main reason for the democratization of global 
environmental governance “secure (s) legitimacy for decisions by involving the 
broader public” as “the ultimate addressees of regulation issues by international 
organizations are largely societal actors”.151 This research assesses the extent to 
which the current mode of UN vision of global democracy meets its promises 
through the processes of international climate change governance and whether it 
is compatible in terms of the participation of the voices of the actors included 
where both rich and poor nation-states as well as NGOs and CSOs participate as 
Mitrany notes: “It is not an unprincipled or an unwise compromise to err, if need 
be, on the side of working democracy (consensus) rather than voting 
democracy”.152 
From the above discussion, and in response to the core question of this thesis 
mentioned above, the following proposition has been derived:  
The institutional shortcomings of the UNFCCC, and also of the 
democratic processes of the UN and its environmental organizations,  have 
resulted in the lack of progress towards international climate change 
governance. 
The above discussion also gives rise to a second proposition: 
The lack of open and respresentative processes, together with the lack of 
consensual debate and public accountability have resulted in the failure to 
achieve agreement on international climate change governance. 
2.3 State-Centric Approach 
Despite the absence of world government, Buchanan notes there is now an 
expanding array of international organizations that function as international rule 
making bodies and the question of their legitimacy based on democratic principles 
is becoming more salient, 153  and that there are different conceptions of 
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international governance.154 The process of developing international governance 
is gradual and, in the case of climate change, policy making has been very slow 
given the urgency of the challenge. The sections below consider the debates 
around realism and liberalism to explore their usefulness in understanding the 
challenges of climate change and whether these theories are too limited by their 
state-centric framework to tackle climate change. If these state-centric approaches 
are not up to the borderless challenges of climate change then a new approach is 
required.  
2.3.1 The Environment and International Relations 
The protection of the environment has been illustrated with the metaphor of the 
‘tragedy of commons’, a phrase first articulated by Garret Hardin.155 Where there 
is unrestricted access to a resource for maximizing individual benefits 
overexploitation of the commons156 occurs, depleting the common resources and 
creating parallel problems leading to a tragedy for all. According to Hardin, it is 
not logical for states to cooperate. Rather based on assumption underlying his 
theory about the “Tragedy of Commons” it is logical for every actor to maximize 
their own use of resource in question, leading inevitably to the destruction of the 
common resource.157 In contrast, many scholars argued that it is logical for states 
to collaborate and cooperate to protect the commons on which mankind’s and the 
eco-system’s lifeline relies. 158  Towards this end, nation-states have created 
international organizations to regulate, monitor and replenish the commons. This 
strategy seems to be working as nation-states have sought to preserve the common 
resources of the issue areas for the benefit of all. Yet, the success and failure 
depends on the issue of the debate and cooperation. Two somewhat successful 
examples of such activity have been the UN Convention Law of the Sea and the 
Antarctic Treaty System. Two other examples of such activity are The Regimes of 
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Whales and Whaling and The Regime for Northern Fur Seals. The first one is 
diverted whereas the second one has collapsed.159 
Through the UN, states agreed to the establishment of the UNFCCC to develop 
effective strategies to combat climate change. The negotiations which have 
followed have made only slow progress and provided a weak international climate 
change policy. Meanwhile, GHG emissions have been gradually and steadily 
increasing, giving rise to major questions about the prospects of protecting the 
environment through such international cooperation. The lack of progress is 
clearly a self-defeating strategy for states which should be doing what they can to 
protect themselves and minimize environmental threats.160  
Conventional approaches to international relations, particularly the realist and 
liberal approaches and their different traditions, have been based on state-centric 
assumptions. The source of the state-centric approach is the Peace of Westphalia 
of 1648 but, increasingly, questions are being asked about the appropriateness of 
the state-centric approach, particularly in light of the implications in dealing with 
the environmental issues which scientists and others have brought to the attention 
of the world. Environmental issues cut across state boundaries as non-territorial 
developments which affect all states and peoples. Attempting to negotiate an 
agreement which would be effective in limiting the production of GHG emissions, 
and would result in a reduction in them appears to be well beyond the capacity of 
a system based on a state-centric approach. The increasing role played by NGOs 
in attempting to develop an effective agreement for the global governance of the 
environment is one way to make progress in international governance on the 
environment. 
2.3.1.1 The Realists 
Even when considering the role and contribution of NGOs in the development of 
international governance on a range of issues, realists emphasise the pre-eminence 
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of the state in international negotiations, and refer to a power hierarchy of 
states.161 Gilpin writes:  
An international system is established for the same reasons that any 
political system is created; actors enter social relations and create 
social structures in order to advance particular sets of political, 
economic or other interests. Because the interests of some of the actors 
may conflict with those of other actors, the particular interests that are 
most favoured by the social arrangements tend to reflect the relative 
powers of the actors.162 
Regarding IOs, Karn and Mingst have noted from a realist perspective that: 
States create IGOs and determine what actions they can or cannot take; 
they create international law and norms and determine their 
compliance or failure to comply. Because the more than 190 states in 
the international system vary so dramatically, however, their relative 
importance in global governance will vary. A large, powerful 
hegemonic state is more likely to play a greater role in international 
politics than are smaller, less powerful states.163 
On this analysis, the failure to develop effective international governance on 
climate change can be attributed to the failures of the powerful states to carry out 
their functions as suggested by the realists. There is no promise that the powerful 
states will be able to carry out their objectives and to date have ended up in a 
stalemate as the problems of climate change grow. For Gilpin, the operation of the 
system depends on the actions of “a single powerful state [which] controls and 
dominates lesser states in the system” of intergovernmental organizations.164 And 
Pease reasons that IOs are neither great-power directorates nor relatively 
independent actors promoting the international public good; rather they are tools 
of the powerful states that undermine and exploit subordinate states.165 Karn and 
Mingst argue that a large, powerful hegemonic state plays a greater role in 
international organizations than smaller, less powerful states. 166  For them, 
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international organizations act as recommenders, and states, as unitary actors, 
consider most international organizations’ actions as recommendations.167  
The conditions suggested by Gilpin and by Karn and Mingst regarding the 
presence of a large, powerful state, or single powerful state, are relevant to climate 
change. Large and powerful states have certainly been present throughout the 
negotiations but been unable to come up with effective measures to address the 
issue. Instead, their participation in negotiations have been limited to their own 
particular interests regarding the measures needed to deal with rising GHG levels. 
With states the main actors for the global governance decision making process, 
their effectiveness lies in their willingness to enter into and comply with 
commitments agreed to.168 For Pease, the state is still a dominant and unitary actor 
of international politics,169 and Cheever agrees that IOs have limited authority.170 
Realists believe the hegemon can only enforce decisions made by IOs therefore 
the potential of cooperation among states is quite limited.171 They do not accord 
any great significance to NGOs. For realists, the state is the central unit of 
analysis in international relations, and so this approach carries through to attempts 
to address the issues of climate change and environmental degradation. 
It could be said that the rich and powerful developed countries are neglecting the 
concerns of developing countries’ economic growth and the agenda of 
development because climate change affects every country but it does so 
disproportionately.172 Environmental NGOs blame the developed world for not 
taking leadership roles over climate change. Within the Copenhagen international 
climate change negotiations new developments have been encountered with major 
emitters from developing countries emerging as key players in climate change 
governance making. The ability of the US to reject the Kyoto and yet promote a 
document agreed to by major emitters during the COP-15 revealed that 
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international cooperation is “harder to achieve, more difficult to maintain, and 
more dependent on state power” to agree or disagree.173 
Although the climate change conferences have not turned out to be a complete 
disaster, there has been an on-going, albeit slow, process which gives the sense 
that the states negotiating the climate change issues are still engaged but the 
outcomes are scanty. The long twenty year journey of negotiations demonstrates 
that states are cooperating over the climate change issue with new and changing 
roles of different states/actors in determining the negotiations, but that the state-
centric framework underlying efforts to address emerging global issues such as 
climate change has been singularly incapable of producing desired outcomes 
compatible with the needs of climate science for new governance directions.  
2.3.1.2 Liberalism 
Liberals, neo-liberals, liberal institutionalists and others have challenged the 
anarchic and national self-interested focus of the realists and given emphasis to a 
more positive and hopeful view of the possibilities for the world.174 Contemporary 
liberalism argues that non-state international actors are important, not just states.  
While most of these theorists concede that states are the primary actors 
at the international level, they argue that the traditional view of state 
sovereignty and unitary interest cannot explain the steady growth of 
international cooperation or the persistence of many specialized 
international institutions in the contemporary world.175  
They argue that individuals as well as governments share many interests and can 
thus engage in collaborative and cooperative social action, domestically as well as 
internationally, which results in greater benefits for everybody at home and 
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abroad.176 For Clark, liberalism is about maintaining a tradition of optimism.177 
While there are many strands of thinking most liberal theorists argue that states 
hold common interests on many issues and their interdependence leads them to 
cooperate because IOs serve not only common interests but they also provide 
many incentives for cooperation.178 For liberals, international cooperation takes 
place in the international system within the context of multiple interactions. These 
occur with various actors learning from their interactions and expecting mutual 
interests to increase with greater interdependence, knowledge, communication, 
and the spread of democratic values.179 
Keohane, Haas, Levy, and Held argue that the UN needs to be reformed in terms 
of making effective responses to address global threats using the means of 
international cooperation.180 Johnson notes that IOs emerged to respond to the 
requirements of coordinating activities among states.181 They emerged in an effort 
to improve the condition of humankind and to help solve problems for states in 
ways other than war.182 For Levy, Keohane and Haas, interdependence restricts 
the ability of governments to attain their objectives unilaterally, and while it may 
be asserted that such interdependence threatens state sovereignty, it facilitates 
collective state-based problem solving.183 To these scholars, interdependence and 
cooperation are the ways to address contemporary global problems.  
Levy, Keohane and Haas emphasize international cooperation as a means to 
address global environmental issues. They make a distinction between 
‘operational sovereignty’ and ‘actual sovereignty’.184 Operational sovereignty can 
be traded for any cross-border concerns whereas actual sovereignty remains with 
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the state. They argue that the division of sovereignty gives new paths for 
international cooperation and preserves the Westphalian notion of state 
sovereignty. Kofi Annan has picked up this point and argued that if this 
operational sovereignty were to be given to the UN, it could make the UN the 
only global institution that derives legitimacy from universal membership, with a 
mandate that encompasses development, security, human rights as well as 
environmental issues. In this way the UN would be unique in world affairs.185  
Anne-Marie Slaughter has argued that sovereignty can be disaggregated for 
participation and status which would empower government institutions around the 
world to engage with each other in networks that would strengthen and improve 
their ability to perform their designated government tasks individually and 
collectively. 186  When national government institutions participate and exercise 
sovereignty for global governance, the core characteristic of sovereignty would 
shift from concerns about external interference to the capacity to participate in 
trans-governmental networks of all types. 187  These scholars contend that IOs 
should play a more prominent role in the international system because of growing 
interdependence among states and rapidly changing roles of international 
organizations’ on cross-border issues of health, terror, crime, security, 
environment and climate. 188  Many IOs have been created for international 
cooperation to combat the common concerns such as human rights, development 
and environment for collective good.  
For the liberals, successful alliances of the nation-states reveal their significant 
strategic, economic and the social ties. Liberals are motivated by incentives in 
cooperation for dealing collectively with complex problems such as economic 
progress, environmental degradation and climatic challenges. Within the liberal 
school, there has been a lively debate regarding the need for substantial 
restructuring of environmental governance institutions. Biermann and Bauer 
believe that problems in global environmental governance such as a lack of 
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resources, poor coordination and ineffectiveness can be resolved by creating a 
new architecture.189 Adil Najam takes a different view and notes: 
It is not only that new organizational maneuveraing is likely to be 
insufficient to revive the spirit of the Rio compact or to intergrate with 
civil society networks; it is also that any new organizational 
arrangement is likely to remain as stymied as the current arrangement 
until these other issues of global environmental governance are tackled 
first.190 
Ken Conca opines that the hybridization concept – a bottom up approach – 
through which governance emerges, is seen where values and rules are contested 
and where non-state actors can take on substantive roles.191 He notes that political 
struggles will deliver alternative governance mechanisms – mechanisms without 
pre-determined outcomes and which may even achieve democratic environmental 
governance.192 Hass sees the UNEP:  
as part of a broader decentralized network of environmental 
governance, where UNEP serves as a hub linking together spokes 
connecting to additional policy networks of scientists, NGOs, MNCs, 
IO secretariats and state actors. Reforms should focus on strengthening 
UNEP’s ability to receive and transmit accurate environmental 
information to a multitude of recipients.193 
The literature distinguishes between various environmental agreements although 
agreements and institutions may not have produced the environmental outcomes. 
Scholars point out that this should not be the only measure. 194   Building 
institutional effectiveness can be seen as a precursor and condition for 
environmental effectiveness, and an important side-effect of the process of 
institutional building and international negotiations may bring about both 
environmental learning and growing environmental awareness, creating a basis for 
more environmentally effective agreements in the future.  
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It could be argued that given both the nature of the international system and the 
complexity and extensive ramifications of climate change policy, building 
environmentally effective institutions and policies has been a long and slow 
process. Climate change negotiations are multilateral issues with states as the 
main decision makers, although the liberal approach recognizes there are other 
actors in international politics besides nation-states. Yet, the liberal theoretical 
perspective is problematic in understanding the international climate change 
negotiation processes. Liberalism advocates cooperation in responding to global 
threats but, on the climate change issue, there has not been a response to meet the 
issue of climate change despite the creation of the UNFCCC, the Kyoto Protocol 
and the Copenhagen Accord, all of them negotiated by the representatives of the 
nation-states, ensuring the continuation of the state-centric framework which has 
failed to produce any significant progress on global GHG emissions and 
temperature rise. Thus, the failure to develop effective responses to address the 
issue of climate change challenges the so-called theoretical optimism of liberalism 
for international cooperation.  
2.3.1.3 NGOs in International Governance 
In international relations theory, the main reaction toward NGOs is ‘NGOs exist 
but…’. 195  According to Kegley and Wittkopf the impact of NGOs on world 
politics should not be exaggerated since nation-states have a monopoly on the use 
of coercive force and retain an enormous capacity to shape global and state 
welfare.196 They note that the nation-state “still molds the activities of non-state 
actors more than its behaviour is molded by them”. 197  Gordenker and Weiss 
believe that NGO activities in shaping international decisions are usually left 
distant or obscured. 198  Others argue that NGOs can influence international 
conferences, monitor the implementation of agreements by states and raise public 
awareness.199 The access of NGOs as observers at UNFCCC conferences has been 
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open and wide enabling non-state actors to play various significant roles at 
international climate change negotiations. 200  As observers, NGOs are not 
necessarily passive during the negotiation processes.  
The climate change literature clearly demonstrates that NGOs have been 
influential and visible entities in international climate change negotiations.201 In 
Elliot’s view the extent to which NGOs or civil societies influence the policy 
making agenda is a matter of dispute but she recognizes that without the expertise 
of environmental NGOs and other civil society groups, multilateral environmental 
agreements would be fewer and weaker.202 Chasek, Downie and Brown claim that 
NGOs influence international environmental conferences by providing scientific 
and technical information, and new arguments to delegations already sympathetic 
to their objectives. 203  NGO participation in environmental conferences has 
gradually increased over time yet their greater attendance has not reflected 
required policy outcome. Betsill and Corell argued that environmental NGOs 
were restricted to attend plenary sessions and the text of Kyoto Protocol did not 
reflect any influence of ENGOs.204 Although the roles of NGOs are known to be 
increasing, their role is still limited to being participant-observers and given “the 
strong focus on self-interested nation-states as the primary units of international 
relations, hardly any room is left for autonomous NGO action”, with the role of 
government representatives being that of negotiators.205  The following section 
argues that these state-centric approaches alone are not sufficient to respond the 
challenges of climate change.  
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2.3.2 Contextualizing Slow Progress: Inadequacy of State-Centrism 
Negotiating reductions to GHG emissions has been a highly challenging political 
process.206 The discussion of realism above showed international negotiations as 
primarily self-seeking forums for nation-states, while liberalism looked to 
international cooperation in addressing the complex problems of climate control. 
Both approaches still highlight the central role of states. Both of these approaches 
have put state at the centre of analyses and tried to solve the emerging global 
problems. They argued for the continued adequacy of conventional state-centric 
problem solving mechanisms. Zurn argues that the model of representation and 
decision making is still “executive multilateralism”, 207  in which governments 
become the representatives of their states, and hold substantial informational and 
other advantages over other actors in shaping global policies.  
Karns and Mingst have argued that governance by entities outside of the state is 
most contested when major economic interests are at stake and when the interests 
of the most powerful state are threatened.208 Climate change policies are well 
insulated with economic interests. In the view of Chasek, Downie and Brown, 
stabilization of CO2 in the atmosphere would require cutting current emissions by 
at least half, which would necessitate a switch from coal and oil to natural gas and 
renewable sources, all of which would affect the interests of the most important 
emitters of GHGs.209 Hence, no comprehensive agreement has been developed so 
far which could have a substantial impact on GHG emissions reduction. The 
Copenhagen and post-Copenhagen negotiations suggest that the old division of 
North and South countries is simply irrelevant for progress on climate change in 
the face of a new pattern emerging in which the political and economic interests 
of major emitting countries have been the major hurdle to producing an effective 
and global legally binding agreement.  
DeSombre has emphasized the disconnection between ecological systems 
(borderless issues) and political systems (territorial state-system) which makes 
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addressing environmental issues at the global level difficult.210 Uncertainty about 
climate change problems, the consequences and actual costs of mitigating it 
undoubtedly challenges the willingness of political leaders to address climate 
change. Cooperation in addressing the issues of climate change encounters similar 
issues to that of other environmental cooperation, “such as the role of powerful 
states and the difficulty of negotiations”. 211  The participating states’ various 
interests, power and wealth is hardly absent from environmental negotiations.212 
The Westphalian framework with its emphasis on state sovereignty has delivered 
and it will continue to deliver remains at the heart of international negotiations.213 
Although the state-centric pursuit of national advantage is frequently neglected in 
discussions of international environmental cooperation, they often feature 
prominently.214  
The UN, the institution that comes closest to the idea of a global political body, 
has the Westphalian principle written into its Charter. 215  The UNFCCC 1992 
reaffirms “the principle of sovereignty” and state-centrism in its Preamble for 
“international cooperation to address climate change”.216 The Copenhagen Accord 
explicitly notes, “Non-Annex I Parties will communicate information on the 
implementation of their actions through National communications, with 
provisions for international consultations and analysis under clearly defined 
guidelines that will ensure that national sovereignty is respected”.217 The RIO+20 
reiterated, “We continue to be guided by the purposes and principles of the 
Charter of United Nations”.218 It could be argued that the UN has been successful 
in achieving international peace and security by depending on the very notion of a 
state-centric framework, however, the continuous failure in achieving ambitious 
environmental and climate change agreements reveals starkly the inability of 
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state-centrism to deliver an outcome to address the borderless global challenges of 
climate change.  
Baber and Bartlett question whether it is even possible to construct a legally 
binding ambitious environmental agreement at the global level. As mentioned 
earlier they argue:  
No one doubts that treaties can be negotiated between nations to 
advance the cause of environmental protection. But is it really possible 
that an international environmental consensus, amounting to a 
collective determination to follow a shared course for reasons held in 
common, can emerge from our disjointed and competitive system of 
global governance?219 
For Bauman the kind of ‘international’ or ‘multilateral’ thinking the UN practises, 
is limited to the state-centric framework, which is not a great step on the road 
towards a global politics, but a major barrier set across the road.220 It is argued 
that policy innovations that increase the participation of and deliberation in 
decision making among citizens and societal actors will enhance public 
acceptance for policy decisions and strengthening the knowledge base for 
implementation. 221  Questions about whether NGOs influenced the decision 
making and shaped the outcomes of negotiations at Kyoto and Copenhagen are 
addressed in chapters 4 and 5 of this research. Although a group of nation-states 
and NGOs could have set the agenda for Copenhagen in trying to achieve their 
particular objectives, they did not succeed, not least because of the difficulties of 
trying to develop some sort of consensus among a large number of very different 
parties, but also because certain parties took over the agenda to the frustration of 
those who were seeking a different outcome.  
Large numbers of environmental NGOs were pressuring governments for drastic 
emission reduction measures. Yet, the outcome showed that nation-states, 
particularly major emitters, were involved in developing and delivering the 
Protocol and Accord which introduced the status-quo positions of nation-states 
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from the establishment of the UNFCCC. This was clearly reflected in the 
development and production of the Copenhagen Accord which is discussed in 
chapter 5. Haas argues that all IOs are deliberately designed by their founders to 
solve problems but no collaboration is conceivable except on the basis of explicit 
articulated interests.222 International cooperation is very necessary in responding 
to the challenges of climate change and states have created a forum to address it, 
based on a state-centric approach. However, some of the major emitters’, also 
known as powerful states (the major emitters from both the developed and 
developing countries), were unwilling to move significantly to develop explicitly 
articulated interests for mitigating GHG emissions, affirming international climate 
change gatherings which reflect a struggle for national advantage.223  
The RIO+20 underscored the broad public participation required for sustainable 
development and environmental conservation through meaningful involvement 
and active participation of all major groups including women, children, youth, 
indigenous peoples, NGOs, local authorities, workers, trade unions, business, 
industry, the scientific and technological community, and farmers as well as other 
stakeholders such as local communities, volunteer groups, migrants, older persons, 
and persons with disabilities.224 Zurn also argues that international climate change 
governance cannot be successful by excluding largely societal actors such as 
individuals, businesses and communities.225 In his view the state-centric approach 
of the UN has diminished the roles of major stakeholders in the making of 
international climate change policies.226 The very notion of state-centrism and the 
division of world into sovereign states that articulates their national-interests has 
created a formidable barrier to the forging of effective international accords for 
the protection of the environment.227 
According to Weiss “now that states visibly cannot address a growing number of 
transboundary threats” such as “climate change, migration and pandemics” and 
the “current feeble system of what many of us now call is ‘global governance’” is 
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entirely inadequate for addressing these global common challenges. Therefore, we 
have a “desperate requirement for” new alternatives “that moves beyond the 
anarchy and overarching authority” of nation-states.228 He notes that the UN is 
still fundamentally state-centric and that there is a:  
fundamental disconnect between the growing number of global 
problems and the current inadequate structures of international 
problem solving…The usual explanation for this sorry state of affairs 
and institutional disarray is a lack of political will, great power politics 
or classic collective action problems but blame also should be 
appointed to us scholars for our lack of imagination beyond the state-
centric framework.229  
From the above discussion, it can be argued that the progress on international 
climate change governance is stymied by the state-centric framework of climate 
change negotiations. Two propositions will be derived from this consideration of 
the centrality of the state-centric approach in international relations for accounting 
the lack of progress in preventing climate change.  
The first proposition derived from the above discussion is: 
The competitive system of global governance negates efforts to achieve an 
international consensus on international climate change governance. 
The second proposition is:  
The state-centric framework of international negotiations on climate change 
governance prevent the prioritisation of saving the global commons.  
2.3 Educating the Public - the Media  
Climate change did not attract much public and political attention during the 
1960s and 1970s. Until 1988 arguments did little to bring climate change to the 
fore until Malta initiated the debate on climate change in the same year at the UN 
General Assembly. Global climate change came to the attention of world 
governments and policy makers after decades of scientific research.230 Over the 
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decades, scientists have recognized the synthesis of research regarding current and 
projected threats that ecosystems face from anthropogenic global warming as well 
as threats to national security, public health, and economies.231 As noted above, 
little has been achieved in these last two decades in respect to reducing global 
GHG emissions.232  Cooper argued that without public trust of climate change 
science, policymaking in a democratic society cannot address the serious threats 
that we face today, and in this, the role of the media is significant in building 
public trust.233 States would be better able to address the issue of climate change 
when the public seriously demands actions, but the public could not be expected 
to pressure governments if they were confused and not motivated to take action 
against climate change. Consequently, the role of media is critical in motivating 
people and building public trust by imparting accurate climate change scientific 
information because the scientific community plays an important role and science 
becomes a powerful political tool in environmental politics.234 
The media is the fourth important organ of the nation-state.235 Media sources fulfil 
a variety of roles from educating the public to enhancing pluralism. As an 
instrument the media is an important source for the public to gain information 
about what is happening around them and across the world. In 1956, Siebert and 
Schramm provided historical, philosophical and international perspectives on the 
press comprised of theories of the press such as authoritarian, totalitarian-
communist, libertarian and social responsibility.236 Almost a half-century later, the 
social responsibility model is said to be widely accepted by the media as an 
unwritten contract and the consequent social commitments toward society and 
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restrain themselves accordingly.237 However, the practice of media particularly on 
climate change does not concur with social responsibility as will be discussed in 
chapters 6 and 7. 
In the contemporary world media conglomerates and media organizations are 
accused of managing newspapers primarily as businesses and trying to please as 
big an audience as possible.238 The financial benefits and market interests drive 
media roles in shaping societies. Media capitalism withholds democratic 
participation because of its profit orientation, narrowing the number of voices 
heard with the result that the media has neglected the important role of promoting 
democratic participation.239 Media serves the interests of governments in areas 
such as terrorism and confidential matters because media does not have free flow 
access to these matters and reports only those things that governments want media 
to report. However, it does not mean that media does not leak any confidential 
reports. The US National Security Agency’s classified document leak in 2013 is 
one of the recent examples of media’s reporting against the national security 
interest of the US government. The role of the media depends on access to the 
populations, information, government interests and significantly the interests of 
media itself. 
Herman and Chomsky’s 240  propoganda model suggests three purposes of the 
media: 1) the mass media serve as a system for communicating messages and 
symbols to the general populace. 2) It is their function to amuse, entertain and 
inform and to include individuals with the values, beliefs and codes of behaviour 
that will integrate them into the institution structures of the large society. 3) 
Finally this role in a world of concentrated wealth and conflict of interest requires 
propoganda. This model argues that there are five classes of filters in society to 
determine ‘what is news’ or simply put, who gets and does not get printed in the 
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newspapers or broadcast by radio and television. While big businesses and 
governments gain easy access to the public in order to convey their state-corporate 
messages, the dissenters from mainstream are given little voice.241  
Bennett suggests that three normative orders affect individual journalists – 
political norms (provide political information to citizenry to enhance 
accountability), economic norms (efficiency and profitability) and journalistic 
norms (fairness, objectivity, accuracy and balance).242  Although the media is seen 
as acting as intermediary vehicles that reflect public opinion, respond to public 
concerns and make the electorate cognizant of state policies, important events and 
view points as the fundamental principles of democracy depend on a reasonably 
informed electorate.243 The propaganda model sees the mass media as instruments 
of power that “mobilize support for the special interests that dominate the state 
and private activity”.244 
Scholars concurr that the media can play an important role in the construction of 
environmental problems and issues since the general public gains most of its 
knowledge about science from media. 245  Although environmental and interest 
groups are good at perusing environmental data, as consumers the public does not 
generally peruse the peer reviewed work on the science of climate change but 
relies on the media which, Walberg and Sjoberg conjecture, plays a key role in the 
public understanding of risk.246 Cooper argues that the press can play a significant 
role in the public education of climate change, and that there is a disparity 
between climate science and climate policy that points to the existence of an 
urgent problem of public education of climate science.247  
Dessler and Parson view the press as often only a little help because controversy 
sells newspapers and argue that journalists do not understand scientific issues any 
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better than policy actors and following their professional norm of providing 
balance between opposing views, the press may give particular prominence not 
just to minority views but also to extreme views.248 Boykoff and Boykoff find that 
balanced reporting is actually problematic in practice when discussing the human 
contribution to global warming and resulting calls for action to combat it.249 
Johnson and Covello note that “Considerable evidence exists that the media 
engage in selective and biased reporting that emphasizes drama, wrongdoing and 
conflict.”250  
This study proceeds from the view that the media plays a significant role in 
shaping public opinion on climate change because it has open and free access to 
the information on climate change. The UNFCCC process recognized the media 
by giving it observer status as one of the important actors of climate change 
negotiations. They have easy access to negotiations, meetings and side events 
organized by NGOs. Fifty years ago in 1963 Bernard Cohen argued: “The press 
may not be successful much of the time in telling people what to think, but it is 
stunningly successful in telling its readers what to think about.”251 In their 1972 
work, McCombs and Shaw argue: “The media are the major primary sources of 
national political information; for most, mass media provide the best – and only – 
easily available approximation of even changing political realities”. 252  “New 
research exploring the consequences of agenda setting and media framing suggest 
that the media not only tell us what to think about, but also how to think about it, 
and, consequently, what to think”. 253  Media can, by providing objective 
information instead of relying on their professional norms of presenting a 
balanced view, 254  make connections between scientific knowledge and 
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information dissemination through media as a function of public education to 
make people better understand the problem and to respond to the challenges of 
climate change.255  
However, this has not happened so far. For example, the American Congress 
continue to be divided on the climate change issue and so are the public. Thus, 
this study notes that where the media is divided in its reporting of scientific 
knowledge and information dissemination then the public is confused and ill-
informed. The divisions may be seen in recommendations for setting the agenda, 
in identifying the issues of international climate change, and over the negotiations.  
From the discussion above on the media, and in response to the core research 
question for this thesis, the following propostion is derived for analysis:  
The role of the media in building the trust of the public of the issues of 
climate change science and proposed policies is essential to the 
endeavours of political and policy leaders to come to agreement on climate 
change governance.  
2.4 Conclusion 
Scholars present contrasting views in debates relating to the democratic deficit in 
international organizations. Cosmopolitan democrats argue for the establishment 
of a global parliament. Deliberative democrats put the emphasis on deliberations, 
making governance processes more talk-centred than vote-centred. In terms of the 
UN vision of global democracy, some argue that the inter-state system should be 
converted into a multi-actor system of states, together with other participating 
actors such as NGOs and CSOs. Concerning global governance and state 
participation, one group of scholars argues that international organizations are 
creations of states and so they can do little other than make recommendations.256 
This means they do not go beyond the will of states, particularly the will of the 
powerful states, and therefore there is a democratic deficit as international 
organizations can be used by powerful states to prevail in pursuit of their interests 
which, however, might not be true with all global issues. A second group of 
scholars argue that international organizations are mediums for international 
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cooperation to address international concerns.257 These scholars opine that the UN 
and its environmental organizations need to be restructured or reformed to 
produce competitively better outcomes.  
The notion of democratic representation refers to the democratic credentials of the 
international organizations with regard to their member states’ representation in 
the deliberative formulation of the policies that affect the states.258 But in the 
globalized twenty-first century, Held has suggested that the concept of the 
sovereign state lies at the crossroads of a vast array of networks and organizations 
which have been established to regulate and manage diverse areas of cross-
national issues. 259  The perceived democratic deficit is interlinked with two 
difficulties: the power imbalances among states as well as those between states 
and non-states actors as the representatives of civil society in the shaping and 
making the global public policy,260 under the prevailing state-centric framework. 
Administrative rationality is increasingly recognized as full of flaws, ill-equipped 
and inadequate to solve environmental problems 261 whereas it is argued that 
deliberative rationality, with its call for greater participation, transparency, 
accountability, communication and multiple actors (all stakeholders) engagement 
in problem solving and decision making will lead to more effective and more 
democratic environmental governance, 262  improving implementation and 
producing effective environmental outcomes that stand up to scrutiny under 
evaluation. 
Although Herman and Chomsky’s Propoganda Model shows that power and the 
interests of industries calibrate the role of the media, many scholars believe that 
the media needs to play a significant role in the public education of climate 
change issues.263 But the failure of international climate change negotiations and 
lack of public pressure on governments to act against climate change begs the 
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question of whether evaluating the role of media in educating the public by 
explaining or describing issues has salience. The Kyoto Protocol and Copenhagen 
Accord were two significant agreements in the history of climate change 
negotiations. The primary objective of these agreements was to reduce global 
emissions yet they have not been effective in this. Critics cite them as significant 
steps, but not concrete steps, for minimizing the emissions.  
In sum, this chapter has identified three main themes in the literature: the 
democratic deficit, the state-centric framework and the role of the media and the 
existing gaps in the literature to be contributed from these major themes in the 
field of international environmental politics, climate change politics and media 
studies. The issue of democratic deficit in international organzations is not a novel 
argument in itself but what this thesis contributes is to apply the notion of 
democratic deficit in international climate change governance through empirical 
analysis of negotiations and the media communications.  
Addressing the issues of international security, peace and international trade 
through the medium of state-centric institutions has long been undertaken, but this 
thesis challenges this deep rooted practice by showing its inability to address the 
borderless problem of climate change, thereby showing how the state-centred 
approach has slowed progress in climate change governance. This thesis also 
makes a direct contribution to research on this issue in assessing the role of the 
Western and Non-western media in passing the information to the public on 
climate change science, particularly concerning the barriers to climate change 
governance and paths forward from the major emitters of the North and South. 
This thesis brings the strong combination of the three insights discussed above in 
understanding the limited progress made on climate change governance.  
The chapters ahead will respond to the core research question – Why has there 
been little progress in the making of an effective international climate change 
governance to prevent climate change? To address the core research question and 
its three subset questions, the following chapters will put forward more 
perspectives contextualizing international climate change governance building on 
the arguments of democratic deficit, the state-centric framework and the role of 
the media in public education and policy orientations. This chapter and the 
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propositions generated at the end of each section conclude by revisiting the major 
themes developed in this chapter to assess and summarise the main arguments. 
The propositions are reiterated below in terms of consolidating the arguments 
which follow in the next chapters. 
From the above discussion, and in response to the core question for this thesis as 
noted the preceding paragraph, the following propositions have been derived:  
1. The institutional shortcomings of the UNFCCC, and also of the 
democratic processes of the UN and its environmental organizations,  have 
resulted in the lack of progress towards international climate change 
governance. 
2. The lack of open and respresentative processes, together with the lack of 
consensual debate and public accountability have resulted in the failure to 
achieve agreement on international climate change governance.  
3. The competitive system of global governance negates efforts to achieve 
an international consensus on international climate change governance.  
4. The state-centric framework of international negotiations on climate 
change governance prevent the prioritisation of saving the global 
commons.  
5. The role of the media in building the trust of the public of the issues of 
climate change science and proposed policies is essential to the 
endeavours of political and policy leaders to come to agreement on climate 
change governance. 
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Chapter 3 
Methodology 
3.1 Introduction 
The distinction between quantitative and qualitative research is important in 
research. The data collected from each have different characteristics and require 
different techniques for analysis.1 The outcomes of any research are primarily 
dependent on the stance of the researcher and the methodology employed. 
Quantitative research uses the syntax of mathematical operations to investigate the 
properties of data and is therefore considered to be more applicable to natural 
sciences.2 With qualitative research the researcher becomes immersed in the data, 
searching out patterns, surprising phenomena and inconsistencies to generate new 
concepts, theory or uncover further instances of those already in existence. 3 
Quantitative and qualitative research are said to be two diametrically opposed 
research approaches.4 This research takes a predominantly qualitative case study 
approach in examining multilateral efforts to address the substantive issues of 
climate change as discussed in the proceedings leading to the Kyoto Protocol 
1997, the Copenhagen Accord 2009, and in the selected media. However, in terms 
of data collection, and building the analysis and assembling arguments through 
figures and graphs, the research has also used a quantitative approach. It is this 
researcher’s view that to answer the research question of this thesis, a mixed 
methodology is appropriate as Bryman and Burgress noted when appropriate, a 
mixture of quantitative and qualitative research is possible.5 
3.2 The Mixed Approach 
This research takes a mixed approach in examining the working systems of 
international climate change governance and in seeking to understand the issues, 
strategies and outcomes. The decision to take a qualitative or quantitative 
approach needs to be based on the research question and the nature of the data 
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collection.6 It also depends on the type of data and the method used to collect the 
data. The choice of a mixed method is based on diverse types of data used for this 
study and “to develop a better understanding of the phenomena being studied” 
because “the fundamental claim being made here is that a mix of methods will 
generate a better understanding than will a single method alone”.7 The data used 
are in written form, such as legal documents of climate change agreements, 
articles from print media, experimental investigations or social survey 
investigations reports from databases and in record/visual form such as recorded 
webcast videos of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC), and relevant television news/documentaries that are publically 
available.  
Both qualitative and  quantitative approaches were used in collecting data from 
databases such as Factiva, UNFCCC, Earth Negotiations Bulletin (ENB), 
International Energy Agency (IEA), Energy Information Administration (EIA), 
Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency (NEAA), National Oceanic and 
Atmosphreic Administrtion (NOAA) and analysing them. Bryman notes 
“quantitative research can be construed as a research strategy that emphasizes 
quantification in the collection and analysis of the data”.8 It entails a deductive 
approach and incorporates positivism and embodies a view of social reality as an 
external, objective reality.9 Graphs, figures, tables and numbers became part of the 
quantitative aspects of this research derived from databases noted above and 
others to build the arguments and analyses in this research and answer the central 
research question.  
Bryman writes: “Qualitative research can be construed as a research strategy that 
usually emphasizes words rather than quantification in the collection and analysis 
of the data”.10 It emphasizes an inductive approach and embodies a view of social 
reality as a constantly shifting emergent property of individuals’ creation. 11 
Sandelowski writes, “Qualitative research is an umbrella term for an array of 
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attitudes towards and strategies for conducting inquiry that are aimed at 
discovering how human beings understand, experience interpret, and produce 
social world” views.12 Qualitative research is required here in assessing data such 
as the legal documents of UNFCCC, media accounts and quantitative data 
collected from databases  critical to drilling down into the issues of international 
climate change governance and exploring the nuances in the written words and 
visuals to understand the issues, strategies and outcomes from a range of sources 
noted above and below. Qualitative research is essential for analyses in the case 
study and describing complex phenomena like climate change negotiation 
processes. The qualitative approach is also used in assessing what the newspapers 
(media) have reported, the assessment of the developments of the Kyoto Protocol 
and Copenhagen Accord, contextualizing what the countries’ positions were and 
what they meant in addressing climate change. 
This study acknowledges the limitations of stand-alone qualitative and 
quantitative research methods with the researcher aiming to show the benefits 
from both of these approaches to gain a better understanding of the empirical 
enquiry relating to this research. “After all, the presence of the words in data 
collection and analysis is not distinctive to qualitative research: words are central 
to questionnaires, a common source of quantitative data; and there are generally 
more words than numbers in the analysis sections of the quantitative research 
reports”.13  To one degree or another, this research has been shaped by ideas 
(qualitative) about the nature of social phenomena and how they can be 
understood from quantitative and qualitative data. However, this researcher 
acknowledges that the knowledge produced through this research might not be 
applicable to other issues of global governance and may remain unique to 
relatively few other cases. Ensuring personal biases and idiosyncrasies do not 
intrude in such a study and distort the findings is of particular importance in this 
research.  
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3.3 The Case Study 
This research is based on a case study approach which is one of the ways of doing 
social science research.14 Case studies are the preferred strategies when ‘how’ or 
‘why’ questions are being posed, where the researcher has little control over 
events and the focus is on contemporary phenomenon as in this study.15  The 
question of this study begins with ‘why’ to explore the slow progress of climate 
change at international climate change negotiations, which is considered one of 
the most challenging contemporary issues of the 21st century. Yin writes, “A case 
study is an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within 
its real life context, especially when boundaries between phenomenon and context 
are not clearly evident”.16 Case studies “combine a qualitative investigation of a 
topic, using all appropriate techniques, with a link to wider themes in the study of 
politics”.17 The unit of analysis of the case study may be a person, an organization, 
a social action in a particular setting or a country.18 “Such studies combine a 
qualitative investigation of a topic, using all appropriate techniques, with a link to 
wider themes in the study of politics”.19  
The primary strength of using a case study approach in research is the abundant 
variety of evidence that can be collected from multiple sources including 
newspapers, recorded videos and legal/official documents. 20  Case studies can 
analyse complex events and take into account numerous variables precisely 
because they do not require numerous cases or a limited number of variables.21 A 
case study approach is a solid basis for building theory; it can be either a critical 
case, extreme case, representative case or a revelatory case.22  
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The choice of case study does have some limitations for any research. It can be 
more subjective because it relies on personal interpretation of data and inferences 
can arise. "Investigators who do case studies are often regarded as having deviated 
from their academic disciplines and their investigations as having insufficient 
precision, objectivity and rigor".23  Critics say a case study cannot be used in 
generalizations but this does not mean that it cannot enter into the collective 
process of knowledge accumulation in a given field or in a society. Yet, a purely 
descriptive and explanatory case study without any attempt to generalize can 
certainly be of value in this process and has often helped cut a path towards 
scientific innovation.24 This study recognizes that every study has some sort of 
limitations but a case study approach, carefully carried out, is a major contributor 
to advancing knowledge and learning. It does not lack precision, objectivity or 
rigour, rather its “finding or conclusion…is likely to be much more convincing 
and accurate” because this study “is based on several different sources of 
information”.25  
There are four types of case study designs: (a) single-case (holistic) designs; (b) 
single-case (embedded) designs; (c) multiple-case (holistic) designs; and (d) 
multiple case (embedded) designs.26  “Clearly there are different definitions of 
cases and case studies, and this has made systematic analyses of the value and 
purposes of technique difficult”.27 To be identified as a case study it is important 
to treat the total study population as one entity. The selected ‘case (s)’ becomes 
the basis of a thorough, holistic and in-depth exploration of the aspect(s) that the 
researcher wants to determine. It is an approach in which a particular instance or a 
few carefully selected cases are studied intensively. In a case study the focus of 
attention is the case in its idiosyncratic complexity, not on the whole population of 
cases.28 ‘The case’ that forms the basis of the investigation is usually something 
that already exists. The case is a naturally occurring phenomenon. It exists prior to 
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the research project and, it is hoped, continues to exist once the research has 
finished. There is no pressure on the researcher to impose controls or to change 
circumstances. The boundaries of the case can prove difficult to define in an 
absolute and clear-cut fashion.29  
For the purpose of this research, the central case study question concerns the lack 
of progress in climate change negotiations. A case is defined as an instance or an 
episode such as the development of issues relating to the Kyoto Protocol and 
failure to adopt effective climate policies. Cases include climate change 
negotiation episodes which have occurred subsequently, media accounts on these 
episodes/events and legal documents detailing these cases, as will be discussed 
below. The case study will focus on two cases (the developments of the Kyoto 
Protocol and the Copenhagen Accord and their failure to adopt strong measures to 
address climate change and media accounts to explain the positions and actions of 
the parties at the Kyoto and Copenhagen), which is a multiple-case design (two to 
three cases), through an empirical examination of real world phenomena 
(international climate change negotiations and their perennial failure) within its 
naturally occurring context and without directly manipulating either the 
phenomena or the context. Multiple cases research findings are considered more 
compelling and the overall study is therefore regarded as being more robust.30  
Emphasis in the analyses is laid on providing a detailed analysis of a limited 
number of cases (two cases) on the same topic in order to find answers to the 
research question. 31  For more than 2 decades, international climate change 
governance has failed to produce desired outcomes in order to address climate 
change. Thus, the central question/case study of the research is about the failure of 
climate negotiations to achieve desired outcomes to mitigate greenhouse gases 
(GHGs). The outlines of the developments of the Kyoto Protocol and the 
developments of the Copenhagen Accord are central to this study and so is the use 
of the media accounts to explain the positions and actions of the parties and to 
examine what happened at Kyoto and Copenhagen, and how this was all 
understood and interpreted in the media communications the researcher has 
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(England: Open University Press 2010), 54, 62, 63. 
30 Yin, 1994, 45. 
31 Matthews and Ross, 2010. 
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selected. There can be no answer to the core research question without 
considering what happened at Kyoto and Copenhagen, and why it happened as it 
did. The use of media provides a widely published and available account of what 
happened and why at the negotiations. The use of records (webcast) of and about 
Kyoto and Copenhagen is partly to ground the outline in ‘official’ reports and data, 
and to use these as a check on what the media reported.  
In examining Kyoto and Copenhagen negotiations, the responses of the various 
parties to climate change, the major issues, strategies, outcomes and their 
overarching complex relationship with states, non-state actors and public 
representation in formulating strategies and policy proposals will be determined. 
Through a careful analysis of Kyoto and Copenhagen the global climate change 
negotiations and decision making processes are determined, particularly the issues, 
strategies and outcomes that took place at an inter-state setting by “empirical 
inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon”. 32  Negotiations over 
climate change have been continuing since the 1992 Earth Summit yet the 
responses of the COPs have not been able to settle on the level of emissions 
reduction reported and recommended by the International Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC), a global intergovernmental scientific body. The Kyoto Protocol 
and Copenhagen Accord were certainly seeking to address the major issues 
associated with climate change, however, stalemates have given rise to the core 
question of this research.  
3.4 Research Design  
In seeking to answer why there has been little progress in the making of an 
effective international climate change governance to prevent climate change, 
three subsets of questions are also examined: 1. Is the democractic deficit slowing 
the progress of international climate change governance? 2. Are state-centric 
institutions up to the challenge of addressing climate change? 3. Is there a 
disconnection between the concerns of climate change and the role of media? 
These questions are strongly linked to the propositions dervied from the literature 
of democratic deficit, state-centric framework and the role of the media. These 
three themes are tightly connected with one another in this research as the state-
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centric framework gives rise to the notion of a democratic deficit.  To understand 
these issues in the policy making process and address the problem is an important 
role of the media since it is the media that disseminates information from science 
and government to the general public.33 In order to explain and understand why 
the climate change policy making was conducted in the way it was rather than in 
another way which could have produced positive results the focus will be on 
content, context, processes, actors, and outcomes. Even after the IPCC produced 
four assessment reports and informed policy makers to take swift, fast and 
effective responses to stay within the limit of 2 degrees Celsius global temperature 
it did not happen as parties stuck to their national positions over two decades of 
the negotiations process. Emissions continued to skyrocket even after having bi-
annual climate change conferences and many agreements including the Kyoto 
Protocol and Copenhagen Accord.  
Evaluating parties positions and actions, and communications of newspapers 
articles in terms of what parties said and what newspapers wrote on the issues are 
central. While the negotiations and associated factors (actors, positions, processes, 
strategies) and the media reports to explain positions and actions of the parties are 
treated as independent variable, the Kyoto Protocol and Copenhagen Accord’s 
and their outcomes are treated as dependent variables in this research. This 
process determines who said what, who wrote what, or signed what, and who is 
seen as being responsible for what was said, who the intended audience was and 
how participants responded to negotiations and discussions leading to the lowest 
common denominator agreements. The roles played by different negotiating 
groups and COPs are carefully scrutinized and analysed along with newspapers 
accounts from 1997 to March 2012 on international climate change negotiations. 
The research then examines the way the negotiating blocs and COPs performed 
during the climate negotiations to determine the (un)common interests the 
participating states held and what influences they were able to exert on the 
negotiation processes.  
Earlier many researchers divided climate change negotiations into North-South 
politics but now there are several negotiating blocs at international climate change 
                                                 
33 See chapter 2 for details. 
77 
negotiations including the Umbrella Group (UG), the European Union (EU), 
Group of 77+ China (G-77+ China), African Group (AG), Least Developing 
Countries (LDC), Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS), and the 
Environmental Integrity Group (EIG). From Copenhagen there evolved new 
climate change alliances such as BASIC (Brazil, South Africa, India and China), 
IBSA (India, Brazil and South Africa), and USCI (United States, China and India). 
Given the changing scenario of the countries of the world, this research 
contextualizes the alterations and examines whether the framework and principles 
of the UNFCCC process reflected these changes and what new roles these 
emerging alliances have been forming at negotiations and whether they are 
making a paradigm shift to address climate change issues. Understanding the 
stances and the interests of the COPs sheds light on the major priorities of the 
parties and their overarching links with climate change negotiations and their 
likely impacts on their domestic politics, economy, and social lives of national 
societies.  
3.5 Data Sources 
The study will analyse primary and secondary data in order to understand key 
aspects of the international climate change negotiations and policy making. The 
primary sources of data are video webcasts of the entire UNFCCC process, the 
texts of the Kyoto Protocol and the Copenhagen Accord, and the media accounts 
and commentary of these meetings. The Earth Negotiations Bulletin [ENB in 
cooperation with International Institute of Sustainable Development (IISD)] 
database is a balanced, timely and independent reporting service that provides 
daily information in print and electronic formats on the multilateral negotiations 
on environment and development.34  
Generally, in the UNFCCC process, negotiation texts were developed, analysed 
word for word, contested, redrafted and renegotiated by COPs along with 
technical support from the Secretariat until a consensus was reached. Information 
relating to the prescribed two-track approach, Ad hoc Working Group-Kyoto 
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Protocol (AWG-KP) and Ad hoc Working Group – Long Term Cooperative 
Action (AWG-LCA), under the Kyoto Protocol and the UNFCCC was posted on 
UNFCCC’s official website (www.unfccc.int) by the Secretariat for networks and 
the individuals interested in climate change negotiations, such as governments, 
civil society and business link-ups.  
In these ways the research highlights insights from the climate agreements, 
webcast documentaries of the UNFCCC’s formal meetings of COP plenary 
sessions, UNFCCC Secretariat Press briefings of the progress made, the UN Press 
Conference on the progress of negotiations, and the non-state actors press 
conferences organized within the venue of COP centre of COP 13, COP 15 and 
onwards available online via UNFCCC’s official website. The webcast 
documentaries are official records recorded in videos as and when they happened 
throughout the negotiations process of two weeks to make them publicly available 
to all interested parties to comprehend how countries were positioning themselves 
on climate negotiations and present the formal statements made by the COPs, the 
opinions expressed, what happened and why it happened.  
These videos provide a more accurate picture of how parties behaved than one can 
gain by attending the two weeks negotiations. Indeed, “The secretariat provides 
full audio and video recordings for all official open plenary meetings in audio 
format and webcast on the Internet”, where negotiations were finalized and 
adopted.35  These sources are treated as the primary source of information by 
UNFCCC and treated in this research as observations on the behaviours of the 
parties at climate negotiations. The question and answer sessions during press 
briefings provides the formal views of the UNFCCC Secretariat, UN, COPs and 
non-state actors. The webcast data was collated, compared, contrasted and 
analysed with the outcomes, the Kyoto Protocol and Copenhagen Accord along 
with the accounts of newspapers.  
This research is based predominantly on official documents/recordings of the 
UNFCCC and media’s accounts but has been supplemented with some interviews 
with a number of relevant people. Attempts were made to conduct a number of 
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interviews via Skype with interview requests submitted to the UNFCCC chief, the 
US, China and Indian climate change ministries. The Indian environment ministry 
made a brief response and while the US and UNFCCC promised interviews they 
never happened. Therefore, collecting the world leaders' opinions from direct 
quotations of the newspapers/media became an alternative source for interviews 
where necessary because their opinions were abundantly available in the media 
and press briefing on-demand webcast of UNFCCC.  
The secondary sources of data include the related UN official documents, public 
documents, press releases, websites, and opinions given to newspapers by 
UN/climate deal officials, states’ representatives at climate summits and observers, 
related journal articles and textbooks. This study focused on the fundamental data 
for the core research from the Kyoto Protocol and background to it, the 
Copenhagen Accord and background to it, and the behaviours of the selected 
media accounts.  
The newsprint media is central to this study because of its critical role in 
disseminating information, helping to shape national and public opinions as a 
primary source of information around the world. While there is a sizable literature 
on climate change issues there is a clear gap in the literature about the nexus of 
the media and climate change negotiations. Moreover, there is no research that 
combines tripartite data (agreements, process and media) in analysing the climate 
process. Media accounts bring insights from the 663 articles on international 
climate change negotiations collected from 5 leading newspapers by using textual 
analysis of the news frames36 in determining how the media has portrayed the 
issues of climate change and sought to influence the climate change negotiation 
processes.  
This research draws on data from reliable and leading newspaper sources, 
particularly editorial and opinion articles from 1997 to 2012 of current 
developments both online and in-print on the climate change debate, including the 
international climate change negotiations and the politics inherent in reports. 
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There has been a huge flow of information on the climate change issue but only 
articles that focus on the UNFCCC climate change negotiations and were related 
to COP-3, the Kyoto Protocol, and up to and including COP 17 and the Durban 
Summit were examined to see how the negotiations and the debate on climate 
change was moving ahead. The five newspapers selected enable an assessment to 
be made of the way in which the climate change debate developed and how the 
UN responses were reported by leading newspapers over the period covered in 
this research. 
The newspapers selected are: 1) Wall Street Journal, a national ranking and 
leading newspaper in the US, widely recognized at home and abroad and cited by 
many research studies; it has the largest circulation in the US.37 2) The New York 
Times is another leading paper nationally and internationally with the largest 
circulation of its Sunday newspaper and online editions. 38  3) The Guardian 
United Kingdom is another leading newspaper around the world with a long 
experience of covering environmental and climate issues in a highly reputable 
way. It has a separate section, ‘Guardian Environment Network’, that provides 
extensive coverage of many aspects of climate change negotiations. 4) The Hindu 
is one of the most prominent newspapers of India and has a strong tradition of 
opinion articles written by people of wide repute. It is one of the top two largest 
circulated English dailies in India.39 The Hindu is widely acknowledged as the 
reading material of those in agenda setting positions in India.40 5) The China 
Daily is the leading English newspaper published in print and online in China. It 
is China’s “flagship English language newspaper” and window into China with 
the largest circulation in China and abroad.41  
The rationale behind the selection of these newspapers was not based on whether 
they were conservative or progressive, but their national and international 
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reputation as being in the group of top newspapers widely read and constantly 
used by researchers. 42  These five newspapers have credibility, are widely 
recognized, are ranked highly and have been extensively used by other researchers 
and recognized as ‘prestige press’ of those countries.43 Although limited, these 
papers also present views from both the English speaking world and the non-
English speaking world, and from both Annex I (developed) and Non-Annex I 
(developing) countries bringing the understanding and perspectives of the many 
different categories of Conferences of Parties. Another rationale behind choosing 
these newspapers was to examine the roles of newspapers in major emitting 
countries. Copenhagen and post-Copenhagen negotiations saw gradual movement 
toward a paradigm shift, giving primary decision making roles to the US, China, 
India and the EU. For this reason, newspapers from the US, UK, China and India 
were included. By including the two US newspapers what was offered was very 
different stances from the US on climate change and what should be done about it. 
This will be discussed further in chapters 6 and 7.  
It could be argued that at least one newspaper from each of the countries 
participating in the negotiations should have been included. But with around 192 
countries involved in the climate change negotiations it was well beyond the 
resources and scope of this research to embark on such a large number of 
publications. The main objective of the research is to locate why there has been 
such little progress on international climate change negotiations and finding 
answers to these questions requires that major emitting countries such as China, 
India and the US gain the priority. It is one thing to include newspapers from all 
the countries of the world and quite another to set goals to understand the 
international climate governance in a limited time with limited resources.  
The Factiva database, Google and individual website archives of the newspapers 
were used to extract the data. Factiva offers the world's most comprehensive 
collection of news. 44  The Factiva search produced several articles that were 
repetitions. The researcher had to check each of the articles to avoid repetition. 
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The Factiva search could not produce enough related articles and therefore 
Google and individual website archives were used. Although very time 
consuming and frustrating, Google and the individual newspapers’ website 
archives produced the most of the articles that were of major importance to this 
project. Search terms used were ‘(editorial or opinion) and (global warming or 
climate change) and (Kyoto Protocol or Copenhagen Accord) and (UN climate 
change negotiations)’. The focus was on the UN climate change negotiations. In 
addition to the five newspapers’ editorials and opinion pieces, some materials 
were also obtained from the CNN, BBC, CBC, All Jazeera and AFP, as a way of 
updating knowledge on the global climate change debate and negotiations.  
Newspapers have long played critical roles in shaping public opinion.45 How the 
stories of climate change developed and how the perceptions of climate change 
were seen as affecting negotiations and processes of policy making are of 
particular interest to this study. How newspapers may be seen to shape public 
opinion on the issues and whether they had an impact on decision making on 
international climate change governance is one approach to understanding the role 
of the media on the climate change issue. How the leading newspapers expressed 
different views on the many aspects of climate change negotiations, and how they 
disseminated knowledge to make the politicians, world leaders and national 
societies aware of the issues is central to this research.  
Therefore, as noted above, this study has used primarily 5 newspapers from 
around the world. In addition, some secondary data will also be drawn from other 
newspapers and Television news sources because the key strength of case study is 
to use multiple sources of data information 46  but these are used to develop 
understanding of climate change negotiation perceptions and are not treated as 
main sources of data for the study. The case study of this research will have 
insights from related academic literature as indicated, but in particular, the data 
for this study will be drawn from the following: 
1. The Kyoto Protocol 1997 and further developments 
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2. The Copenhagen Accord 2009 and subsequent developments 
3. Newspapers: New York Times, Wall Street Journal, The Guardian, UK, The 
Hindu and China Daily.  
3.6 Frame Analysis of the Media 
Five newspapers’ articles available both in print and online are examined by 
textual analysis of frame covering a time period of 1997 to 2012. Studying the 
media is consistent with studying society and the issues of society. Editorials, 
opinions and news analysis are forms of public discourse, which reproduce 
existing opinions, values, ideologies, and power structures.47 Media sources are 
not neutral and play an active role in shaping perspectives, which can trigger 
actions for future development. A good method for analysing editorials and 
opinions is through framing.48 Frames are interpretive packages and at the core of 
the interpretive package is “a central organizing idea or frame of making sense of 
relevant events, suggesting what is at issue”.49  
Gitlin defined frames as persistent patterns of cognition, interpretation, and 
presentation of the selection, emphasis and exclusion by which symbol handlers 
routinely organize discourse. 50  Entman defined framing as selecting “some 
aspects of a perceived reality” and making them “more salient in a communicating 
text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, casual 
interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the item 
described”.51 Frames should not be confused with agreement, disagreement and 
positions for or against some policy measure because frames are shared. They can 
be generic and issue specific. With the aim of examining the central question in 
this research, issue specific frames have been used as part of the media analyses.  
When an issue or a conflict reaches a stalemate such as occurred in the climate 
change negotiations, neither side can impose its will on the other and each can 
veto whatever the other proposes, framing offers a way to assess whether or not 
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the debates are working. 52  Framing refers to the effects of presentation of 
judgment and choice.53 The author selects and presents information in such a way 
that it first resonates with readers and then persuades them to reach specific 
opinions. Lakoff, the linguist, adds to the definition of framing, stating that they 
are cognitive structures that allow human beings to understand their reality.54 
Conceptual frames shape our thinking in a similar way. The concepts we use 
provide borders and modes of thought for drawing inferences beyond them. For 
example, using words such as “crimes against humanity” in America’s post-9/11 
context will resonate with moral and political principles deep in the American 
readerships’ unconscious minds. These frames then shape how they experience 
political relationships to their own leaders and people in other countries.  
To understand framing, Lakoff explains that using a word such as ‘war’, triggers 
fundamental moral and political principle frames that evoke an evil world in 
which we must look to an authoritarian President as commander-in-chief, whose 
orders we obey in order to protect our entire society from destruction by foreign 
enemies. With these frames dominating our thinking, we are more likely to 
tolerate giving up some of our civil liberties and dropping bombs that kill 
innocent civilians. 55  Framing is a central discursive strategy that occurs in 
virtually all genres of discourse and may be used as a very powerful method of 
persuasion, often having profound political, social or behavioural consequences.56  
The concept of framing recognizes frames and framing strategies in a variety of 
discourse types, in framing analysis as a part of discourse analysis, and in using 
framing strategies themselves. Framing is about moral values, deep truths, and the 
policies that flow from them.57 “Framing is about getting language that fits your 
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world. It is not just language. The ideas are primary – and the language carries 
those ideas and evokes those ideas”.58 
As the framing can follow a number of approaches, the critical discourse analyst 
van Dijk has defined three elements in his schematic for framing in newspaper 
editorial and opinion pieces. These include: definition, explanation, and 
moral/recommendation59 or “moral evaluation” for the item described.60  These 
three categories are more than just descriptive; they simultaneously equate to 
three functions. Editorials/articles not only express an opinion about a recent news 
event, but are also intended to persuade a reading public. As such, the text must 
contain argumentative structures. The three categories that van Dijk outlines 
collectively buttress the persuasive power of an article.  
The first category, definition, summarizes an event. It answers the question ‘What 
happened?’, where the information focuses on the present or very recent past. In 
order to write an opinion article and evaluate an incident, it is sometimes 
necessary to review the events, select relevant dimensions of the story, and focus 
on specific actions or political actors. This summary encapsulates the definition. 
However, the definition is not necessarily a straightforward, objective element. 
Rather, reviewing, selecting, and focusing presuppose ideologically framed 
opinions which are part of the editor’s cognitive model, or worldview, of the 
situation. 61  Second, editorials and opinion articles contain explanations which 
seek to account for the causes of an event and to answer the question ‘Why did it 
happen?’ The argumentation scheme may use a variety of strategies such as facts 
and figures as data. The scheme can also explain a circumstance through the lens 
of history62 evaluating why something happened.  
The third element of an editorial or an opinion article is the recommendations or 
moral stance. These are the natural consequences or conclusions from 
argumentation positioned by definition and evaluation. This aspect of the articles 
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makes predictions and answers the question ‘What will happen?’ or ‘What might 
happen?’ In addition, the recommendations/morals offer the most robust tone to 
answer the question ‘What should be done?’ The advice laid down in these 
sections is often targeted towards gaining an understanding of the ruling elites or 
concerned parties including policy makers. Together these categories form an 
argument, often through making the editorial or the opinion article’s locus 
credible and making other positions flawed.  
Frames become invaluable tools for presenting relatively complex issues, such as 
stem cell research or climate change, efficiently and in a way that makes them 
accessible to lay audiences because they play to existing cognitive schemas.63 
McCombs argued that framing is simply a more refined version of agenda 
setting.64 From that perspective, framing means making aspects of an issue more 
salient through different modes of presentation and therefore shifting people’s 
attitudes.65  He labels this phenomenon ‘second-level agenda setting’. Framing 
does not focus on which topics or issues are selected for coverage by the news 
media, but instead on the particular ways those issues are presented.66 
Entman, and de Vreese’s framework of textual analysis of frame is applied to this 
case study of this thesis as it is the most suitable for assessing mainly opinion 
articles in the newspaper to “promote a particular problem definition, casual 
interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the item 
described”.67 Articles/data have been processed by using textual analysis of issue 
specific frame to arrive at findings. Three issue specific frames/themes (Shaping 
Perception of Climate Change Science; Setting Issues and Agenda for 
Negotiations and Democracy Debate in the Media) are developed based on 
Entman and de Vreese’s framework in chapter 7 for finding responses on the 
propositions developed in chapter 2. The climate change values held by the 
newspapers, their understanding of democracy, the importance that they attach to 
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solving problems through agenda setting and (non) adherence to governments’ 
positions are also evaluated. This multidisciplinary approach helps answer the 
central research question and its three sub questions as noted above. The answers 
to these questions are then interpreted within the larger context of international 
climate change governance, taking into account the current negotiations and 
political situation along with historical information production and dissemination 
of print media. 
3.7 Limitations of the Approach and Methodology 
This case study may not be generalized with other issues of global governance. 
Although the concerns of democratic deficit and state-centric framework may be 
gerneralized, the role of media will differ from one environmental issue to another. 
This research has not sought to examine the arguments concerning the origins of, 
and reasons for, climate change but focuses instead on the difficulties the 
international community has had in seeking to address major global issues. 
Moreover, the research seeks to explain the causes of slow progress in the making 
of an effective international climate change governance to prevent climate change 
in a holistic way but does not offer a prescription for a successful and effective 
climate agreement. Instead, it argues that various alternative models and 
approaches need to be used to reduce the existing level of democratic deficit, to be 
more inclusive in the state-centric framework and that a more socially responsible 
media be developed as pre-requisites in addressing climate change.  
Expecting that a computer aided software program would reduce time and help in 
the process of data analysis, the researcher learnt to use Nvivo – a computer aided 
software program claimed to be useful for qualitative data analysis – and was 
supported in this by the university which purchased the software. However, the 
software proved to be rather limiting and disappointing. Nvivo was useful in 
finding specific words which led to the identification of relevant material, but in 
terms of understanding the context for texual analysis, necessary for this study, it 
was not very useful and its use was discontinued. 
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3.8 Conclusion 
This chapter has shown that the methods of data collection, types of data collected 
and their analysis requires a mixed method to answer the core research question 
why has there been little progress in the making of an effective international 
climate change governance to prevent climate change? The case study section 
clarified how this research should proceed to highlight the lack of progress in 
climate change negotiations and policy making. Within climate change 
developments the Kyoto Protocol and the Copenhagen Accord along with media 
accounts of both of these events are key in responding to the case study analyses, 
the research questions and propositions generated in chapter 2. In the research 
design section, the independent and dependent variables and the strong 
connections between central research question, subset of research questions and 
propositions concerning a democratic deficit, state-centric framework and the role 
of media have been identified.  
As the central goal of the thesis is to answer the propostions, three sub research 
questions and one main question, data has been drawn from wide range of sources: 
legal documents and webcast videos of UNFCCC, media accounts mainly from 
five newspapers (several other newspapers and TV commentaries have been used 
to observe the developments of climate change debate and negotiations), the use 
of databases such as ENB, IEA, EIA, NOAA and NEAA utilizing mixed method 
for the research. Editorial, opinion articles and news analysis are of the major 
interest of this research as they reproduce existing opinions, values, ideologies 
and power structures and this will also be contextualized in processing and 
analysing media data. For the analysis of the media data, Entman and de Vreese’s 
frame analysis of opinionated articles will be applied in chapter 7 along with 
evaluation. Specific frame analysis has been used. Although the newspapers used 
many different frames in presenting the news, to answer the central research 
question the author, after sampling and coding the newspapers, developed three 
issue specific frames: ‘Shaping perception of Climate Change Science’, ‘Setting 
Issues and Agendas for Negotiations’, and ‘Democracy Debate in the Media’ to 
examine how the newspapers’ contributed on the three topics of particular interest 
in chapter 7. The chapters ahead will put the methodology discussion of this 
chapter into context. 
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Chapter 4 
Kyoto Climate Conference and the Kyoto Protocol 
4.1 Introduction  
As outlined in Chapter 1, international climate change negotiations under the 
United Nation’s (UN) platform commenced with the formal establishment of  the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in 1992, 
and included the voluntary pledges of signatories. These voluntary pledges against 
climate change were considered to be inadequate and the Conference of the 
Parties (COPs) negotiated a new agreement at COP-3 on December 10, 1997 in 
Kyoto, Japan. The most significant achievement of COP-3 was the adoption of the 
Kyoto Protocol (KP), a far reaching international climate change agreement at the 
time in an effort to constrain global greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and to 
reduce the threat of anthropogenic global climate change.  
In accordance with Article 24 of the KP it was open for signature from 16 March 
1998 to 15 March 1999 at the UN Headquarters, New York. By that date the 
Protocol had received 84 signatures. 68  Finally, the KP came into force on 
February 16, 2005 when more than 55 countries incorporating industrialized 
countries responsible for at least 55 per cent of global carbon dioxide emissions 
had ratified it. The ratification process took almost 8 years to meet the threshold 
set by the Protocol. Two major industrialized countries, the United States (US) 
and Australia, did not ratify the Protocol when it was concluded. Australia ratified 
it in 2007 but the US has never ratified the Protocol.  
The primary objective of the KP was to stabilize emissions below 5 per cent of 
1990 levels and prevent further environmental deterioration and “limit dangerous 
human interference with the climate system”.69 Some scholars and commentators 
have argued that the KP was a most significant document in developing the 
environmental regime whereas others viewed it as a document of compromise. 
The targets agreed at the KP, the result of compromise, bore little relationship to 
                                                 
68 See UNFCCC, ‘Status of Ratification of the Kyoto Protocol’, 
http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/status_of_ratification/items/2613.php . 
69 UN, ‘Climate Change: The Negotiations’, 
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what was required to make a serious impact on global warming.70 The 5 per cent 
target of emission reductions was below the recommendation of the International 
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC).71 Recent data shows a rollercoaster increase in 
global GHG emissions raising serious questions about the significance of the KP. 
A few member states may be on track to meet their targets but most of the states 
were struggling and there has been little progress in reducing the emissions of 
GHG. In 2008-2010, the EU-15 as a whole was almost 2% below the target, an 
achievement that was facilitated to some extent by the recent economic crisis but 
in terms of the EU 27, Australia, Japan, and Russia, all failed to achieve their 
Kyoto targets.72 China, India and the US remained major emittors.  
So far, studies of climate change have focused mainly on the domestic groups 
lobbying for states to accept or reject ratification of the Protocol.73 This chapter 
investigates the reasons for the slow progress in relation to a democratic deficit 
and state-centrism, as discussed in chapter 2, in the development of the Protocol.  
The first section presents the background and context for the development of the 
KP before setting out the characteristics of the KP, with particular reference to the 
distinction between Annex I and Non-Annex I parties and the perennial problem 
this distinction created. Whether, and to what extent, the Kyoto decision making 
was in accord with the UN vision of global democracy is then assessed. The next 
section analyses whether the KP met environmental concerns or whether it was an 
agreement of compromise. The effectiveness of the Kyoto mechanism is analysed, 
including the emission trading scheme (ETS), Joint Implementation (JI) and Clean 
Development Mechanism (CDM) and concludes that Kyoto’s flexible 
mechanisms have not played any significant role in the abatement of global GHG 
emissions. Next it explores the national interests of the major emitters and 
concludes that the major emitters had put economic interests over the 
environmental concerns. Section 4.7 explores why major emitters either ratified 
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72 Corina Haita, ‘The State of Compliance on the Kyoto Protocol: ICCG Reflection No. 12/2012’, 
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73 Aaron M. McCright and Riley D. Dunlap, ‘Defeating Kyoto: The Conservative Movement’s 
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the Protocol or refused to ratify it followed by the conclusion.  
4.2 Background and Context 
Since the early 1980s, an international consensus on the reality and seriousness of 
climate change has been debated, including several comprehensive reports from 
the National Academy of Sciences and National Research Council 1983 and 2001, 
and from the IPCC in 1990, 1995, 2001, 2007 and the World Climate Program 
1985. 74  Increasing scientific evidence of human interaction with the climate 
system, coupled with growing public concern over global environmental issues, 
began to push climate change onto the political agenda by the mid-1980s. 
Considering the seriousness of climate change the United Nations General 
Assembly (UNGA) took up the issue for the first time when it was proposed by 
the government of Malta and adopted resolution 43/53 for the “Protection of 
global climate change for present and future generations”. 75  According to the 
IPCC, emissions resulting from human activities were substantially increasing the 
atmospheric concentrations of the GHGs: carbon dioxide (CO2), methane, 
chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) and nitrous oxide. 76  The IPCC confirmed that 
human-induced climate change was the most likely threat and called for a global 
climate change treaty to address the problem,77 resulting in the establishment of 
UNFCCC. 
The UNFCCC 1992 was the second major international legal instrument to 
address the problems of global environmental change78 and came into force on 
March 21, 1994 with 189 Parties to the Convention (188 states and 1 European 
Community). Its membership in 2012 had reached 195.79 It enjoys one of the 
highest rates of membership among Multilateral Environmental Agreements 
(MEAs). The first of its kind was the Vienna Convention for the Protection of 
Ozone Layer (POL) with its Montreal Protocol on Substances adopted on 16 
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September 1987 for restoring the depleted ozone layer. After more than ten years 
of intense scientific research and nearly two years of intense diplomatic 
negotiations, UNFCCC moved forward with aspirations of measures to reduce the 
risks of rapid climate change.80  
The UNFCCC stated in 1992 that the increases of GHG enhanced the natural 
greenhouse effect, and would result in warming of the Earth's surface and 
atmosphere to the point where such change may adversely affect natural 
ecosystems and humankind.81 It recognized that the climate system was a shared 
resource whose stability could be affected by industrial and other emissions of 
CO2 and other GHGs.
82 In support of the UNFCCC aims, and with agreement to a 
legally binding targets, the KP was adopted on December 11, 1997 in Kyoto, 
Japan, and came into effect in 2005 after the threshold was met following the 
ratification of the Russian Federation. The major distinction between the 1992 
Convention and the KP is that the Convention only encouraged developed 
countries to stabilize GHG emissions whereas the Protocol committed 
industrialized countries to legally binding targets.  
The KP developed four different commitments: 1) stabilizing GHGs; 2) binding 
targets for developed countries; 3) new tools for reducing emissions; 4) 
monitoring compliance. 83  Development of the mechanism for monitoring 
compliance was to support implementation of the three tools/mechanisms and 
compliance with the binding commitments of Annex I Parties. Table 4.1 provides 
the brief but significant issues of Protocol. It illustrates that the Protocol gave 
different targets to individual Annex I countries with an aggregate goal of 
reducing emissions by 5 per cent below the level of 1990. The principle common 
but differentiated responsibility (CBDR) and flexible mechanisms are important 
features of the Protocol to achieve the targets. 
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Table 4.1: Key Elements of the Kyoto Protocol 1997 
 
 
4.3 Characteristics of the Kyoto Protocol 
According to CBC News in 2007: “Depending on who you talk to, the KP was 
either a) an expensive, bureaucratic solution to fix a problem that may not even 
exist; or b) the last, best chance to save the world from the ‘time bomb’ of global 
warning”.84 The scientific evidence of climate change was gradually mounting 
even if it was unclear how much human beings were contributing to it and the 
actual risks of climate change. Yet, it was relevant that solutions be sought, and 
made binding for industrialized countries. Under the KP Annex I parties were 
required to make demonstrable progress in achieving their commitments by 2005. 
It took account of economies in transition (EITs) by providing some flexibility 
within Annex I parties. It also required parties to initiate post-Kyoto commitment 
negotiations seven years before the expiry of the KP. The KP was built on the 
principles set by Article 3 of the 1992 UNFCCC which involved the continuation 
of the policies of the Convention. The policies introduced in Article 3 are:85 
                                                 
84 ‘In Depth Kyoto and Beyond’, CBC News, February 14, 2007, 
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85 See Article 3 of UNFCCC 1992. 
 General commitments from all parties. 
 Specific individual emission targets from Annex I parties in general and Annex II parties in 
particular. 
 Emission reduction target: 5 per cent below the level of 1990. 
 Emission targets cover CO2, CH4, N2O, HFCs, PFCs, SF6.  
 Flexibility Mechanisms: Joint Implementation (JI); Clean Development Mechanism 
(CDM); Emission Trading Scheme (ETS). 
 Reporting and review procedures for Annex I parties. 
 Compliance system. 
 Regular reviews. 
 Common but differentiated responsibilities (CBDR) among parties. 
 Rules of Procedure: Consensual decision making among parties: for KP, 55 countries 
incorporating industrialized countries which are responsible for at least 55 per cent of 
global CO2 emissions, needed to ratify to be effective. 
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1) The parties should protect the climate system for the benefit of present and 
future generations of humankind, on the basis of equity and in accordance with 
their common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities. 
 2) Developed countries should take the lead in combating climate change and 
adverse effects thereof. The specific needs and special circumstances of 
developing country parties, particularly vulnerable, should be given full 
consideration. 
3) Parties should work towards sustainable development, sustainable economic 
growth and take appropriate mitigation measures which should be integrated with 
national development programmes.  
4.4 Annex I and Non-Annex I Classification 
All parties to the global climate change negotiations were categorized as either 
Annex I (industrialised/developed countries) or Non-Annex I (non-
industrialised/developing countries). The KP makes a clear distinction between 
industrialized and developing countries’ GHGs reduction requirements.86 It was 
founded on the principles of CBDR and historical responsibility (HR) – the 
leadership role of Annex I or industrialized countries. 87  CBDR refers to the 
concept that while all countries had a common responsibility to address global 
climate change, the industrialized countries had a special responsibility for their 
greater historical contribution to climate change, greater per-capita emissions, and 
greater financial and technological resources. 88  The assumption was that the 
industrialized countries would take the lead role and gradually the developing 
countries would move to achieve that goal but the Protocol did not set any 
particular time-span for the graduation period of developing countries, unlike that 
of the ozone layer regime where “developing countries accepted binding controls 
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to reduce the use of ODS under the Montreal Protocol”.89  
The Annex I and Non-Annex I division created a gulf between the industrialized 
and the developing countries. The developing countries first wanted to see the 
responses made by the industrialized countries, while the industrialized countries 
waited for the developing countries to share the responsibility. The different 
parties/groups looked at the climate change from different angles and the issue 
became politicized as these different parties presented conflicting propositions 
based on their interests. The difficulties arising from the principles of CBDR 
along with the categorization of Annex I (developed) and Non-Annex I 
(developing) countries will be further contextualized in the discussion of the 
making of the Copenhagen Accord in 5.2 section of Chapter 5. 
Within Annex I is Annex II which refers to advance industrialized countries 
whereas Annex I includes industrialized countries as well as EITs, countries in 
economic transition. The Annex I and Non-Annex I were further divided into 
different negotiating groups having different interest coalitions, some of which 
came from official UN listings, including Small Island Developing Countries 
(SIDS), the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS), Least Developed Countries 
(LDCs), Group-77 (G-77), Umbrella Group (UG), Organization of Petroleum 
Exporting Countries (OPEC), European Union (EU) and the Environmental 
Integrity Group (EIG), which came to existence in 2000.  
4.5 Kyoto Decision Making: the UN Vision of Global Democracy 
Chapter 2 discussed the UN vision of global democracy noting that international 
organizations (IOs) have been accountable only to their member states and that 
their legitimacy was exclusively dependent on their member states. But, in 
practice, at a functional level, IOs have long had to work in conjunction with non-
state entities and be accountable to them as well as to member states. For example, 
were the World Health Organisation (WHO) and Millineum Development Goals 
(MDGs) to propose actions which did not have the support and agreement of the 
relevant non-state entities then there would be no effective action as its authority 
and effectiveness would be challenged by non-state actors and transnational 
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networks. In more recent concerns about the environment, non-state actors have 
been demanding more transparency from IOs and greater participation by relevant 
actors, state and non-state, in addressing the democratic deficit.90 Several scholars 
have questioned the democratic deficit and accountability of global governance 
institutions such as the WTO, the IMF and others.91 Although the WTO and IMF 
are not UN institutions, the degree of democratic deficit related to these 
institutions is significant. Decision making processes have given little access to 
wider societal groups and many member states, particularly the developing 
countries, argue that their voices often go unheard.92 
Many UN reports in the 1990s concluded that the UN needed to be more 
democratic in its decision making processes. Global democracy is considered to 
be either the implementation of a world state or democratization of all world 
governments, or reforming existing states and international organizations for the 
democratic management of global problems.93 The UN raised public awareness of 
environmental issues through a series of thematic conferences such as the Earth 
Summit 1992 in Rio with NGOs making a significant contribution, demonstrating 
that global problems cannot be solved in an exclusively intergovernmental 
realm.94 These problems need global responses that include states and societal 
actors because “the ultimate addressees of regulations issued by international 
organizations are largely societal actors”.95 The UN top officials showed deep 
interest in democratizing the UN and their analyses were affirmed when the 
democratization of the UN was officially declared “the central and overarching 
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objective of the 2008 session of the General Assembly”.96 It opened the windows 
for NGOs to be participants in most of the international meetings that deal with 
the issues of public importance. 
In the process of democratization, unlike that proposed by the cosmopolitan 
democrats, the UN looked to a new mode of governance system which involved 
consensual decision making process among states and involvement of the non-
state actors to decentralize the roles of states through “politics above and below 
the state”. 97  NGOs have been important contributors in the UN system since 
1945.98 Although only 400 NGOs were registered until the 25th birthday of the UN, 
the UN boosted non-state involvement in international public policy making by 
embarking upon a series of major world conferences and summits through the 
1990s and by launching the Global Compact99 which asked companies to embrace 
universal principles and to partner with the UN. It has grown to become a critical 
platform for the UN to engage effectively with enlightened global business.100 
NGOs have access to intergovernmental meetings, present written statements, 
make speeches, and lobby for specific texts to be adopted. Thus, the UN vision of 
global democracy defined UN intergovernmental forum and non-state actors’ 
partnership as “voluntary and collaborative relationships between various parties, 
both state and non-state, in which participants agree to work together to achieve a 
common purpose or undertake a specific task”.101 
Developing an agreement on global climate change negotiations involves a 
complex process of bargaining primarily among the states. As observers, NGOs 
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play a critical role at the agenda setting stage because environmental NGOs have 
gained the greatest advantage from the relatively open nature of international 
environmental negotiations.102 Article 7.6 of the UNFCCC opened the doors for 
participation of representatives of (I)NGOs as observers, an indication that the UN 
was trying to change itself as its dynamics were changing. The UN and UNFCCC 
have moved to include NGOs and IOs in the climate change negotiation process. 
“By promoting civil society’s greater involvement in world politics, the discourse 
and policies of the UN have indeed succeeded in advancing the idea of democracy 
without borders”.103 In this way the UN has sought to make the process more 
democratic and legitimate creating more space within the state-centric framework 
of international system. But how far the making of the KP confirmed the UN 
vision of democracy and consensual politics of decision making among the states 
and active involvement of the NGOs will be explored in the following four sub-
sections.  
4.5.1 The Rules of Procedure for Climate Change Negotiations  
The negotiation processes of climate change have become more complex with 
multiple actors, including states, IOs, NGOs, industry, expert groups and global 
environmental social movements. The number of parties and observers has 
increased rapidly. The climate change issues for negotiation have also multiplied. 
Parties are engaged in negotiations dealing with issues such as adjusting existing 
rules, creating new rules, implementing the rules agreed and reviewing the 
effectiveness of rules to the changing circumstances of scientific knowledge 
available on climate change. To manage these issues, the formal rules for 
conducting the climate change negotiations are established in Convention’s Rules 
of Procedure.104 
UNFCCC Article 7.2 (k) notes that the Conference of the Parties is the supreme 
body of the Convention and they agree upon and adopt, by consensus, rules of 
procedure and financial rules for itself and for any subsidiary bodies.105 Article 
7.3 notes: 
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The Conference of the Parties shall, at its first session, adopt its own 
rules of procedures as well as those of the subsidiary bodies 
established by the Convention, which shall include decision-making 
procedures for matters not already covered by decision-making 
procedures stipulated in the Convention. Such procedures may include 
specified majorities required for the adoption of particular decisions.106 
Similar provisions were made for the rules of procedure in the KP. Article 13.5 of 
the KP notes: 
The rules of procedure of the Conference of the Parties and financial 
procedures under the Convention shall be applied mutatis mutandis 
under this Protocol, except as may be otherwise decided by consensus 
by the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties 
to this Protocol.107  
There was no provision made for the KP to be adopted on the basis of majority 
voting. The KP was successfully adopted on the basis of consensus because, at the 
time it was adopted, all the parties, including the US, agreed to Article 25 of the 
KP: 
This Protocol shall enter into force on the ninetieth day after the date 
on which not less than 55 Parties to the Convention, incorporating 
Parties included in Annex I which accounted in total for at least 55 per 
cent of the total carbon emissions for 1990 of the Parties included in 
Annex I, have deposited their instruments of ratification, acceptance, 
approval or accession.108 
The consensual decision making system among the Parties to the Convention has 
been practiced since the beginning of climate change negotiations in the 
UNFCCC, and the consensual decision of the COPs may seek other ways of 
decision making such as majority voting or the special threshold sought for the 
KP ratification to be effective. Yet, the continuous delay in the progress of 
negotiations let alone the goal of emissions reductions begs the question of 
whether the state-centric framework of consensual politics determines effective 
decision making. This debate will be further discussed in section 5.5 of chapter 5 
where it is argued that although consensual decision making process (state-centric) 
is one of the important elements of the UN vision of (deliberative) democracy, 
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continuous gridlock at climate change negotiations among a large number of 
parties suggest that innovative ways need to be sought for better policy outcomes 
and effectiveness of climate change governance. States that are not parties to the 
Convention, the UN, special agencies of the UN, intergovernmental bodies and 
NGOs have observer status, enabling them to observe the negotiation process, 
make comments and suggestions but are barred from voting. Each party to the 
climate change negotiations has one vote109 but observers have no voting rights. 
Figure 4.1 below shows the extensive participation of states and the non-state 
actors as observers of the COPs/MOPs110 and their fragile impact on international 
climate change policy making. This will be discussed further in section 4.5.4. 
4.5.2 Climate Process Participation  
The COP-1 began in Berlin in 1995 with the participation of almost 5000 people 
from interested parties, observer states, observers, and media. COP-2 in Geneva, 
Switzerland was attended by fewer than 2000 participants, while COP-3 attracted 
almost 10,000 participants in Kyoto, following the greater interest in 
environmental and climate issues by the media and environmental organizations, 
and by states.  
Figure 4.1: Participation of Parties, Observers and Media at COP 1, 2 and 3 
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Source: Adapted from UNFCCC Participation Breakdown 
The COP-1 held high hopes and concluded with the ‘Berlin Mandate’ that showed 
uncertainty about progress and agreed to a two year period for analysis and 
evaluation on how individual countries could combat GHGs. 111  Since COP-1, 
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different countries started to back track from the negotiations and downplayed the 
need for a legally binding treaty. OPEC, Russia and Australia showed their 
objections through COP-1 and COP-2. The objections of the fossil-fuel exporters 
(OPEC) and of the US and Australia led to the breakdown in COP-2 which, 
although a small gathering, did set out some milestones for policies. It was 
established that countries would not seek a uniform solution but act according to 
their own situation while also expressing a wish for binding targets in the 
medium-term future.112 The COP-3 garnered the greatest number of participants 
as many countries signed the KP, as shown above in figure 4.1. The numbers of 
media and observers were comparatively greater than the states, showing the 
salience of the issue for states, for media and for many observers.  
4.5.3 The Ratification Process 
192 states and 1 international regional organization (EU) were parties to the 
Protocol.113 Of the 193 parties, only 84 had signed the Protocol by 15 March 1999, 
the official deadline set by the Convention to the KP. However, the rule for the 
KP was set up in such a way that it could be effective without having consensus 
for ratification that solely depended on the ratification of developed countries. 
Only 55 per cent of parties were required for ratification, provided those ratifying 
countries include 55 per cent of emitters’ total global emissions. It meant that 
major industrialized emitting countries had to ratify the Protocol to bring it into 
force.  
Only 5 countries ratified the Protocol in 1998. The EU favoured a high threshold 
(55 per cent) for ratification because it was unwilling to assume any obligations if 
the US did not ratify,114 and the US favoured it because it gave the US a veto. 
Another 15 countries ratified the Protocol in 1999 and 10 countries in 2000. Many 
more countries ratified the Protocol in the following years. Out of 193 COPs, only 
the US, one of the major emitting countries, never ratified the Protocol despite 
having signed it on 12 November 1998. The reasons for this are outlined in 
section 4.7 of this chapter below. 
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2002 was an important year for the KP with most members of the EU, China and 
India ratifying the Protocol. The threshold was not met until 2004 when Russia 
ratified it and the debate shifted from ratification to implementation. There has not 
been much evidence of implementation and compliance in terms of effective 
environmental outcomes. Section 4.7 discusses the reasons for the Russian and 
other COPs’ ratification. 
4.5.4 Inequality of Parties 
A large number of parties formed coalitions in climate change negotiations. The 
constitutions of international organizations are based on the equality of members, 
as Article 2.1 of the UN Charter states: “The Organization is based on the 
principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members”.115 However, in global 
intergovernmental negotiations inequality is pervasive, whatever the issue under 
negotiation.116 Powerful states have more resources at their disposal and often 
affect the processes of negotiation and decision making. States with the military, 
economic and political resources are able to use them to exert influence in global 
negotiations.117  
Despite inequality the KP was unanimously adopted. Initially, the US agreed to 
adoption and the unanimous adoption, from Realist perspective, may be because 
of inequality, as the existence of a hegemon can induce other states to subscribe to 
what is supported by the hegemon but later the US did not persist in its initial 
support for a strong climate change agreement and  did not ratify the Kyoto. 
However, the unanimous adoption confirms that it was consensual. The three 
major issues of the KP negotiations were: 1) how much emissions should be 
reduced; 2) who should be responsible for reducing GHG emissions and the role 
of developing countries in reducing emissions; 3) what measures and mechanisms 
should be adopted to reduce emissions.118 The KP required that emissions should 
                                                 
115 See UN, Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International Court of Justice (New 
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be reduced by 5 per cent from the levels of 1990, and that developed countries 
should take the lead role and finance developing countries projects of emissions 
mitigation and building the infrastructure of adaptation. The liabilities should be 
carried out based on the principles of CBDR and HR as indicated above.  
The climate policy of the KP is the CBDR and is based on the concept that 
because the developed world was more responsible for anthropogenic climate 
change it should bear greater responsibilities, and that as the developing countries 
become developed they would take up their share of the burden. Thus, the KP’s 
emission reductions covered only a small portion of emitters. The few developing 
countries, being emerging economies, were not able to tackle the challenges of 
climate change without the necessary financial and technological support for 
mitigation and adaptation. Developing countries are more vulnerable to climate 
change impacts and have less capacity to adapt to these impacts than developed 
countries.119 The financial and technological supports were available through the 
industrialized countries, particularly the US, Japan and others. During the KP 
negotiations, the small and poor country coalitions such as AOSIS, SIDs and 
LDCs had moral authority but this did not count for much in the view of other 
states in the negotiations as the outcomes of the KP was the lowest common 
denominators.  
Formally, states are the parties which participate at international negotiations. 
International environmental negotiations have welcomed the non-state actors as 
observers of the negotiation processes. They have not enjoyed the status of state 
participants but NGOs have been participating in international environmental 
negotiations in increasing numbers, particularly since the Earth Summit in 1992, 
begging the question of whether and how NGO participation affects the 
negotiation process.120 Matthews noted that "National governments are not simply 
losing autonomy in a globalizing economy. They are sharing powers – including 
political, social, and security roles at the core of sovereignty – with businesses, 
                                                                                                                                     
themes emerged as the issues which have been the most contentious in each of the international 
climate change negotiations. 
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with international organizations, and with a multitude of citizens groups”.121 Litfin 
stated “(Once) States have acceded to non-binding principles or weak agreements, 
they usually find it difficult not to agree to increasingly robust commitments”.122  
Non-state actors particularly the environmental NGOs were active participants at 
the KP. Greenpeace, World Wildlife Fund (WWF) and Friends of the Earth (FOE) 
had the largest delegations attending negotiating sessions but their roles were 
limited. 123  NGOs have been invited to observe international environmental 
negotiations but they have frequently been excluded from plenary and closed-door 
sessions – often known as ‘informal’ or ‘informal-informal’ – where many of the 
key decisions are made.124 Betsill argues: 
States have a further advantage in treaty making because they 
ultimately vote on whether to approve the text of an international 
agreement. States can use the threat to block negotiations as a source 
of leverage, a tool that is generally not available to NGOs.125 
States address environmental problems in an international treaty making context 
which gives special leverage to states and the outcome of the treaty becomes 
moderate because states become mindful to take account of their domestic and 
international interests in adopting and ratifying the international environmental 
agreements.  
Yet ENGOs were active during the KP negotiation processes. Many scholars 
agree that NGOs’ participation at global environmental negotiations do make a 
difference126 but the extent of influence is contestable. COP-3 had more than 1000 
ENGOs representatives but only one fourth of the ENGOs were from the less 
developed South which had sent only one or two representatives each.127 ENGOs 
established a coalition called Climate Action Network (CAN) for their activities 
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and lobbying during the KP negotiations. CAN was created in 1989 as a global 
network of almost 700 environmental NGOs working to curb human-induced 
climate change to ecologically sustainable levels.128 “The major NGOs also have 
considerable independent international activities that take place outside the 
framework of CAN”.129 
The ENGOs had four main objectives during the KP negotiations: 130 
commitments from industrialized countries for twenty per cent GHG emissions 
reductions below 1990 levels by 2005, strong review and compliance mechanisms, 
objections to allow industrialized countries to meet commitments through 
emissions trading, and opposition to credit for emissions absorbed by sinks.131 
The outcomes of the KP were quite different from what the ENGOs had lobbied 
to influence and as Paterson has argued: “it is hard to conceive that their very high 
profile [during the UNFCCC negotiations], their persistent lobbying (in large 
numbers), and their links to the media both internationally and in their own 
countries, were without effect”. 132  For example, the KP’s target of GHG 
emissions was set at 5 per cent below the 1990 level instead of the 20 per cent 
proposed by the ENGOs, emission trading mechanisms became significant tools 
for flexibility for emissions reductions, and parties decided to use sinks as 
absorbers.  
ENGO’s access to the plenary meetings was also very limited. Their participation 
at plenary sessions mostly depended on the Chairman’s discretion until KP. 
Betsill noted: “Throughout the ABGM process, NGOs were denied access to the 
floor during plenary sessions and by ABGM 6, delegates met primarily in closed 
door ‘non-group’ sessions from which NGOs were excluded altogether”.133 The 
post-Kyoto negotiations saw a more open attitude on the part of the chairing 
officers and secretariat to participation by NGOs. 134  Although KP was a 
consensual outcome by the states, NGOs – the representatives of the global civil 
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society – were mostly denied access to the plenary sessions and none of their 
goals were reflected in the Protocol. The limitations on the participation of NGOs 
and non-state actors in actual decision making has implications for what would 
constitute a ‘more democratic’ process. 
4.6 Kyoto Protocol: Environmental Protection or a Compromise 
Despite considerable controversy among parties over the climate change regime, 
the KP came into effect in 2005. It was designed to contain global emissions since 
any increase or reduction of GHG by any country would have global ramifications, 
unlike some other environmental problems such as surface water pollution and 
industrial waste. North America and Europe have had a long history of emitting 
high rates of GHGs since industrialization and the KP upheld the principles of 
CBDR and HR as a way of sharing the global warming burden between developed 
and developing countries. On the developing countries’ interpretation of the 
principle of CBDR the responsibility for remedies was placed on the developed 
countries. Under the KP they were to accept binding emissions targets, provide 
financial and technological support to the developing countries whereas 
developing countries could continue their development business-as-usual.  
Among the industrialized countries, the emissions from the US were the greatest 
with the EU, Canada and Japan the other major emitters. The targets for emissions 
of these and other countries were assumed to reduce under the KP to a level that 
would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system.135  
The EU agreed to the deepest cuts to reduce emissions and ratified the Protocol in 
2002. It was proposed that such levels should be achieved within a time frame 
sufficient to allow ecosystems to adapt naturally to climate change, to ensure that 
food production was not threatened and to enable economic development to 
proceed in a sustainable manner.136 However, the 5 per cent reduction targets of 
the KP was far removed from what the climate science was demanding. Table 4.2 
shows the details of states’ GHG emissions targets. 
 
                                                 
135 The preamble of the Kyoto Protocol writes that Kyoto Protocol is adopted in pursuit of the 
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136 See UNFCCC, 1992. 
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Table 4.2: Parties and Emission Targets by Percentage of Base Year 
Party Quantified Emission 
Reduction Targets 
Party Quantified Emission 
Reduction Targets 
Australia 108 Liechtenstein 92 
Austria 92 Lithuania* 92 
Belgium 92 Luxemburg 92 
Bulgaria* 92 Monaco 92 
Canada 94 Netherlands 92 
Croatia* 95 New Zealand 100 
Czech Republic* 92 Norway 101 
Denmark 92 Poland* 94 
Estonia* 92 Portugal 92 
European Community 92 Romania* 92 
Finland 92 Russian Federation* 100 
France 92 Slovakia* 92 
Germany 92 Slovenia* 92 
Greece 92 Spain  92 
Hungary* 92 Sweden 92 
Iceland 110 Switzerland 92 
Ireland 92 Ukraine* 100 
Italy 92 United Kingdom of 
Great Britain & 
Northern Ireland 
92 
Japan 94 United States of 
America 
93 
Latvia* 92   
Source: Extracted from UNFCCC’s Kyoto Protocol text. Asterisk* has been used to denote 
Economy in Transition.  
It soon became clear that: “The existing climate regime remains grossly 
inadequate when it comes to stabilizing greenhouse gas”.137 The data in figure 4.2 
shows that countries such as Australia, New Zealand and Iceland were the highest 
emitters per capita but they were allowed to continue GHG emissions and their 
way of life. Australia was allowed to accelerate its emissions by 8 per cent; 
Iceland was permitted to accelerate by 10 per cent whereas New Zealand, Russia 
and Ukraine were able to run their industries business-as-usual. The US was to 
reduce by 7 per cent (though it never ratified the agreement), Canada to reduce by 
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6 (it also opted out after Durban Agreement 2011 because it widely failed to keep 
Kyoto targets), and Japan to reduce by 6.  
 
Figure 4.2: Greenhouse Gas Emissions Per Capita, 2009, CO2e Tonnes 
 
Note: Data excludes Land use, land-use change and forestry (LULUCF) 
Source: United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (2011) National Inventory 
Submissions. 
The KP did not give China and India any binding targets as developing countries. 
Recent data from the US Energy Information Administration (EIA) presented in 
figure 4.3 shows that China and India have become the world’s number one and 
number three emitters and the trend of their emissions is rapidly increasing. 
According to International Energy Agency’s (IEA) World Energy Outlook 2011 
the US stands in the second position. China’s total GHG emission by percentage 
is 25.4, the US total emission is 17.8 per cent and India’s total emission is 5.3 per 
cent of the total global emissions which mean together they emit 48.5 per cent.138 
India’s emissions rose 8.7 per cent, in 2011 moving it ahead of Russia to become 
the fourth largest emitter behind China, the US, and the EU. 139  The IEA 
anticipates that CO2 emission trends in developing countries will continue to 
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increase, through the growing consumption of fossil fuels in some of the larger 
countries.140  
 
Figure 4.3: 10 Major Emitters of Greenhouse Gases - 2009 
Source: Extracted from the US Energy Information Administration 2009. The figures shown are in 
million tonnes of greenhouse gas emissions.  
The industrialized countries have been struggling to meet their KP requirements. 
In 2009 GHG emissions in developed countries slightly decreased but the IEA 
reasoned: “The trend of emissions in developed countries will rebound in 2010 
and CO2 emissions will likely be at a similar level to 2008, before the recent 
financial crisis and the slowdown in economic activity”.141 The EU led the way in 
proposing emission limits but even its members are lagging behind and struggling 
to meet the target commitments. Japan’s GHG emissions increased by 2.4 per cent 
in 2012 as a result of a substantial increase in the use of fossil fuels in power 
generation post-Fukushima. 142  Canada's December 2011 decision to withdraw 
from the KP – based on domestic economic concerns, its inability to meet the 
Protocol’s commitments as well as its view that the world's top GHG emitters 
have refused to ratify the agreement – generated concerns that the KP itself may 
be in danger of collapse. 143  According to Climate Action Tracker, emissions 
calculations carried out recently among developed countries reveal that only 
Norway has achieved the Kyoto targets, that Iceland, Israel and Switzerland have 
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made some progress and the rest of the developed countries have achieved 
insufficient reductions to their targets.144 
4.6.1 Kyoto Protocol’s Flexible Mechanisms  
The KP, as noted above, has developed mechanisms such as ETS, 145 JI and CDM. 
The ETS, as set out in the article 17 of the KP, provides opportunities for 
countries to sell their spare emission units. Industrialized countries needing more 
carbon-use than indicated by their cap-quota can buy from those which have 
unused emission credits. The ETS made carbon a commodity which can be 
bought and sold. Parties can buy emission credits and continue polluting.  
The JI is a flexible mechanism established by the KP to support Annex I parties in 
order to maintain their emissions ceilings. The JI is explained in article 6 of the 
Protocol which notes: 
For the purpose of meeting its commitments under Article 3, any Party 
included in Annex I may transfer to, or acquire from, any other such 
Party emission reduction units resulting from projects aimed at 
reducing anthropogenic emissions by sources or enhancing 
anthropogenic removals by sinks of greenhouse gases in any sector of 
economy.146  
Under JI, industrialized countries may run low-carbon projects such as replacing a 
coal fired power plant by a more efficient combined heat and power plant in EITs 
where the costs of running such projects are cheaper. The countries or companies 
can use the earned credits known as emissions reduction units (ERUs) to meet 
their own quantified quotas given by the KP. The provision offers parties a cost-
efficient and flexible means to fulfil their Kyoto commitments whereas the host 
party147  benefits from technology transfer along with foreign investment. The 
projects under the JI mechanism did not start until 2008 and only a few projects 
are in operation.148 Russia and the Ukraine are the host countries of most of the JI 
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projects and the optimism about sharing costs and spreading benefits remains in 
theory.149 The dwindling future of KP has also led to a significant fall in the 
number of JI projects. 
The KP mechanism that has resulted in the greatest growth in the international 
carbon market is the CDM.150 Article 12 of the KP notes: 
The purpose of the clean development mechanism shall be to assist 
Parties not included in Annex I in achieving sustainable 
development and in contributing to the ultimate objective of the 
Convention, and to assist Parties included in Annex I in achieving 
compliance with their quantified emission limitation and reduction 
commitments under Article 3.151  
Under the CDM mechanism industrialized countries invest in clean energy 
projects in developing countries to meet their emissions targets through certified 
emissions reductions (CERs) in their home countries. CDM commenced 
comparatively earlier than JI. By the middle of the 2007, around 700 CDM 
projects had been approved to be funded mostly in the major developing country 
emitters such as China, India, Brazil and Mexico.152 Figure 4.4 below shows the 
limited focus of CDM. The four different colours stand for four countries from 
bottom – ascending order: India, China, Brazil and Mexico. The figure shows that 
almost 80 per cent of CDM projects have been concentrated in these four 
countries. The largest portion of the figure is indicated in red which stands for 
China. The second largest portion, in light purple, represents India. Brazil, 
indicated by white, stands at the third position with Mexico, shown in dark purple, 
is the fourth. 
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Figure 4.4: CDM Projects in Operation in Developing Countries 
 
Source: United Nations Environmental Program, http://cdmpipeline.org/cdm-projects-region.htm.  
By creating assets with a market value of CERs, the CDM is designed to help 
channel private sector investment towards climate friendly projects that otherwise 
might not have come into existence.153  Yet there is doubt that CDM projects 
create win-win situations in reducing GHGs because “it allows developed 
countries to relax their own emissions reductions efforts”. 154  In addition, the 
“Lack of non-Annex I Parties’ quantified mitigation commitments in the CDM 
context creates incentives for those involved in CDM projects to inflate the 
amount of CERs claimed, through, for example, manipulation of counterfactual 
‘base-line’ scenarios”.155  
Whether developing countries are transforming the modes of energy production 
and consumption into renewable sources of energy through CDM is not yet clear. 
It is said that marginal projects dominate, such as containment of industrial gases 
by bolting on fixtures to already existing pipes and, according to Giddens, almost 
half the emission reduction claims are the results of accounting tricks and empty 
of content.156 “And it has encouraged a lot of fraud”.157 
Despite heavy criticism of the environmental integrity of coal projects, the CDM 
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executive board permitted two controversial mega projects: a new coal fired 
power plant and a hydro power plant in India which made headlines because of its 
non‐additionality in reduction of emissions and the harm reportedly caused to the 
local population.158 The transparencies of the CDM projects are rather limited 
because the processes of registration and granting CERs are not made public.  
The US sought these emission trading mechanisms during the KP negotiations 
that would allow developed countries to achieve their emission targets either 
through emission-abatement projects or through emission trading, whereas the EU 
and developing countries argued that domestic actions were the main measures to 
achieving targets. 159  The EU’s initial rejection of emissions trading made it 
impossible for America to stay in the treaty,160 and while this debate ended up 
with flexible mechanisms, America stayed out of the Protocol. The introduction of 
these flexible mechanisms was intended to reduce GHG emissions but, as Victor 
noted, they carried “deep flaws that are hard to fix”.161 In fact they provided easy 
access to the investors to move to developing countries, where there were no 
quantified targets, from industrialized countries to pay and pollute there. Many 
rich countries have achieved some improvement of environmental performance, at 
least in part, by shifting some of the more resource intensive and polluting 
industries to developing countries and by increasing imports. 162  Thus, they 
provide relaxation to industrialized countries to meet their quantified Kyoto 
targets by offshoring domestic emissions elsewhere but making no serious 
contributions to global emissions reduction. 
4.7 Responses of Key Players to the Kyoto Protocol 
The varied differences and interests among the parties and negotiating groups 
over environmental protection made the climate change negotiations complex. As 
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mentioned in chapter 2, Barber and Bartlett wrote:  
Treaties can be negotiated between nations to advance the cause of 
environmental protection. But is it really possible that an international 
environmental consensus, amounting to a collective determination to 
follow a shared course for reasons held in common, can emerge from 
our disjointed and competitive system of global governance?163  
The climate change problem, as a part of wider environmental problems, is 
borderless and intervenes globally because the “interconnectedness and 
interdependence” of the current world order means that environmental problems 
cannot be resolved by individual states or regional organizations.164 Keohane and 
Nye argued that in the politics of interdependence, domestic and foreign policy 
become closely linked and interdependence in world politics refers to situations 
characterized by reciprocal effects among countries or among actors in different 
countries.165  
The 8 years of wrangling between the parties left the KP with little optimism until, 
finally, with Russia on board, it was able to come into effect. Exploring the 
economic interests and political differences of parties provides a clear picture of 
the slow progress of the KP. This section examines why some high emitting 
industrialized countries ratified the Protocol, and whether they were actually 
concerned with environmental issues or with their national interests and strategies. 
The US Senate rejected the KP by 95 against 0 votes in 1997, yet this does not 
explain why Russia ratified the Protocol in 2004, or why the EU, Japan, Canada, 
China and India ratified the KP. The following section examines the extent to 
which economic issues determined the outcome of the KP. 
Japan’s ratification of the KP in 2001 was crucial for the survival of the Protocol. 
The US withdrawal from the KP was a heavy blow for Japan because it could give 
the US industries an advantage to continue their businesses as usual, while 
Japanese industries would have to make heavy cuts to meet their KP targets of 6 
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per cent. By ratifying the KP, Japan had a competitive disadvantage because the 
US had opted out of the Protocol and the emerging developing countries were 
exempt from any commitments. Japanese industries did not want the government 
to ratify the Protocol because of the possible effect on their economy whereas the 
Japanese public and NGOs were largely supportive of early ratification. 166  In 
addition, there was strong support for ratification from the Japanese Ministry of 
Environment (MOE), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA) and some 
industries including pollution, nuclear and insurance.167  
It is certainly not inconceivable that Japan would have sided with the US,168 since 
Japan had strong trade relations with the US. An important concern for the 
Japanese government in ratifying the Protocol was the close association with 
Japanese national identity and the name of the Protocol – Kyoto. The embedded 
symbolism constrained the ability of anti-KP forces in Japan to get their concerns 
onto the political agenda and limited the freedom of action of political leaders in 
the wake of the US withdrawal.169 In addition, Europe was also one of the most 
lucrative Japanese markets and Japan was aware that if Japan did not ratify the KP, 
Japanese products would possibly be boycotted by the European champions of 
environmental concerns. Thus, Japan’s embedded symbolism coupled with its 
economic interests saw Japan ratify the Protocol. 
The EU had established some of the strongest and most innovative environmental 
protection measures in the world and had increasingly taken the lead role on 
international environmental issues such as climate change. 170  The EU and its 
member countries were parties to both the UNFCCC and the KP. The 15 EU 
states who were then members in 1997 took on an 8 per cent emissions reduction 
target, and distributed the reduction among its members. The EU ratified the KP 
in 2002, thereby confirming the commitment of EU members to emission 
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reductions. There has been no major political drive identified for the EU’s climate 
championship, but it did want to salvage itself from the wrongs that it had 
committed by destroying the environment as based on the principle of CBDR. It 
was also interested to save the environment given the EU was the most developed 
landmass of the earth, ensuring the maintenance of its central role in climate 
change politics. Most EU countries had already reached full development. The EU 
was also committed to the KP and its use and promotion of biofuels energy and 
common regional trade interest. Perhaps one of the reasons for the EU’s 
willingness to tackle GHG emissions had also something to do with the need of 
EU countries to reduce their dependence on imports of oil and gas. 
Scholars including Axelrod, Vig and Schreurs have noted the lead role of the EU: 
Political will and public support have been keys to EU success in 
approaching the environment from an integrated perspective. First, the 
legal foundations have been firmly established so that the EU has an 
unchallenged right to protect the environment. Second, all states 
recognize that without common environmental policies, barriers to free 
trade develop. Third, political, economic, and geographic diversity 
have challenged policy makers to develop innovative strategies for 
overcoming differences and sharing burdens equitably.171 
While the EU as a bloc ratified the KP, “the picture is patchy across the bloc” and 
“many member states are finding it tough to meet their individual targets as set 
under a burden sharing agreement”. 172  Europe has generally talked a better 
climate-protection game than it has delivered. The EU deferred the target of 30 
per cent emissions reductions announced in the build-up of COP-15, in part 
because of the economic strains of the global recession in 2008 but, by slowing 
the economic activity across Europe, the recession has made the target easier and 
cheaper to achieve. 173  An IEA press release reports that the challenge of 
improving and maintaining the quality of life for people in all countries, while 
limiting CO2 emissions, had never been greater since the IEA estimated that 40% 
of global emissions came from OECD countries in 2010. These countries 
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accounted for 25% of emissions growth compared to 2009.174 Many newly joined 
EU members accepted the targets because they could derive huge economic 
benefits from the ETS mechanism such as the JI. 
Canada’s ratification of the Protocol gave a somewhat different message. Canada 
calculated the US to be uncooperative in trying to impose its unilateralism. For 
example, Chretien’s government sent a message to the US that its unilateral policy 
was unfair. Canada ratified the KP and, in 2005, Paul Martin and his Liberal 
government, made a pledge to spend $10 billion on climate change.175 However, 
when Stephen Harper’s government presented the federal budget in 2006, there 
was no mention of the KP.176 In 2006 the Canadian Conservative government said 
that the KP targets were unrealistic and unachievable. After the Durban Climate 
Conference in December 2011, Canada formally announced that it would 
withdraw its participation from the KP. There were two major consequences of 
the withdrawal: Canada was to pay $14 billion for carbon credits because it 
lagged far behind the KP target and, second, the KP was ineffective for Canada 
because it exempted major emitters. This meant that even if the industrialized 
countries reduced their emissions, the concentration of emissions would rise 
because of the major developing economies.177 
Canada and Australia had been actively involved in the UNFCCC climate 
negotiations from the outset. Australia had decided not to ratify the Protocol on 5 
June, 2002 whereas Canada ratified the Protocol in December 2002. The 
Australian government announced that it had “decided not to ratify the Kyoto 
Protocol although it has agreed to limit its greenhouse gas emissions to 108 per 
cent of the level of 1990 emissions by 2008-12”.178 Australia is the world’s worst 
per capita emitter of GHGs mainly due to its large exports of coal and gas and its 
low population.179 The US decision on the KP was one of the major causes of 
                                                 
174 IEA, Prospect of Limiting the Global Increase in Temperature to 2ºC is Getting Bleaker (Paris: 
OECD/IEA, 2011c). 
175 ‘In Depth: Kyoto and Beyond’, CBC News, February 14, 2007, 
http://www.cbc.ca/news/background/kyoto/. 
176 Ibid. 
177 Rob Gilles, ‘Canada Pulls Out of the Kyoto Protocol’, The GUK, December 13, 2011, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/feedarticle/9992409.  
178Australian Government. State of Environment 2006 (Canberra: Department of Sustainability, 
Environment, Water, Population and Communities, 2006).  
179 Grant Holloway, ‘Australia Isolated over Kyoto’, CNN.com/World, September 4, 2002, 
http://edition.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/asiapcf/auspac/09/04/australia.kyoto/index.html . 
118 
Australian non-ratification. The political and economic relationships between the 
US, Canada and Australia were significant. The Australian Prime Minister 
Howard stated that if the Protocol was in the best interests of Australia, it would 
sign it, noting three areas of concern for Australia: first, Australia did not know 
what the obligations would be in the next two assessment periods; second, unlike 
most developed countries Australia was a net exporter of energy; third, there was 
the uncompetitive position of Australia with competitor countries such as China 
and India, which were not part of the binding KP.180 These three issues revolved 
around the national interests of Australia. Yet, despite these earlier concerns, 
Kevin Rudd’s government ratified the KP in 2007 after winning the government 
benches.181 
The Russian Federation ratified the KP on November 5, 2004, which provided the 
lifeline to the Protocol by passing the threshold set. “Like a swamp creature in a 
bad horror movie, the Kyoto treaty on climate change has risen from the dead”.182 
Three different factors lay behind the delayed Russian decision to ratify the KP: 
economic, political and environmental. Economically, the KP gave Russia a 0 per 
cent target which meant Russia was able to maintain its emissions at 1990 levels 
without making any major change.183 The collapse of the Russian economy put 
global-warming emissions well below the limits set by the KP. Accepting the 0 
emission limits would have profited Russia handsomely from selling unused 
emission credits to countries with booming economies.184 In addition, Russia was 
given an extra incentive considering its vast forests which could work as carbon 
sinks. The JI was a lucrative mechanism for Russia to sell its carbon credits. 
The economic gain from the sale of carbon credits would have led Russia to ratify 
the Protocol in 2002 along with other major industrialized countries. But when the 
US, the biggest market for Russia’s carbon credits, withdrew from the Protocol, 
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Russia was in confusion. Russia’s heavy reliance on the energy sector for revenue 
meant that Russia had to be certain that the KP would not detrimentally affect its 
energy industry.185 Russia was in transition and unsure whether ratifying the KP 
was an advantage or whether it would be at a position of disadvantage. Russia 
needed some time to understand the economic consequences of ratification.  
Climate science, for Vladimir Putin, was embryonic. Apparently there were a 
number of uncertainties about the impacts of climate change and the scale of 
damage. Putin was not convinced that climate change was anthropogenic. For 
example, in 2000 Putin curtailed the environmental committees of Russia to 
minimize the number of bureaucrats, and permitted an oil pipeline from Southern 
Siberia to China as a measure of economic development.186 Putin had ambivalent 
attitudes towards environmental protection. The statement he produced after the 
ratification of the KP suggested that environmental protection was just rhetoric for 
Putin. He said: 
The decision on ratification was passed taking into account the 
significance of the Protocol for the development of international 
cooperation and, likewise, taking into account the Protocol will take 
effect only under the condition of the Russian Federation's 
participation in it.187  
Putin wanted to continue bargaining for political benefits and economic interests 
in addition to earning profits by selling carbon credits to European markets 
without the US. The US withdrawal positioned Russia at the centre of the KP 
because it was only Russian ratification that could have made the Protocol 
effective. Acknowledging its sound position on KP ratification, Putin pressurized 
the EU to offer favours for ratification. In particular, Russia wanted strong support 
from the EU on its bid to join World Trade Organization (WTO) as a favour for 
the KP ratification. 188  The Working Party on the Accession of the Russian 
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Federation was established on 16 June 1993, completing its mandate on 10 
November 2011, under the chairmanship of Ambassador Stefán Jóhannesson 
(Iceland). The Eighth Ministerial Conference formally approved the Accession 
Package of the Russian Federation on 16 December 2011 and on 22 August 2012, 
the WTO welcomed the Russian Federation as its 156th member.189 
An analysis of the history of climate change negotiations and a breakdown of the 
national (economic) interests that are potentially affected explains why opposition 
has, up to now, prevailed in the US.190 The US economy has a heavy dependence 
on fossil fuels and accounted for 36.1 per cent of GHG emissions in 1990, making 
it the world’s biggest polluter.191 “With 4 per cent of the world’s population, the 
US produces 25 per cent of its carbon-dioxide emissions”.192 There had been great 
concern that ratification of the KP would make the US economy suffer.193 The US 
response to the KP was in line with its responses to other multilateral agreements, 
such as the International Criminal Court (ICC), and international arms control 
agencies and weapons inspectors which posed a profound challenge to the UN’s 
founding principle of collective security.194  
The Bush Administration preferred unilateralism, or at least US dominance 
instead of multilateralism, in terms of global policy making. The US did not trust 
the UN and offered no constructive roles on various issues of that time. Victor 
wrote: “The US, unlike nearly all other countries on the planet, can get things 
done without the UN, and that luxury allows many Americans to see the UN as a 
bothersome constraint on American freedom of action”. 195  It appears the US 
sought UN support only to legitimize its unilateral actions such as waging war 
against Iraq and for seeking a coalition in the name of terrorism although it may 
not be the case for all issues.  
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In sharp contrast to climate change negotiations, the US provided strong 
leadership for protecting the ozone layer negotiations. 
The United States, which at that time accounted for more than 40 per 
cent of worldwide CFC production, took a lead role in the negotiations 
in part because it had already banned CFC use in aerosol spray cans, 
which accounted for a large percentage of total use at that time, and 
wanted other states to follow suit.196  
The Montreal Protocol did not threaten the US interest and economy but allowed 
it to export the US manufactured domestic law to the international level. “DuPont 
officials announced that substitutes could be available in five years if market 
conditions warranted the development effort”. 197  DuPont’s announcement was 
followed by other large chemical companies in the US and the Europe.198 Indeed, 
the Montreal Protocol had limited contents (a few gases used mostly for 
refrigeration and readily available substitutes) on the table and found it cheaper to 
address them in comparison to the risk of skin cancer and huge expenses to fight 
against it. The ozone regime had ten years graduation period for developing 
countries but the stark difference with climate change regime is that there is no 
graduation period for developing countries.  
Developing countries were required to make binding commitments and in return 
developed countries agreed to provide financial and technological support for 
phasing out the ozone depleting substances. It was based on national domestic 
abatement of ozone depleting substances whereas the KP’s flexible mechanisms 
offered external alternatives for emission caps. The scientific body to produce 
knowledge on ozone depleting substances was not intergovernmental and the 
process of producing knowledge was more efficient, faster and less bureaucratic. 
The US did not have sound climate change policies ready for implementation. If 
the US had had bold and effective policies at home it would have given the US a 
leadership role on international climate change negotiations and policy.  
The US Congress had been very sceptical about UN actions regarding the 
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environment.199 The frequent watering down of international climate agreements 
by the US Congress demonstrated that the Congressmen did not put scientific 
evidence of IPCC on their priority list over the US economy as noted in Byrd-
Hagel resolution in 1997.200 The polarized politics of climate change within the 
Senate and the House of Representatives between Democrats and Republicans 
further complicated the issue.201  
According to two 1998 nationwide polls by the Program on International Policy 
Attitudes “an overwhelming majority of the U.S. public embraces the idea that 
global warming is a real problem that requires action” and “a strong majority of 
Americans favours Senate ratification of the Kyoto Treaty but Senate did not 
embrace the will of Americans.”202 An editorial in The New York Times wrote: 
“The problem, when it comes to motivating politicians, is that the dangers from 
global warming – drought, famine, rising seas – appear to be decades off”.203 In 
short, although opinions were fluid, many thought the effects of global warming 
were unlikely to occur for some decades and would most likely have severe 
consequences for others, i.e. the poor and distant.204 
Under the Clinton administration, the US argued that the major emitters from 
developing countries should make quantified reduction commitments, but the 
developing countries were not ready to accept any binding commitments. Without 
the developing countries on board the US was not inclined to ratify the KP. Had 
the US ratified the Protocol the costs involved in ratification would have been 
significantly greater than the advantages of non-cooperation. “The cost to the US 
of fulfilling its obligations, for instance, could exceed 4% of its GDP and result in 
the loss of 4 million job opportunities”.205 Elliot argued that the US did not ratify 
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the KP for its vested interest in continuing the consumption of fossil fuels to 
upgrade the US economy and the fear that Kyoto was alien, so developing 
countries like China and India would benefit more than the US because if the US 
ratified the Protocol, as a developed country it had to follow the reduction targets 
and also pay a large sum of money for technology transfer and development of the 
developing countries.206 Thus, the US opted out from the KP on the grounds of 
political interests, economic benefits and ‘business interest’. 207  The scientific 
confusion was also used as a reason for non-ratification.  
The New York Times argued that once the US improved its domestic emission 
reductions, it would open the way for it to provide global leadership in climate 
change.208 Apart from this, the US had to be more flexible towards the developing 
countries if it wished to provide global leadership. The New York Times noted in 
2010 that: “industrialized nations agreed in Copenhagen to provide $30 billion in 
aid between 2010 and 2012 and $100 billion annually beginning in 2020” showed 
the remarkable resurgence of American interest in climate change leadership.209 
The US was usually the leading voice on most matters of international 
environmental policy twenty-five years ago but the US resurgence dwindled as, 
Victor noted, “…the US itself is stuck in political gridlock”.210  
China, one of the biggest emitters of GHGs, ratified the KP in 2002 bringing it 
closer to implementation.211 Chinese Premier, Zhu Ronnie, announced through a 
press release that China had approved the KP and that this showed China’s 
positive stance towards international environmental cooperation and sustainable 
development.212 China was considered to be a developing country so it was not 
required to limit its emissions, leaving Chinese industries able to continue with 
the existing modes of energy consumption. China’s mission to reinforce ties and 
cooperation among developing countries was at the foundation of its foreign 
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policy. 213  The issue of climate change, therefore, presented to China 
unprecedented opportunities to enhance its prestige among developing 
countries.214 
In addition, China would be able to earn from the emission trading schemes such 
as CDM. The developed countries had hoped that China would be brought into the 
binding commitments of the KP. It has not materialized yet except Chinese own 
initiatives to fight climate change. China announced its “green project”, a five 
year plan, in 2001 to bring about environmentally friendly products and 
sustainable development. In 2007 China issued a national plan to restructure its 
economy by promoting clean technologies and by improving energy efficiency. 
China is heavily dependent on fossil fuels for its economy and is putting various 
climate change policies into effect to fulfil its responsibilities.215  
China’s 12th five year plan commissioned in 2012 sets binding targets to reduce 
energy consumption per unit of GDP by 16 per cent, aims to cut CO2 emissions 
per unit of GDP by 17 per cent, and raise the proportion of non-fossil fuels in the 
overall primary energy mix to 11.4 per cent.216 But the increasing numbers of 
private cars are emerging worries for Chinese constraints of emissions. Chinese 
light vehicle sales in 2009, at 13.6 million, exceeded the 10 million of the US and 
Chinese consumer spending was expected to rise rapidly. 217  Due to its deep 
economic interests for continuity for higher growth rate and large population, it 
has encountered uphill challenges in the fight against climate change.  
With its population of 1.2 billion, India is close to China in the global ranks of 
population. India ratified the Protocol in 2002. T.R. Baalu, Minister for 
Environment and Forests of India, said: “India’s accession to the Kyoto Protocol 
is a reiteration of our commitment to addressing and resolving various issues of 
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global concern in a multilateral manner”. 218  India is another fast growing 
economy and, as a developing country, did not have to meet any specific target to 
curb emissions. It could also benefit from the emission trading scheme such as the 
CDM projects. Having gained these economic advantages, India had nothing to 
lose in political and environmental matters by ratifying the KP. To have its 
political role in international relations, India needed a multilateral forum and 
ratification of the KP would place India in a better bargaining position in the 
future.  
In addition, COP-8 was scheduled to take place in India. In 2008 India released its 
first National Action Plan on Climate Change emphasizing the overriding priority 
of maintaining high economic growth rates to raise living standards. The plan 
identified measures that promoted Indian development objectives while also 
yielding co-benefits for addressing climate change effectively. It declared its 
national measures would be more successful with assistance from developed 
countries, and pledged that India’s per capita GHG emissions “will at no point 
exceed that of developed countries even as we pursue our development 
objectives”.219  
In sum, the selection of 1990 as the base year of 5 per cent emissions reduction 
targets delivered some advantage to the Russian Federation and countries of the 
Eastern European bloc. 220  Developing countries ratified the KP to fulfil their 
economic and technological necessities for the mitigation of GHGs and adaptation 
to changing climate. For developing countries, having an international agreement 
signed was a means of ensuring the continuation of funding aid from the 
developed countries. The ratification of the KP did not constrain developing 
countries and made no significant contribution to the problems of climate change. 
The AOSIS were concerned with the possible submerging of their low lying 
island states and had the strongest voice for radical cuts but the national 
(economic and political) interests of the powerful states softened their voices. 
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The KP came into existence to reduce emissions below 5 per cent from 1990 
levels. Several rounds of negotiations and bargaining among the major emitters 
resulted in the KP becoming a near universal document, but it had little to offer by 
way of reducing GHG emissions. States have been able to choose any base year 
and binding targets can vary from one state to another. The industrialized 
countries have different levels of targets for cutting GHG emissions. Only Europe 
had targets of 8 per cent but the major GHG emitters had low targets or were able 
to increase their emissions further. The targets and policies of the KP proposed 
insignificant targets to decrease emissions. The politics of climate change among 
the key actors turned the KP into a legally binding but a weak document that 
could offer very little to arrest climate change.  
4.8 Conclusion 
The KP was the first legally binding agreement on global climate change and 
aimed to reduce 5 per cent of GHG emissions below the level of 1990 which, 
however, proved not to be enough to address the potential impact of climate 
change predicted by climate scientists. The near-universal ratification indicated 
that policy making procedures at Kyoto reflected a consensual approach based on 
formal equality. Given the large number of parties to the international climate 
change negotiations, not all parties could equally participate in every stage of 
negotiations and decision making. NGOs, as representatives of global civil society, 
offered considerable expertise for drastic emissions cuts but the outcomes of the 
KP did not reflect that the presence of NGOs made any difference. They should 
have been given greater roles in policy making instead of being restricted in their 
participation at plenary sessions of the KP negotiations. Their presence could have 
encouraged parties to be more flexible in building the consensus because NGOs 
would report the positions of the parties back to their constituencies on the one 
hand and, on the other hand, their presence could have reduced the democratic 
deficit evident in the UN’s processes of negotiation.  
The principle of CBDR, agreed in the UNFCCC in 1992, albiet very relevant to 
most developing countries, was rendered less relevant to China, India and Brazil 
as they rapidly increased their economic growth. These countries are reluctant to 
share the burden that restricts their economic growth along with development and 
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political interests, as will be further discussed in chapter 5. The US as the biggest 
emitter did not ratify the Protocol, while India and China, two of the biggest 
emitters, were free-riders because they did not have to commit themselves to any 
legally binding emission targets. The Protocol came into force in 2005 but the 
evidence shows that, with very few exceptions, countries have not met their KP 
goals,221 and that global GHG emissions have continued to rise.222 The developed 
countries committed to GHG emissions reductions negotiated at the KP, in order 
to reduce the cost of meeting their commitments, depend on their access to 
cheaper reductions elsewhere.223  
KP negotiations after its adoption in 1997 became more complex until it was 
given the final support by Russia. Studies conducted by the International Institute 
for Applied Systems (IIASA) and the World Energy Council (WEC) show that 
Russia and the Ukraine are likely to reach their KP targets even in the absence of 
any global warming policy so they could receive economic incentives by the 
Protocol.224 Japanese confusion and the Canadian decision to withdraw from the 
Protocol confirmed their concerns for economic interests over climate change. 
Under the state-centric framework, states’ economic and political interests were 
the first priority of the major emitters, as seen in the concerns of the US and 
Australia and others.  
The KP became a compromised manifesto as political and economic interests of 
the parties predominated making it ineffective in the reduction of GHGs. 225 
Nevertheless, the proponents of the KP could argue that it is a unique 
environmental agreement on at least four counts. First, it was an international 
legally binding agreement which many signatories were expected to observe.226 
Second, the COPs to the KP agreed to adopt different targets among industrialized 
countries for the period of 2008-2012 with the average range of emission 
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reductions 5 per cent below the 1990 levels. 227  Third, it developed flexible 
mechanisms, particularly the ETS, JI and CDM to support project-based 
cooperation with developed countries like Annex I and Annex II parties, and 
developed and developing countries like Annex I and Non-Annex I parties. For 
the ETS, a flexible mechanism such as JI assisted industrialized countries in 
meeting their binding targets, and there has been the CDM to assist developing 
countries through sustainable development. Fourth, the KP was able to 
disseminate the knowledge that for the stability of the concentration of GHGs in 
the atmosphere, the current mode of using fossil fuels and way of life had to be 
altered.  
However, the Kyoto style agreement cannot be considered a pathfinder for future 
negotiations because significant contributions from each state are necessary to 
address rapid emissions concentrations in the atmosphere. The unequal 
distribution of wealth and resources among the states of the rich and poor and 
development agenda of the developing countries are to be addressed to combat 
climate change but they should not be done at the expense of environment. The 
developed countries have great responsibility to lead and shoulder the burden of 
addressing climate change and compensation is necessary because it can be 
effective in getting reluctant countries to participate in the international effort to 
slow global warming much more effectively.228 But if emerging economies such 
as China and India become free-riders and continue their emissions as business as 
usual on the basis of the historic responsibility of the North, the global aim of 
GHGs abatement remains elusive.  
Although HR is an important aspect of climate change negotiations, it is also one 
of the arguments made by some for their national interests. It is not a given and 
cannot be used to immune contemporary  major emitters. Each party to the 
UNFCCC should acknowledge the fact that if climate change is a problem, it is 
global problem and it requires global actions to contain it. It is clear that any 
emissions reductions by only developed countries is far removed from limiting the 
global temperature to 2 degree Celsius relative to pre-industrial age, exempting 
major emitters from developing countries. The current debate centres on whether 
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the developing world should share the burden. For an appropriate and robust 
response to global climate change, all major emitters should be willing to shoulder 
the responsibility for drastic emissions cuts. Mechanisms such as compensation 
and differential commitments can help bind major developing countries into 
quantified commitments but such rules are complicated and difficult to design 
given the large number of states with vested state-centric interests are parties to 
the UNFCCC.229  
This chapter has shown that the state-centric framework for the negotiations, in 
which non-state actors were only observers rather than participants, meant that the 
special national interests of the major emitters dominated the outcome leaving the 
KP unable to contribute significantly in reducing emissions and slow progress. 
Further, it needs to be noted that although NGOs’ fuller participation might have 
made some difference, it is not clear that states would have had to come to terms 
with their environmental agenda through the current interstate forum of UNFCCC. 
A multi-actor partnership, including major stakeholder participation and extensive 
deliberation would make the decision making process more democratic, legitimate 
and the policies more effective in terms of policy making and implementation. An 
inclusive approach would help the public, the main addressees of the climate 
change, to understand, ‘own’ and respond to the problem. 
This case study has displayed that states, particularly major emitters, can stay out 
of any environmental agreements irrespective of pressures created by other states. 
With reference to the first two sub questions and propositions related to these 
questions generated in chapter 2, it can be concluded that the lack of progress 
towards achieving the benefits of climate change is due to the institutional 
shortcomings of the UNFCCC and also those of the democratic processes of the 
UN and its environmental organizations and, second, that an international climate 
consensus is not possible because of the competitive system of global governance. 
These conclusions will be further contextualized in the concluding chapter of the 
thesis. The next chapter explores whether these cases affirm the procedures and 
processes of developments in the round of negotiations at COP-15 and the 
production of Copenhagen Accord.  
                                                 
229 Ibid, 43. 
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Chapter 5 
The Copenhagen Climate Change Conference 2009 
5.1 Introduction 
Chapter 4 established that the Kyoto Protocol (KP) was a compromised lowest 
common denominator document and short-term climate agreement for four years 
period (2008-2012). Under it, Conferences of the Parties (COPs) were to negotiate 
and agree to a substantial and long term climate agreement by 2009 for limiting 
the global temperature by 2 degree Celsius (2°C). Under the auspices of the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the COPs 
organized the fifteenth meeting in Copenhagen, Denmark, with the hope of 
producing legal certainty and political guidance to the future of the international 
climate change regime after 2012 in accordance with the Bali Action Plan (BAP) 
adopted in 2007 which set the terms for long-term cooperative action for the post 
2012 period.1 The goal of COP-15 was to establish a serious international climate 
change agreement for implementation when the KP expired. Formal statements 
from negotiating blocs and parties at COP-15 illustrated their intention to 
conclude a rigorous post-Kyoto agreement in December 2009 with a globally 
legally binding effect. However, the outcomes of the conference were weak 
legally, environmentally and democratically since “no serious commitment to 
binding reductions was agreed upon”.2 
Many countries called for a global and comprehensive agreement, with a robust 
and legally binding structure that would provide the necessary investment 
environment and the basis of trust between countries to reassure all that 
everybody was doing their fair share. 3  Although many anticipated a legally 
binding treaty from COP-15, which needed to include large emitters such as the 
                                                 
1 UNFCCC, ‘The Bali Roadmap, Closing Statement of Joint High-Level Segment by the President 
of the COP, Rachmat Witoelar,’ http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/ 
cop_13/application/pdf/close_stat_cop13_president.pdf. According to BAP the areas to focus on at 
COP-15 were GHG emissions reduction goals for industrialized countries an0d, where applicable, 
for newly industrializing countries, and financial and technological support to developing 
countries for adaptation and mitigation. 
2 Margaret P. Karns and Karen A. Mingst, International Organizations: The Politics and 
Processes of Global Governance (Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2011), 501. 
3 Joeri Rogeli, et al. ‘Copenhagen Accord Pledges are Paltry’, Nature 464, no. 7292 (2010): 1126-
28. 
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United States (US), no legally binding agreement was forthcoming. 4  The 
expectations for an ‘agreed outcome’ of the Bali Action Plan were not met,5 and a 
recurring question has been why parties made no progress even after having 
recognized the climate science. In addressing the core question of the lack of 
progress, chapter 4 analysed the state-centric interests of the parties and the 
(in)ability of the KP to reduce greenhouse gases (GHGs). The principle of 
common but differentiated responsibilities (CBDR) was the major element in 
keeping the US, the number one emitter, out, thereby making the Protocol weak. 
Furthermore, although by the UNFCCC constitution all parties were equal, with 
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) having observer status, major emitters 
were influential in determining the outcomes of the KP, while NGOs were given 
access to the meetings only at the discretion of the Chair of the meetings. This 
chapter examines the COP-15 negotiations, the Copenhagen Accord and its 
relevance to the goals of the UNFCCC, and outlines the various interests of the 
largest emitting parties, their concern for the environment, the contributions of 
parties and observers to the deliberations, and the climate change negotiating 
framework and contents in assessing the main reasons for the inadequate 
outcomes of COP-15. 
The first section of this chapter presents the background and context of the COP-
15. Section 5.2 contextualizes the issues of the representation of actors and the 
equality of UNFCCC’s norms in theory and practice. Section 5.3 discusses the 
conflict between the emissions reductions goals of UNFCCC and the 
environmental concerns of participating governments, while section 5.4 analyses 
the consensual decision making practices of UNFCCC gauging its strengths and 
weaknesses. This analysis shows that the practice of consensual decision making 
was undemocratic, the outcomes which followed were often protracted, frustrating 
and of the lowest common denominator. There was also the risk of veto and 
stalled negotiations, as experienced in COP-15. The following sections outline 
and discuss major issues with COP-15, the Copenhagen Accord and the 
implications arising from COP-15. The last section discusses the interests of the 
different negotiating blocs and major emitters, followed by a conclusion.  
                                                 
4 Lauren M. Sandler and Reeva I. Schiffman Kymer, ‘Copenhagen Accord: Outcomes, Next Steps, 
and Business Implications’, Environmental Claims Journal 22, no. 2 (2010):144-49. 
5 UNFCCC, Bali Action Plan (Bonn: Climate Change Secretariat, 2007).  
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5.2 Background and Context 
COP-15, held from 7 to 19 December 2009, was one of the largest gatherings of 
world leaders ever held outside UN headquarters. More than 40,000 people, 
representing governments, NGOs, intergovernmental organizations, faith-based 
organizations, media and UN agencies were accredited. 6  Also present were 
participants of the Subsidiary Body for Implementation (SBI) and the Subsidiary 
Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA), the Ad hoc Working 
Group on Further Commitments for Annex I Parties under the KP (AWG-KP), 
and the Ad hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action under the 
Convention (AWG-LCA).7  
Under the KP, an Ad hoc working group, AWG-KP, had been established to work 
towards future negotiations and commitments to uphold commitments from 
industrialized countries for a second commitment period of the KP. The US was 
not party to the AWG-KP, but did have observer status. To bring the US into the 
negotiation process the AWG-LCA was established at COP-13 in Bali, as a 
subsidiary body for the enhancement of the implementation of the Convention in 
accordance with the provisions of the Convention and commitments made.8 They 
both developed a shared vision of long-term cooperative action, enhanced 
adaptation, mitigation,9 finance and technology transfer. Apart from bringing the 
US into the negotiating process, the aim of establishing AWG-LCA was to launch 
a comprehensive process to enable the full, effective and sustained 
implementation of the Convention through a long-term cooperative action, up to 
and beyond 2012, in order to reach an agreed outcome and adopt decisions made 
at COP-15.10 The two AWGs held their meetings in parallel, but there was little 
substantive cooperation and coordination between them.11 
                                                 
6 UNFCCC, Copenhagen Climate Change Conference - December 2009 (Bonn: Climate Change 
Secretariat, 2009b). 
7 Ibid.  
8 See UNFCCC, United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (Bonn: Climate 
Change Secretariat, 1992), Article 2. 
9 Mitigation refers to how to minimize the impacts of climate change. 
10 See UNFCCC, 2007.  
11 Kati Kulovesi and Maria Gutiérrez, ‘Climate Change Negotiations Update: Process and 
Prospects for a Copenhagen Agreed Outcome in December 2009’,  Review of European 
Community and International Environmental Law 18, no. 3(2009): 229–43 
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The BAP was the most significant factor in preparing for COP-15 and followed 
two years of intense international climate change negotiations proposed by Bali 
conference 2007 for a new global climate agreement to come into effect by the 
end of 2012. There was hope that the inauguration of the Obama administration in 
the US would provide a strong leadership role on climate change and that the 
strengthening of the international standing of China would also show some 
leadership on climate change. Although it did not translate into reality, with each 
of the two major emitters seeking excuses for their lack of action by using the 
other’s failure to act, a weak and limited document was produced. Nevertheless, 
by meeting at COP-15 states indicated that they accepted climate change as a 
significant challenge of the 21st century. 12  The world leaders accepted the 
projections of global warming by the international scientific community in 
Copenhagen 2009.13  
5.3 Copenhagen Climate Conference Participation and Representation 
COP-15 was attended by 193 COPs and two observer states: the Holy See and 
Andorra,14 indicating that the states were taking the climate issue seriously and 
wanted to deliver on it. The number of non-state actors’ participation showed that 
the global civil society was also concerned about climate change and were 
lobbying the states to deliver. It was an unprecedented climate change conference 
because it was planned by many of the COPs to deliver on the goals set by the 
BAP “on long-term cooperation” for a post-Kyoto arrangement.15 The conference 
attracted the attendance of world leaders.  
Figure 5.1 below summarises participation by the three main groups at COP-2, 3 
and 15. Parties include member states and observers representing a wide range of 
people. It shows that COP-15 had significantly more observers and parties than 
earlier meetings.  
 
                                                 
12 See UNFCCC 1992, and UNFCCC, Kyoto Protocol (Bonn: Climate Change Secretariat, 1998). 
13 Reports by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). The reports are prepared by 
2500 scientists from 130 countries and must be endorsed by all governments before being 
officially released. 
14 IISD Reporting Services, ‘COP 15 Final’, Earth Negotiations Bulletin 12, no. 459 (2009): 1-30. 
15 IISD Reporting Services, ‘COP/MOP3 Final’, Earth Negotiations Bulletin12, no. 354 (2007): 1-
22. 
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Figure 5.1: Comparative data of COP-2, 3 and 15 
 
Source: Adapted from UNFCCC’s Participation Breakdown, 
http://unfccc.int/files/parties_and_observers/ngo/application/pdf/participation_breakdown_cop1-
17.pdf. 0 to 14000 shows the individuals attending the conference from each group. 
The presence of non-state actors was a valuable source of increasing the 
accountability and transparency of the UNFCCC and its Conventions, Protocols 
and Accords and was compatible with the vision of global democracy the UN had 
adopted 16 , as discussed in chapter 2. The UN had emphasized the need to 
democratize global decision making processes which could only result from the 
more extensive engagement of non-state actors, especially non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) and businesses.17  
Backstrand noted that: “Multi-stakeholder partnerships are presented as win-win 
solutions that can increase the democratic credentials of global governance and 
simultaneously strengthen environmental performance and effectiveness”. 18 
Article 71 of the UN Charter provides the legal grounds for non-state actor 
involvement in policy making as observers. A very similar provision is found in 
Article 7.6 of the Convention and Article 13.8 of the KP which seeks to ensure 
climate change processes are legitimate, transparent and accountable by involving 
both states and non-states actors.19  
                                                 
16 Jean-Philippe Therien and Madeleine Belanger Dumontier, ‘The United Nations and Global 
Democracy; From Discourse to Deeds’, Cooperation and Conflict 44, no. 355 (2009): 355-77. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Karin Backstrand, ‘The Legitimacy of Global Public Private Partnership on Climate and 
Sustainable Development’, in Environmental Politics and Deliberative Democracy: Examining the 
Promise of New Modes of Governance, ed., Karin Backstrand et al. 85-104 (Cheltenham, Gloss: 
Edward Elgar Publishing, 2010), 85. 
19 See Article 7.6 of UNFCCC, 1992.  
135 
Questions have been raised by critics of this approach to global democracy who 
comment that non-state actors suffer from low level accountability and 
representativeness.20 Sen argues that the UN conception of global democracy may 
begin “from the middle”21 rather than participation from grass-roots levels. Yet, as 
argued in chapter 2, this model of democracy can only be an alternative in the 
contemporary system of global governance unless both global political leaders 
and academics become more imaginative in responding to borderless challenges.22 
COP-15 was not an exception by including more than 16,000 representatives from 
non-state sectors that included NGOs, civil society organizations (CSOs) and the 
media in the conference, putting pressure on world leaders to ensure better agenda 
setting and delivery processes although these non-state actors were  restrained 
from participation. 
5.3.1 Decision Making Procedures 
The climate change negotiation process followed the consensual approach (see 
chapter 4 above) in reaching decisions and agreements as noted in the rules of 
procedure of climate change in the Convention of 1992. 23  At COP-15 the 
President, Hedegaard, 24  recalled the practice of applying the draft rules of 
procedure with the exception of draft rule 42 on voting. Papua New Guinea 
opposed this, stating that agreement by consensus based on “the lowest common 
denominator” was “gravely negligent” given the seriousness of climate-change 
impacts.25 Amendments of the rules and regulations could be made provided that 
parties agreed and fulfilled the required procedures. 26  Papua New Guinea 
proposed changes to the decision making process, but this was refused at COP-15 
on the majority voting system.  
                                                 
20 Michael Edwards and Simon Zadek, ‘Governing the Provision of Global Public Goods: The 
Role of Legitimacy of Non-state Actors’, in Providing Global Public Goods: Managing 
Globalization, eds. Inge Kaul, Pedro Conceicao,  Katell Le Goulven and Ronald U. Mendoza 200-
24 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003) and Paul Wapner, ‘Introductory Essay: Paradise Lost? 
NGOs and Global Accountability’, Chicago Journal of International Law 3 (2002): 155-60. 
21 Jai Sen, ‘The Power of Civility’, Development Dialogue 49 (2007): 51-64. 
22 Thomas Weiss, ‘What Happened to the Idea of World Government’, International Studies 
Quarterly 53 (2009), 253-271. 
23 See Article 7.2 (k) and 7.3 of UNFCCC 1992. 
24 Connie Hedegaard, Denmark’s climate and energy minister, served as the president of COP-15 
for the first week but she is replaced by Denmark’s Prime Minister Rasmussen as many heads of 
the governments arrived in Copenhagen for the COP-15.  
25 IISD, 2009. 
26 See UNFCCC, Organizational Matters: Adoption of the Rules of Procedure (Bonn: Climate 
Change Secretariat, 1996). 
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Majority voting was considered to be ineffective since some can escape the 
implementation of the policies because they could vote against the policy while 
the process relied on parties showing a willingness to cooperate. It is particularly 
difficult when the issues have multi-dimensional impacts on access to resources, 
and their distribution. Hardin argued:  
When issues have differential effects, especially distributional effects, 
at the international level, we cannot simply vote by some kind of 
majority decision procedure and then expect every nation to follow 
through as virtually every US citizen might be expected to follow 
through on Environmental Protection Agency directives.27  
Thus, the parties to the Convention and Protocol could not form a consensus on 
majority voting for adopting documents and, instead, resorted to a consensual 
decision making process at COP-15 where parties debated but could not produce a 
unanimous agreement, as discussed below. The COPs advised the UNFCCC, 
made policies and took decisions. The UNFCCC and the UN then acted on the 
advice of parties and were accountable to the parties. 
5.3.2 COP-15 Input Processes and Implications  
Article 7.2 of the UNFCCC clarifies the procedures and input processes of the 
COP meetings:  
The Conference of the Parties, as the supreme body of this 
Convention, shall keep under regular review the implementation of the 
Convention and any related legal instruments that the Conference of 
the Parties may adopt, and shall make, within its mandate, the 
decisions necessary to promote the effective implementation of the 
Convention.28  
Decisions must be agreed and adopted by consensus. COPs can change the rules 
of procedure and financial rules for itself and its subsidiary bodies by consensual 
agreement and adoption.  
                                                 
27 Russell Hardin, ‘Democracy and Collective Bads’, in Democracy's Edges, eds. Ian Shapiro and 
Casiano Hacker-Cordon (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 81. 
28 See UNFCCC, 1992. 
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The webcast documentary29 of COP-15 shows that the opening day ceremony 
commenced and concluded smoothly in the Bella Centre in Copenhagen. 
Delegates representing different negotiating groups spoke on behalf of each of 
their negotiating blocs as outlined in section 4.4 of chapter 4. The participation 
processes went smoothly for the first week, prior to the ministerial-level talks but 
access to non-state actors was significantly restricted during the second week of 
the negotiations.30 The Bella centre could only accommodate 15,000 of the 40,000 
representatives. Many countries were disenfranchised from the policy-making 
process at COP-15,31 as will be discussed below. 
This disenfranchisement affected representatives of both the countries and NGOs, 
particularly in the Copenhagen Accord with discussions over transparency and the 
involvement of observers and civil society representatives. 32  Many NGO 
representatives were angry, arguing that their exclusion from the negotiations at 
such a critical moment was not good for the outcome because they could not put 
pressure on the delegates.33 Many of the parties were not represented in the select 
group.34 The setting up of the select group and the difficulties arising from its 
establishment and operation, culminating in the Copenhagen Accord are outlined 
and discussed below in section 5.5.  
The final plenary session of COP-15 debated the provisions about limiting the rise 
of global temperature to 2°C above preindustrial levels by 2050, and how this 
could be achieved. There was a proposal to reduce GHG emissions by 80 per cent 
by 2050 with the possibility of a mid-term goal by 2020.35 In the final discussion 
process, a majority of parties from the select group supported 80 per cent 
                                                 
29 UNFCCC’s Webcast documentary is a complete video recording of COP-15 from December 7 
to 19, 2009 and is available on demand from UNFCCC website, 
http://unfccc.int/press/multimedia/webcasts/items/5857.php.  
30 Dana R. Fisher, ‘The Limits of Civil Society’s Participation and Influence at COP-15: A 
Comment on Disenfranchisement of Countries and Civil Society at COP-15 in Copenhagen by Ian 
McGregor’, Global Environmental Politics 11, no.1 (2011): 8-11; and Matthew J. Hoffmann, 
Climate Governance at the Crossroads (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 1.  
31 Ian McGregor, ‘Disenfranchisement of Countries and Civil Society at COP-15 in Copenhagen’, 
Global Environmental Politics 11, no.1 (2011): 1-7. And also see the comment by Dana R. Fisher 
on the same piece. 
32 IISD, 2009, 28. 
33Ibid.  
34 McGregor, 2011, 4.  
35 Markus Becker, ‘Failure in Copenhagen Gunning Full Throttle into the Greenhouse’, 
Spiegelonline, December 19, 2009, 
http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,668111,00.html.  
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emissions reductions but the consensus of all states was required by the UNFCCC 
process, and this could not be reached even among the select group of 25. 
Meanwhile, the more than 100 other world leaders were waiting in the plenary 
chamber next door anticipating that the 25-member mini-summit would produce 
some sort of document.36 It did not happen. 
The conflict within the group of 25 turned into a major political theme that 
defined the conference – the tension between the UN principle of global 
democracy and the pragmatic need for problem-solving.37 UNFCCC processes 
authenticated the sovereign equality of each state and provided a veto to each 
party, meaning that any country could block the negotiation process. It was 
particularly difficult to achieve consensus for such a complex issue involving so 
many different players with varying national interests.  
Victor and Hass have questioned whether a global approach was the best approach 
to combat climate change.38 The International Energy Agency (IEA) data showed 
that about twenty countries were responsible for more than 80 per cent of global 
GHG emissions. Some argued that forums like the Group of 20 (G-20) and the 
Major Economic Forum (MEF) countries were more likely to produce effective 
outcomes than the UN platform.39 Victor advocated abandoning the UN climate 
change process in favour of alternative approaches.40 Perlmutter and Rothstein 
noted that there were some encouraging signs that other negotiating arenas such as 
the Group of 8 (G-8), the Group of 16 (G-16) and G-20 were being explored.41 
Although it is more appropriate to ask if the institutional structure of international 
                                                 
36 McGregor, 2011 and see also Tobias Rapp, Christian Schwagerl, and Gerald Traufetter, ‘How 
China and India Sabotaged the UN Climate Summit’, Spiegelonline, December 19, 2009, 
http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,692861,00.html. 
37 Radoslav S. Dimitrov, ‘Inside UN Climate Change Negotiations: The Copenhagen Conference 
2010’, Review of Policy Research 27, no. 6 (2010): 795-821. 
38 David Victor, ‘Towards Effective International Cooperation on Climate Change: Numbers, 
Interests and Institutions’, Global Environmental Politics 6, no. 3 (2006): 90-103; Peter M. Hass, 
‘Climate Change Governance after Bali’, Global Environmental Politics 8, no. 3 (2008): 73-79. 
39 See Chapter 7 and 8 for details: Wall Street Journal, New York Times and Guardian, UK are in 
favour of alternative approaches. 
40 David G. Victor, ‘Fragmented Carbon Markets and Reluctant Nations: Implications for the 
Design of Effective Architectures’, in Architectures for Agreement: Addressing Global Climate 
Change in the Post-Kyoto World, eds., J.E. Aldy and R.N. Stavins, 133-60 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2007). 
41 Daniel D. Perlmutter and Robert L. Rothstein, The Challenge of Climate Change: Which Way 
Now? (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011), 192-93.  
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climate change negotiations was the problem,42  it is also noteworthy that the 
progress has been slowed by the big emitters who were unwilling to commit to 
binding targets43 not by the small emitters, raising the question as to whether these 
big emitters would agree to cut their fossil-fuel emissions drastically to realise the 
goal of maintaining 2°C. Then there is the question as to whether the big emitters 
would seriously consider the dire concerns of the most climate change vulnerable 
countries such as the Least Developed Countries (LDCs) and Alliance of Small 
Island States (AOSIS).  
Climate change is not the first major complex issue involving multiple parties. 
Protecting the Ozone Layer (POL) and the Law of the Sea were also very complex 
and difficult issues but the UN managed to deal with them although these issues 
were very different in terms of making responses. In POL the most important 
innovations and most contentious issues were the financial and technology 
transfer provisions,44 with a fund being created to pay the incremental costs of 
developing country parties in meeting their control obligations. Industrial country 
parties contributed to the fund, according to the UN scale of assessment, and were 
in addition to other funding.  
For technology transfer, parties pledged to ensure that the technology necessary to 
meet control obligations was available to developing country parties on “fair and 
most favourable terms” – a compromise with G-77 and, second, that the capacity 
of LDCs to fulfil the control obligations “will depend upon the effective 
implementation of the financial co-operation and transfer of technology”.45 The 
UN was also successful in dealing with another complex issue on the Law of the 
Sea. By 2011, 163 countries had ratified the Convention. The US signed the 1994 
Agreement on Implementation but objected to the deep seabed provisions to the 
Convention. The success and usefulness of the UN platform in tackling complex 
issues depends on the particular issue.  
                                                 
42 Hoffmann, 2011.  
43 Radoslav Dimitrov, ‘Inside Copenhagen: The State of Climate Governance’, Global 
Environmental Politics 10 no. 2 (2010): 18-24; and ‘Canada Tagged as ‘Fossil of the Year,’ CBC 
News, http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/story/2009/12/18/climate-canada-award.html.  
44 Edward A. Parson, ‘Protecting the Ozone Layer’, in Institutions for the Earth: Sources of 
Effective International Environmental Protection, eds., Peter M. Hass, Robert O. Keohane and 
Marc A. Levy, 28-73 (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1993). 
45 Interview with national officials quoted in Ibid. 
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The climate change negotiating process is enormous, unwieldy and not 
transparent because the most important decisions “take place behind closed 
doors”.46 Of the meeting in Copenhagen, Pears notes “The process at the COP 
was controversial, with ‘secret drafts’, repeated suspensions of formal processes, 
and progressively tougher exclusion of NGOs (including business) from the core 
processes”.47 He also notes that in final discussions, a large majority of parties 
spoke in support, but the consensus required by the UN process could not be 
reached. O’Neill comments: “The construction of international environmental 
treaty regimes rests on a complex process of bargaining and negotiation among 
nation states”.48  
Progress towards an agreement that could reduce emissions were stalled because 
negotiators, particularly from the US and major developing countries, were at a 
stand-off. The US President Obama worked to produce an agreement with the 
leaders of Brazil, South Africa, India and China (BASIC) but excluded the EU 
and other parties from the negotiation process of the select group because these 
were the current and future major emitters from developing countries. 49  A 
minimalist agreement with no reference to specific emission reduction targets was 
announced as China firmly stuck to its position, and India followed China in 
repeating that “developed countries had caused the problem, so they should act 
first and strongest to fix it”.50 Obama argued that unless major emitters agreed to 
be on board, then the West would not be bound by any specific legally binding 
commitments. Like the Europeans, the US President was also intent on securing a 
commitment to protect the climate from the new economic superpowers, China 
and India.51 
China and India, supported by two other members of the BASIC group were 
adamant on CBDR and the historical responsibility of the developed countries. 
The BASIC bloc was sure that any legally binding commitments from them would 
                                                 
46 Matthew J. Hoffmann, Climate Governance at the Crossroad: Experimenting with a Global 
Response after Kyoto (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 4. 
47 Alan Pears, ‘COP 15: the Notes and the Verdict’, The Fifthstate, February 16, 2010, 
http://www.thefifthestate.com.au/archives/9424.  
48 Kate O’Neill, The Environment and International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2009), 81.  
49 McGregor, 2011 and see also Rapp, Schwagerl, and Traufetter, 2010.  
50 See Pears, 2010; and McGregor, 2010.  
51 See Rapp, Schwagerl, and Traufetter, 2010.  
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hamper their rapid economic growth and argued that the developed countries must 
commit to quantified legally binding commitments because their industrialization 
based on fossil fuels was solely responsible for the current status of GHG 
concentrations. The US remained adamant that unless the BASIC countries, 
particularly India and China, agreed to be committed to a legally binding 
agreement, the US was not interested in hampering its economy, which was 
already in deep recession. It was clear that the final deal was to come out from the 
US, China and India known as (USCI) group. 
Obama had been an advocate of climate change during his election campaign and 
at the G-8 summit in L’Aquila recognised the scientific view on the requirement to 
keep global temperatures below 2°C in July, 2009. 52  The Norwegian Nobel 
Committee highlighted Obama’s fight against climate change and the assurances 
that the US was not indifferent to global challenges.53 Obama’s assurances had 
created high hopes for a global and legally binding treaty which the US would 
support, unlike the KP. On Friday 18 December 2009, Obama announced that the 
US, China, India, Brazil and South Africa had concluded an “unprecedented 
breakthrough” and “agreed to set a mitigation target to limit warming to no more 
than 2°C and, importantly, to take action to meet this objective”. 54  Yet the 
Copenhagen Accord turned out to be a modest agreement reflecting that national 
interests and major emitters can contain progress as Susskind observes: “In the 
final analysis, only agreements that are politically acceptable to national leaders 
will be approved”.55 
5.4 The UNFCCC Principle and Environmental Concerns of Negotiating 
Blocs  
The negotiations included plenary sessions, working bodies, informal working 
groups, traditional general debate, roundtable discussions, and direct 
                                                 
52 G8 Leaders Declaration, ‘Responsible Leadership for a Sustainable Future’, G8 Summit, 
L’Aquila, http://www.g8italia2009.it/static/G8_Allegato/G8_Declaration_08_07_09_final,0.pdf. 
53 Thorbjorn Jagland, ‘Award Ceremony Speech’, Oslo, December 10, 2009, 
http://www.nobelprize.org/ 
54 Quoted in Focus Report, ‘COP Ends With Meaningful But Contentious Agreement’, Business 
and the Environment xxi, no.1 (2010): 1-4. 
55 Lawrence Susskind, Environmental Diplomacy: Negotiating more Effective Global Agreements 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 12. 
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participation.56 Countries with similar interests and viewpoints formed coalitions, 
registered themselves in the process of the UNFCCC, and tended to negotiate in 
groups, which saved negotiating time and enabled one country to speak on behalf 
of a wider coalition of countries. To assist negotiations groups, as noted in chapter 
4, frequently tabled their official positions and items to be addressed at COP 
meetings.57 Table 5.1 provides a synopsis of the positions taken by the negotiating 
blocs of COP-15. 
Table 5.1: Negotiating blocs and Their Positions for COP-15 Contents 
Negotiating Blocs Temperature Limit Legal Status as 
Binding 
Burden Sharing Agreement 
Track 
Umbrella Group 
10 Countries 
2°C All-inclusive Developed and 
Developing as per 
individual capabilities 
New global 
agreement 
European Union 
27 Countries 
1.5°C to 2°C  All-inclusive Developed and 
Developing as per 
individual capabilities 
New global 
agreement or 
Kyoto 2 
G-77 
130 Countries 
1.5°C to 2°C Developed 
Countries 
Historical 
Responsibility (HR) 
of Annex I 
 
Kyoto 2 
AOSIS 
43 Countries 
1.5°C  Developed 
Countries 
HR of Annex I  
Kyoto 2 
LDC 
49 Countries 
1.5°C Developed 
Countries 
HR of Annex I  
Kyoto 2 
AU 
50 Countries 
1.5°C Developed 
Countries 
HR of Annex I  
Kyoto 2 
EIG 
5 Countries 
1.5°C or 2°C  Developed 
Countries 
HR of Annex I   
Kyoto 2 
Source: Chandra Lal Pandey (figures drawn from IIED, 2009)58 
At COP-15 Australia delivered the official statement on behalf of the Umbrella 
Group (UG), consisting of Australia, New Zealand, Norway Canada, Iceland, 
Japan, Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, the Ukraine, and the United States, 
which sought to coordinate positions and deliver common statements. The UG 
made it clear that they recognized the magnitude of inaction over climate change. 
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They stated that they were committed to action, with a strong outcome to meet the 
aspirations of the world’s citizens who demanded a successful outcome to tackle 
climate change. They also made it clear that it was not only the responsibility of 
the industrialized and advanced world but also that legally binding commitments 
must include all major economies from both developed and developing countries.  
Any global climate change agreement would be only partially complete if the US 
remained outside. In 2009 Obama showed a deep-interest in climate change, 
declaring:  
The threat from climate change is serious, it is urgent, and it is 
growing. Our generation’s response to this challenge will be judged by 
history, for if we fail to meet it – boldly, swiftly, and together – we 
risk consigning future generations to an irreversible catastrophe.59  
The US and, specifically, President Obama, were represented widely in the 
Western media as having brokered the Copenhagen deal that rescued failing 
negotiations.60 Obama’s commitment to an international climate change agreement 
would be mere lip service unless it could muster a majority vote in the Senate for 
ratification to introduce stringent climate change policies at the domestic level. 
One of the main difficulties faced by the US Presidents Clinton and Bush over 
ratification of the KP was due to domestic political institutions such as the 
Senate.61  
In 1997 Republican Senators Byrd-Hagel proposed the resolution, passed 
unanimously by the full house Senate by 95:0, with the clear message that the US 
Senate was not in favour of ratifying the KP, for two major reasons. First, the KP 
exempted developing country parties from any binding commitments where 
“greenhouse gas emissions of Developing Country Parties are rapidly increasing 
and are expected to surpass emissions of the United States and other OECD 
countries as early as 2015” so “the exemption for Developing Country Parties is 
inconsistent with the need for global action on climate change and is 
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environmentally flawed”.62 Second, the Senate was strongly of the view that the 
disparity of treatment between Annex I and Non-Annex I Countries and the level 
of required emission reductions, “could result in serious harm to the United States 
economy, including significant job loss, trade disadvantages, increased energy and 
consumer costs, or any combination thereof”.63 It noted that it would not ratify any 
future agreement “unless the protocol or other agreement also mandates new 
specific scheduled commitments to limit or reduce greenhouse gas emissions for 
Developing Country Parties within the same compliance period”. 64  American 
Presidents have been bound by this resolution.  
Russia, another member of the UG, highlighted its pledge to reduce emissions.65 In 
September 2009, just before Copenhagen, Russia announced that it would reduce 
emissions between 20 to 25 per cent of the 1990 levels.66 But in the COP-15 
negotiations, Russia only pledged to make a 10 to 15 per cent reduction below 
1990 levels by 2020 as part of a commitment to the KP, but said that it would 
reduce emissions by 20 to 25 per cent as part of an agreement on long-term 
cooperative action. 67  However, it refused to be a part of Kyoto 2. Instead, it 
advocated a voluntary bottom-up approach that would allow each country to 
determine so-called ‘no-lose’ targets whose achievement would bring rewards and 
noncompliance would bring no penalties. Russia went on to develop national 
emission reduction goals domestically.68 
Japan, another member of the UG, unlike its earlier support for the KP, was firmly 
against any further extension of the KP as Kyoto-2. In September 2009, Yukio 
Hatoyama’s government announced 25% emission reductions by 2020 below the 
level of 1990. Several countries, including Japan, noted that their pledges to 
reduce emissions were contingent on a comprehensive global framework.69 Japan 
declared that it would provide assistance to developing countries of about US$15 
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billion in total up to 2012, including 11 billion towards the target of US$30 billion 
to the Copenhagen Green Climate Fund (GCF).70 These amounts were promised 
upon the establishment of a fair and effective international framework by all major 
economies and agreement on their ambitious targets. Rather than extending the 
KP, Japan wanted to see a single political document agreed by all major 
economies.  
The EU, of 27 member states, had been a champion of climate change negotiation, 
and had adopted an effective energy and climate change policy.71 The EU had 
been a party to the Convention since 1993 and to the KP since 2002. Under the KP 
the then EU-1572 committed itself to reducing its GHG emissions by 8 per cent in 
relation to the 1990 level during the first commitment period from 2008 to 2012.73 
Member states of the EU transferred part of their sovereign powers to the EU 
including climate change.74 The EU advocated the development of a strong legally 
binding agreement, in line with the proposed economy-wide emission abatement, 
strong financial support and robust compliance mechanisms. The EU committed to 
the KP and EU-27 emissions were 9% below the 1990 levels in 2007.  
The EU showed its willingness to contribute 2 to 15 billion Euros by 2020 and 
proposed that all the countries should contribute to the global climate fund except 
the least developed countries. About the new climate agreement, the EU clearly set 
out its position on climate change, on finance and on the type of a new legally 
binding agreement. It sought to bridge the differences between AWG-KP and 
AWG-LCA mentioned above and move towards a new legally binding agreement 
which did not come solely from the KP, which exempted major developing 
countries from any commitments. It set the number at 2°C temperature limit and 
demanded that all countries contribute to commitments and finance except the 
LDCs. 
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The G-77/China group of 130 countries was a powerful block for climate change 
negotiations and were united in advocating Kyoto 2 with stringent binding targets 
for the North, voluntary targets, and substantial international financial and 
technological support for the South and no MRV75  for policies that were not 
supported internationally.76 They were against the proposal for a single globally 
legally binding agreement. For G77/China, Sudan expressed concern at the 
‘insistence’ of developed countries on a single outcome in Copenhagen and urged 
parties to build on the Protocol’s success by establishing more ambitious targets 
for the second commitment period, as well as developing the means to address the 
potential consequences of Annex I parties’ policies and measures on developing 
countries.77  
The G77 bloc included the major emitters of China and India, along with poor 
countries that were most vulnerable to climate change impacts but lacked the 
resources for mitigation and adaptation. Together, they remained adamant that rich 
nations must commit to emission cuts beyond 2012 under the KP since it was the 
only international legally binding instrument that they believed would curb carbon 
emissions and also that it contained functioning mechanisms for bringing 
development benefits to poor countries.78 They argued that any new global treaty 
would violate the UNFCCC’s founding principle of CBDR and historical 
responsibility.79  
In 2001, it was projected that emissions from the developing world would rise 
rapidly and within the next three decades, was likely to exceed those from the 
industrialized nations.80 Since 1997 China and India have consistently continued 
their developments on their fossil footprints that seriously increased their GHG 
emissions. The increased emissions identify China as the world’s number one 
emitter and India the number 3 emitter, both of which were challenged to reduce 
their emissions along with Brazil and South Africa. Figure 5.2 shows that the 
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increasing GHG emission rate is gradually shifting from developed countries to 
developing countries. 
Figure 5.2: World Energy Consumption, 1990-2035 
 
Source: International Energy Outlook 2011, US Energy Information Administration, 
 http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/ieo/index.cfm.  
 
Figure 5.2 shows that the emissions were greater in developed countries from 
1990 to 2000 but from 2008 onwards the emission rates of developing countries 
have increased rapidly and are projected to rise. Figure 5.3 below shows that 
global CO2 emissions have been continuously growing. The share of the 
developed countries emissions has been either static or in decline whereas the 
share of developing countries has been in strong growth. Although a legally 
binding agreement, applauded by many environmentalists and G-77/China, the 
KP did not make any impact on the footprint of GHG emissions. Figure 5.3 shows 
that GHG emissions have risen significantly, confirming that any legally binding 
or voluntary agreements without firm and serious emission reduction 
commitments from major emitters would be a skeleton without flesh and blood in 
the fight of climate change. 
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Figure 5.3: Global CO2 Emission per Region from Fossil Fuel Use and 
Cement Production 
 
Source: EDGAR 4.2 (1970-2008); IEA 2011; USGS 2012; WSA 2012; NOAA 2012, 
http://edgar.jrc.ec.europa.eu/CO2REPORT2012.pdf.  
However, the G-77 bloc and China made it clear that they were not going to 
commit to any binding agreements but on the evidence in figures 5.2 and 5.3, as 
major emitters, they would be committed to legally binding targets, and to reduce 
emission concentrations. During COP-15, and follow up climate conferenes the 
developed countries were hesitant to follow principles of CBDR and HR because 
they made sense of the message from the data in figures 5.2 and 5.3. Yet, 
developing countries were reluctant to support any regulations which restricted 
their agenda of development and economy whereas the developed world was wary 
of substantial funding to developing countries. 
The AOSIS bloc, including the most vulnerable states, wanted swift and strong 
action to limit global temperature rise. They wanted to limit the temperature to 
1.5°C above pre-industrialized levels because they believed that a 2°C rise was not 
safe for them. In 2009 they demanded higher reduction targets and kept a clearly 
defined stance of 45 per cent emission cuts for Annex I countries and the 1.5°C 
temperature limit. The bloc supported the statement made by Sudan on behalf of 
G-77/China and went further to note that “over a hundred countries have 
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committed to this” and concluded by emphasising that 1.5°C was necessary for 
them to stay alive.81  
The AOSIS statement made its appeal on moral grounds because the survival of 
small low lying islands was conjectured to be threatened, yet the argument on how 
much GHG emissions should be reduced was political and misleading. It 
acknowledged that since 2008, developing countries had been surpassing the GHG 
emissions in global records. Unlike other negotiating blocs from developing 
countries, AOSIS demanded emission reductions from all major emitting 
countries, a new development breaking the solidarity of G-77/China.82 
The LDCs group, including SIDs, openly supported the view expressed by G-77 
and their position was also founded on the CBDR and historical responsibility. 
The LDCs’ statement that the quantified emission targets for Annex I parties was 
the only way to reduce emissions, raised serious concern over the negotiating 
behaviour of the group. While it apparently supported the arguments made by 
other negotiating groups such as G-77/China, and AOSIS, it did not support the 
main drive of reducing GHG emissions against climate change.  
The IEA reported in 2008 that “Due to continuing strong economic growth, China 
and India account for just over half of the increase world primary energy demand 
between 2006 and 2030”83 and it noted in 2011 that China, India and the US 
together emitted around 50 per cent of total global GHG emissions.84 Graphs 5.2 
and 5.3 above show that if these parties, together with other major emitting 
countries such as Brazil, and South Africa, were exempted, even if the remaining 
Annex I parties made 100 per cent reductions, GHGs would not be reduced. And 
on current trends, in a business-as-usual scenario, GHGs would rise inexorably 
pushing up average global temperature by as much as 6°C in the long term.85  
The Environment Integrity Group (EIG), formed in 2000 and comprising South 
Korea, Mexico, Switzerland, Liechtenstein and Monaco put its formal position at 
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COP-15 and urged that the opportunity provided by COP-15 should not be missed. 
The group was committed to 30 per cent reduction of GHG emissions.  
The participating parties recognised the threats and problems of climate change 
and the unacceptability of continuing under a business-as-usual scenario. They 
also recognized that the challenges of climate change needed quick and efficient 
actions. They identified that the most vulnerable parties were the LDCs, AOSIS 
and SIDs, and showed their seriousness towards the problems of climate change 
through their political statements. The statements of each negotiating bloc 
identified the ways of addressing climate change, although they differed over how 
to address climate change. This will be explored further below.  
Coalition blocs such as the UG and EU aimed to work towards maintaining a 2°C 
limit in temperature rise whereas negotiating blocs such as G-77/China, AOSIS, 
and LDCs looked for a 1.5°C limit. The UG and EU groups aspired to sign a 
single new deal in which both developed and developing countries would adopt 
binding commitment targets for emissions reductions. The G-77/China, SIDs, 
LDCs and AOSIS groups considered that it was the responsibility of the developed 
countries to reduce GHG emissions and to make financial contributions and 
transfer technology. They argued that the developed countries should not attempt 
to avoid the burden of climate change because it was the historical responsibility 
of the developed countries. These positions made the process of negotiation more 
complex. The complexities of the negotiation process are often forgotten by 
negotiators and national governments often fail to consider the full range of 
negotiation complexities in their negotiation preparations.86  
The principle of CBDR emerged in recognition of the special needs of developing 
countries and to encourage them to participate in global environmental 
agreements.87 Article 3.1 of the UNFCCC states that the parties should protect the 
climate system for the benefit of present and future generations of humankind, “on 
the basis of equity and in accordance with their common but differentiated 
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responsibilities and respective capabilities. Accordingly, the developed country 
parties should take the lead in combating climate change and the adverse effects 
thereof”.88  
The Article had two important elements: “states have a common responsibility to 
protect certain environmental resources”, and “to take account of differing 
circumstances, particularly in relation to each state’s contribution to causing a 
particular environmental problem and its ability to respond to the threat”.89 The 
Preamble of the UNFCCC demands the widest possible cooperation by all 
countries for their participation “in an effective and appropriate international 
response, in accordance with their common but differentiated responsibilities and 
respective capabilities and their social and economic conditions”.90 
Application of the CBDR principle had important consequences for climate 
change policy making and its relevance to the Brundtland commission report, Our 
Common Future, which recognized that poverty and underdevelopment in 
developing countries were major contributors to environmental degradation, and 
that environmental priorities could not be realized unless poverty in developing 
countries was reduced through sustainable economic growth and inequalities of 
consumption patterns between poor and rich countries were addressed. 91  The 
LDCs, many from AOSIS and SIDs, were the most vulnerable parties in 
negotiations and lacked financial, technological and other knowledge to combat 
climate change. They needed financial and technological support from the 
developed countries for adaptation and clear quantified emission reduction targets 
for developed and all major emitting countries as their social and economic 
conditions are gradually changing. Yet, chapter 4 showed that almost 80 per cent 
of climate funding through clean development mechanism (CDM) for mitigation 
and adaptation went to major emerging economies. 
As noted above, the G-77/China group was comprised of more than 130 
developing countries. South Korea and Mexico were still Non-Annex I 
(developing) countries even as part of the OECD. China and India still thought of 
                                                 
88 Article 3.1 of UNFCCC 1992. 
89 Sands and Peel, 2005, 55. 
90 See Preamble of UNFCCC 1992. 
91 World Commission on Environment and Development, Our Common Future (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1987).  
152 
themselves as LDCs. The various parties needed to clearly define the principle of 
CBDR so that a single new treaty could be developed under which all 
industrialized countries and major emitters of GHGs from developing countries 
would make binding commitments. It has been clear that the KP was not adequate 
and the emerging data from the IEA and EIA showed that GHG emissions were 
increasing at an alarming rate in the major economies of developing countries, 
while the middle class and the population of major developing countries were also 
rapidly increasing. 92 The IEA reported: 
China consolidates its position as the world’s largest energy consumer: 
in 2035 it consumes nearly 70% more energy than the United States, 
the second-largest consumer, even though, by then, per-capita energy 
consumption in China is still less than half the level in the United 
States. The rates of growth in energy consumption in India, Indonesia, 
Brazil and the Middle East are even faster than in China.93 
The IPCC’s Fourth Assessment Report emphasized that stabilizing GHGs at 450 
ppm (parts per million) required a reduction of developed countries’ CO2 
emissions by 25 to 40 per cent below 1990 levels by 2020.94 The IPCC report also 
noted that developing countries needed to reduce their emissions as soon as 
possible even if developed countries made substantial reductions for limiting 
temperature by 2°C. Thus, for making serious and sustained responses against 
climate change both developed and major emitters from developing countries had 
to commit to them. This could only happen if the concerns raised earlier were 
resolved, or else emerging economies from developing countries would claim 
exemption from any binding targets that consequently did not support the goal of 
environmental concerns of the UNFCCC, and the abatement of global GHG 
emissions. Instead, it brought a deterioration of the international climate change 
negotiations as Canada resigned from the KP in a competitive system of global 
governance. 95  Russia, Japan and New Zealand had already declared that they 
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would not support the concept of KP-296 and even the EU could stop supporting 
the KP if major emitters from developing countries were not included.  
The prospects of arresting GHG emissions are grim as current and future major 
emitters from developing countries have stuck to CBDR and historic 
responsibility, and the US Byrd-Hagel Resolution included the condition that 
“unless the Protocol or other agreement also mandates new specific scheduled 
commitments to limit or reduce greenhouse gas emissions for Developing Country 
Parties within the same compliance period” the US would not be a party to 
developing a new climate change agreement. 97  Thus, unless the discourse of 
CBDR and equity was resolved, emerging economies from developing countries 
would claim exemption from any binding targets and the developed world would 
not commit to any binding agreement.  
5.5 Consensual Politics and COP-15 Final Plenary Session  
The Danish Prime Minister, host and President of last week of the COP-15, 
proposed a select group as ‘Friends of the Chair’ for good to unblock the 
negotiations when negotiations failed to reach agreement.  
Differences emerged, inter alia, on whether work should be carried out 
in a smaller ‘Friends of the Chair’ format as well as on a proposal by 
the Danish COP Presidency to table two texts reflecting the work done 
by the AWGs. Many parties rejected this idea, urging that only texts 
developed in the AWGs by parties should be used.98 
The EU, Japan, Columbia, Canada, Marshal Islands, Iceland, Guyana and many 
others supported the establishment of a ‘Friends of the Chair’ group.99 Sudan, 
Bolivia and many others stressed the need for transparency and sought 
clarification on the establishment of the smaller group. 100  The select group 
consisted of 25 states: the US, the UK, Sweden, Spain, Saudi Arabia, the Russian 
Federation, Norway, Mexico, the Maldives, Lesotho, South Africa, Bangladesh, 
Algeria, Denmark, Germany, France, India, Ethiopia, Colombia, South Korea, 
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China, Brazil, and Grenada.101 The main issues of contention were over whether 
there should be a 1.5°C or 2°C temperature limit; whether there should be 
voluntary commitments or a legally binding agreement; whether there should be 
an extension of the KP or a new global agreement. As the select group of 25 
started to work to break the deadlock the rest of the more than 100 representatives 
sat and waited for further notices for plenary sessions. The meeting that took place 
‘behind closed doors’ in Copenhagen lasted for 10 hours. Dissenting parties stood 
vigorously against the process employed but it was not clear what else could have 
been done in the face of opposition had not a small group of negotiators been 
formed.  
The President of COP-15 oversaw the development of a draft text with all parties 
having participated in producing an Accord that was the product of “consensus 
from that group”. 102  He requested the parties to consult with other parties in 
considering the Accord consisting of 12 articles and two appendices to be 
completed when parties submitted their pledges by February 2010. Developed 
countries should also submit their quantified targets under appendix 1. Developing 
countries were to submit their plans for mitigation under appendix 2. The 
President gave one hour for consideration and consultation of the Copenhagen 
Accord to be adopted. Several parties demanded points of order to present their 
dissenting opinions on the process and its outcome, followed by parties who were 
in the favour of adopting the draft.  
Tuvalu argued that the COPs’ work under the umbrella of the UN was based on an 
equal right to participate in the climate process whether a nation was large or 
small. Tuvalu had not been represented during the decision input processes of the 
Accord. It also noted that the Accord was short on substance.103 Venezuela also 
showed its deeper concerns of being unrepresented in the process. It argued that 
they had been waiting to participate but the chair and select group did not give 
them a chance to participate and so the policy outcomes did not include their needs 
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and anticipations.104 Bolivia also argued that the process of producing the policy 
text was extremely unsatisfactory and did not give them a chance to deliberate or 
be consulted. The outcome did not capture their needs or requirements.105 Cuba 
considered the Accord lacked transparency and that it was dictatorial. It did not 
capture the policy essence of CBDR.106  
Costa Rica noted that it was not consulted so the Accord could not be adopted at 
the meeting.107 Nicaragua showed its grave concern over the shortness of time 
given to solve the climate change problems. It argued that the international 
democratic system of the UN was deteriorating because the production of the 
Accord lacked representation and legitimacy. Nicaragua initially proposed 
suspending the meeting but later withdrew the proposal.108 Sudan compared the 
Copenhagen Accord to the Holocaust stating:  
It is to ask Africa to sign a suicide pact to let continue the economic 
dominance of a few countries…No one, no Obama or you can threaten 
Africa. No African delegates are given a mandate to kill Africa. The 
promise of 100 billion will not bribe us to destroy the continent.109  
Reacting to Sudan’s statement and in support of the Copenhagen Accord, the 
Maldives stated:  
We worked hard to maintain 1.5 but big emitting countries blatantly 
refused it. In my view, this document is not what we are looking and 
seeking for but it is amicable as beginning to continue talks. Please 
accept this document because it has many life lines.110  
Ethiopia and Papua New Guinea also noted that they were not represented but that 
they wanted to adopt the document. Spain, Canada, France, Sweden, United 
Kingdom, USA, Norway, and Australia agreed with the Maldives statement and 
expressed their concerns about Sudan’s comparison of the Holocaust.111 Japan and 
Russia also wanted to adopt the document.112 
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Some 187 countries supported the Accord and 6 opposed it, blocking it from being 
adopted. The final plenary statements of parties pointed to the huge gap between 
agenda setting and progress made. Some member states seeking a rigorous and an 
ambitious agreement were frustrated by the Accord. The formal statements 
expressed through points of order during the final plenary session depicted the 
picture and revealed how disappointing the Copenhagen process and the Accord 
were. 
This section has demonstrated the difficulties of international climate change 
negotiations and policy making with more than 193 parties as formal negotiators. 
It questions whether international climate change governance, in which so many 
parties are involved, possesses “the capacity to deliver the global collective 
environmental benefits they are asked to provide”.113 Downie argues that solutions 
to international environmental problems often require the participation of a large 
number of state and private actors which decreases the possibility of effective 
environmental cooperation due to increased transaction costs, the increased 
likelihood of free riding, and difficulties in identifying and reaching consensus.114  
Not only are there difficulties with such a large number of states but also there are 
the difficulties of the underlying North-South divisions115 and divisions within 
North and South. COP-15 also had to confront the many different negotiating 
groups within the North and South groups. Soroos concluded that one of the 
reasons for the weak Copenhagen Accord was the “product of complex time 
consuming negotiations among disparate countries with conflicting interests that 
typically produce weak documents reflecting the lowest common denominator of 
perceived interests.”116 The conflicting national interests of the states side-lined 
the role of non-state actors including global civil society. The consensual decision 
making process among states empirically showed that UNFCCC is not a 
multilateral institution rather a state-centric institution that by its very nature treats 
non-state actors as peripheral.  
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5.6 Issues for the Copenhagen Climate Conference 2009  
Figure 5.4: The Most Contested Issues at COP-15 
 
 
Source: Adapted from Climaticoanalysis.org, 
http://www.climaticoanalysis.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/01/post-cop15-report52.pdf.  
Establishing how negotiations should proceed was a key issue for COP-15. Figure 
5.4 shows the most contentious issues on the table at COP-15. AWG-KP and 
AWG-LCA could not resolve the issues of whether the KP track should be 
extended or whether a new global agreement should be produced, who should be 
involved in legally binding commitments for emission reductions, what actions 
should be taken to combat climate change, and what the threshold of temperature 
limit should be – whether 1.5°C or 2°C. It was intended that COP-15 would 
resolve these questions about the post-2012 climate regime – a view reflected in 
the unofficial slogan for the conference, “seal the deal”.117 Conversely, the major 
actors upheld their positions strongly and delegates were unable to finalize the 
fundamental themes of the COP-15. Besides, the major themes of establishing 
procedures, the negotiation processes dealt with a wide range of technical 
issues 118  such as enhanced adaptation, mitigation, finance and technology 
                                                 
117 Daniel Bodansky, ‘The Copenhagen Climate Change Conference: A Postmortem’, The 
American Journal of International Law, 104, no. 2 (2010): 230-40.  
118 Lavanya Rajamani, The Copenhagen Agreed Outcome: Form, Shape and Influence (New Delhi: 
Centre for Policy Research, 2009). And see Kulovesi and Gutierrez, 2009. 
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transfers. The comparison and contrast between the themes of the agenda, the 
statements of the negotiating blocs and the outcomes of COP-15 reveals the gaps 
between what was on the agenda and what happened.  
5.7 The Copenhagen Accord 2009 
The Copenhagen Accord consisted of 12 articles. It was widely reported as being 
a political agreement among certain heads of state and was not the result of 
consultation with all the world leaders present in Copenhagen.119 The Accord was 
a kind of ‘letter of intent’ declaration containing no concrete and actual plan. It 
recognized that climate change was one of the greatest challenges of our time and 
that it would be combated in accordance with the principle of CBDR and 
respective capabilities and on the basis of equity.120  
Sandler and Kymer notes: “The Accord, however, has critical limitations that will 
lead to policy uncertainties. The most obvious is the lack of a deadline for a 
successor document to the Kyoto Protocol”.121 Article 1 of the Accord provided 
greater political support and validity of the scientific view of the IPCC and 
maintained that temperatures should not rise more than 2°C. It provided no 
specific emission reductions and dates other than those chosen by states. The 
principles of CBDR and respective capabilities were reiterated but the status of 
emerging economies – whether developing countries, countries in transition or 
developed countries – was not made clear. This classification would have made it 
easier to continue with the CBDR principle. This will be discussed further below.  
The Accord also recognized that social, economic development and poverty 
eradication were the first and overriding priorities of developing countries, and 
that a low-emission development strategy was indispensable to sustainable 
development which provided BASIC 122  countries, still regarded as developing 
countries, more space for saying ‘no’ to the binding commitments for GHG 
emissions. Article 3 of the Accord stated that enhanced action and international 
cooperation was urgently required for enabling and supporting the implementation 
                                                 
119 See UNFCCC, 2009a. 
120 Ibid. 
121 Sandler and Kymer, 2010, 145.  
122 BASIC refers to Brazil, South Africa, India and China which are emerging economies and 
major greenhouse gas emitters. 
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of adaptation actions aimed at reducing vulnerability and building resilience, 
especially in those countries that were vulnerable, such as the LDCs and SIDs and 
Africa.123 
Article 8 of the Accord noted that the collective commitment by developed 
countries would provide around US$30 billion for the period 2010-2012 with 
balanced allocations between adaptation and mitigation. In the context of 
meaningful mitigation actions and transparency of implementation, developed 
countries had a goal of mobilizing jointly US$100 billion a year by 2020 to 
address the needs of developing countries. It emphasized that the funding was to 
be sent to the most vulnerable and the neediest countries.124 As the US special 
envoy for climate change, Todd Stern, stated, “I do not envision public funds, 
certainly not from the US going to China. We would intend to direct our public 
funds to the neediest countries”.125 Article 8 noted that the sources of funding were 
to be public and private, bilateral and multilateral, including alternative sources of 
finance with the fund to be channelled through the Copenhagen GCF with a new 
effective and efficient governance structure providing equal representation to 
developed and developing countries. It set out the provisions of finance for short 
and long term climate policy. Some countries made voluntary pledges for the flow 
of the fast-start fund from 2010 to 2013. Table 5.2 provides a glimpse of the 
financial pledges made at COP-15. 
Table 5.2: Informal Pledges for Funding Contributions made at Copenhagen 
2009 
Country Pledges for 2010 to 2012 (US$) 
Japan 11 billion 
EU 10.7 billion 
Norway 1.5 billion 
USA 3.7 billion 
Russia 200 million 
Source: Data taken from UNFCCC, COP-15 Webcast. 
                                                 
123 See Article 3 of UNFCCC, 2009a. 
124 See Article 8 of Ibid. 
125 Quoted in Focus Report, ‘COP Ends With Meaningful But Contentious Agreement’, Business 
and the Environment xxi:1 (January 2010): 1-4.  
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The World Resource Institute (WRI) 2011 data on pledges of fast start funding 
shows how much countries have pledged and whether the funds pledged are 
independently fast-start or include the allocations of other similar titles of the past. 
Table 5.3 below provides the data for 2011 for fast start funding pledges. 
Table 5.3: Updated Summary of Developed Countries Fast-Start Climate 
Finance Pledges by November 23, 2011 
Country  Updated Pledges in US$ Million 
Australia $641 
Belgium  $214 
Canada $409 
Denmark $230 
European Commission $214 
European Union (*not included in pledge total, 
above)  
$10,283 
Finland $157 
France  $1800 
Germany $1800 
Iceland $1 
Ireland $143 
Japan $15000 
Liechtenstein $ 0 
Luxemburg $13 
Malta $1 
Netherlands $443 
New Zealand $74 
Norway $1000 
Portugal $51 
Slovenia $11 
Spain $536 
Sweden $1143 
Switzerland $162 
United Kingdom $2471 
United States $1704 
Source: World Resource Institute, http://www.wri.org/publication/summary-of-developed-country-
fast-start-climate-finance-pledges. 
The WRI noted that the total pledges made amounted to US$28.22 billion but the 
delivery of the pledges remained uncertain. It further noted: 
‘New’ funding represents an increase relative to pledges or allocations 
from previous years. However, a number of pledges include 
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commitments already made in the past. For example, Japan’s USD 15 
billion fast start pledge announced in December 2009 as the Hatoyama 
initiative includes USD 10 billion announced previously in 2008, 
while the fast start pledges of the United Kingdom and the United 
States also include their 2008 commitments to the Climate Investment 
Funds (CIFs) of roughly USD 1.4 billion and USD 2 billion 
respectively.126 
Many of these pledges related to funds that were supposed to have been delivered 
in 2008. There are doubts whether countries will deliver the pledges. The debate 
on the GCF nomination for representation delayed the board meeting and was 
scheduled to take place from August 23 to 25, 2012. The failure of the Durban 
climate conference to make solid progress on sources of finance and the global 
economic crisis left rich nations reluctant to commit cash, promoting fears the 
money may not emerge in time.127 
Articles 10 and 11 noted that a Technology Mechanism was to be established to 
accelerate technology development and to transfer support for action on adaptation 
and mitigation which includes REDD+.128 The Accord required that the Annex I 
countries submit their emission reduction pledges and Non-Annex I countries to 
submit the mitigation measures that they would adopt by February 2010. It also 
required that Non-Annex I countries report their progress through national 
communications every two years to ensure that national sovereignty is respected 
through national communications and international consultations. The weaker part 
of the Accord was that Non-Annex I countries did not have to undergo any 
verification process through MRV for the local projects. Chinese and Indian 
projects would remain free of any MRV process for state-centric political and 
economic reasons since it was agreed that the MRV would apply only to those 
projects that were internationally funded.129 The liberty for developing countries 
not to undergo any verification process through MRV raises questions about the 
reliability of Non-Annex I parties’ reporting.  
                                                 
126 World Resource Institute, Summary of Developed Country ‘Fast-Start’ Climate Finance 
Pledges (Washington DC: World Resource Institute, 2011).  
127 Nina Chestney, ‘First UN Climate Fund Board Meeting Set for August 23’, Reuters, August 2, 
2012, http://uk.reuters.com/article/2012/08/02/us-un-gcf-idUKBRE8710IH20120802.  
128 Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and Deforestation is a mechanism to increase resilience 
to climate change. It requires the full engagement and rights of indigenous people and other forest 
dependent communities.  
129 Article 5 of UNFCCC, 2009. 
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The KP featured the difficulty of the consensus building process for climate 
change. It took a considerable amount of time for the major emitting Annex I 
parties to ratify it, and it was not universal. In contrast, the Copenhagen Accord 
was the first to include all major emitters. All the parties undertook to set some 
kind of commitments voluntarily because they were not legally binding. Yet the 
Accord became a fragile agreement in the sense that any party could volunteer 
emission pledges according to their choice that would not contribute to any 
emission reductions.  
The focus of climate change moved from scientific consensus to political 
consensus because the focus of the parties was not about science but about the 
ways to tackle the climate problem. Non-binding, reporting through national 
communications, international consultations and the voluntary bottom-up nature of 
the agreement was important in making the agreement broadly inclusive which 
affirmed the principle of sovereignty – the adequacy of the Convention’s state-
centric approach of the UN – but it did not necessarily strengthen the effectiveness 
of global climate change policies. The idea of boundary and political authority 
relates to the concept of sovereignty and suggests that states are free from any 
MRV process and penalty and were therefore unlikely to stick to their voluntary 
commitments. 
5.8 Implications and Analysis of COP-15 
COP-15 was intended to produce a legally binding agreement. Faced with the 
prospect of failure, the UN General Secretary Ban Ki-moon requested the major 
parties to find a common ground, and they produced the draft Copenhagen 
Accord. Many parties were not satisfied with the draft because it did not address 
their demands, but they understood the constraints in making any further progress 
and supported the draft. The draft was sent to a plenary session where more than 
100 delegates were waiting. The outcome of COP-15 was that the full plenary of 
all UN member states was unable to reach any fruitful results, and the group of 25 
was also unable to produce any significant outcome.  
The Accord faced several constraints. It did not specify how the industrialized 
countries were to lower emissions because it did not establish emission reduction 
targets for developed countries either short (2020) or long term (2050). It did not 
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specify any deadline for making the agreement binding, and did not indicate how 
the amounts of US$30 billion and US$100 billion would be made by individual 
contributors. Politically, it was a significant Accord because it brought influential 
leaders together in an effort to move forward, even if the Accord was only a ‘letter 
of intent’. It introduced a new policy on REDD+ but it was not passed or adopted. 
Many parties and observers had expected the Accord to be fair, ambitious and 
binding but the Accord failed on all three counts: the poorest and neediest nations 
did not believe it to be fair; the EU, AOSIS, SIDs, LDCs, environmentalists and 
climate scientists did not see it as ambitious and the Accord did not become a 
binding agreement. The ingredients of the architecture might have respo0nded to 
the long term challenges of climate change but not in precise legal terms because 
the Accord did not hold any legal standing in the UNFCCC process.130  
Thompson states that the most important task was to launch the Copenhagen GCF 
as soon as possible since the poor in developing nations would suffer first and, 
most likely, suffer the most.131  The funds to developing countries would start 
working on new projects of clean energy, green growth and climate resilience. The 
Accord argued that funds should be sent to the most climate vulnerable countries 
yet it did not specify how this was to happen and where they should be directed.  
COP-15 and the Copenhagen Accord showed instances of good international 
cooperation, optimism and frustration based on state-centric institutional 
framework. The US was the chief advocate of the consensual climate change 
negotiations to ensure it, or other influential developed countries, could veto the 
agreement. However, at Copenhagen a few developing countries used the 
consensual veto to block the Accord from being adopted. In the three months to 
Copenhagen the hope of achieving a legally binding agreement had almost 
diminished, with officials believing that solid packages 132  would be set up in 
                                                 
130 COP-15 Press Conference, Copenhagen, Denmark, 19 December 2009, UNFCCC Executive 
Secretary Yvo de Boer available at http://cop15.meta-
fusion.com/kongresse/cop15/templ/play.php?id_kongresssession=2759&theme=unfccc  
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Copenhagen as contours to a legally binding agreement, but even that did not take 
place.133 
The Copenhagen Accord suffered from a lack of trust and from representative 
deficits. Voices were raised for greater transparency, mature diplomacy, and to 
follow the UNFCCC procedures for policy making as written in Article 7.2. Most 
of the voices were from the small island and most vulnerable countries. Non-state 
actors could not make it into the negotiations halls. At the plenary sessions, none 
of the big and influential parties raised issues of transparency and procedure. The 
conflicts of interest between the major emitters and the small island and 
developing countries were not simply about environmental or climate change 
interests; rather they had broader and overarching implications which will be 
discussed below.  
5.9 Interests of Major Emitters 
Much has been discussed about the responses of the key players to the Kyoto 
Protocol in section 4.7 of chapter 4. Section 4.7 also articulated the conflicting 
national self-interests of the major emitters and their negative impact on the Kyoto 
Protocol. This section explores the politics of resources or energy politics, interests 
of major emitters and their implications on international cooperation for effective 
climate governance. International cooperation on the climate change issue was 
made difficult because of the serious implications for countries’ social, political,  
economic structures,134 and their heavy reliance on fossil fuels. Although the small 
island and vulnerable countries were threatened by IPCC estimates of sea level 
rises, the major emitters, as their economies have been strongly embedded to fossil 
fuel growth, could not adopt any agreement against their national political 
interests.  
The IPCC AR4 report stated that if global temperature was not limited to 1.5°C, 
climate change would bring unintended consequences for low lying island and 
most vulnerable countries. 135  Developed countries and major emitters from 
developing countries had a stake in the impact of climate change but they were not 
                                                 
133 See UNFCCC Press Conference Webcast, December 19, 2009. 
134 Matthew Paterson and Michael Grubb, ‘The International Politics of Climate Change’, 
International Affairs 68:2 (1992): 293-310. 
135 See IPCC, Climate Change 2007: Synthesis Report (Geneva: IPCC, 2007d).  
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able to pursue any serious responses against climate change because they had their 
bigger concerns of social, political and economic structures within their domestic 
constituencies. The responses required limiting and managing climate change 
which would affect the heart of a country’s socio-political and economic-industrial 
structures,136 and serious actions for preventing climate change have frequently 
been watered down.  
Politicians are generally reluctant to take serious decisions that impinge on the 
way of life of the people in their respective countries because of the impact on 
economic growth and its economic values embedded in existing social-political 
structures. The economic growth imperative is inherent to the capitalist system, 
which imprisons governments and that is increasingly globally interdependent.137 
If the ecological and economic imperatives are deemed incompatible, this may 
well be the most fundamental obstacle to progress on climate change. Although 
there are different views on this question, making changes to the requirements of 
climate change can lead to a decline in the standard of life and can generate protest 
and opposition showing the linkage between social, political and economic issues.  
The countries that have the greater stake at UN global climate change negotiations 
are important in terms of fossil fuel consumption and possession of reserves that 
are the backbone of their economy and mode of life. Some countries such as the 
US and China have major challenges in maintaining their supplies of fossil fuels 
and in developing other forms and alternative sources of energy. 138  Export 
dependent countries like Saudi Arabia and other OPEC members are worried 
about their dependence on oil revenues and the implications of any decline in the 
use of fossil fuels. These countries fear the economic consequences of emission 
limitations and oppose abatement measures strongly, even those taken by other 
countries.139 
Among all negotiating blocs, the EU, LDCs and AOSIS looked for an ambitious 
and legally binding agreement, but none of them had significant carbon reserves. 
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166 
The EU is highly dependent on energy imports and it is meaningful for it to reduce 
its energy dependence. Among the LDCs and AOSIS countries, consumption is 
very low with no major impacts on global emissions, whereas countries like the 
US, Canada, China, India, Russia and Saudi Arabia together account for between 
60-70 per cent of the world’s total potential fossil-fuel consumption.140 Canada’s 
departure from the KP was related to economic issues and linked with its tar 
sands.141 Saudi Arabia has always stood against any legally binding agreement that 
would prevent it from exploiting its oil wells, which have long been the most 
important source of its national income.142  The US, Russia and China are the 
leading producers and consumers of world energy.143 India and China rely on coal 
as their primary source of commercial energy.144 
These countries saw that there was a trade-off between possession and 
consumption of fossil fuel reserves and economic development, between economic 
development and standards of living as society benefits, and between fossil fuel 
modes of economic development and environmental degradation and 
sustainability. These countries have focused more on the first two trade-offs to 
maintain and upgrade the standards of living. China and India have taken measures 
to control population leaving the significant demands of existing populations to be 
met. For instance, Jai Ram Ramesh, India’s former Environment and Forests 
Minister, stated: “To say that climate change is the defining issue, no, there are 
bread-and-butter environmental issues”.145 Governments in developing countries 
give greater emphasis to their development and to meeting basic human needs. 
They understand that climate change is a priority particularly for the developed 
countries. Their argument is well supported by the Brundtland Report that noted: 
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“inequality is the planet’s main environmental problem” and “it is futile to attempt 
to deal with environmental problems without a broader perspective that 
encompasses the factors underlying world poverty and international inequality”.146 
All countries possessing fossil fuels are not necessarily rich now. They came from 
different negotiating blocs to block the negotiation. Major emitters from 
developing countries such as China, India and Brazil saw climate change as a long 
term threat and wanted financial and technical assistance. Saudi Arabia and other 
fossil fuel exporting countries were concerned that efforts to cut GHG emissions 
would damage their economy 147  and are bargaining for compensation if an 
ambitious climate agreement takes place. China was determined to ensure that no 
agreement would threaten its on-going economic development and independence 
of action. 148  To ensure it was not bound, “China played a very tough game, 
including insulting the US president and other heads of state by sending their vice-
foreign minister to the final negotiations with heads of state instead of their 
premier.”149 India continued to insist that developed countries should act first and 
strongly to fix climate change and opposing this approach were the US, Canada, 
Russia, and Australia.150  
Developed countries were “cautious about any institution which would require 
substantial funding” to support developing countries and remain in a 
disadvantaged position if major emitters from developing countries did not 
commit to quantified binding targets.151 “Few nations or firms will do much to 
control emissions unless they are sure that their competitors will bear similar 
costs”.152 Thus global climate change negotiations and policy making were not 
only a struggle between developed and developing (North and South) countries, 
but also a new mode in global climate governance where the long term standing, 
and the emerging, powers were not much help in coming to an agreement.  
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While many countries had been working hard to make their economies green, they 
insisted that a new legally binding treaty must be negotiated. The IPCC153 also 
noted that the poor and vulnerable were going to suffer if the issue of climate 
change remained unaddressed, but no stringent agreement was forthcoming. In 
2012, international climate change talks in Doha ended with agreement to extend 
the KP with the number of signatories greatly reduced to the EU and Australia. 
New Zealand, Japan, Russia, and Canada opted out from the Kyoto 2. The three 
major emitters the US, China and India, the free riders of the KP, refused to be 
included.  
Table 5.4 shows the biggest emitters of the world by GHG per captita. China’s 
CO2 emission is 1.5 tonnes per capita and India’s is 0.7 whereas New Zealand, 
Australia, Russia, Canada, the US and the Finland have per capita CO2 emissions 
of 10, 9.6, 4.9, 4.7, 3.7 and 3.4 tonnes respectively. This suggests that China and 
India are on solid ground in arguing that they are still developing countries and do 
not want to take any binding commitments because they have to develop their 
country to reduce poverty and improve efficiency since “there is an urgent need 
for debate over the appropriate role of the climate regime in the broader fight for 
poverty reduction and development”.154 Connecting climate change with poverty 
reduction and development is a good approach but as the climate clock crosses 
2°C, the questions are: Is this an appropriate measure? It is not the quantity of 
emissions which matters? The second question is more pertinent although the 
issues of poverty reduction and development in the South are equally important. 
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Table 5.4: Major Emitting Countries in the World and their Economies 2011. 
Country GHGs Per Capita (tonnes 
of CO2 Equivalent) 
GDP (nominal) Per Capita 
in US$ 
Qatar 18.0 97,967 
Brunei Darussalam 17.9 36,521 
New Zealand 10.00 38,227 
Australia 9.6 66,984 
UAE 6.2 66,625 
Norway 5.8 96,591 
Russian Federation 4.9 13,236 
Bolivia 4.9 2,246 
Canada 4.7 51,147 
USA 3.7 48,147 
Finland 3.4 50,090 
Iceland 3.3 43,226 
Venezuela 3.0 10,409 
Brazil 4.0 12,917 
Saudi Arabia 2.5 19,890 
South Africa 1.9 8,342 
China 1.5 5,184 
India 0.7 1,527 
Sources: UNDP, Greenhouse gases per capita (tonnes of CO2 equivalent) and IMF, World 
Economic Outlook Database-September 2011.155 
The principles of CBDR, historical responsibility, equity and GDP have been 
central to climate change negotiations since the establishment of the UNFCCC in 
1992. This has served to highlight the “the persistent dysfunctional North-South 
politics”,156 a broad division unlikely to disappear at any time soon but becoming 
more and more irrelevant now. Helm noted that the climate change governance 
principle should be based on consumption instead of production.157 He wrote: “a 
serious weakness of Kyoto is that what matters for an international agreement is 
the consumption of carbon, not its geographic production”.158  
Helm further noted that: “As China has pointed out, although it might produce 
high emissions, these are on behalf of consumers in developed countries, and 
                                                 
155 See UNDP, International Human Development Indicators, Greenhouse Gases Per Capita 
(tonnes of CO2 equivalent),  http://hdr.undp.org. See also International Monetary Fund, World 
Economic Outlook Database-September 2011, http://www.imf.org/external/data.htm  
156 Deplede and Yamin, 2009, 443. 
157 Helm, 2009.  
158 Ibid, 19. 
170 
therefore the consumers should pay for the relevant reductions”.159 This line of 
reasoning also supports the argument that developed countries should pay more for 
GHG emission reductions based on their high consumption ratio. This argument 
may give reason for developing countries particularly major emitters to resist 
pressure on them to make the adjustments, but it fails to address the fundamental 
goal of emissions abatement and the issues surrounding the rising population and 
middle class in China, India, and Brazil and their greater consumption of 
commodities. Further, even if the Western countries were to pay for the GHG 
emissions on the basis of consumption it is not in accord with the UNFCCC aim 
which is to stabilize emission concentrations because this principle talks only 
about payment of money and not about the ways to mitigate the emissions. 
There are several other issues of climate change deadlock apart from the 
superficial North-South division and the consumption and production issues. The 
framework and the principles of UNFCCC have been major obstacles as the 
conditions of the countries changing. The lack of progress can also be attributed to 
the problems evident in the international system, procedural problems of 
negotiations, and the characteristic problems of climate change.160 The underlying 
theme is that even if “we are condemned to live with uncertainty” over the extent 
of the impacts of the climate change, we still have to find a way out.161 The nature 
of climate change is complex with its causes, geographic scope and consequences 
along with uncertainties.  
The core debate of the “environmental and climate change governance is to 
transform societies and individuals behaviour toward more sustainable and 
environmentally sound ways” that consequently reduce global GHG emissions.162 
The “environmental governance is about effecting societal change to lead to 
stronger environmental performance and effectiveness”.163 Newell and Paterson 
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argue that collective human societies should embark on a project to radically 
transform the way their societies work, “seeking a dramatic transformation of the 
entire global economy”.164 The global economy could be transformed into a low 
carbon economy through the use of climate market mechanisms such as CDM, JI 
and ETS introduced in the KP. However, Chapter 4 showed that these mechanisms 
were focused on very limited countries and have had little impact on GHG 
emission abatement so far. 
Reports from many prominent global GHG monitoring institutions demonstrate 
that emissions are rapidly increasing every year with many key climate indicators 
moving beyond the natural variability within which contemporary society and 
economy have cultivated, and thrived. Despite more than twenty years of 
international efforts along with enormous amount of time and energy expended on 
the UNFCCC process, carbon emissions are now rising many times more than in 
1990.  
There is no reliable and meaningful solution in sight to date. Deep ecologists 
argued for ‘back to nature’ but said ‘no’ to a technological fix. They could be 
pointing in the right direction but the current level of ecological consciousness of 
mankind refuses to go back to nature as consumers show no sign of changing their 
spending habits on less environmentally intensive goods and services 165  so a 
technological fix, albeit for the short term, is a serious option as it is embedded in 
political economic systems, the profit based interests and values if the world is to 
remain around 2°C as the IPCC has demanded.  A holistic approach of changing 
attitudes on the “social-cultural” dynamics seems aspirational at least for now and 
would take a long time for the public to ‘own’ the problem and run out of other 
options.166 
The Copenhagen Accord did not place the core understanding of climate change 
governance – the transformation of human behaviour and the global economy – in 
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sustainable and environmentally sound ways. Addressing this issue reveals clearly 
that there is no future in being negative about the responses of various participants 
but there is a future in determining and understanding the situation in which each 
finds itself, and not just in general terms of being developed or developing or in 
being dependent on fossil fuels or some other category. The future is that each 
party should respond to the extent it can to materialize the complex goal of climate 
governance of transforming societies resulting into low-carbon world. Chapters 8 
and 9 will discuss these issues further. 
5.10 Conclusion 
COP-15’s major achievement was the Copenhagen Accord, a three page 
document with 12 articles and two appendices. The main objective of the COP-15 
was to adopt an ambitious agreement that would be effective after the expiry of 
the KP. To achieve an agreement the parties had to agree on the temperature 
increase limit, and on burden sharing in reducing and mitigating GHGs. However, 
the parties insisted on their long standing arguments on the position of climate 
change based on UNFCCC principles and state-centric institutional framework. 
The outdated UNFCCC division of Annex I and Non-Annex I blurred the climate 
change negotiations. For instance, Korea and Mexico – both of which, to their 
credit, participated creatively in the Copenhagen process – joined the OECD six 
months after Kyoto, but they have remained as Non-Annex I countries.167 Russia 
and the Ukraine are not OECD members until now but they have been members 
of the Annex I category. Emerging economies such as China, India, Brazil, Korea, 
Mexico and South Africa had more in common on some key economic 
dimensions with some countries in the so-called developed world than they did 
with the poorest developing countries, such as those of sub-Saharan Africa and 
Asia.168 
Yet the Copenhagen climate change conference took climate change concerns to 
the highest political level. Almost 115 of the world’s leaders made it an historical 
conference in search of a multi-level environmental agreement. The active 
participation of the Obama administration was significant given the earlier stance 
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Assessment’, Environment Magazine 52, no. 3 (2010): 8-14. 
168 Ibid.  
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of the Clinton and Bush Administrations. Copenhagen brought a high level of 
participation from non-state actors, including various NGOs, academia, 
businesses and media. However, COP-15 did not allow most of the accredited 
non-state actors to enter the Bella centre.169 Likewise many of the heads of state 
and negotiators were not allowed to participate in the negotiations. 170 
Consequently, six countries – none of them major emitters – objected to the 
Accord which was noted by the conference, and not adopted.171  
It was an international climate change agreement which brought both developed 
and developing countries together but the Accord did not say anything about 
moving emerging economies to the Annex I group or any new alternative group. 
The Accord made provisions for a fast-start fund of US$30 billion for 2010-2012 
and long term funding of US$100 billion a year by 2020. It also focused on the 
issues of adaptation for the most vulnerable ones but it left the appendices empty 
for voluntary commitments for GHGs mitigation. As discussed earlier, the 
contents of the figures 5.2 and 5.3 above and the positions of a few major emitting 
countries from both so called developed and developing worlds weakened the 
Accord. Reflecting on COP-15, Chasek and Downie note:  
The climate regime has developed at a slower pace, it does not yet 
include the rules that are required to mitigate climate change in the 
long-term, it does not yet have a binding regime to control emission 
reductions for all major emitters, therefore, only a few call it as a 
success.172  
The Copenhagen Accord was a meaningful first step for President Obama, and 
many delegates from the EU, but many delegates from developing countries and 
the environmentalists described it as a failure. A successful agreement needed 
agreement on emission reduction targets to limit global temperature rises to below 
2°C. It also needed a strong form of governance for funding and technology 
transfer for emission mitigation and adaptation, and it needed a solid framework 
for burden sharing by redefining the essence of developing and developed 
countries along with greater role of global civil society. If the Copenhagen Accord 
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is judged from these criteria, even if the Accord may provide many lifelines to 
future negotiations, it is safe to say that the Accord did not bring together major 
environmental concerns, and did not pay sufficient attention to the multilateral 
norms of sovereign equality as well as representation of non-state actors. It 
confirms that states were directed more according to state-centric interest than 
about environmental concerns. 
Nevertheless COP-15 imparted a very important message for future negotiations. 
It confirmed that there was a general but perennial problem of conflicting interests 
among the large number of parties. Global issues such as climate change and bio 
diversity present the special problems of large numbers of states. 173  Creating 
consensus among these large numbers of parties with conflicting interests is more 
than a Herculean task vividly observed in many international negotiations 
including COP-15. The Accord was crafted by only 5 parties following 
negotiations which had ended in stalemate when all parties as well as the 25 in the 
special group had been included. It showed that the UN process of state-centric 
consensus approach for negotiations had become weaker and time consuming. 
Many COP-15 delegates argued that the: “UN process had become completely 
unworkable, making it impossible to forge consensus among disparate countries 
debating contentious fundamental requirements of a global climate change 
agreement”.174 Except that the difficulties were more likely to be issue specific 
ones than suggesting a decline in the UN processes. 
In sum, this chapter identified five perennial problems at COP-15 which were 
consistent with the KP, and which can be generalized with other UNFCCC 
conferences: 1) the problem of conflicting interests of the large number of parties 
who often prioritized state-centric national interests more than the so called 
cooperation for environmental concerns and who side-lined non-state actors; 2) 
the consensual decision making process among parties and use of the veto: all the 
parties intended to adopt the Copenhagen Accord, albeit imperfect, but six 
developing countries used their veto power to block it from being adopted; 3) 
politics within and between North-South, North-North and South-South: the 
North’s reluctance to deploy funding and low carbon technology to the South and 
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South’s right to development (business-as-usual) combined with an unwillingness 
to take binding commitments by some Northern countries and major emitters from 
the South; 4) the understanding of the CBDR principle with no graduation date for 
major emitters from developing countries: the graduation clause with specific 
details for seperating countries from developing to a new criteria where they could 
assume more responsibility than other developing countries would create the 
space to address an important challenge and invite countries to start considering 
whether or how they might take steps towards addressing climate change;175 and 
5) unsubstantiated understanding of historical responsibility: many developing 
countries were calling for the industrial world to clear its debts but it was 
inappropriate and misleading as they remain silent for countries like India and 
China, who were also benefiting by importing Western technologies for their 
continuous economic growth at the significant environmental costs. 176  These 
countries have also continued to be major emitters.  
This chapter also argues that, in the short term, technological intervention is 
necessary to keep the world on the edge of a temperature limit of 2°C. The 
following chapter presents data and insights derived from selected newspapers as 
noted in chapter 3 from four major GHG emitters and central players in climate 
change policy making, to analyse whether the newspapers identified the problems 
of slow progress and what efforts were made to resolve these problems by passing 
accurate scientific information to educate the public and to enable governments to 
articulate pro-climate stands on climate change issues. 
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Chapter 6 
Media and Climate Change 
6.1 Introduction 
Previous chapters on the Kyoto Protocol (KP) and the Copenhagen Climate 
Conference explored issues related to the slow progress in the development of the 
international climate change governance. This chapter sets out how the newspaper 
media covered international climate change negotiations and policy making. It 
presents the data from selected newspapers on the issues of climate change, and 
examines the role it played in its coverage of the international climate change 
negotiations and agreements, including coverage, the consistency, or lack of it, 
between data collection and making meaning of the data in this research. 
This research is based on 667 articles from five major world newspapers selected 
for this research as noted in the methodology section in chapter 3. Editorials and 
opinion articles from each newspaper were of particular interest because editorials 
are semi-official writings, present the stance taken by the newspapers and opinion 
articles are generally included as pieces of significance in terms of public interest. 
Chapters 7 draws analyses from the data presented in this chapter. The articles1 
from the Wall Street Journal (WSJ) and the New York Times (NYT) cover the 
period from 1997 to early 2012. The Guardian (GUK) covers the period from 
1998 to 2012 because archives were not available before 1998. The Hindu covers 
from 2000 to 2012 and the China Daily from 2001 to 2012, the latter, due to the 
limited material available online.  
Articles published covered the period 1997, the year of KP adoption, to 2012, the 
year of the Doha Agreement. Prior to 2006, articles covered issues surrounding 
the KP. For 2007 there is coverage of the initiatives for post-Kyoto agreement 
which resulted in the Bali Action Plan. Between 2007 and 2009, the media 
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nations from nation-states or states according to classic definitions of political science. 
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coverage of climate change centred on various rounds of negotiations ultimately 
leading to the Copenhagen climate conference 2009 where the Conference of the 
Parties 15 (COP-15) was expected to deliver an ambitious climate treaty. In 2010 
the media covered the Cancun climate conference. In 2011, there were high 
expectations that the meetings in Durban would decide the future path of climate 
change negotiations. In 2012, the media covered the concerns of Durban and 
COP-18 in Doha. The division of articles in table 6.1 sets out the years, place of 
the meetings and number of articles discussed during the climate change 
conferences.  
Table 6.1: Number of articles by period and issue 1997-2012 
Newspaper        WSJ      NYT      GUK       Hindu  China Daily 
Period 1997-2012 1997-2012 1998-2012 2000-2012 2001-2012 
Topic 
Kyoto (1997) 
75 articles 
(1996-2006) 
83 articles 
(1996-2006) 
56 articles 
(1999-2006) 
30 articles 
(2000-06) 
19 articles 
(2001-06) 
Topic 
Bali(2007) 
8 articles  11 articles 16 articles 12 articles 13 articles 
Topic 
Poznan(2008) 
8 articles 8 articles 4 articles 10 articles 6 articles 
Topic 
Copenhagen(2009) 
36 articles 22 articles 25 articles 22 articles 19 articles 
Topic 
Cancun(2010) 
23 articles 13 articles 11 articles 22 articles 19 articles 
Topic 
Durban(2011-12) 
15 articles 25 articles 22 articles 7 articles 23 articles 
                                  165 articles  162 articles   134 articles       103 articles          99 articles 
Source: Chandra Lal Pandey 
As noted in chapter 3 on methodology the search terms produced a total of 165 
articles from the WSJ; 162 articles from the NYT; 134 articles from the GUK; 103 
articles from The Hindu; and 99 articles from the China Daily. The researcher 
attempted to archive all the available relevant articles from the selected 
newspapers but acknowledges the limitations of the search with the possibility 
that some articles might have been missed. The WSJ published more articles on 
Copenhagen and Cancun than the other papers. It sought to highlight the 
Climategate events of 2009 and 2010. The Hindu had the least coverage after 
Cancun while the China Daily carried a number of articles in the period. From 
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Kyoto to Poznan, the China Daily published fewer articles than in the period 
Copenhagen to Durban. It had more coverage during and after Durban.  
As mentioned in chapter 3, Factiva found no articles in the China Daily before 
2007 and from that time there was a growing interest in the paper on climate 
change issues. The NYT had more articles concerning Kyoto than any other 
newspaper, but less coverage during Bali and Poznan than the other papers, and 
had more than others from Copenhagen (less than the Hindu), and Cancun. The 
China Daily had the least number of articles during the KP when the period is 
taken into consideration as noted earlier. The GUK had good coverage during the 
Kyoto period and Copenhagen and published the highest number of articles on 
Bali compared to other papers but over Poznan it had the least.  
Each newspaper produced a few articles before, during or after the international 
climate change negotiation conferences. Editorials were from 650 to 900 words 
and opinion articles from 1000 to 1400 words, and more complex than the 
editorials. The following sections outline the original articles and summaries of 
the articles published. The first section of this chapter outlines the material from 
the WSJ, the second section from the NYT, the third, the fourth and the fifth from 
the GUK, the Hindu and China Daily respectively. The conclusion of this chapter 
presents summarized analysis of the newspapers and their main arguments being 
made. 
6.2 The WSJ Eastern Editions and Online 
This study used 165 articles from the WSJ in total. An article dated December 15, 
1997 expressed the view that the United States (US) should not accept the 
emissions targets as proposed by the KP of 7 per cent below the levels of 1990 by 
2012 because of the damage it would do to the US economy and, in return for 
such steep reductions, the US would get nothing solid.2 On November 17, 1998 
the WSJ argued that the level of warming caused by human activity was very 
small and that the KP was an unnecessary policy to raise taxes.3 In November 28, 
2000, an article argued that news of global warming was not new news so drastic 
steps that would imperil the world economy made no sense especially when there 
                                                 
2 Ronald Bailye, ‘Shanghaied in Kyoto’, WSJ, December 15, 1997, A1. 
3 Editorial, ‘Classic Political Effect’, WSJ, November 17, 1998, A 1. 
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was so much doubt about global warming.4 Prior to this, an editorial in September 
2000 argued that the US reductions of carbon dioxide to meet the Kyoto targets 
would increase the prices of commodities.5  
In 2001 a contributor wrote that the evidence against a warming trend was 
overwhelming, expressing concern that the Bush administration might support the 
KP and that would be rash, lopsided, and based on erroneous science. It argued 
that Bush’s rejection of the KP was good science, good economics and good 
politics.6 An editorial on May 31, 2001 argued that the European Union (EU) 
should not paint the Bush Administration as global villain for rejecting the KP 
when the US was facing energy shortages and the Senate had already rejected it.7 
An opinion article on July 16, 2001 wrote that the need of 55 per cent of the 
developed countries that emitted 55 per cent of the total emissions was the 
threshold for Kyoto’s ratification and that Europe could not do it alone without 
the US or Russia and Japan.8 It also approved the US rejection of the KP in giving 
the US companies an advantage over their foreign rivals but warned that in the 
long term the US companies would find themselves less energy efficient than their 
foreign competitors.9  
On October 3, 2003 comments were made about the EU’s battle for allocating 
their emission allowances arguing that US industry was watching the European 
battle closely.10 The WSJ reported that Russia would not ratify the KP but when 
Russia subsequently ratified it, it said that it was bad news because Russian 
ratification would be enough to activate the ill-considered treaty. It doubted that, 
given the high price and meagre yield of the United Nations (UN) project, a good 
time frame for policy implementation would ever come.11 Its editorial on June 6, 
2004 noted that many were worrying over global warming which made it easy to 
forget that most of the world’s poor and sick continued to deal with far more basic 
                                                 
4 James K. Glassman, ‘Forget Kyoto’, WSJ, November 28, 2000, A 26. 
5 Editorial, ‘Gore’s Emergency’, WSJ, September 25, 2000, A 36. 
6 James K. Glassman, ‘It’s No Time to Go Wobbly on Kyoto’, WSJ, May 11, 2001, A 14. 
7 Editorial, ‘Who Speaks for Europe’, WSJ, May 31, 2001, A 16. 
8 John J. Fialka and Geoff Winestock, ‘Future of Kyoto Protocol minus the US is Uncertain’, WSJ, 
July 16, 2001, A 2. 
9 ‘Kyoto Spurned Is Mixed Bag for US Firms - Subsidiaries Abroad Will Have to Abide by New 
Emissions Rules’, WSJ, July 25, 2001, A 2. 
10 ‘Readies Worried Indus For Kyoto Caps’, WSJ, October 3, 2003, A 12. 
11 Editorial, ‘Quid Pro Kyoto’, WSJ, May 5, 2004, A16. 
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problems associated with living conditions than the impacts of climate change and 
thus argued for the importance of a Copenhagen Consensus – a consensus to solve 
the world’s basic problems including hunger, poverty and housing rather than 
global warming.12  
On February 16, 2005 in an opinion piece the WSJ wrote that while the US was a 
leading proponent of GEOSS,13 it was not signing up for the KP, in part because 
the Bush administration argued that the data did not prove that global warming 
was as big a threat as Kyoto supporters contended.14 In analysing climate change 
and other pressing issues, it suggested that there were other more effective ways 
to help the world’s poor by controlling HIV/AIDS, providing micronutrients, 
liberalizing trade, controlling malaria.15 On June 25, 2005 an argument was made 
that most global warming alarms were based on computer simulations that were 
largely speculative and depended on a multitude of debatable assumptions, and 
since “the Byrd-Hagel vote eight years ago, the case of linking fossil fuels to 
global warming has, if anything, [become] even more doubtful.”16 After Kyoto 
was ratified, it said that even if countries met their Kyoto targets, it would not do 
much for the atmosphere because the world’s biggest emitters did not have any 
commitments.17 The US did not sign the KP because arbitrary emissions targets 
were both pointless and economically damaging and no proof existed that 
lowering emissions would reduce global warming.  
The WSJ argued that the idea that human activity influenced climate change was 
far from proven, and that if the warming trend of recent decades continued then it 
might be a boon to humanity.18 An editorial of December 4, 2006, noted that 
Exxon was being targeted by mainstream scientists and environmental activists 
because it was one of the few companies that still thought that some debate on 
climate change was valuable. By way of contrast the editorial argued that 
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environmentalists had been wrong about the apocalyptic claims such as global 
famine, overpopulation, natural resource exhaustion, the evils of pesticides, and 
global warming.19  
Criticizing the KP, an editorial of December 6, 2006, stated that recent data 
showed that placing artificial limits on emissions had not done much to reduce 
emissions and may even have been counterproductive. Therefore, the American 
approach was more promising than that of Europe – the key to reducing carbon 
emissions lay in unleashing the private sector, not capping it.20 A letter published 
on 13 December 2006 carried a contrasting theme noting: “Science outranks 
senators. Galileo was a consensus of one”.21 Another contributor saw the debate 
as shifting the focus from science to economics.22 Its editorial of December 4, 
2007, expressed concern over Australia’s new Prime Minister, Kevin Rudd, who 
vowed to tackle climate change and ratify the KP.23 
An editorial on June 6, 2008, argued that the political consensus on global 
warming was exaggerated by the alleged scientific consensus.24 Its editorial on 
June 7, 2008, quoted Bjorn Lomborg25 and expressed the view that the costs of 
mitigating climate change would be much greater than the speculative benefits 
and that therefore the focus should be shifted to adaptation by seeking new 
technologies rather than to a cap-and-trade regime.26  
On June 1, 2009, the editorial wrote that China was now the world’s number one 
carbon dioxide (CO2) emitter and criticised the idea of green investments because 
China wanted its economy to be more efficient while the West would be less 
competitive.27 It argued that sceptics were swelling everywhere so there was no 
point in the US House of Representatives preparing to pass a climate-change bill. 
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The Australian Parliament was preparing to kill its own country’s carbon-
emissions scheme and a growing number of Australian politicians, scientists and 
citizens once again doubted the science of human-caused global warming.28 In an 
article on September 21, 2009, the paper wrote that President Obama had 
promised strong action on climate change since his first day of office but that he 
had several other pressing issues to address and there were differences between 
the US and Europe on fundamental issues such as how quickly rich countries 
should have to cut their emissions over the next decade. The EU targets were to be 
between 20 to 30 per cent below 1990 levels by 2020 whereas the most aggressive 
proposal in Congress to curb US emissions was for 4 per cent reduction below 
1990 levels by 2020.29 
The paper noted China’s view that the stand of developed countries had made the 
deal more difficult.30 Its editorial ridiculed Barack Obama’s statement: “Now is 
the time to confront this challenge once and for all. Delay is no longer an option” 
but “it turns out that delay is an option”.31 It argued that the pointlessness of 
Copenhagen would become part of Obama's argument that the Senate should 
introduce a cap and tax on the US, as well as a justification for the Environment 
Protection Agency’s (EPA) nondemocratic carbon crackdown via clean-air 
regulation. If Obama were to be lucky, however, the Senate would fail to act, the 
EPA would get tied up in court, and the economy would recover faster without the 
looming burden of higher energy taxes.32  
In 2009 November and December, it published 5 articles critiquing the argument 
of mainstream climate science contextualizing Climategate. It argued this was not 
settled science but indicated it was a cracking empirical foundation with many 
billion-dollar edifices built on it which, sooner or later, were bound to crumble.33 
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At the beginning of the Copenhagen climate conference in 2009, it wrote that 
officials from 192 countries would meet in Copenhagen to tackle global climate 
change, seeking a successor to the KP. Even if they could not negotiate a binding 
agreement because each country had its own particular priorities and concerns, 
many countries hoped at least to work out commitments to reduce their GHG 
emissions and provide assistance to poorer countries likely to be hardest hit by the 
effects of global warming.34 
On December 10, 2009 an article discussed the issue raised by the US Chief 
climate change negotiator, Todd Stern, that the US did not plan to give money to 
China to subsidize its efforts to curb GHGs, and that developing countries could 
not get a pass from demands to burn less fossil fuels.35 It compared Copenhagen 
2009 with other conferences, and noted that what was proposed was a lot of 
financial dealings, a potential foreign aid bonanza, and a massive transfer of funds 
from West to Non-Annex I countries with little to show for it because the 
corruption, political oppression, government control of the economy and the 
absence of the rule of law would combine to keep poor countries poor. Recasting 
foreign aid as climate mitigation would not change any of that.36  
Its editorial of December 17, 2009, wrote that the cap-and-trade policy would be 
counterproductive. It was a scheme that would impose heavy carbon taxes and 
allowances on US industries, which would provide an incentive to move offshore, 
or to sell those allowances to overseas’ companies that could use them to become 
more competitive against US companies. American workers, it concluded, would 
be the big losers.37 
On December 19, 2009, it was reported that the Copenhagen Accord left key 
questions unanswered and it was silent on how to achieve the goals set in the 
Accord claiming it would have little immediate impact on companies in the US 
and elsewhere. The negotiations also showed the shift in the balance of power 
between the US and China as a central dynamic of the fractiousness at 
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Copenhagen.38 The Accord provided the foundation for an eventual binding treaty 
but the same foundation had been laid many times before with scant success.39 It 
wrote:  
Honest carbon accounting would also impede programs like the 
corrupt clean development mechanism where European consumers end 
up paying Chinese companies for emissions reductions that either 
aren't real or would have happened anyway. At least Copenhagen's talk 
did less tangible harm.40  
An opinion article on December, 2009, stated that Copenhagen climate talks 2009 
focused on the leading climate culprit – carbon dioxide. But reversing global 
temperatures by reducing carbon emissions would take many decades if not 
centuries. Even if the largest CO2 cuts were implemented, it would not reverse the 
melting ice already occurring in the most sensitive areas, including the rapid 
disappearance of glaciers in Tibet, the Arctic and Latin America implying that 
what we could do effectively to buffer global warming would be to make an all-
out effort to reduce emissions of methane.41 
In 2010 the WSJ editorials criticized the International Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC) report and its climate chief Rajendra Pachauri’s blistering rebuke to 
India's environment minister for casting doubt on the notion that global warming 
was causing the rapid melting of Himalayan glaciers. It argued that the Himalayan 
glaciers do seem to be retreating and the reasons for that are complex and still 
poorly understood.42 At least three articles were written criticising the IPCC and 
mainstream climate science.43  An editorial on February 16, 2010 wrote: “We 
think the science is still disputable”.44  
An opinion article on November 29, 2010 noted that the US had two key goals at 
the Cancun climate conference in 2010: to reinforce an international agreement on 
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climate change that entailed comparable efforts from all major GHG emitters and 
avoid getting blamed if the talks were seen to fail. 45  An opinion article on 
December 7, 2010, expressed the view that few people would be surprised if the 
Cancun talks failed but the real surprise was that, for the previous two decades, 
people believed that there was a realistic prospect of securing broad international 
agreement to restrict CO2 by all the major emitters. That did not happen so 
individual approaches to the problem should be sought.46 
On December 10, 2010, it reported that the fate of the KP appeared uncertain at 
Cancun as diplomats struggled to finalize a package of agreements to address 
climate change, while a global treaty on the issue stalled amid a stalemate among 
the US, China, Japan and other nations. 47  It reported that, at Cancun, rich 
countries would voluntarily cut emissions as pledged in Copenhagen 2009 and 
developing countries were to come up with plans to make cuts to limit global 
warming to less than 2 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels. The agreement 
included a green fund of $100 billion a year that wealthier countries would 
provide to help poor countries finance programs to cut emissions and cope with 
drought and other effects of global warming.48  
On December 11, 2010 an editorial commented that when it came to global 
warming, there has always been more than a touch of the old-time religion. 
Unfortunately for the climateers, the rest of the Maya pantheon did not seem to be 
cooperating. A more realistic view came from the Japanese, who said they would 
not sign on to any successor to the 1997 KP, expiring in 2012.49 It was also noted 
that the Cancun, Mexico, climate conference would not be the last of its kind in 
failing to gain a legally binding agreement.50 It reported that world leaders at 
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Cancun made it clear that addressing the climate issue would be all about 
money.51 
The Australian Prime Minister Julia Gillard was attacked in an article on July 18, 
2011 for her carbon tax by writing “Ms. Gillard vowed to press forward with cap 
and tax and said that her convictions are ‘very deeply held’. We'll see if her 
government can survive them”. Continuing its stand on climate change, an 
editorial on October 25, 2011 commented:  
The science on climate change and man's influence on it is far from 
settled. The question today is whether it makes sense to combat a 
potential climate threat by imposing economically destructive 
regulations and sinking billions into failure-prone technologies that 
have their own environmental costs.52 
It further cast doubt on any legally binding treaty in Durban 2011:  
The chances that a global deal on carbon would ever be reached were 
always slim, a point brought home by the collapse of the 2009 
Copenhagen summit. The US, Russia and Japan have all said they 
won't agree to any new binding carbon pact, while India and China 
were never believers in the first place.53  
In an opinion article on November 25, 2011, the view was expressed that the real 
peril of climate change was not the increasingly shaky theory of anthropogenic 
global warming, but the sweeping, eye-wateringly expensive, economically 
catastrophic policies being introduced on the basis of little more than junk 
science, so the anonymous leaker FOIA has done the causes of truth, rationalism 
and global justice an enormous favour.54 
On December 6, 2011, an article reported on its research about China which wants 
to extend the KP, currently set to expire in 2012, $30 billion annually by 2012 and 
follow through on a plan for $100 billion by 2020 to mitigate the effects of 
climate change in poor nations, a system for rich countries to provide climate-
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adaptation technology and best practices to poorer nations, a review of efforts to 
reduce emissions so far, and a policy of common but differentiated principles 
(CBDR) to mitigate climate change.55 And if these demands were met, China 
might consider a legally binding arrangement, according to Xie Zhenhua, China's 
chief negotiator at Durban. It touched upon the issues and tussles among the US, 
China and India and the voices of environmental organizations such as ‘kill 
Africa’ and ‘climate justice now’.56 It also reported on the contentious issue of 
funding:  
Wealthier nations were angling for control of donations that flow from 
their public coffers to the fund, while poorer nations that will be the 
beneficiaries of funds want the United Nations-led climate conference 
to be in charge of overseeing it.57  
Referring to the Durban summit a WSJ opinion article stated:  
The Durban agreement is being hailed as a diplomatic victory. Yet it 
essentially concedes defeat, leaving any hard decisions to the far end 
of the decade when other politicians will have to deal with it. For 
nearly 20 years, the international community has tried to negotiate 
commitments to carbon cuts, with almost nothing to show for it.58  
Any carbon deal to replace Kyoto would have a negligible impact on climate in 
coming decades so the focus should be about adaptation.59 On January 26, 2012, a 
letter was published signed by 16 scientists saying that there was no need to panic 
about global warming because there was no compelling scientific argument for 
drastic action to 'decarbonize' the world's economy even if one accepts the inflated 
climate forecasts of the IPCC, aggressive GHG control policies are not justified 
economically. 60  Interestingly, it published one letter signed by many climate 
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scientists that clearly criticized the article “No Need to Panic About Global 
Warming”.61 The letter reads: 
You published ‘No Need to Panic About Global Warming’ (Op-Ed, 
Jan. 27) on climate change by the climate-science equivalent of 
dentists practicing cardiology. While accomplished in their own fields, 
most of these authors have no expertise in climate science. The few 
authors who have such expertise are known to have extreme views that 
are out of step with nearly every other climate expert. For example, 
there is a retrovirus expert who does not accept that HIV causes AIDS. 
And it is instructive to recall that a few scientists continued to state 
that smoking did not cause cancer, long after that was settled science.62  
It went on to claim that:  
Research shows that more than 97 per cent of scientists actively 
publishing in the field agree that climate change is real and human 
caused. It would be an act of recklessness for any political leader to 
disregard the weight of evidence and ignore the enormous risks that 
climate change clearly poses.63  
With few exceptions, the WSJ consistently argued against climate change and also 
noted that old voters were more important for Senators and Congressmen because 
their turnout is greater than young ones who believe in climate change:  
What is more, the age divide is not enough to change the dynamics in 
Congress, where lawmakers are well-aware that older voters turn out 
more frequently and broad action to address global warming is not on 
the immediate agenda.64 
6.3 NYT Late Editions and Online 
This section of the study outlines a total of 162 articles from the NYT. It covers 
the period between 1997 and 2012. On December 6, 1997, the NYT reported that a 
possible agreement on cutting industrialized countries' emissions of heat-trapping 
waste gases had begun to emerge from intensive negotiations. This preceded the 
second key issue about the immediate role of developing countries in controlling 
                                                 
61 ‘Check with Climate Scientists for Views on Climate’, WSJ, February 2, 2012, 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204740904577193270727472662.html#printMod. 
62 Ibid. 
63 Ibid. 
64 Keith Johnson, ‘On Climate change, Some Arguments Shift’, WSJ, January 26, 2013, A 4. 
189 
the gases which continued to threaten the overall prospects for successful talks.65 
On December 11, 1997 the NYT reported that negotiators from around the world 
had agreed on a legally binding treaty obligating industrial countries to cut 
emissions of waste industrial gases that scientists argued were warming the earth's 
atmosphere. However, one contentious issue – the possible sale or trade of 
emissions permits between the countries – remained unsettled. It also noted that 
the US Senate had to ratify the Protocol for it to be implemented in the US, which 
the Republican Senator Chuck Hagel predicted was unlikely.66  
On December 12, 1997 the NYT reported to its readers that despite the KP, CO2 
emissions would keep rising noting that the Protocol left developing countries out 
of any commitments.67 On December 14, 1997 it was suggested that US President 
Clinton and Vice President Gore would have difficulty getting the KP ratified by 
the Senate because Republican Senators denounced the treaty. Furthermore, the 
White House said it would not seek ratification until developing countries agreed 
to participate, but developing countries insisted that they would not make 
commitments until the industrialized countries started cutting back.68 
A November 11, 1998 editorial commented that nobody had successfully 
challenged the urgency of the climate mission, despite the well-financed efforts of 
some industry groups to minimize the warming threat. The scientific consensus – 
that the unchecked burning of fossil fuels could someday cause great damage to 
the environment – remains intact, but what is not intact, is the spirit of common 
purpose that produced the Kyoto agreement.69 It opined two considerations which 
were necessary to make the Protocol work well: early action meaning that instead 
of waiting until 2008, nation-states should try to implement targets immediately; 
and that emission trading should commence involving buying pollution permits 
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from poorer countries. 70  On October 28, 2000 the editorial wrote: “The 
international panel of climate scientists, considered the most authoritative voice 
on global warming, has now concluded that mankind's contribution to the problem 
is greater than originally believed”. 71  It lamented that unfortunately, the US 
Congress refused to address the issue but progress could still be made by the 
private sector.72 
On July 19, 2001 the Bush Administration was criticized in an editorial for 
renouncing the Protocol with the paper urging investment in new low-carbon 
technology.73 An editorial on July 24, 2001, said Democrats and many corporate 
leaders agreed with ratification of the Kyoto and reminded Bush about his 
campaign pledge to impose mandatory controls on carbon dioxide. Bush was 
reminded about his father’s commitments by saying that it was at Rio that his 
father first committed the US to a global effort to reduce GHGs and there was still 
time for his son to honour that commitment.74 
By 16 February 2002 Bush’s global warming strategy was accused in an editorial 
of having lost its impetus and that America’s long-awaited substitute for Kyoto 
was a disappointment.75 Another editorial also criticized the US approach to the 
KP claiming that Bush had no serious strategies for climate change. It provided 
two options for America: one was to rely on dated dirty modes of energy to 
increase pollution in cities and global warming, and the other was to redesign the 
energy system to reduce America’s dependence on carbon based fuels and send a 
signal to the world that America was serious about climate change.76 Another 
editorial on June 18, 2002 exposed the failures of Bush as he rejected the KP, 
dismayed the allies of America, reneged on his own campaign pledge, and 
dismissed a report written by his own experts that asserted “human activities are 
largely responsible for global warming and warns that the environmental 
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consequences could be severe”.77 It also appreciated Japanese ratification of the 
Kyoto – a blow for the Bush Administration.78 
On February 14, 2003 an editorial highlighted Bush’s policies of ‘carbon-
intensity’ and voluntarism in the place of KP problems. The former only aimed to 
slowly increase the carbon and the latter did not motivate and squeeze companies 
to act.79 By August 2003 an article claimed Bush was in denial and was asking for 
more research on already confirmed scientific evidence. The McCain-Lieberman 
climate bill, the author said, was not likely to pass by Bush or senior Republicans, 
but every senator would now be required to take a stand one way or the other on 
an issue of great public concern; an issue on which the world had spoken clearly 
but Congress remained irresponsibly silent for too long.80 On December 4, 2003 
the editorial noted that it was sad that Russia was not motivated to ratify the KP 
because the US, the major buyer of the carbon credits, had already refused to 
ratify, and it would not be easy for other countries which ratified the KP to invest 
in cleaner power plants while the US had a free ride.81 
On January 25, 2004 an editorial discussed Bush’s election campaigns which had 
no mention of climate change and noted that Bush regarded a mandatory 
emissions cap in the KP as top-down regulatory management which was 
unacceptable to him. But Bush’s bottom-up voluntarism was going nowhere 
meaning the McCain-Lieberman climate bill needed another try.82 On December 
14, 2005 an editorial criticized America’s shameful foot-dragging at Montreal and 
praised the countries that care about global warming which did not allow the US 
to blow the whole conference to smithereens.  
Given the steadily mounting evidence of the present and potential consequences 
of climate change – disappearing glaciers, melting polar ice caps, dying coral 
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reefs, threatened coastlines, increasingly violent hurricanes – one would surely 
have expected America's negotiators to arrive in Montreal willing to discuss 
alternatives but they did not.83 It also asked “Why should India and China make 
major sacrifices while the United States, in effect, gets a free ride? The battle 
against global warming will never be won unless America joins it, urgently and 
enthusiastically. Our grandchildren will look back with anger and astonishment if 
we fail to do so”. 84  An editorial on November 26, 2006 commented on the 
inactivity of the EPA and the Bush administration for failing to address the 
challenges of global warming with 12 US federal states including New York and 
Massachusetts proceeding to sue the EPA in the Supreme Court the following 
day.85  
Two factors, an editorial on April 16, 2007 claimed, were crucial to the success of 
any global system to reduce GHGs. One was American leadership and the other 
was China's full participation. Despite President Bush's diffidence, there had been 
mounting pressure from mayors, governors, some in Congress and, lately, even 
the Supreme Court, for the US to assume a more aggressive role. And now there 
were some modestly encouraging signs from China.86 It opined that China was 
unlikely to take binding targets as long as the US did not do so as well. Just as 
Bush was using China to excuse his own lack of action, China was using 
America’s lack of action to account for its inaction. A plea to the Democrats in 
Congress to help break the stalemate, and further encourage China to engage with 
the issue by establishing strong and credible emission limits for America was 
made.87  
On September 29, 2007 an editorial noted: President Bush’s global warming 
summit brought 17 countries together including G-8 and big emitting countries 
like China, India and Brazil. The summit suggested the change of Bush’s 
perception on climate change from deep denial about existence of global warming 
or the fact that humans and fossil fuels are primarily responsible for it to a more 
open minded and somewhat chastened in legacy mode. Congress, it said, should 
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lead him because in terms of substance Bush was still isolated.88 On November 
20, 2007 the paper noted that the world’s scientists had done their job. The IPCC, 
the most powerful, authoritative voice on global warming, consisting of 2500 
world climate scientists, had produced a clear message about the need for an 
urgent response to the climate challenge saying it was time for world leaders, 
starting with Bush, to act.89 An editorial on December 17, 2007 mentioned that the 
Bali climate change conference in 2007 ended in disappointment without any 
quantified commitments from the largest emitters.90 
On November 9, 2008 an opinion article by Gore was published. In it Gore argued 
that American people elected Obama as their 44th President and so laid the 
foundation for fighting against climate challenges and that the US should put a 
price on carbon at home, and lead the world’s efforts to replace the KP in 2009 in 
Copenhagen with a more effective treaty that would cap global CO2 emissions and 
encourage countries to invest together in efficient ways to reduce global warming 
pollution quickly, including by sharply reducing deforestation. It also argued that 
the best way – indeed the only way – to secure a global agreement to safeguard 
our future was to re-establish the US as the country with the moral and political 
authority to lead the world toward a solution. 91  On November 28, 2008 an 
editorial compared and contrasted President Bush’s and President-elect Obama’s 
positions on climate change. It said Bush was in denial but Obama was arguing 
that the economic crisis was the best time to invest in clean energy technologies.92 
It further said: “Call it what you will: a climate policy wrapped inside an energy 
policy wrapped inside an economic policy. By any name, it is a radical shift from 
the defeatism and denial that marked President Bush’s eight years in office”.93 
An editorial on January 27, 2009 reaffirmed Obama’s stand on climate change 
citing his direction to the EPA to consider California’s application to set its own 
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rules on GHG emissions from cars and trucks, contrasting that with Bush’s 
rejection of the application.94 A February 26, 2009 editorial appreciated Obama’s 
attempts to invest in clean energy technologies and said that Obama had to 
persuade everyone from Congress, the Senate, American taxpayers and China to 
follow. It also argued: 
Merely acknowledging a problem is not the same as addressing it. It 
has been four decades since Richard Nixon urged Congress to free the 
nation from its dependence on foreign oil, and the country is more 
dependent than ever. It has been well over a decade since the world’s 
industrialized nations agreed in Kyoto, Japan, to control global-
warming emissions, and emissions continue to rise. Mr. Obama is 
challenging not just the country, but history.95  
On June 29, 2009 an article applauded the House for passing the Waxman-
Markey climate change bill96 and questioned Bush’s legacy: 
Do you remember the days when Bush administration officials claimed 
that terrorism posed an ‘existential threat’ to America, a threat in 
whose face normal rules no longer applied? That was hyperbole – but 
the existential threat from climate change is all too real.97  
On July 10, 2009 an editorial reported that Obama had learnt lessons on global 
warming and mentioned how divided the world was about taking responsibility 
when he attended the G-8 summit.98 Two other editorials in July and August 2009 
stated that climate science demanded radical actions to cut emissions but that the 
US had not been able to respond accordingly and saw the climate change bill 
passed by the House as not very robust first step.99 
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On September 30, 2009 an editorial wrote that more than 100 leaders had gathered 
for the New York climate change summit 2009 sponsored by the UN and 
including President Obama and the Chinese President Jintao who were seen as 
important because together these countries produced more than 40 per cent of the 
total global emissions. They could lead the world or mess things up royally.100 It 
was noted that both of these leaders failed to bridge the gap that China was no 
longer pretending that it was a backward country and that the US was 
acknowledging its responsibility to help poor and most vulnerable nations reduce 
emissions without sacrificing growth. The two leaders had a considerable distance 
to bridge.101 An editorial on December 7, 2009 opined that nobody should expect 
a planet saving agreement from Copenhagen because it would be all about 
attitudes and aspirations.  
Nonetheless, the US and China agreed to reduce emissions and their two leaders 
worked to produce an interim agreement which included Obama seeking Congress 
approval to deliver on his promise of 17 per cent emission reductions.102  On 
December 21, 2009 it was noted that the international climate negotiations in 
Copenhagen had produced neither a grand success nor the complete meltdown 
despite two years of advance work. The meeting failed to convert a rare gathering 
of world leaders into an ambitious, legally binding action plan for reducing GHG 
emissions. It applauded Obama’s role on climate change but said the UN climate 
talks had been chaotic and real progress will henceforth be made in small 
gatherings of big players. It noted that except on finance, the pledges of 
Copenhagen Accord were nowhere near enough to keep atmospheric 
concentrations of carbon dioxide from rising above dangerous levels. 103 
A February 22, 2010 editorial noted that Yvo do Boer, chief of the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), had resigned because the 
UN climate change negotiation processes were tiring, cumbersome and slow. This 
resignation did not prove that that UN negotiation framework was of no value and 
                                                                                                                                     
 http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/18/opinion/18tue1.html? ; Editorial, ‘Trade and Climate’, NYT, 
July 19, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/19/opinion/19sun1.html?  
100 Editorial, ‘Mr Obama and Mr Hu on Warming’, NYT, September 23, 2009, 
  http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/23/opinion/23wed1.html?  
101 Ibid. 
102 Editorial, ‘Beyond Copenhagen’, NYT, December 7, 2009, A 28. 
103 Editorial, ‘Copenhagen and Beyond’, NYT, December 21, 2009, 
 http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/21/opinion/21mon1.html?  
196 
therefore should be abandoned.104 On July 17, 2010 an editorial contrasted the US 
Senate’s attempt to water down the House-passed energy bill with the British, 
German and French environmental ministers’ attempts to approve stricter 
emissions targets. “Nobody expects the Senate to go as far as the European 
ministers’ advocate. But there is no excuse for the Senate's backward march. We 
all live on the same planet, and it is getting warmer”.105 On October 18, 2010 an 
editorial asserted that Republicans were climate deniers.106  
The paper on December 3, 2010 focused on the issues to be resolved insisting that 
Copenhagen’s promises must be carried out by actions even if the differences 
between poor and rich countries, and the biggest emitters China and the US, were 
unresolved. It also asked the US delegates to work hard to honour Obama’s 
pledges to reduce 17 per cent emissions at home and cautioned that the UN 
climate process itself was on probation and that climate change and the havoc it 
would cause was a global issue requiring a global forum to address it.107  On 
December 17, 2010 an editorial commented that Cancun produced better results 
than Copenhagen in terms of transparency, helping poor countries to protect 
tropical forests, and adopt clean energy systems through the green fund while also 
keeping the UN climate process alive. However, it argued that keeping the UN 
process alive was not the same as saving the planet so big emitters must reduce 
their emissions as climate science demanded.108  
On March 5, 2011 the paper’s editor wrote: “Humans were inevitably going to be 
part of the fossil record. But the true meaning of the Anthropocene is that we have 
affected nearly every aspect of our environment – from a warming atmosphere to 
the bottom of an acidifying ocean”.109 Based on research published in Science, an 
editorial on September 27, 2011 reported that many species would die out. Some 
might adapt, however, Atlantic and Pacific populations of bowhead whales – long 
kept apart by the frozen Arctic – were now overlapping in the open waters of the 
Northwest Passage. “A rapid reduction in greenhouse gas emissions is tragically 
unlikely. We are holding the future of every species on this planet – including 
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ourselves – hostage”.110 An article on November 23, 2011 stated there was no 
doubt about climate change. Human activity affected the environment causing 
climate change and we have no idea about the magnitude of this effect but we 
need to do our best to preserve our environment and move to non-fossil fuels as 
sources of energy.111 On November 27, 2011 an article stated:  
The negotiating process itself is under fire from some quarters, 
including the poorest nations, who believe their needs are neglected in 
the fight among the major economic powers. Criticism is also coming 
from a relatively small but vocal band of climate change skeptics –  
many of them sitting members of the U.S. Congress – who doubt 
human influence on the climate and ridicule international efforts to 
address it.112  
Following this on November 28, 2011 an article claimed that the fund of $100 
billion promised in Copenhagen was a fiasco because, from its inception, the fund 
had been hamstrung by a lack of practical details of where the money should 
come from, and by competing visions for how it should achieve its aims.113 
An editorial on December 4, 2011 confirmed delegates from 194 countries would 
gather in Durban to negotiate controlling the GHGs aware that over the years 
there had been far more talk than action. The overall results had been dismal even 
by Kyoto’s modest standards, and the history of climate change control was not 
encouraging because GHGs rose between 1990 and 2009 by a whopping 38 per 
cent and the biggest obstacles for global progress had been countries like China, 
India and the US.114 An opinion article on December 9, 2011 noted that American 
delegates faced sharp criticism from fellow envoys, environmental activists and 
demonstrators, as they had shifted their position in Durban on the European 
Roadmap saying: “We are strongly committed to promptly starting a process to 
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move forward on that.” 115  The statement was immediately qualified with the 
statement that any resulting agreement may or may not be legally binding.  
On December 11, 2011 an opinion article asserted that the issues on the table were 
rather taller and broader than atmospheric carbon levels or forestry practices in 
seeking to devise a fund to compensate those affected but what was really at play 
were the politics concerning the relations among Europe, the US, Canada, Japan 
and three rapidly rising economic powers: China, India and Brazil. Those 
international relations, in turn, were driven by each country’s domestic politics 
and the strains the global financial crisis had put on all of them.116  
By December 12, 2011 it was commented that the Durban agreement had 
dismantled a 20 year old tradition of UNFCCC by bringing all developed and 
developing countries on board but for now it remained a pledge to move forward 
with details to be negotiated. The conclusion of talks in Durban was marked by 
exhaustion and explosions of temper while the governments avoided a climate 
process disaster, the decisions adopted fell well short of what was needed.117 
American climate change delegates were reported satisfied by the Durban 
outcome because the Americans went to Durban with two goals: 1) to deepen the 
agreements reached in Cancun and in Copenhagen, 2) to replace the KP with a 
new all-inclusive agreement and America got both because in the real world of 
international negotiations on exceptionally difficult global commons problem 
such as climate change the Durban agreement looked like a success.118  
Comments made on February 16, 2012 relating to climate change emails leaks 
offered a glimpse into the campaign against climate change with documents, from 
a non-profit organization in Chicago called the Heartland Institute, outlining plans 
to promote a curriculum that would cast doubt on the scientific findings that fossil 
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fuel emissions endanger the long-term welfare of the planet.119 On March 27, 
2012 an article quoting the scientific community warned about increasing global 
emissions which had reached a record high in 2010. It cautioned that a concerted 
worldwide effort to reduce emissions might not begin particularly in the face of a 
global economic slowdown.120  
The paper also noted that the UNFCCC meetings had ended in disillusionment 
with incremental political progress with little real impact on arresting climate 
change. The negotiation processes came under fire from the poorest countries and 
from a small but vocal band of climate change sceptics, many of them from the 
US Senate and House of Representatives, who doubted the existence of human 
influence on the climate and ridiculed international efforts to deal with it.121 From 
the coverage outlined it is clear that NYT identified the lack of progress – it 
mentioned the issues of power politics between long standing power and 
emerging economies and the complex issues of technology and economy—yet did 
not set out to analyse in detail why there had not been progress and how the 
solutions be achieved. 
6.4 The GUK (Includes Observer and its editorial ‘Leader’) 
This section of the study examines a total 134 articles from the GUK. On April 9, 
1999, an article criticized the US Department of Energy (DOE) for allowing the 
US domestic emissions to go on increasing, contrary to the intention of the 1997 
KP and Vice-President Gore’s commitment that the US would cut emissions as 
stipulated in the KP.122 On August 13, 2000 the leader noted that five of the 
hottest years of the last millennium took place in the 1990s. The twentieth-
century's 10 warmest years all occurred in its last 15 years. Snow-covers in the 
Northern Hemisphere and ice floes in the Arctic Ocean have decreased. Globally, 
the sea level rose between four and 10 inches over the past century. 123 
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The same article also stated that worldwide precipitation over land had increased 
by about 1 per cent. Furthermore, since the adoption of the KP in 1997 major 
countries had agreed to work toward reducing emissions but that US policy had 
been held hostage by special interest groups, particularly those in the US oil 
industry.124 On November 17, 2000, the leader complained that ignorance was no 
longer an excuse for inaction because most climate scientists agreed that human 
activity was the main cause of global warming. Scientists argued that the 5 per 
cent target of Kyoto was inadequate and with 4 per cent of the world’s population, 
the US was responsible for more than 20 per cent of emissions meaning its degree 
of irresponsibility to Kyoto would rise if the election went to Bush, a global 
warming denier.125 
The leader on April 1, 2001 remarked that the Bush administration was in a state 
of right-wing delusion, considered global supremacy in the 21st Century as a 
tussle between China and America with Bush’s views on climate change as a 
socialist plot designed to distort the scientific evidence to justify an assault on the 
American way of life to escape from the KP through a unilateral decision.126 It 
further asserted that:  
His dangerous distortion of reality results not only from the corruption 
of the conservative mind. Another cause is no less sinister. The 
Petroleum Club of Houston, Mr Bush's Texan oil backer, is now 
central in forging American energy and environmental policy.127  
On May 3, 2001 an article evaluated Bush’s first 100 days in office and stated that 
Bush carried the military-industrial complex character; he was immoral, he 
abandoned the KP, and instructed his treasury secretary to block IMF funds to bail 
out developing countries. All these actions abandoned faith and principle and 
came from arrogance, ignorance, and conscience-less conservatism.128  
                                                 
124 Ibid. 
125 Leader, ‘High Noon at Hague’, GUK, November 17, 2000, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2000/nov/17/guardianleaders.globalwarming?INTCMP=S
RCH.  
126 Leader, ‘The US is Not Fit to Run the World’, GUK, April 1, 2001, 
 http://www.guardian.co.uk/news/2001/apr/01/leaders.leaders?INTCMP=SRCH.  
127 Ibid. 
128 ‘Mr Bush’s Bad Dream’, GUK, May 3, 2001,  
http://www.guardian.co.uk/theguardian/2001/may/03/guardianweekly.guardianweekly11?INTCM
P=SRCH. 
201 
The leader on May 6, 2001 censured Exxon’s support for Bush’s abandonment of 
the KP and went on to urge a boycott of the petrol stations of Esso and Exxon’s in 
the UK as an appropriate response to its pressure on Bush to ratify Kyoto.129 On 
June 19, 2001 the leader stated that Mr. Bush’s boastful refusal of the KP and 
demand for more research was an attempt to ignore others’ persuasive 
assessments of the climate change problem. His love for missiles could easily 
make Europeans understand that Bush is an affable, inflexible front man for a 
right-wing business, political and military alliance intent on pursuing the logic of 
a solo superpower to its domineering conclusion.130 It reported on June 30, 2001 
that: 
The original Kyoto agreement was to cut the developed world's 
emissions by 5.5% by 2010 from a 1990 baseline. This is more 
difficult than it sounds because emissions have risen dramatically since 
1990, particularly in the US, and gives a clue to why Mr Bush finds it 
impossible to ratify the agreement.131  
An article reported on July 24, 2001 that reaching an agreement on the KP was a 
roller coaster ride and one of the most arduous series of international negotiations 
ever recorded but it stated that the deal came into existence after 8 years and it 
was just a small step.132 The leader remarked on the same date:  
The 186 countries involved in the Bonn climate change negotiations 
are, with one exception, to be congratulated on their success in 
translating the 1997 Kyoto protocol into an international treaty. 
Particular praise is due to the European Union, which took the lead 
when others faltered.133 
On August 22, 2002 an article opined about the disturbing gap between rich and 
poor countries with both sides agreeing that enriching the world must not be at the 
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expense of the environment. It also stated that if there was one cause that the 
summit on sustainable development was synonymous with, it was climate change 
because Rio had laid the foundation for the KP where industrialized countries 
pledged to cut emissions, therefore the summit on sustainable development should 
go further to ‘grow without grime’ for considerable investment in renewable 
technology since development cannot see one planet split into two worlds.134 The 
leader on August 25, 2002 stated that the KP must be brought into force and the 
world must go ahead without the US even if its emissions were 25 per cent of the 
global total.135  
Close to a year later on August 6, 2003 the leader lamented that global warming 
was becoming part of the present, with the 1990s the hottest decade in the 
millennium. Bizarrely, the weight of the evidence required for policy makers 
around the world to act decisively was not enough for the world’s greatest 
polluter, the US, but urgent policy changes such as more cash for alternative 
sources of energy, making polluters pay, cutting subsidies for dirty fuels were 
needed as first steps.136 On December 5, 2003 the editorial argued that Russia 
would join the KP because it allowed nations to sell emissions rights to others that 
needed them, and the hard cash countries could invest in cleaner energy. It also 
said that other developed countries would invest in clean energy whereas the US, 
by turning its back on Kyoto, would rely only on dirty fuels.137 
An opinion article on February 19, 2004 discussed the flaws of producing and 
understanding climate science, arguing that anti-environmental lobby groups, 
along with the US Senators, played hard to create distrust of climate change 
among people and even forced the editorial boards to publish papers in their 
interests.138  On April 5, 2004 the leader was critical that Bush was trying to 
improve his image for his second election campaign of 2004 by altering his stand 
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on unilateralism to gently reintegrate with the rest of the world by signing a low 
key maritime treaty. Bush was warned that before signing the convention, he must 
overcome the conservative fringe of the Republican Party. It also criticized the 
“Wall Street Journal, the house newspaper of the swivel-eyed right” editorial on 
the danger of a US subject to "the control of a highly politicised UN bureaucracy", 
and argued that the Law of the Sea treaty set a terrible precedent.139 On October 2, 
2004 the leader applauded the Russian ratification of the KP and said that the US 
and Australian involvement in the Iraq war overshadowed other international 
issues including the KP. Consequently, the US and Australian non-ratification of 
Kyoto would make them unable to benefit from valuable economic resources 
created under the Protocol.140 
The leader on July 29, 2005 questioned:  
Why, after being so implacably opposed for so long to the Kyoto 
Protocol, did the US perform a U-turn yesterday? To the complete 
surprise of even its closest allies, it announced a new pact with five 
Asian-Pacific states to cut greenhouse gases.141 
It noted belatedly, that even the US president, whose bread had been buttered by 
the fossil fuel industry, had acknowledged that global warming was a problem. 
This followed the 132 American city mayors and several state governors who 
voluntarily signed up to help meet the targets that Kyoto set for the US. This 
support was not confined to the Democratic Party but transmitted to leading 
Republican figures, such as Senator John McCain and California governor Arnold 
Schwarzenegger, who signalled their strong support for a ceiling on US carbon 
dioxide emissions.142 
The leader on April 2, 2006 raised the issue of aviation industry noting that 
airlines that paid no fuel tax or duty were exempt from any climate change levy 
and this uncontrolled flight luxury was way beyond what the planet could afford. 
It implored governments to tax aviation industries unilaterally and if it cannot be 
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done unilaterally it must be established through international agreement. 143  A 
contributor on November 4, 2006 wrote: “As an American, I am appalled, 
ashamed, and embarrassed by my country's lack of leadership in dealing with 
global warming”.144 The Bush administration was not the only US problem but oil 
men and their buddies also did not want conservation being core conservatives on 
the matter. The former Clinton and Gore administrations had fared no better in 
taking any brave actions aimed at radically reducing emissions.145 
On June 1, 2007 the leader expressed the view that Bush had a history of making 
visionary speeches which came to nothing. His G-8 partners did not listen to him 
at their meetings where Bush attempted to deviate from the UNFCCC negotiating 
process because the US wanted a deal on a fossil intensive approach that had no 
chance of reducing GHG emissions.146 An opinion piece on June 2, 2007 set out 
the flaws of CDM147 projects evident until 2006 under the KP. Companies like 
Ernst and Young that ran CDM projects in India manipulated the public opinion 
data and made huge profits. It also said that until 2006 the CDM board did not 
reject even one application and the causes could be that CDM was short of staff, 
experts and funding until the end of 2006 when it stood on its own feet.148  
The paper’s environmental editor commended the voices of influential scientists 
and government officials on the price increase from airline’s flight to inefficient 
light bulbs to effectively tackle climate change. The editor wrote that although the 
IPCC did not recommend specific climate policies, an IPCC’s draft obtained by 
the Guardian highlighted the introduction of an effective global carbon tax priced 
between $20 and $80 per tonne by 2030 to limit the temperature rise. The Bali 
2007 climate conference would initiate how such a tax could be imposed 
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globally. 149  On December 3, 2007 the leader stated: “The science of climate 
change is clear. The politics of the world's response are still murky, as the Bali 
summit, which begins today, will show”. It speculated that Bali would fall short of 
the scientific expectations and that the US would not go for deep cuts and rapidly 
growing economies like China and India would not join hands for mandatory cuts.  
The same article reported that the 10,000 officials from 190 countries would battle 
for their country’s national advantage and concluded the Bali conference offered 
an option to talk.150 On December 15, 2007 the leader declared that the Bali 
conference was not a failure but that US obstruction could still threaten a deal by 
2009 impinging on its success. The US intransigence at the Bali conference had 
been all the more shameful the leader declared, because it was no longer 
accompanied by a denial of the basic science as the US now accepted that the 
world was facing catastrophe although it still refused to take its share of the pain 
needed to avert it – which was selfish behaviour on a global scale. 151  On 
December 16, 2007 an article explained that the US had finally joined the Bali 
agreement after the conference overran by a day however the US still maintained 
reservations and wanted the developing nations to adopt mandatory emissions 
targets. The Bali Roadmap opened the road for two years to seal a deal in 
Copenhagen in 2009.152 
An article on February 2, 2008 cautioned:  
The Climate Security Act going through Congress and the Bali 
negotiations bear witness to the resistance. The problem is that many 
Americans still dismiss the sustainability agenda as bad science, bad 
religion, bad for business and bad for America.153 
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Their fear is that if you factor in the environmental costs you'll price 
America out of the market and export their jobs and factories to India 
and China. Or that the environmental agenda will be the Trojan horse 
that will bring socialism to America and the country to its knees.154 
On April 14, 2008 it was noted that the developing world was dismayed by the 
lack of climate negotiation leadership so a new deal to replace the KP was under 
threat. Approving of the comments of a top UN climate official it wrote that 
China, India and other developing countries were unwilling to sign a new climate 
pact to replace Kyoto because the rich countries failed to set a clear example on 
cutting carbon emissions.155  
On October 15, 2008 two propositions were suggested for preventing climate 
change: cut emissions by at least 80 per cent and safeguard the forests by stopping 
deforestation and moving to afforestation.156 On December 8, 2008 the paper, 
citing a UN document, claimed that the world seemed to be on the track to meet 
the Kyoto targets by cutting emissions. It said that 16 industrialized countries had 
met the targets but 20 industrialized countries were off the course and that the KP 
had been successful in setting up the framework but had failed to reduce GHG 
emissions. 157  An article on December 15, 2008 commented: “climate change 
negotiations taking place in Poland last week ended in disappointment for many 
hoping for a global agreement on greenhouse gas emissions. The Americans 
weren't helping”.158  
On March 14, 2009 an editorial argued that the science of climate change was 
clear. Scientists had clarified and done their bit in 2007 and later, so now the issue 
of climate change fell to politicians to pick up the agenda and devise a 
replacement for the KP and for an agreement of global scope. American political 
                                                 
154 Ibid. 
155 David Adam and John Vidal, ‘Rich States Failing to Lead on Emissions, Says UN Climate 
Chief’, GUK, April 14, 2008, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2008/apr/14/climatechange.carbonemissions?INTCMP=S
RCH.  
156 Editorial, ‘Climate Change Seeing the Wood’, GUK, October 15, 2008, 
 http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2008/oct/15/climate-change-
deforestation?INTCMP=SRCH.  
157 David Adam, ‘Analysis: Has the Kyoto Protocol Worked?’ GUK, December 8, 2008, 
 http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2008/dec/08/kyoto-poznan-environment-emissions-
carbon?INTCMP=SRCH.  
158 Tan Copsey, ‘A Bleak Week in Poznan’, GUK, December 15, 2008, 
 http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2008/dec/15/poznan-climate-change.  
207 
leadership change is significant which is not only the replacement of a ‘denial 
man’ by a man who does not deny it and can put policies into practice unlike, the 
Clinton Administration that signed Kyoto but could not ratify it.159 An editorial on 
June 2, 2009, cited the Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency’s (NEAA) 
research that CO2 emissions from the developing world accounted for more than 
half of the total global emissions for the first time so the developing world could 
be ignored in the 1990s but that could not be overlooked any longer.160  
An editorial on September 20, 2009 explained the deadlock between the 
developed and developing countries:  
There are various obstacles in the negotiations, but the main one is a 
global fault line between developed and developing worlds. Countries 
with massive industrial potential still unfulfilled – mainly China and 
India – will not take moral instruction in eco-austerity from countries 
that have already industrialised and left a legacy of carbon in the 
atmosphere as a result. The industrialised countries, meanwhile, are 
reluctant to bind themselves to targets that do not also restrain 
countries they see as competitors.161 
An editorial on November 15, 2009 observed that without compliance from the 
major emitter, the US, there was less chance of negotiating a globally binding 
agreement. The US officials were waiting for China’s emissions cuts 
announcement of 40 to 45 per cent reductions relative to economic growth by 
2020 before joining other key nations such as Brazil and Japan who had pledged 
more action than the US. It also argued that voluntary action was not enough to 
prevent the global average temperature from increasing by more than 2°C, in 
conjunction there would need to be a global cut in emissions within the next five 
years.162 
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On December 18, 2009 an article commented that the Copenhagen Accord was 
produced by the participation of very few countries. Developing countries were 
bitterly disappointed by the Accord and the process as most of them had not been 
invited to work on the draft, after huge pressure from the US.163 An editorial on 
December 19, 2009 said that the Copenhagen climate change summit had three 
tickets on its agenda: emissions, financial aid and the process of moving ahead, 
and on each of these three counts the Accord, effectively hammered out was not 
by the whole conference but by BASIC164 and the US, fell woefully short.165 It 
further remarked that the Accord was a sad tribute to collective failure and that the 
all-important question at the end of Copenhagen is – what happens next?166  
On December 21, 2009 an editorial commented that the Copenhagen climate 
change conference looked both adequate and inadequate: adequate because of the 
novel manner through which the ultimate failure of COP-15 was reached and 
inadequate, because a considered reading of the Accord, which was its only 
tangible output, reveals that it was not just inadequate but in fact utterly empty.167 
It concluded:  
Failure to fix the climate in Copenhagen might have been forgiven had 
the delegates emerged with a credible timetable for getting the job 
done. Instead, progress made under the text's inaction plan is to be 
‘assessed’ in 2015, with a view to considering whether to tighten the 2 
degrees Celsius lid on temperature rises to 1.5 degrees Celsius. This 
may sound a noble idea, but the review is set to be futile, since the 
science says that rises above 1.5 degrees Celsius will probably be 
guaranteed by the middle of the new decade.168 
On December 22, 2009 the paper published an interview with leading climate 
change experts asking for their assessment of the Copenhagen Accord. Fuqiang 
Yang, director of global climate solutions, World Wildlife Fund (WWF) 
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International, responded that Copenhagen ended without a fair, ambitious and 
legally binding treaty to reduce GHG emissions, yet what did emerge was an 
agreement that would at the very least cut emissions, set up an emissions 
verification system and reduce deforestation. John Prescott, climate change 
rapporteur for the Council of Europe, opined that Copenhagen failed to produce a 
legally binding global treaty and it was hard to get one, but Copenhagen produced 
a statement of principle which was the final admission that we cannot let 
temperatures rise above 2°C from pre-industrial levels.  
Martin Rees, president of the Royal Society, stated that the outcomes from 
Copenhagen were less than many had hoped for but the involvement of China and 
India was crucial. The grandstanding by particular countries and insistence by 
some on an unreasonable target of 1.5°C was plainly unhelpful to the negotiations 
yet the Accord helped maintain long term concerns about climate change on the 
global agenda. Bryony Worthington, climate campaigner with sandbag.org, who 
helped draft the UK climate change bill, opined that the Accord was a spectacular 
failure on many levels such as the voluntary pledge and review later measures, the 
insultingly low level of funds, and the current poor arrangement of COP-15where 
no consensus could be reached toward future policies.  
Gavin Schmidt, climate scientist at NASA and co-founder of RealClimate.org, 
stated that COP-15 was not an event but a process with people now seeing the 
problems caused by climate change. Kumi Naidoo, executive director, 
Greenpeace International, posited that the outcome of COP-15 was unfair and that 
nation-states and climate polluting industries had put their self-interest before 
climate protection; the pledges were weak and could drive temperature to 4°C 
instead of 2. Global citizens, for their part, needed to elect more ambitious leaders 
who could embrace new, low carbon technologies. Vicky Pope, head of climate 
change advice at the Met Office, stated that the Accord was fairly weak and 
disappointing but it was good that everyone accepted the scientific reality that 
climate change was a problem and that we needed to limit warming to 2°C. 
Nicholas Stern, chair, Grantham Research Institute on climate change and the 
environment, stated that COP-15 was a disappointment but that the road to 
Copenhagen and the summit itself generated commitments on emissions 
reductions from many countries, including, for the first time, from the world's two 
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largest emitters, China and the US, and that the Accord did recognise that a rise in 
global average temperature should be limited to below 2°C. 
 Dr Myles Allen, head of the climate dynamics group in the atmosphere, argued 
that the COP-15 outcome was good on one level because it recognized the 2°C 
temperature limit and that China and the US came on the board. But it was 
depressing that governments wanted to spend years on a legally binding 
agreement instead of implementing what had already been agreed upon. 
Bernarditas de Castro Muller, former lead negotiator for the G-77 plus the China 
group of developing countries, stated that the outcome of COP-15 was inadequate 
and there were other problems arising from the process of producing documents: 
the main one was that the process resulted in an agreement that completely 
undermined the cardinal rule of multilateralism, transparency and inclusiveness. 
Rajendra Pachauri, chairman of the IPCC, said that Copenhagen 2009 produced 
three major achievements: the agreement of 2°C temperature limit that guaranteed 
that climate science was settled, that BASIC and the US were on board the 
agreement, and that there was $30 billion funding for 2010-2012.169  
On February 23, 2010 an opinion article criticized the Climategate email hackers 
for their malicious attempt to stall Copenhagen but it wrote that Climategate did 
not erode the interests of people in climate change instead it made people more 
concerned about climate change.170 An editorial on July 8, 2010 reaffirmed the 
Climategate opinion:  
There was no attempt to hoax the world into believing that climate 
change exists, just excessive secrecy. There was no panicky cover-up 
to hide rigged data, for no data was rigged. There was no cabal of 
scientists cooking up fake evidence of catastrophe. There is, however, 
a real crisis of the most extreme nature: evidence suggests that climate 
change is real, urgent and increasing. Nothing about the so-called 
Climategate affair challenges that fact.171  
                                                 
169 Adam Vaughan and David Adam, ‘Copenhagen Climate Deal Spectacular Failure or A Few 
Important Steps?’ GUK, December 22, 2009, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2009/dec/22/copenhagen-climate-deal-expert-view . 
170 David Adam, ‘Climate Wars Damage the Scientists But We All Stand to Lose in the Battle’, 
GUK, February 23, 2010, http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/cif-green/2010/feb/23/climate-
scepticism-hacked-emails?INTCMP=SRCH.  
171 Editorial, ‘Climate Change: The Science Stands’, GUK, July 8, 2010, 
211 
Investors support was sought on November 17, 2010 in an article that implored 
policy makers and leading investors like Allianz and HSBC as well as investment 
groups from developing countries and pension funds from across Europe and 
North America to tackle global climate change at Cancun’s UN climate summit or 
risk economic disturbance.172  
On December 12, 2010 an editorial noted that the Cancun agreement left too 
many issues unresolved but enough was agreed by the delegates in Mexico to 
raise hopes that climatic disaster could be avoided in the long term with its 
proposals for a mechanism to prevent deforestation in the developing countries, 
disbursement of $100 billion a year by 2020 to protect poor nations against 
climate impacts and make a move to low carbon development, set up for 
technology transfer for low carbon economy. 173  On December 13, 2010 an 
editorial presented how Britain’s weather patterns were changing and how people 
were suffering in Pakistan and many other places because of the impacts of 
climate change and argued that though Cancun may look fine for now it is 
actually more like another opportunity missed in the process of climate 
negotiations.174  
An editorial presented new figures released on May 30, 2011 showed we were 
continuing to hurtle towards dangerous climate change at a time when policy 
makers were running out of ideas. It noted that over the past half-decade, three 
global warming orthodoxies had endured: the diplomatic one which saw the UN 
forum as the best place to negotiate; the economic one in which the great 
recession would automatically lower the emissions; and the industrial one where 
the rich countries would wean themselves off the fossil fuels and move to a mix of 
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nuclear and renewable. All of these were seemingly utopian for their inability to 
make any progress to cut emissions.175  
An environmental editor on June 6, 2011 wrote that developing nations were 
questioning funding commitments from developed countries, citing World 
Research Institute data that showing the world’s 21 developed countries and the 
European Commission had publicly announced pledges of $28 billion in fast track 
after commitment made in Copenhagen in 2009. While this was close to the $30 
billion promised for the 2010-2012 period, only around $12 billion had actually 
been budgeted for by countries and as little as 30 per cent had been delivered in 
some cases.176 On July 15, 2011 an article quoted Sir David King, chief scientific 
adviser to the United Kingdom (UK) government, saying that the world should 
abandon the KP on climate change and find a way forward through alternative 
approaches with emissions quotas based on population by mid-century.177 But on 
October 12, 2011 it published an article arguing that if the Kyoto process died in 
Durban, the politics of climate change negotiations would be more difficult, and 
that allowing Kyoto to lapse would be a disaster. 178  On November 24, 2011 
claims were made that vulnerable countries were considering occupying Durban 
talks until substantial progress was made.179 
On November 25, 2011 an article conceded that although legally binding targets 
were the only way to tackle climate change, the powerful, high emitting nations 
would be stubborn and the titanic clash over climate change negotiations would 
continue particularly among the big emitters. It urged a step forward from India, 
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the US, China, Japan and Canada on the negotiation process.180 On the same day, 
November 25, an editorial remarked that global emissions needed to start to fall 
within the next five years or so, and that each delay made failure costlier and 
harder to avoid.  
The will to act on climate change was out of political energy, running on empty. 
The problem was (relatively) distant, complex and intractable, and the solution 
was costly, immediate, and the gains uncertain. It was the kind of slow-burn crisis 
that democratic politicians only tackle under sustained popular pressure and at the 
time of writing Western voters had other things on their minds such as looming 
economic turmoil. The government that promised to be the greenest ever was 
allowing emission-cutting policies to appear an indulgent hangover from a more 
prosperous age. As a consequence, when the 17th climate change conference 
opened in Durban, Africa had the opportunity to remind the parties why inaction 
was not an option.181 
 On December 9, 2011 yearly climate conference was described as a pantomime 
and doubt was cast on the US behaviour. For President Obama, facing an election 
campaign amid the worst recession for 80 years, the political reality was that a 
Durban deal would be used as ammunition by his opponents, most of whom 
dismissed climate change as a conspiracy to defraud Americans. Finding the real 
villain, one should look behind Obama to the Republican Party.182 On December 
12, 2011 an article noted how climate scientists and environmental groups reacted 
to opening the door for a globally legally binding agreement. In their view it was a 
positive sign but, not enough unless ambitious and rapid emission cuts could be 
implemented nothing would minimize temperature rise and there would be an 
increase in global emissions.183  
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On the same day an editorial lamented that the Durban agreement was almost a 
complete failure because trying to get agreement became instead a plan about a 
plan. Conflicts of interest centred on arguments between developed and 
developing economies over who pays for the past, and how to pay for the future 
without the heaviest burden falling on those most vulnerable to climate change – 
the least developed countries and small island states. The phrase ‘legal force’ used 
in the Durban text was undefined, and no plan was made for sustainable income, 
no certainty of a Kyoto extension for 4 or 5 years, and at least 8 years more of 
ongoing pollution and emissions.184 On April 1, 2012 an editorial pointing to the 
problem of climate change in the Arctic region issued a warning: “There is a 
dangerous lack of urgency among politicians in their reactions to the vast changes 
that are sweeping our planet”.185 
6.5 The Hindu 
A total of 103 articles from the Hindu were examined. On October 4, 2000 the 
actions of developed countries were criticised in editorial noting it was unfair for 
the industrialised countries to impose their agenda of interests on the developing 
countries. The paper criticized the role of major global financial institutions 
including the UN and argued that they needed to change their attitudes towards 
developing countries 186  An article on November 26, 2000 confirmed that the 
UNFCCC summit on global warming in the Hague brought more businessmen 
than environmentalists to the table given the emerging global emissions market 
was worth billions of dollars. It went on to note that most scientists were 
convinced that global warming was happening but that some experts argued that 
the science of climate change was still in its infancy. The Hindu posited that the 
common perception based on evidence was that global warming was happening 
and a real phenomenon.187  
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On November 26, 2000 a republished Agence France Presse (AFP) article 
reported that the UN climate talks collapsed at the 11th hour after the EU and the 
US failed to settle a bitter row over ways to stop global warming and over how to 
cut emissions of GHGs – the by-product of burning oil, gas and coal held 
responsible for the earth's warming.188 An editorial criticized the US stand on 
April 7, 2001 and noted: “It is true that the industrialised countries bear the main 
responsibility for the build-up of GHGs in the atmosphere and it is therefore they 
and not the developing countries which should take action to halt the process”.189 
The then Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee on October 30, 2002 rejected 
suggestions from several developed countries that India and other developing 
countries increase their commitments to reduce the emission of GHGs to address 
the problem of climate change, opining that it was the developed world which had 
contributed much more to the problem. Vajpayee argued that the ethos of 
democracy could not support any norm other than equal per capita rights to global 
environmental resources and urged that the UNFCCC Convention pay more 
attention to the aspect of vulnerability and adaptation of developing countries.190  
The COP-8 negotiations in New Delhi received many warnings but made little 
commitment to arrest global warming. The Hindu’s editor remarked on November 
1, 2002 that with the passing of each year, the signs of changes in the weather – 
global warming leading to alteration of rainfall and temperature patterns – were 
becoming more and more apparent. There could now no longer be any doubt that 
the world was in the midst of climate change. Since it would take decades to 
reverse the process, there was a need for immediate action but the UNFCCC 
process to climate action was very slow. Further, COP-8 was convened in India 
and as a developing country India should have worked harder to produce better 
and more meaningful outcomes whereas the draft prepared by India and adopted, 
made no mention of the KP and its implementation and thus India tarnished its 
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image. The only two countries that appreciated the draft were the US, an opponent 
of the KP and Saudi Arabia, a major exporter of crude oil.191 
An editorial on December 15, 2004 claimed the ratification of the KP by Russia 
was significant in reducing GHG emissions through the international framework 
and that, equally, the recently released eight-nation Arctic Climate Impact 
Assessment report published by the University of Cambridge, reinforced its vital 
importance through its projections about the likely consequences of unchecked 
global warming.192 An article on December 19, 2004 commented on the UNFCCC 
meeting held in Buenos Aires, where the EU and the US worked out a modest 
deal to inch ahead in the international efforts to put a cap on global warming, 
although the Americans avoided any commitment to negotiate any mandatory 
emissions reductions.193  
On December 12, 2005 it was reported that India and China had sent a signal to 
the rest of the world that they would take action against climate change although 
the US declined to ratify the KP despite the private and deep worries of many 
Americans about global warming. 194  An editorial on December 16, 2005 
applauded the efforts made at COP-11 in Montreal that brought an improvement 
in the international campaign to reduce the dangers of global warming along with 
the CDM mechanism. The Montreal conference had two major achievements: one 
was in firming up a plan to start talks on further commitments on targeted 
emission reductions beyond 2012 by those developed countries which had already 
undertaken such commitments in the first phase of the Protocol, and the second 
was in trying to bring the US and other dissident members of the UNFCCC into 
the international climate change agenda by initiating what was called a ‘dialogue 
process’, due to take place in the following two years.195 
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Citing the International Energy Agency (IEA), the Hindu wrote that global 
emissions would accelerate dramatically because of the increased reliance on coal 
for electricity production, and that without the policies in place to increase the use 
of alternative and renewable sources of energy as well as government 
intervention, global emissions would rise significantly as developing economies 
continued to rely on fossil fuels.196 An opinion piece published on November 9, 
2006 noted that the consensus on climate change was already clear and 
incontrovertible while the UN data showed that emissions continued to rise in 
industrialized countries as the scientists had warned. The former chief economist 
of the World Bank, Nicholas Stern, called climate change the greatest and widest 
market failure ever.197  
An editorial on November 14, 2006 wrote approving of the Stern report that not 
doing anything to reduce global warming was no longer a valid choice and argued 
that the uncertainty surrounding the long-term impacts of GHG emissions on 
climate warranted stronger, not weaker, goals to limit them before they would 
cause permanent and dangerous climate change. It commented that attention had 
turned to China, India and the US and the decisions of these countries would be 
crucial to the success of UNFCCC climate change negotiations.198 
Changes in land use and wood burning from deforestation were responsible for 18 
per cent of global GHG emissions each year so the world must protect tropical 
rainforests from further destruction to combat climate change. 199  The CDM 
projects were actually not protecting the forests or the poor and vulnerable people. 
Instead, they were new ways of exploiting the forests, vulnerable and indigenous 
people in the name of emission trading.200 Given the climate challenges were 
building up, more than 180 countries agreed to review the KP but there was no 
deal adopted on a deadline for setting a global limit on GHGs that could be 
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applied after 2012 when the KP would expire. 201 The Hindu noted that there were 
no signs that the US and Australia, which had rejected the Protocol, would 
consider signing a successor agreement, or that industrialising countries such as 
China and India would agree to cut their carbon emissions.202 
A December 3, 2007 article remarked that a consensus had developed for a drastic 
reduction of GHG emissions, although there were differing views of countries on 
how much and how soon. India, with one sixth of the world’s population, had its 
job cut out at Bali because it could no longer afford to maintain its present laid-
back attitude on deteriorating climate system.203 Further, it reported that world 
leaders had launched marathon negotiations on how to fight global warming 
which, if left unchecked, could cause devastating sea level rises, send millions 
further into poverty and lead to the mass extinction of plants and animals.204 On 
December 6 the Hindu wrote:  
The real issues in Bali are not technical or economic. The crisis we 
face demands a profound philosophical discussion, a reappraisal of 
who we are and what progress means. Debating these matters makes 
us neither saints nor communists; it shows only that we have 
understood the science.205  
The paper on December 8, 2007 highlighted that while the Bali roadmap has been 
touted as the starting point for a fresh set of negotiations for a post-2012 
agreement when the Kyoto Protocol lapses, developing countries — particularly 
the G77 group — has been pushing for honouring the existing commitments first. 
It wrote “sources claim that the developed world is insisting that the developing 
world purchase the technology in the open market”.206  
On December 14, it was commented that the US had worsened the deadlock in the 
on-going global climate change talks at Bali, by putting forward a proposal that 
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seemed to completely discard the international UN framework, in favour of 
separate national-level efforts to reduce GHG emissions without any binding 
international commitment.207 However, on December 17, the paper commended 
that the Bali conference overcame considerable wrangling and produced the Bali 
Action Plan, a basic but promising Road Map to 2009, when major economies had 
to decide on new actions to reduce GHG emissions. The Bali resolution accepted 
the scientific evidence and emphasised the urgency of combating climate change. 
Developed countries must, as per the Bali Action Plan, adopt measurable, 
reportable and verifiable emission limits and reductions while developing 
countries could emphasise adaptation rather than emissions reduction.  
The Bali Action Plan provided opportunities for China and India to reduce their 
carbon footprint through technology and to strive for mitigation without 
compromising economic growth.208 An article on December 18, 2007 approved 
that India’s responsibility for global warming remained at rock bottom however it 
did not mean that India needed to do nothing except negotiating smart.209 
On December 3, 2008 an article discussed the threatening situation of climate 
change particularly for the Pacific Islands and stated that increasing coastal 
inundation, salinization and erosion, as a consequence of rising sea-levels and 
human activities, were contaminating and reducing the size of productive 
agricultural lands, thus threatening household and local food security. 210  The 
fragile Himalayan region had to be protected because the Himalayas have a deep 
association with glaciers, biodiversity, forests, ecology, environment and climate 
change risks.211  
The participants of the 2008 Poznan, Poland, climate conference were not serious 
in the negotiations as they failed to produce a roadmap for a revised mode of 
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negotiation and new UNFCCC climate agreement. The Hindu stated that 
ambitious targets must be at the heart of the agreement based on a new 
institutional architecture for cooperation between rich and poor countries because 
while countries can recover from financial crises, there was no antidote or rewind 
button for global warming.212 An article published on December 9, 2008 wrote 
that global emissions were on track to meet the Kyoto targets but the drop in 
emissions had actually nothing to do with climate policies, but were parts of 
political upheaval of the Soviet Union and the subsequent economic decline in the 
Eastern Europe as the causes of the drop in emissions.213  
The next day the paper commented that the Poznan climate change negotiations 
were not progressing fast enough to produce a “fully elaborate and 
comprehensive” treaty by the time delegates meet again in Copenhagen in 
December. An article reported the Indian stance on climate change negotiation 
quoting the chief Indian climate change delegate, Vijay Sharma, saying: 
If any party wants to tinker with the established principles, such as the 
principle of common but differentiated responsibility, which mandates 
emission cuts only for developed nations, then of course this would 
handicap the negotiations and detract from the efficiency, and lose 
unnecessary time.214 
However, two days later the Poznan climate change conference was reported as 
significant because it had paved the way for sealing a deal at the Copenhagen 
climate conference in 2009. Recalling the proverb ‘prevention is better than cure’, 
the paper argued for prevention through mitigation and adaptation. The issue of 
climate justice and human rights in the development perspective are to be 
addressed and the industrialized countries must take strong and immediate steps to 
increase assistance to the least developed countries for adaptation.215 
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On December 13 the comment was made that Poznan had been mildly successful 
in operationalizing the adaptation fund with the slow progress attributed partly to 
the US Presidential transition, and the uncertainty of the EU’s internal climate 
negotiations which ended with huge concessions for European industry.216  By 
December 20, 2008 an editorial reviewed climate change as a side-line issue in a 
period of economic meltdown however there was consensus that the earth would 
continue to grow warmer due to accumulated atmospheric carbon dioxide and that 
the level of the long-lived gas had risen to 385 parts per million today from 280 
ppm before the industrial revolution. At Poznan a great deal of attention had been 
devoted to implementing a much-needed adaptation fund for vulnerable countries 
which needed strengthening. The Hindu noted: 
 At the recent UN Climate Change Conference in Poland a great deal 
of attention was devoted to implementing a much-needed adaptation 
fund for vulnerable countries. That effort must be strengthened. What 
is more, its emissions trading scheme does not appear to be 
functioning optimally – preliminary data for 2007 show a surplus of 
permits rather than the intended shortage that would make emissions 
costly.217 
One commentator quoted the Environment Minister of India, Jairam Ramesh, on 
November 23, 2009 saying that India was not a deal breaker but a deal maker and 
that the present crisis on climate change was the ‘inability’ of the US to put on the 
table credible emissions reduction targets for 2020.218 Chinese President Jintao 
was quoted at the UN climate change conference in New York in September 
2009, as saying “Global climate change has a profound impact on the existence 
and development of mankind and is a major challenge facing all countries”. Jintao 
further noted that China was endeavouring to cut CO2 emissions per unit of 
growth domestic product (GDP) by a notable margin by 2020 from the 2005 level; 
to vigorously develop renewable energy and nuclear energy; to energetically 
increase a forest carbon sink; endeavour to increase forest coverage by 40 million 
hectares and forest stock volume by 1.3 billion cubic meters by 2020 from the 
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2005 levels; to step up efforts to develop the green economy, the low-carbon 
economy and circular economy; and to enhance research, development and the 
dissemination of climate-friendly technologies.219 
The next day an editorial praised Obama’s efforts aimed at bringing major 
emitting developing countries forward in their commitments to mitigate climate 
change. India too, it implored, must step forward because the official stance that 
the country’s per capita emissions would always be lower than those of the 
developed countries could not form the basis for serious climate talks, considering 
the goal was to reduce the rate at which GHGs were being added to the Earth’s 
atmosphere. It applauded Chinese President Jintao’s clear and specific goals and 
efforts to reduce emissions, and also stated that technology must be developed for 
at source carbon sequestration. 220  China, India, Japan and private sector 
contribution just prior to the Copenhagen climate conference in 2009 was 
applauded but the Hindu cautioned that there were huge challenges ahead to make 
negotiations successful at international and domestic levels for developing 
appropriate climate policies and implementing them. Real vision, leadership, 
creativity, as well as a mutual understanding of the difficulties of making and 
implementing climate policies are required through a global effort to forge a path 
towards a more prosperous and sustainable future for us, our children, and 
generations to follow.221 In sum, the developed world must take the leadership and 
that: 
Developing countries should also sharply reduce their emissions, but 
they must be supported, financially and through technology sharing 
with the rich industrialised countries. Without commitments to such 
support, the negotiations ahead will prove very difficult.222 
An article on December 2, 2009 analysed the Chinese pledge of a voluntary 
reduction in the intensity of its carbon dioxide emissions per unit of GDP by 40-
45 per cent of 2005 levels by 2020. This extended experts’ views that China 
would have to do little to match its new pledges as it had only pledged to reduce 
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the intensity of its emissions not its net emissions. Nonetheless, China had finally 
put its pledges on paper as fixed targets, even if it had already committed those 
targets in its domestic plans. 223  In terms of Copenhagen, China was not 
considered a game-changer, but it had laid down a marker by pledging 40 to 45 
per cent GHGs reductions.224  
On December 6, 2009 an editorial commented:  
Today 56 newspapers in 45 countries take the unprecedented step of 
speaking with one voice through a common editorial. We do so 
because humanity faces a profound emergency. Unless we combine to 
take decisive action, climate change will ravage our planet, and with it 
our prosperity and security.225  
It further noted that Copenhagen should not be a venue for blaming each other or 
a fighting place between rich and poor because climate change is a global 
problem, and its science is clear.  
The 56 editorials called on all the representatives to seize the opportunity for 
progress or face the greatest modern failure of politics. Climate change was a 
matter of social justice which demanded that the industrialised world dig deep into 
its pockets and pledge cash to help poorer countries adapt introducing clean 
technologies to enable them to grow economically without raising emissions. 
Fairness required that the burden placed on individual developed countries take 
into account their ability to bear costs. For instance, newer EU members, often 
much poorer than ‘old Europe’, must not suffer more than their richer partners. 
 The aim of the Copenhagen climate conference was after all to reset the goal to 
produce an ‘operationally binding political agreement’ on how and under what 
terms actions were needed to prevent dangerous global warming and how it could 
be distributed globally, across 192 countries.  The editorial wrote that the signs 
and indications from the first few days of Copenhagen had not been auspicious, 
and argued that the key should be the convention’s principle CBDR that major 
developing countries should seek to meet the concerns of developed countries. 
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There were also indications that the developed nations, instead of reaching across 
the trust divide, were contemplating political arm-twisting to safeguard their key 
interests while overriding developing countries’ concerns. Smaller nations do and 
could influence the course of the negotiations but a great deal would depend on 
the kind of role the US, the EU, China, and India ended up playing in the 
negotiations and the high-level political parleys.226 
An article on December 18, 2009 claimed that measurable, reportable and 
verifiable (MRV) pledges became the defining battle ground of the Copenhagen 
climate conference because major developing countries, including India, remained 
firm that their voluntary mitigation actions were not open to international scrutiny 
but a common ground was being sought.227 Two days later the editor wrote that on 
any reasonable reckoning, the outcome of the Copenhagen climate summit fell far 
short of what the nations of the world, particularly the industrialised countries, 
needed to do to combat global warming. The Copenhagen Accord was seen as a 
personal negotiation among the political leaders of the US, China, India, Brazil 
and South Africa and by postponing any global quantitative commitment to 
climate mitigation, particularly any commitment to drastic emissions reduction by 
the developed nations, they paid a disproportionate amount of attention to the 
responsibilities of developing countries. The most serious import of these 
concessions was evident from the UNFCCC assessment that the current global 
mitigation efforts allowed for a significant probability that global temperature rise 
would reach 3°C.  
One observer declared that the contribution to mitigation commitments of 
developing countries was greater than that of the developed countries and the cry 
of many small developing countries, led by the Island nation of Tuvalu, which had 
been promised $100 billion in annual climate finance by 2020 amounted to asking 
them to trade their future “for thirty pieces of silver today,” was a call to moral 
responsibility that must not be ignored. The observer further argued that the 
political challenge before the BASIC countries, especially India and China, was to 
redefine the task of drastic emissions reduction globally, led by the developed 
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countries, in a manner that refused to counter pose the global public good to the 
development imperative. Climate laggards in the developed as well as the 
developing world needed to be pushed aside in a dialogue which had both the 
scientific case and the ethical imperative and demanded a stronger display of 
political will that went beyond firm negotiating stances and forces all major 
players in mitigation action to do their due share for humanity.228  
On December 22, 2009 an opinion article wrote that the COP-15 was 
undemocratic. It further noted that no one could have imagined that the 
Copenhagen climate conference’s final plenary session would be suspended for 
the US President Obama for a meeting where only he and a selected group of 
guests, would have the exclusive right to speak. 229  An article published on 
December 24, 2009 claimed the reasons of the failure of the Copenhagen climate 
conference was the arrangement that the big players preferred “an informal 
setting, where each country says what it is prepared to do --where nothing is 
negotiated and nothing is legally binding”.230  
Two days later an opinion article commented that the principle of CBDR impact 
of 2°C change in mean temperature was essential for prioritising climate victims 
because India’s food and water security systems would be the worst victims of a 
rise in mean temperature. Therefore, building defences against potential climate 
change pre-empted calamities by mainstreaming climate resilience in all 
developmental programmes should be the priority task. 231  An editorial on the 
same day pointed to the likely plight of climate change refugees affected by 
famine and natural disasters and the problem of the UN treaty, the Convention and 
Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees of 1951, which did not grant climate 
refugees the status of refugees.232  
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A month later a joint statement was issued at the conclusion of the Second 
Meeting of Ministers of the BASIC countries on climate change in New Delhi 
which was notable for its sober message sent to the developed world and the UN, 
that progress on climate talks would depend on a reassertion of the central 
principle of CBDR outlined by the UNFCCC. 233 The BASIC Four affirmed their 
intention to submit voluntary national mitigation actions to the UNFCCC by 
January 31, 2010 and the onus was now on the developed world to do its part. It 
also noted that future negotiations should be inclusive and transparent noting that 
the absence of such transparency at Copenhagen resulted in a highly visible crisis 
of credibility for the entire process.234  
An editorial published on April 3, 2010 commented that the World’s People 
Conference on Climate Change, which drew around 30,000 people, deserved 
credit for drawing attention to contentious issues. It demanded the rich and 
affluent nations bear responsibility for the accumulation of GHGs and prepare to 
pay out massive compensation for those most at risk from climate-linked 
environmental destructions. The conference asserted the deep sense of injustice 
nursed by the nations of the developing world who wanted a climate tribunal 
established along the lines of the International Court of Justice where developed 
countries could be tried for not fulfilling their Kyoto commitments. It also 
highlighted the conflict faced by the indigenous peoples’ traditional rights and the 
UN carbon credits for forest protection.235 
Financial assistance from developed countries for projects to combat climate 
change in the developing world emerged over 2010 as a key sticking point. At the 
climate meet in Tianjin, China, which was the last round of negotiations before 
the year-end Cancun conference, negotiators from India, China and other 
developing nations called on the West to step up to its commitments with 
promises. Differences also surfaced over developed countries repackaging earlier 
development aid as climate-related funding.236 An editorial on October 10, 2010 
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wrote that the Tianjin talks witnessed some progress on the issue of financing the 
mitigation efforts of climate change and adaptation, but there was a significant 
gap between the level of funding required and what had been committed. The 
public dispute between China and the US also weakened the levels of emissions 
cuts. China argued the developed world must take mandatory commitments for 
emissions cuts whereas China and India sought to engage through voluntary 
emissions cuts, a stance approved by editorial comments. It also said that 
REDD+237 was to be formalized at Cancun for post 2012 implementation.238 
An editorial on December 5, 2010 implored India to make a strong case in Cancan 
for substantial international funding for carbon mitigation. It opined that the fast 
track $30 billion finance for 2010-2012 had not been fully contributed and 
channelled, and suggested that India be careful in its urban development because 
housing infrastructure and transport were the main sources of emissions meaning 
India should go for a green infrastructure.239 Japan for its part stood firm that it 
would not extend the KP for a second commitment period.240 And on December 
10, 2010 an article noted that the race was on for a UN climate summit deal but 
that there were deep differences on how to cooperate on cutting global GHG 
emissions. In the interim, some progress had been made on a new mechanism to 
support poor countries deal with global warming.241 
No grand compact mandating deep cuts in global warming gases was brokered in 
Cancan, instead the two-week session focused on a proliferation of secondary 
issues – a ‘Green Fund’ to help poor nations, deforestation, technology sales and 
other matters to produce a modest deal.242 An article on December 17, 2010 stated 
that Cancun addressed the issue of transparency, adaptation, a green climate fund, 
technology transfer, forestry and capacity-building, which included long-awaited 
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decisions but the world could not just wait and hope that commitments and targets 
by individual countries would be enough to reduce GHG emissions and that was 
the failure of the Cancun agreements.243 
On July 21, 2011 an article stated that India had discussions on climate change in 
the Security Council which was a welcome step, but it argued that the 15-member 
body did not have mandate to deal with climate change. For India peacekeeping 
missions, the use of force and sanctions which the UN Security Council can 
authorise, did not fit with the problems of climate change so it needed to stay in 
the realm of UN General Assembly or the UNFCCC, yet the Indian stand was 
modest because China and Russia were absolutely against the Security Council 
dealing with climate change.244 On October 7, 2011 an editorial focused on rapid 
urbanization, economic growth and the repercussions of climate change given that 
cities contribute 75 per cent of human-induced GHGs.245 Following on the central 
theme of Durban 2011 what was needed was to redefine rich and poor countries 
saying it was time to move beyond traditional distinctions between developed and 
developing countries and move China and other growing economies to accept 
legally binding curbs on GHGs.246  
An editorial on November 28, 2011 wrote that any attempt at the Durban climate 
change conference in 2011 to transfer the onus of emission cuts from the rich 
countries to India and China should be resisted. It also claimed that there appeared 
to be public indifference to the UNFCCC meeting as Europe, the epicentre of the 
whole discourse on climate change, was coming apart because the continent had 
its economic crisis to deal with. Copenhagen started this insidious process and 
Durban could take it further so it must be resisted. Copenhagen undermined the 
basic principle of the KP and sought to alter it by placing both advanced and 
emerging economies on the same plane despite India and China having obvious 
differences on per capita income compared to the industrialized world. It also 
wrote that the post-Fukushima world’s prospects looked bleak, Germany was 
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turning away from nuclear energy and there was no reliable renewable energy 
attainment yet which meant that the world was back to coal and oil which was not 
best thing. The only way to delink fossil fuel emissions from the ups and downs of 
the world economy was to develop a robust alternative to carbon markets, more 
investment in renewable energies and to ensure that nuclear power became a 
credible option.247 
By December 13, 2011 it was argued that India had lost the climate change plot at 
Durban because in any reasonable reckoning the outcome of UNFCCC 17th 
meeting at Durban was a triumph for European climate diplomacy. At Durban, the 
EU succeeded in putting together a substantial coalition, including the small 
island states, the least developed and some other developing countries, and the 
emerging economies of Brazil and South Africa, behind a climate agenda that 
was, in scientific terms, unambitious in its mitigation goals and clearly aimed at 
passing the climate burden on to the large developing countries. It further outlined 
that India was not well prepared for Durban and that the delegation had no 
positive mandate. A strategic mishandling was evident because after two weeks of 
opposition, India finally agreed to everything without making any note of the 
principles of the Convention such as equity. The next UNFCCC meeting (COP-
18) would impel India to recognize that the interests of the 1.2 billion people that 
it so frequently invokes at climate negotiations lies as much in an early climate 
agreement as in adequate access to global atmospheric space.248 An opinion article 
in 2012 viewed that Indian climate negotiators should strongly follow 
conservative country position of the Kyoto style agreement.249 
6.6 China Daily 
This section reviews 99 articles from the China Daily. An opinion article on April 
21, 2001 depicted the Bush administration’s attitude to the KP as ruining years of 
arduous work on environmental protection by the international community. 
Alarming scientific evidence was accumulating and if climate change remained 
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unchecked, the world would see climatic disasters, so the KP needed to come into 
effect at the earliest opportunity.250 The US former Vice-President Dick Cheney 
reportedly doubted the existence of global warming reaffirming the stance that the 
KP was ill-conceived because it did not put any pressure on China, the number 2 
emitter and India, the number 5 emitter at that time.251 An article on November 
11, 2001 claimed “In a rare and bold move that will keep the United States 
isolated, Tokyo is preparing to ratify the Kyoto global warming pact even without 
the world's biggest economy and polluter”. At the domestic level, Japanese 
businesses had warned the government not to ratify but Japan ratified the KP on 
the considerable external pressure from the EU with its concern that if Japan did 
not ratify the Protocol, Japanese products could be boycotted in the European 
market.252 
On September 2, 2002 China Daily reported that China approved ratification of 
the KP with a view to taking an active part in multilateral environmental 
protection.253 One month later the Daily wrote that Chinese ratification of the KP 
was highly appreciated by the UNFCCC and if Russia also ratified Kyoto, China 
and Russia could put pressure on the US for ratification.254 On December 3, 2003 
the Daily wrote:  
Attention focused on Russia after the Bush administration announced 
it would not ratify Kyoto in what it called a flawed pact that would 
unfairly harm the US economy. The US was responsible for one-fourth 
of the world's man-made carbon dioxide emissions, and its March 
2001 decision angered environmentalists.255  
A week later it wrote: “Climate change is not a prognosis; it is a reality… 
Developed countries have a responsibility to reduce their emissions, but also have 
a responsibility to help developing countries adapt to the impacts of global 
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warming”.256 A year later in 2004 it wrote after Russian ratification of the KP 
China became the first country to work under the CDM stipulated by the 
Protocol.257 
In 2005 an article wrote, after 7 years, the Kyoto finally came into existence but 
still the US and Australia had not ratified it. Now officials were pondering a 
‘carbon tax’ to punish polluters – a move opposed by business – while others 
favoured expansion of nuclear power and promotion of energy-saving 
technologies.258 An article on November 12, 2005 commented that the UN climate 
conference in 2005 ended with a watershed agreement by more than 150 
countries, as well as an unwilling US, to open talks on mandatory post-2012 
reductions in GHGs. It remarked that continued warming was melting glaciers 
worldwide, shrinking the Arctic ice cap and heating up the oceans, raising sea 
levels. Climate scientists predicted major climate disruptions in coming 
decades.259 On November 25, 2005 the Daily wrote:  
The Kyoto Protocol is merely a first step. During the 12-day 
conference in Montreal, which begins on November 28, parties to the 
Kyoto Protocol will discuss climate control steps to be taken from 
2013 on. A negotiating mandate or actual treaty such as the Kyoto 
Protocol is not expected for another several years, however.260 
 On December 3, 2005 an opinion article heralded the on-going global climate 
change conference in Montreal, Canada as an opportunity for residents in the 
world community to discuss self-restraints amounting from excessive damages to 
the global climate while pursuing material development. The aim was to put 
concrete steps for a new Kyoto-style agreement as a successor to the KP given 
that no state could stay blind to the negative impacts of accelerated 
industrialization on global climate change.261 On December 9, 2005, Australia 
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was reported as saying: forget the KP and its timetable because short-term targets 
and tight time-tables were not solutions to fighting climate change. The Daily 
criticised Australia’s role in global climate change negotiations.262 
On March 29, 2006 it claimed that failing to address the climate issue would be 
handing on an irresponsible legacy to future generations.263 On November 6, 2006 
the paper wrote that the Nairobi climate conference would aim to work towards 
making a new global climate treaty with the focus on technical matters, such as 
organizing the Adaptation Fund, intended to help poorer countries grapple with 
climate change. Examples include financing the building of walls against rising 
seas or switching to drought-resistant crops. Despite this, not much progress was 
expected unless the Bush administration was out of power in the US.264 An article 
on November 17, 2006 noted the avant-garde views of scientists on climate 
change when the COP was taking place in Nairobi. It reported scientists saying 
that pollution may be helpful to cool the planet especially by the use of sulphur 
dioxide although scientists put this perspective into context considering that 
global climate change negotiations were not making any pace even after strong 
evidence of climate change occurring. 265  
On February 6, 2007 an article stated that China would not cry for oil but for 
water in the future because the UNFCCC process in its 16 years had produced 
very little to halt climate change. The groups stymieing progress were the 
lobbyists from Exxon, the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries 
(OPEC) and the world's coal groups who had spent a lot of money on confusing 
the public with their rhetoric. These groups, however, could not persuade the 
scientists to soften their language, although they tried very hard. It compared 
climate change to national security issues and argued that if climate change was 
military security then we would be basing our policy response on the worst-case 
analysis, not the best-guess consensus. For many years, the Daily argued, climate 
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change was dismissed as scaremongering by contrary voices and fossil-fuel 
industries but today the reality is different as it is invading us.266  
On May 5, 2007 delegates were reported to have approved the world's first 
roadmap for stemming mounting GHG emissions, laying out an arsenal of anti-
warming measures that would have to be rushed into place to avert a disastrous 
spike in global temperatures. The report, a summary of a more than 1,000-page 
study by a UN network of 2,000 scientists, showed the world had to make 
significant cuts in gas emissions through increasing the energy efficiency of 
buildings and vehicles, shifting from fossil to renewable fuels and reforming both 
the forestry and farming sectors.267 
On June 8, 2007 Chinese President Jintao was quoted as saying: 
Considering both historical responsibility and current capability, 
developed countries should take the lead in reducing carbon emissions 
and help developing countries ease and adapt to climate change. For 
developing countries, achieving economic growth and improving the 
lives of our people are top priorities. At the same time, we also need to 
make every effort to pursue sustainable development in accordance 
with our national conditions.268  
A new perspective to the climate change debate was presented on June 25 as it 
wrote “Asian business and government leaders accused rich countries of 
hypocrisy, saying they run polluting industries with cheap labour in China and 
then blame the country for worsening global warming and climate change”.269 The 
Western approach to impose binding emissions targets over China was green 
imperialism. When the Nobel Prize was given to the IPCC, the Daily commented 
that the prize showed the significance of the IPCC’s scientific evidence about 
climate change arguing that the science was clear.270 
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Negotiators left Bali (2007) speaking of an historic breakthrough and promising 
urgent action to fight climate change credited with floods, droughts, storms, heat 
waves and rising seas. It also concluded an agreement to work out a long-term 
climate treaty involving all nations by late 2009. Among incentives for poor 
nations, Bali laid out schemes to slow deforestation, share ‘clean’ technologies 
and established a new fund to help vulnerable people adapt to droughts or rising 
seas.271 On December 17, 2007 doubt was cast on the Bali roadmap believing it 
was a compromise although there was growing enthusiasm for participation. The 
paper noted: “After all, it would be unthinkable to advance a major common 
effort, such as the one defined by the Bali roadmap, without a common fund. And 
it is always a good thing if the common effort can be made ‘measurable, 
reportable and verifiable’ at the market level.”272 
Two days later the Bali conference was reported as not a rich versus poor 
countries’ war, but a common cause war against climate change because the 
concentrations of global emissions had reached a point of no return. To fight 
against climate change the Bali negotiators focused on a climate change deal for 
the post-2012 period. The article defended China saying that China was working 
to develop a low-carbon economy as nearly 40 per cent of global carbon trading 
involved China. 273  An editorial on December 21, 2007 reviewed Bali saying 
world leaders had debated the future of our planet but nothing concrete emerged. 
It noted: 
It's time we reconsidered the existing paradigm of development. The 
world has been talking about sustainable development. But as one of 
India's leading ecologists, Debal Deb, says: It is common 
understanding among natural scientists that if development means 
unlimited growth in production and consumption of materials, 
sustainable development is an oxymoron. That's because unending 
growth of anything in the universe is impossible – except perhaps the 
universe itself.274 
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An opinion article on April 9, 2008 claimed there were different ways to fight 
climate change under the KP such as technological reduction and market 
reduction. The EU has focused on a market reduction approach whereas Japan has 
been focusing on technological reduction. The problem was that the indigenous 
manufacturing industries in China and other emerging markets still lagged far 
behind developed countries and the high standard of emission reduction quotas 
would surely perpetuate the gap between the two worlds and even expand it. The 
US, Japan and the EU were all focused on their own interests in carbon rights 
game theory that would ultimately establish their leading positions in industry and 
cement the ‘retention of relative advantage’ by ensuring a productivity gap 
remained in the future. The late comers in manufacturing would thus be kept at a 
strategic disadvantage by the major players in this ‘power game’ and again denied 
a crucial means for economic development. The article argued that there needed to 
be careful thought about the direction of China’s environmental protection and a 
set of market standards specifically suited to its environment needed to be worked 
out.275  
Bush was quoted as saying: "Today, I am announcing a new national goal: to stop 
the growth of US greenhouse gas emissions by 2025," adding that power plant 
emissions should be slowed so they peak over the next 10 to 15 years and decline 
thereafter. Bush, it reported, did not give any specific mandatory cap on US 
emissions and fell far short compared to the Europeans.276 On December 12, 2008 
an article quoted the Chinese climate change minister, Xie Zhenhua, saying that 
only by sticking to the principles of the 1992 Convention and its KP, working 
toward their full, effective and sustained implementation could it be expected to 
reach a fair and effective agreed outcome in Copenhagen. Any attempt to deviate 
from, breach or re-define the Convention, or to deny the KP, or to merge the 
Convention process with the KP process, would be detrimental, and ultimately 
lead to a fruitless Copenhagen Conference.277 
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An opinion article on April 13, 2009 said that a tough climate change policy 
would benefit China over various sectors – national security, the promotion of 
sustainable economic development and as a full partner in one of the most 
important global efforts of our era. Little time should be wasted on debates over 
carbon that is ‘embedded’ in China's exports and the responsibility lay with 
developed countries for the majority of the historical global emissions. The 
aggressive pursuit of a truly low carbon economy could help establish an era of 
unparalleled innovation and economic prosperity. Action on climate change was 
also an important sign of membership in the international community.278  
Two weeks later an opinion article claimed that the global community would 
continue to follow the principle of CBDR, under which all countries contributed 
to tackling climate change as per their capabilities. Chinese leaders had recently 
stressed that China, being a responsible member of the global community, would 
contribute its fair share in battling climate change so there was clearly ground for 
optimism. It argued that while there was tremendous potential to cut energy use 
and emissions by using technology that already existed in China, or could be 
transferred from developed countries, it was clear that concerted efforts were also 
needed on research, development and demonstration, low-carbon technologies, 
especially renewable energy sources, carbon capture and storage.279 
On August 26, 2009, Chinese government was cited for its resolutions on climate 
change policy directions to speed up research, develop and promote key 
technologies for energy efficiency, and aim at renewable energy, clean energy and 
low-carbon energy. It also called for specific plans and policies to develop a green 
economy and a low-carbon economy, including increasing green investment, and 
advocating green consumption and green growth.280 On September 4, 2009 an 
opinion article discussed how China and India could work together on global 
issues such as climate change. It reported that GHG emissions were increasing 
sharply in fast developing countries such as China and India but counted in per 
                                                 
278 Scott Moore and Julian Wong, ‘Tough Climate Change Policy Would Benefit China’, China 
Daily, April 13, 2009, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/bizchina/2009-04/13/content_7670256.htm.  
279 Serge Abou, ‘Climate Change: EU, China Have Work to Do’, China Daily, April 28, 2009, 
  http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/opinion/2009-04/28/content_7723170.htm.  
280 ‘Climate Change Law to Bring Teeth to Emissions Mandates’, China Daily, August 26, 2009, 
 http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2009-08/26/content_8818449.htm.  
237 
capita terms, their emissions remained very low compared to that of the developed 
countries.  
China and India with more than a billion people each, and high emission levels, 
which the developed world alleges was aggravating the climate crisis, did not take 
into account that the developed world itself had failed to meet the Kyoto 
targets.281 The fear that the developed world would try to impose another one-
sided agreement that suited its interests remained a strong driver to encourage 
China and India to work jointly. The globalization of a few powers' vested 
interests was nothing new for China and India and explained why they needed to 
strengthen their coordination, and draw other marginalized stakeholders to their 
table. The rise of China and India and the admission of their historic responsibility 
held great hope for a fruitful bilateral relationship that could influence the climate 
change course of the world.282 
The developing world, victimized by GHG releases in the West, not only suffered 
from extreme vagaries of weather that brought havoc but was forced to yield 
ground on development making it an imperative to ease the transfer of technology 
between nations in order to save the world from the looming climate crisis that 
knows no borders given that holding off would be more costly. The political will 
of advanced nations in facilitating the South in technology transfers would benefit 
all mankind.283  
An opinion article on November 17, 2009 said that China was waiting for the 
American commitment on climate change, noting that on November 5, House 
Democrats passed through committee the Kerry-Boxer climate change bill that 
would mandate cuts in GHG emissions by 20 per cent from 2005 levels over the 
next decade. The American Clean Energy and Security Act, approved by the 
House in June 2009, would reduce emissions 17 per cent by 2020. While both 
would cut emissions, it noted that the chances of Congress passing any legislation 
before Copenhagen were slight. 284  Further, the US wanted a new agreement 
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different from Kyoto whereas the developing countries wanted Kyoto II, making 
Copenhagen a complex negotiation to achieve a viable agreement.285 
By December 5, 2009, it was reported that world governments were seeking to 
agree to a successor to the Kyoto Protocol. It cited Ban Ki-moon saying: "From 
all corners of the globe, we now see unprecedented momentum for governments 
to act quickly and decisively. I am optimistic Copenhagen can be a success".286 
Another article writing on the UNFCCC CBDR principle, argued that the 
industrialized countries with abundant financial resources and advanced 
technologies should shoulder their responsibilities and make tangible moves to 
deal with their high per capita CO2 emissions noting that the US had been 
reluctant and some other developed countries had also shown dissatisfaction with 
the principle. It stated that developing countries should also make contributions 
but on a voluntary basis whereas the developed world should adopt binding 
targets.287  
On December 12, 2009, developing countries were reported to have slammed the 
Copenhagen Accord claiming that the deal was hammered out by the US and four 
major emitters from the developing world, which revealed conflict between 
developed and developing countries and their differing perspectives. 288  One 
opinion article expressed appreciation for the Copenhagen Accord which 
recognized CBDR and respective capabilities upholding long term emissions 
reductions of less than 2°C, providing funding and technology support for 
developing countries, and increasing transparency on mitigation activities. It 
argued that the issue of CO2 emission reduction was an issue of the development 
right of developing countries and, therefore, it could not be solved without 
changing the unbalanced global economy which was something missing at 
Copenhagen.289  
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On May 7, 2010 the paper wrote that China was trying to improve its image of 
public diplomacy for a single voice with developing countries not only to be heard 
at the negotiation table but also to show its sincerity over emissions reductions.290 
On October 11, 2010 an opinion article reported on the UN climate change 
meeting in Tianjin, which advanced cornerstones for the creation of a global 
climate fund at Cancun, Mexico in 2010. Securing climate financing and 
technology transfer was seen as ‘a must’ to assist the millions of vulnerable, 
poverty-stricken people in poor countries.  
China’s lead role in South-South cooperation was recognized, and urged by 
China, all developing countries were encouraged to hold onto the principles 
agreed by the 194 countries under the UNFCCC to stop rich countries from 
backtracking on their previous promises. China, it claimed, must also go all-out to 
commit itself to tough targets to reduce its emissions, and make the results 
transparent for the good of China as well as the world. Above all, developing 
countries should not allow the rich countries to limit the space and scope of the 
developing countries' future economic growth and shrink their historical and 
present responsibilities for reducing GHG emissions thus helping mitigate the 
impact of climate change.291 
On December 5, 2010 the paper noted that the Kyoto II debate was heating up in 
Cancun, Mexico but Japan’s announcement that it would not bind itself to the 
second commitment period with Kyoto II at any cost surprised the developing 
countries with criticism being directed at Japan. China and other negotiators said 
they would not work through any secret text for negotiations.292 On December 11, 
2010 it was reported that overruling Bolivia’s objection against the adoption of 
the Cancun agreement text, the conference had finally adopted a deal that included 
detailed financing plans although no plans for binding emission cuts to fight 
global warming had been settled.293  
                                                 
290 Fu Jing, ‘Climate Forum Paves Way to Cancun Meet’, China Daily, May, 7, 2010, 
 http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2010-05/07/content_9819385.htm.  
291 Editorial, ‘Climate Change Talks’, China Daily, October 11, 2010, 
 http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/opinion/2010-10/11/content_11392447.htm.    
292 ‘Wrestling Over Kyoto Protocol Heats up at Cancun’, China Daily, December 5, 2010, 
 http://europe.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2010-12/05/content_11834826.htm.  
293 ‘Final Accord Reached at Cancun Despite Bolivia's Objection’, China Daily, December 11, 
2010, 
240 
The Mexican Foreign Minister Patricia Espinosa was quoted while responding to 
Bolivia’s objection: “I take note of your [Bolivian] opinion, but if there are no 
other objections, this text is approved”.294 She further stated, “Consensus does not 
mean that one nation can choose to apply a veto on a process that other nations 
have been working on for years. I cannot ignore the opinion of another 193 states 
that are parties”.295 On December 13, 2010 an article reported that Cancun was a 
big step toward achieving the desired values and strengthening confidence in 
multilateralism given it laid a foundation for talks in Durban in 2011. Delegates 
said that the process was transparent and inclusive and agreed to set up a Green 
Climate Fund that would be steered by 24 board members chosen equally from 
developed and developing countries to assist poor, small, island and least 
developed countries.296 
However, an editor on December 17, 2010 wrote although the fragile deal reached 
in Cancun, Mexico saved the UN negotiating process from collapsing, it could not 
take proper measures to keep the earth from boiling.297 The year 2010 was one of 
the hottest years on record. Although many perceived the Cancun agreement as a 
Christmas gift for it maintained the 2°C target, included a package of $100 billion 
and countries affirmed what they had agreed in Copenhagen with the exception of 
Bolivia, it did not solve everything, with the reduction commitments insufficient 
to keep the temperature increase below 2°C. There were other outstanding issues 
too, such as the legal form of the agreement and how to provide the long-term 
finance, but Cancun proved that the multilateral process could deliver results and 
without such an agreement the UN process would have been in imminent 
danger.298 
On February 2, 2011 an editorial presented the Chinese domestic scenario of 
climate change policy writing that a paper mill company was taken to court for 
not following environmental regulations, to set an example, yet it said it was hard 
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to sue every time because of the various actors involvement in such lawsuits. 
Nevertheless, the case was a step in the right direction.299 An editorial on March 
26, 2011 chronicled mounting public support in China in combating climate 
change with people switching their lights off for one hour in response to the WWF 
asking for support toward a low carbon economy.  
China's leadership had joined the fight against climate change in its own way. In 
2009, the State Council, China's Cabinet, pledged to reduce carbon emissions for 
every unit of GDP by 40-45 per cent by 2020 from the 2005 level. In the previous 
year, the National Development and Reform Commission, the country's top 
planning body, had said a pilot program to test the impact of an emission cap on 
growth would be started in one sector or city before expanding it to other sectors 
and cities. Addressing the National People's Congress on March 5, 2011 Premier 
Jiabao vowed to improve energy efficiency and curb pollution and carbon 
emissions.300 On March 31, 2011 an editorial noted that China as the world's 
second largest economy was expected to become more efficient in its use of 
energy. “To this end, Chinese enterprises should redouble their efforts to go 
green. They need to reap more energy efficiency gains through innovation rather 
than closing outdated facilities”.301  
On June 23, 2011, the Daily wrote that global climate change negotiations 
revealed a discrepancy growing between rich and poor countries because 
developing countries had put a high priority on the continuation of the Protocol, 
while some industrialized countries, such as Japan, Russia and Canada, voiced a 
clear intention to walk away and build a new framework for agreement.302 Later in 
the year an editorial reported that the world’s population was expected to reach 
seven billion the following month. Sustainable development, it argued, had 
become an ever more urgent issue, and one that was intertwined with the 
challenges of water scarcity, energy shortages, global health issues, food security, 
and environmental degradation.  
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It was deemed essential for governments at all levels to calculate the real cost of 
environmental damage paid for by robust growth with such costs seemingly 
bearable at the beginning, but overtaken by the accumulation of environmental 
debts which could not be sustained indefinitely.303 On September 29, 2011 an 
editorial said that international efforts to avoid double digit recession needed a 
contribution from China as the second largest economy, and that China needed to 
rapidly transform its model to pursue greener and more sustainable growth to 
enhance energy security in an attempt to help the world deal with climate 
change.304 
The BASIC countries’ environment ministers met in Beijing to make their 
common stand on climate change negotiations. In their view all industrialized 
countries should support a second round of the KP, agreeing that the conference 
should decide to initiate the operation of the Green Climate Fund, thereby 
ensuring adequate financial support for developing countries, while urging the 
developed countries to capitalize the fund from their public resources. 305  An 
editorial on November 23, 2011 considered the Chinese government’s national 
climate change policy to be effective, saying that the Chinese government never 
assumed that mitigating climate change was beyond their ability noting also that 
whatever the outcome of the UNFCCC in Durban, South Africa, China would 
spare no effort in fulfilling its plan to reduce GHG emissions.306  
On the same day, an article cited the US chief climate change envoy, Todd Stern, 
for UNFCCC as saying:  
Kyoto is not on the table for the US but the US won't see the Kyoto 
being a logjam. The US isn't one of the two tracks; it's up to Kyoto 
parties to say what they want to do about Kyoto. The other track is the 
track that involves all parties. That's the one we are in, that's the one 
we are the most focused on. I think whether in the future ... whether 
we will have two tracks is an open question. We will wait and see.307 
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On November 25, 2011 an opinion article argued although China was still a 
developing country in terms of global standards of classification such as the 
human development index (HDI), per capita GDP, gross national income (GNI), 
and purchasing power parity (PPP). Obama’s contention that China had ‘grown 
up’ and therefore should commit to climate change without hesitation as 
industrialized countries, was growing respect for, rather than fear of, China 
because it was growing so fast and had become so big and powerful that it had the 
potential to ‘swallow’ the Western world in a decade or two. However, in terms of 
classification the data showed that China was still a developing country with the 
article asking why China should commit to being seen as an industrialized 
country.308  
An editorial opinion piece on December 14, 2011 noted how in Durban the parties 
agreed to disagree. After the failure of the Copenhagen and Cancun climate 
conferences, it was probably an optimistic few who expected Durban to achieve a 
real climate deal, making the outcome not unexpected. What was surprising was 
that many countries walked out of the conference cheering that Durban was a 
successful conference although it did nothing to mitigate global warming. 309 
Developed nations including the US and the EU were happy that the new 
agreement would bind developing countries as well but it did not absolve the 
developed world from its historic responsibility. More urgent action was needed, 
the Daily claimed, to save the planet, however, the negotiators in Durban did not 
agree to any new pledges and, in spite of all their backslapping and self-
congratulations, they failed to produce anything that would prevent world 
temperatures from rising by more than 2°C, which scientists reiterated would be 
catastrophic for the planet.310 
An opinion article on January 11, 2012 reviewed Durban as dressing up failure as 
victory which had been integral to climate-change negotiations since they started 
20 years ago. The latest round of talks in South Africa had been no exception. It 
wrote that if the countries wanted to act to mitigate emissions, they should end the 
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collective suspension of disbelief when it came to climate change negotiations and 
see through the hype and self-serving political spin. 311  An opinion article on 
March 12, 2012 stated that the environmental treaties of the last 20 years had not 
been able to develop a global consensus on patterns of natural resource use. New 
values and norms were required to ensure the transformation from a consumerist 
society based on freedom of choice to a more constrained societal model that 
provided rewards to encourage conservation and discourage waste.312  
6.7 Conclusion 
This chapter has shown how the five leading newspapers portrayed and reported 
climate change debates, talks, conferences and agreements from 1997 to the 
beginning of 2012. In using news from a range of sources including individuals 
such as influential diplomats and political leaders, editorials, reports and the 
statements of interviews, each of these newspapers presented many similar and 
many different stories on global climate change negotiations and policy making. 
Except the WSJ, the media applauded the KP and its principles. They encouraged 
countries to join the Kyoto and start reducing their emissions foot-prints. Bali 
2007 was also applauded by the media for its ability to forge consensus to move 
ahead and get an agreement by 2009. The media agreed that Copenhagen 2009 
failed to achieve the climate momentum. It was criticized for poor outcomes, non-
transparency and failures to ensure democratic participation. The media cautiously 
applauded the Cancun 2010 for legalizing and operationalizing many of agreed 
issues of the Copenhagen Accord. They seemed to have put a lot of faith in 
Durban, therefore, they criticized that Durban deal 2011 was unable to stabilize 
GHGs. 
The newspapers, for different arguments, touched on ideas over leadership, over 
the carbon market, over technology, over the shifts in negotiating power, over 
existing agreements, over national interest and development, and over proposals 
for success and it is interesting to see how they gradually emerge over time. The 
NYT and GUK wrestled with the concerns of contrary voices about climate 
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science and events like Climategate. From the outset to 2005, the papers were 
putting perspectives into the development and ratification of the KP. They were 
debating whether their respective governments ratify or abandon the Protocol. All 
newspapers, with an exception of WSJ, commented that the US should ratify 
Kyoto and develop domestic climate policies to contribute to reducing emissions. 
The papers also contextualized Japanese ratification of Kyoto with embedded 
symbolism and economic interest as articulated in chapters 4 and 5. When the US 
abandoned the Protocol, it gave a veto power opportunity to Russia for favourable 
bargaining as a reward of ratification. The papers commented that the Europeans 
weakened the Protocol for Russian ratification in the face of rejection from the US 
and Australia. 
After Kyoto, the four out of five newspapers sought to set out a clearer path for 
future negotiations. An important admission came from the Indian and Chinese 
newspapers which recognized that climate change was a global problem and 
needed a global response. A few of their articles viewed that although the 
principle of CBDR and historical responsibility were always important, China and 
India needed to step up toward finding innovative ways of fighting climate change 
instead of sticking to the argument that it is a Western problem. In the beginning, 
the GUK newspaper unconditionally supported the views of developing countries 
urging the developed world to take leadership to combat climate change. Over 
time, it moved beyond its previous position proposing that climate change was a 
global problem needing a global response. However, its global response was still 
mainly dependent on the Kyoto style agreement.  
The NYT consistently urged the US government to take global leadership in 
climate change negotiations and policy making. It warned if the US did not 
embrace low carbon economy, it would have to bear a huge economic loss in the 
future. Although the WSJ dismissed the salience of climate change agreements 
declaring that they were the channels of transferring funds to many corrupted third 
world countries, it urged the US to take up leadership in the development of 
technology saying that the availability of sophisticated technology would be part 
of economic growth. These emerging positions of papers reflected the growing 
global response to climate change, one of the biggest challenges facing the world, 
which clearly needed a globally sustained and cooperative approach to move to 
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achieving effective governance of climate change. The papers also identified that 
the West was having a difficult time because of the economic recessions; however, 
the NYT, GUK, China Daily and the Hindu argued that an economic recession 
could be overcome in a few years whereas climate change caused by greenhouse 
gases trapped in the atmosphere would need 100 of years to dissipate and a long 
period of time through concerted and globally cooperated action.  
However, in arguing for a global response along a further Kyoto-style agreement, 
the papers continued with the distinctions between ‘Annex I and Non-Annex I’ 
and ‘development and environmentalism’ and these distinctions arguably have 
been obstacles to climate change governance. However, they did not suggest new 
categories or potential framework to incorporate the emerging economies so that 
they could take greater responsibility for addressing climate change. By 
Copenhagen in 2009, the focus of climate change negotiations and agreements, 
which had been based on developing a Kyoto style treaty, that focuses on the 
responsibility of the developed countries was little relevant as GHG emissions 
were rapidly rising in the major emerging economies in the South. Negotiations 
for international climate change policy needed a different approach than the Kyoto 
style one that the newspapers had been advocating for long. The following chapter 
will bring more insights and present detailed analyses of what all these 
newspapers reporting and impartation of the news meant to global climate change 
negotiations and policy making and their contribution to slow progress of the 
climate change in the contexts of previous chapters.  
 
247 
Chapter 7 
Analysis of the Media  
7.1 Introduction 
The fundamentals of international climate change governance and decision 
making through the case studies of the Kyoto Protocol (KP) in chapter 4 and the 
Copenhagen Accord in chapter 5 have been established. Chapter 4 demonstrated 
that the eight years of wrangling was very time consuming with many nation-
states unwilling to commit to the Protocol. As established, Australia finally 
ratified in 2007 while the United States (US) has never ratified, raising economic 
and policy concerns about a Protocol that exempted major developing countries 
including China and India. Since then many of the countries that ratified the 
Protocol have failed to meet their commitments with Canada renouncing the KP 
in 2011, pointing out that there had been little success in making it legally binding.  
According to Article 3.9 of the KP, parties started to negotiate for an agreement 
that would be effective on its expiry in 2012. The Bali Action Plan set out the path 
for an agreement that was expected to be sealed in Copenhagen 2009, but the 
Copenhagen Accord which resulted was not promising.  The mission of reducing 
GHGs had been elusive because of the problem of the climate change framework 
and the common but differentiated responsibilities (CBDR) principle. The state-
centric framework and the diverse national interests of the parties resulted in 
various interpretations of the CBDR principle which made climate change 
governance making even more complicated.  
The climate change conferences in Cancun in 2010, Durban in 2011 and Doha in 
2012 made modest promises for a new agreement but these have not been 
achieved to date. Parties have agreed to hold negotiations on a global agreement 
which does not mean that parties have agreed to ratify, commit and implement 
governance procedure to meet the targets required by climate science to limit 
temperature to 2°C. The shape and essence of any future agreement is still unclear 
and unknown. Any legally binding agreement will not come into existence until 
major emitters from developing economies are included. Whether China, India 
and the US will support a future agreement remains unanswered. Kyoto has 
expired and COP-18 at Doha did not achieve an agreement other than 15 per cent 
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of the global emitters making commitments for a second round of the KP 
beginning on January 1, 2013 and ending on December 30, 2020.1 
The newspapers’ overall arguments over the issues of climate change and 
international climate change negotiations have been presented in chapter 6. The 
chapter also outlined the media’s coverage in terms of the contribution made to 
advancing a wider understanding of climate change and the measures necessary to 
address concerns. This chapter assesses how the media contributed to the debate 
on global climate change governance, international climate negotiations and 
decision making. The first section discusses the newspapers’ framing of climate 
change science and assesses their contribution to educating the public on climate 
change issues. The second section examines the framing of setting the issues and 
agenda for climate change negotiations, and the third section assesses the 
newspapers’ framing of the democracy debate in terms of the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) negotiations, climate 
governance and decision making procedures. These three themes were derived 
from the literature discussed in chapter 2 in seeking to explain why there has been 
a lack of progress in addressing or preventing climate change issues.  
In the first section, this chapter examines the proposition that the disconnection 
between the concerns of climate change and the role of media stymied the 
progress of international climate change governance and so the public and 
policymaking in a democratic society cannot address the serious threats facing 
states today. The media’s role in building public trust of climate change for sound 
policy making is examined. Diamond argues that only when public pressure 
results in the passing of laws demanding different and stringent actions to address 
climate change, will there be the necessary change.2  
In the second section on setting the issues and agenda for climate change 
negotiations, the media’s contribution focused on national interests and state-
centric power politics as identified in chapters 4 and 5, reflecting the prevailing 
UNFCCC structure in which the state is the unit of analysis and the central 
                                                 
1 See Page 2 of UNFCCC, Outcome of the work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Further 
Commitments for Annex I Parties under the Kyoto Protocol (Bonn: Climate Change Secretariat, 
2012b). 
2 Jared Diamond, Collapse: How Societies Choose To Fail or Succeed (New York: Viking, 
Penguin, 2005), 38. 
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principle for dealing with climate change is common but differentiated 
responsibilities (CBDR). Here, the media were aware of changing power 
structures, shifting alliances and the differing positions of states which from time 
to time, questioned the validity of the principle of CBDR given the increase in 
global emissions from emerging economies. Four out of five newspapers played 
an important role in setting the agenda for a successful transformation from a 
fossil-fuelled world to a low-carbon world through technology, with each offering 
proposals for a solution. The New York Times (NYT), Guardian, UK (GUK), The 
Hindu and China Daily highlighted the continued adequacy of a Kyoto style 
agreement based on the state-centric approach for the future which will be 
contextualized in section 7. 3 below. 
In the third section, a response is made to the concerns of democratic deficit. With 
the international politics of climate change shaped by the inter-state system, the 
question arises as to whether this system was a major obstacle in achieving the 
appropriate responses to climate change or facilitated change. The newspapers 
focused on inter-state procedural democratic participation and reported that 100 
leaders were not able to participate in the negotiations which produced the 
Copenhagen Accord. The media did not shed light on the limited participation of 
non-state actors. These issues will be further discussed below. 
7.2 Shaping Perceptions of Climate Change Science 
The debate on climate change negotiations was intense in each of the newspapers 
with each raising a range of issues within the debate over climate change. The 
newspapers framed climate change news as either being supportive of mainstream 
science or being sceptical of it. The Wall Street Journal (WSJ) consistently 
challenged the International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) arguments on the 
nature of climate change and its anthropogenic causes.3 It argued that the level of 
warming caused by human activity was very small and that the Kyoto Protocol 
(KP) was an unnecessary policy to raise tax from taxpayers.4 It highlighted the 
climate denials and Climategate email leaks and argued that the knowledge of 
mainstream science was exaggerated. Most of its writings revolved around the 
                                                 
3 All articles of the Wall Street Journal consistently challenged this view from 1997. 
4 Editorial, ‘Classic Political Effect’, WSJ, November 17, 1998, A 1. 
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uncertainty of science and thus cautioned against negotiations for the prevention 
of climate change, funding flows and climate justice. In 2009, contextualizing 
Climategate it argued climate science was not settled science but that its empirical 
foundation, with many billion-dollar edifices built on it, was cracking and, sooner 
or later, was bound to crumble.5  
The WSJ challenged the claims of climate scientists and their arguments that 
human activity was causing climate change. The WSJ’s scepticism related to the 
production of new knowledge which could be important in reducing climate 
uncertainty. The questioning of the validity of climate science by the WSJ could 
open the door for new knowledge to be pursued. But it reported in 2012 that 
“Research shows that more than 97 per cent of scientists actively publishing in the 
field agree that climate change is real and human caused”.6 Rajendra Pachauri, the 
chief of the IPCC, at the Cancun climate conference 2010 noted that there were 
3750 experts involved in the production of knowledge 7  who worked on a 
voluntary basis.  
Each of the IPCC’s four reports claimed that the evidence was consolidating the 
conclusion that human activities were the main cause of temperature rise in the 
19th, 20th and 21st centuries. Richard Muller, a climate sceptic, also conducted 
independent research funded by the Heartland Institute, a climate denial funding 
institution, and his findings were consistent with mainstream science that climate 
change was happening.8 The WSJ’s denial of climate change and its support for 
very small group of scientific sceptics did not make any contribution to sound 
knowledge but contributed to confusion and policy delays. The WSJ highlighted 
on ‘unsettled climate science’, ‘climategate events’ ‘climate change as natural’ 
                                                 
5 See for more: Editorial, ‘Global Warming With the Lid Off’, WSJ, November 24, 2009, A 22; 
Editorial, ‘Rigging a Climate Consensus’, WSJ, November 28, 2009, A 14; Bret Stephens, 
‘Climategate: Follow the Money’, WSJ, December 1, 2009, 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703939404574566124250205490.html#printMod
e ,; and Editorial, ‘We Deserve Ethical Behavior by Climate Scientists’, WSJ, December 2, 2009, 
A 24; Editorial, ‘The Copenhagen Concoction’, WSJ, December 8, 2009, A 20. 
6 ‘Check With Climate Scientists for Views on Climate’, WSJ, February 2, 2012, 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204740904577193270727472662.html#printMod. 
7 Rajendra Pachauri speaking at ‘Cancun Climate Conference 2010, COP 16/CMP6’, November 
29, 2010, Mexico, http://unfccc.int/resource/webcast/player/app/play.php?id_episode=3023. 
8 Leo Hickman, ‘Climate Change Study Forces Sceptical Scientists to Change Minds’, GUK, July 
29, 2012, http://www.guardian.co.uk/science/2012/jul/29/climate-change-sceptics-change-mind.  
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‘anthropogenic climate change as hoax’, ‘climate scepticism’, to frame its news 
articles and convey information on climate change science.  
The NYT framed and disseminated the information from mainstream science on 
climate change insisting that there was a real need to combat global warming. A 
NYT editorial on anthropogenic global warming, published in 2000, stated that the 
IPCC, “considered the most authoritative voice on global warming, has now 
concluded that mankind's contribution to the problem is greater than originally 
believed”.9 In noting the views of the minority opposition, an editorial, published 
in 2007 observed that most scientists concurred that the long-term costs of doing 
nothing against climate change would be more flooding, famine, and drought.10 
An article in 2012 suggested that the leaks of climate change emails provided a 
preview of the campaign against climate change and the attempts to cast doubt on 
the scientific finding that fossil fuel emissions endanger the long-term welfare of 
the planet. 11  Explanations about the causes of climate change provided the 
substance of the NYT’s articles focusing on human aspects of global warming. 
‘Anthropogenic climate change’, ‘Western reponsibility’ and ‘scepticism as 
rhetorics’ were the main frames used by the NYT to inform the public on climate 
change science.  
The GUK framed climate change as antropogenic and stated that humans have 
contrived many more ways of destroying nature's delicate checks and balances. 
The anthropocentric ill-considered economic development resulted into 
deforestation, soil erosion, uncontrollable flooding and other forms of 
environmental degradations. The GUK argued that most climate scientists 
including IPCC by producing several scientific reports agreed that human activity 
is the main cause of global warming and climate change; therefore, inaction 
cannot be an excuse.12 The GUK referred to Climategate and to sceptics, and 
argued that the evidence showed that the fight against climate change had been 
reinforced as the investigating committees found nothing wrong with the scientific 
                                                 
9 Editorial, ‘A Sharper Warning on Warming’, NYT, October 28, 2000, pg. A. 14. 
10 Editorial, ‘Global Warming and Your Wallet’, NYT, July 6, 2007, pg. A.14.  
11 Justin Gillis and Leslie Kaufman, ‘Leak Offers Glimpse of Campaign Against Climate Science’, 
NYT, February 16, 2012, A 23.  
12 Leader, ‘High Noon at Hague’, GUK, November 17, 2000, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2000/nov/17/guardianleaders.globalwarming?INTCMP=S
RCH. 
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evidence. 13  ‘Anthropogenic climate change’ ‘Western created problem’ 
‘climategate as sceptics conspiracy’ were the major frames articulated by the 
GUK in producing its news to convey climate change messages to the public. 
The Hindu framed its news of climate change based on IPCC’s reports. The Hindu 
wrote that the denial industry was working to destroy the canon of climate science 
because it was not interested in establishing the truth as it was going to harm their 
interests. 14  The articles from the Hindu maintained that the IPCC was the 
mainstream science of climate change  and it was clear from IPCC’s scientific 
reports that anthropogenic climate change was happening. The Hindu argued that 
climate change as a problem caused by the West. It explained that climate change 
was an immediate threat to all living beings including humans and the natural 
environment so significant responses must be taken to prevent it from developing 
further. The main frames it used were ‘anthropogenic climate change’, ‘Western 
created problem’, ‘no space for scepticism’.  
On the issue of framing climate change science, the China Daily followed the 
reports of the IPCC, which it regarded as the mainstream body of climate change 
science. Climate change, it said, was not a projection and it would gradually bring 
human misery and economic adversity.15 It argued that there was not any doubt 
about anthropogenic climate change. It explained that the industrial development 
of the West was the central cause of rising temperature and emerging climate 
challenges. It noted that the planet was also facing growing challenges posed by 
environmental degradations and rising temperatures making it essential for 
governments at all levels to calculate the real cost of the damage. States paid for 
robust growth but costs which seem bearable today are accumulating as 
environmental debts which cannot be sustained indefinitely. 16  ‘Anthropogenic 
climate change’, ‘Western created problem’, and ‘climate scepticism unnecessary’ 
were the main frames developed and used by the China Daily. 
                                                 
13 David Adam, ‘Climate Wars Damage the Scientists but We All Stand to Lose in the Battle’, 
GUK, February 23, 2010, http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/cif-green/2010/feb/23/climate-
scepticism-hacked-emails?INTCMP=SRCH.  
14 George Monbiot, ‘The Climate Denial Industry Seeks to Dupe the Public. It’s Working’, The 
Hindu, December 9, 2009, http://www.thehindu.com/2009/12/09/stories/2009120954960900.htm.  
15 ‘Climate Change Cost $60 Billion in 2003’, China Daily, December 12, 2003, 
 http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/en/doc/2003-12/12/content_289545.htm.  
16 Editorials, ‘Environmental Debts’, China Daily, September 15, 2011, P. 9. 
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The NYT, GUK, Hindu and China Daily did not question the validity and 
reliability of the IPCC’s Assessment Reports (ARs). Although sceptics had raised 
some valid concerns such as the use made of the World Wildlife Fund’s (WWF) 
data on retreating glaciers in the IPCC AR4 report and the IPCC’s use of a 
Greenpeace campaigner in one of its key reports which critics said presented 
misleading claims about renewable energy, these newspapers viewed events like 
these including Climategate as conspiracies of sceptics. 17  The framing of 
argument in these four newspapers was clear that anthropogenic climate change 
was happening although it may seem a bit more one sided on the issue of climate 
science as they did not provide sufficient discussion to inform and educate the 
public. However, as argued in chapter 2, being balanced on climate change 
science is being selective and biased.18 
Yet, the GUK was more investigative in seeking to reveal the secret stories of the 
contrary voices than other newspapers. Only the WSJ embraced the anti-climate 
science stance, while the others embraced the IPCC’s stand. But the WSJ was 
locked in the debate of believers versus sceptics, leading the public to live in 
confusion as Helm reasoned, we are “condemned to live with uncertainty” 19 
because we do not know the impacts of climate change. Johnson and Covello 
went further to argue that we were also doomed to live with confusion because the 
newspapers in the name of balanced reporting did not impart unbiased 
information.20  A more detailed and investigative but also critical reporting of 
contrary voices dissecting their lies or weaknesses, if any, by the NYT could have 
given primarily the US public a better understanding of the issues of climate 
change. 
The global population understands little about the science, and the causes and 
consequences of global warming and climate change. Bord’s research has shown 
that much of the American population misunderstands climate change and global 
                                                 
17 ‘Greenpeace Influence Seen in Climate Report’, NZherald.co.nz, June 17, 2011, 
http://www.nzherald.co.nz/world/news/article.cfm?c_id=2&objectid=10732704. 
18 See 2.3 of chapter 2. 
19 Dieter Helm, ‘Climate Changed Policy: Why Has So Little Been Achieved’, in The Economics 
and Politics of Climate Change, eds., Dieter Helm and Cameron Hepburn (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2009). 
20 B.B. Johnson and V. T. Covello, ‘Agenda- Setting, Group Conflict, and the Social Construction 
of Risk’, in The Social and Cultural Construction of Risk, eds., B.B. Johnson and V. T. Covello , 
179-81(Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing, 1987). 
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warming. 21  Boykoff and Boykoff argued that media conglommerates and 
reporters distort reality by making scientific errors, by rigid adherence to balanced 
coverage and by presenting human-interest stories rather than scientific content.22 
They argue that the fundamental problem with media outlets is the way they 
misframe the climate change debate with images such as falling ice in Antartica or 
storm pictures. Entman 23  wrote, “Balance aims for neutrality” in the media. 
According to Dunwoody and Peters the balance coverage of science in the media 
is “surrogate to validity checks” because “the typical journalist, even one trained 
as science writer, has neither the time nor the expertise to check the validity of the 
claims herself (sic)”.24 But many scholars argue that balance coverage does not 
always mean accurate coverage. “In fact when it comes to the coverage of global 
warming, balanced report can actually be informational bias”.25  
The media presents dangerous and scary images of environmental degradation and 
demands action for preventing such degradation. Framing news with images is 
great in drawing the attention of the people to the short term, but complex 
problems like climate change need long term solutions. It is hard for public to 
grasp the actual scope of climate change problem. Ordinary people are busy with 
their day to day challenges of making a living, sending their children to schools 
and securing healthcare. The media needs to focus on helping the public 
understand the invisible GHGs produced in addition to simply showing the 
images. As people understand the impacts of these invisible GHGs, they will be 
more motivated to change their life style to contribute to reductions in GHGs. 
Indeed, understanding the daily weather is different from understanding climate 
change since weather is a daily feature whereas climate is about long term 
changes in weather and temperature patterns. 
                                                 
21 Richard J. Bord et al., ‘Public Perceptions of Global Warming: United States and International 
Perspectives’, Climate Research 11 (1998): 75-84. 
22 Maxwell T. Boykoff and Jules M. Boykoff, ‘Balance as Bias: Global Warming and the US 
Prestige Press’, Global Environmental Change 14 (2004): 125–36. 
23 R. Entman, Democracy Without Citizens: Media and the Decay of American Politics (New York 
and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), 30. 
24 S. Dunwoody, H. P. Peters, Mass Media Coverage of Technological and Environmental Risks. 
Public Understanding of Science 1, no. 2 (1992): 199–230. 
25 Boykoff and Boykoff, 2004, 126. 
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Schoenfeld et al argued that the media plays a critical role in the construction of 
environmental issues and problems.26 Media coverage of climate change science 
is much more than a collection of news articles made ready for passing balanced 
information, it is also about presenting accurate information for the public and 
establishing the link between the public, messages conveyed and problems to be 
solved. However, the newspapers, particularly the WSJ, in this research framed 
the climate change issue around the contrast between believers and sceptics for 
their balanced coverage.  
The WSJ did not acknowledge the US fuel industry lobby against climate change 
as against ozone protection regulation because, as DuPont argued, “the science 
was too speculative and uncertain to justify”.27 This has not resulted in a positive 
contribution in solving the complex problem of climate change. Similarly, former 
US Vice President, Al Gore and the chair of the IPCC, Rajendra Pachauri, have 
shown their preferred images and claimed that there was no room for doubt on the 
science of climate change. Leading sceptics like Lord Monckton and Christopher 
Brooker framed it in the opposite way. The debate on climate change has further 
obfuscated an already complex issue: it has been more about politics than about 
science. Critics have rightly noted: “The unfortunate result of the rough meeting 
of science and politics is an exaggerated and misleading appearance of scientific 
controversy and conflict played out in policy debates and in the press”.28 
In Designs on Nature (2005), Jasanoff examines how 'scientific authority’ is 
constructed in different political settings. By comparing the US, UK and Germany, 
she argues that those who have the authority (power) to speak for science in those 
contexts differ and it is important when considering who is referenced 
(particularly in the media) and who is considered authoritative in public science 
debates that concern policy making. In addition, “Science and technology have 
been regarded for centuries as intruments of social progress and personal 
                                                 
26 A. Clay Schoenfeld, Robert F. Meier and Robert J.Griffin, ‘Constructing a Social Problem: the 
Press and the Environment’, Social Problems 27, no. 1 (1979): 38–61. 
27 Edward A. Parson, ‘Protecting the Ozone Layer’, in Institutions for the Earth: Sources of 
Effective International Environmental Protection, eds., Peter M. Hass, Robert O. Keohane and 
Marc A. Levy (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1993), 34. 
28 Andrew E. Dessler and Edward A. Parson, The Science and Politics of Global Climate Change: 
A Guide to the Debate (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 41. 
256 
liberation”29 but when scientific knowledge is associated with gaining economic 
and political might “we can reasonably wonder whether science will lose its 
ability to serve either state or society as a source of impartial critical authority”.30 
In fact, the Gore-Monckton debate on climate change is more political and less 
scientific presenting personal interest and the self-righteousness either for political 
or economic gains with the media appropriating it to its interest of balanced 
reporting or biased reporting. As Breslow wrote: “Australia’s bruising fight over 
cap-and-trade stands as a reminder that despite broad scientific consensus on 
global warming, an unsettled political debate over the issue is not unique to the 
US”.31  
Instead of focusing on the questions of ‘do you believe in climate change or are 
you a skeptic?’ the WSJ needs to reframe the debate to focus on the serious 
question of ‘is climate change a problem worth worrying about?’ The media is 
obligated to pass correct information about the scientific details onto the public 
rather than relying on images of melting polar caps and similar events. The use of 
dramatic pictures of the weather is a compelling way to frame the debate, but it 
can also distort public perceptions with uncertainty of weather patterns used to 
counter the points. From their study of national opinion polls bewteen 1990 and 
2010, Donner and McDaniels found that people tend to ‘blow hot and cold’ 
according to the short term evidence around them.32 They showed that a cold snap 
may lead to skepticism over climate change whereas a particularly hot spell may 
increase climate concerns.33 The media has to enable the public to distinguish 
daily or weekly weather changes from long term alternations in temperature, and 
how this might affect all the related policy issues.  
The crude presentation of climate change in terms of ‘for or against’ reduced the 
debate to a political campaign, with the adoption of a party line and attacks on the 
other’s campaign, whereas the disagreement at negotiations arose for different 
                                                 
29 Sheila Jasanoff, Designs on Nature: Science and Democracy in Europe and the United States 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005), 5. 
30 Ibid, 6. 
31 Jason M. Breslow, ‘Beyond U.S., Climate Politics Stir Parallel Battles’, Frontline, October 23, 
2012, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/environment/climate-of-doubt/beyond-u-s-
climate-politics-stir-parallel-battles.  
32 Simon Donner and Jeremy McDaniels, ‘Blowing Hot and Cold: US Belief in Climate Change 
Shifts with Weather (New York and Heidelberg: Climate Change, Springer, 2013), 1-14. 
33 Ibid. 
257 
reasons. Such issues were finally picked by the media and dessiminated more 
widely. In playing the game of accusing and developing stories of ‘for’ and 
‘against’, the media, as particularly conveyed by WSJ in this research, sent 
confusing messages to the general public, rather than providing a considered 
assessment of the issues and failing to educate the public intelligently.  
The NYT, GUK, the Hindua and China Daily should have been more investigative 
and shown people what was going on behind the scenes, highlighting the sources 
of information of both the mainstream scientists and the sceptics, as George 
Monbiot34 has done. Instead, the WSJ was saying that nothing was happening and 
that climate change was a hoax, while other newspapers were highlighting the 
gloomy days ahead if climate change was not addressed in time. The ramifications 
of this division did not robustly boost climate change policy making because 
public concerns were smeared in confusion.35 
 The research points to considerable evidence that the “media engages in selective 
and biased reporting” that emphasizes drama and conflict.36 It was clear from this 
research that the media, as pointed out earlier, particulary WSJ, did not do well in 
meeting the climate change challenge by providing more investigative analysis, 
preferring to highlight the shallow contrasting arguments of believers and sceptics 
rather then highlighting the issue of the invisible carbon dioxide (CO2) as a heat 
trap that causes long-term temperature rises. The role of media in building public 
trust37 on climate change is important as Cooper argued that without public trust 
of climate change science, policymaking in a democratic society cannot address 
the serious threats that we face today.38 However, chaper 6 and assessement above 
in this section illustrated that there is disconnection between climate change 
science and its dessimination by the media. 
                                                 
34 See Chapter 2 of George Monbiot, Heat: How Can We Stop the Planet Burning (London: 
Penguin, 2007). 
35 Chandra L. Pandey, ‘International Climate Change Negotiations and the Media’, in The 
Refereed Proceedings of the 2012 Australian Political Studies Association Conference, eds., 
Richard Eccleston, Nicholas Sageman and Felicity Gray, 273-300 (Hobart, Australia: University 
of Tasmania, 2012b), 293. 
36 Johnson and Covello 1987, 179. 
37 The division among media to pass two completely contradictory pictures of same issue created 
confusion among people. The real problem is although GUK tried best to convince people, WSJ 
crumbled GUK’s attempt. 
38 Caren B. Cooper, ‘Media Literacy as a Key Strategy toward Improving Public Acceptance of 
Climate Change Science’, Bioscience 61 (2011): 231-37. 
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7.3 Setting Issues and Agendas for Negotiation 
In their attempt to develop an ambitious and successful climate change agreement,  
the newspapers, although to different levels and contexts, made contributions by 
framing their news on the value of technology, finance and possible new 
proposals, as discussed in chapter 6. The WSJ framed its news putting the US 
economic growth and the American life-style at the top of its agenda setting, 
postulating that CO2 concentrations and warmer temperatures could be a boon to 
humanity. It did not want the US to ratify the KP. The WSJ explicitly made the 
point that any US commitments for GHG emissions would have a significant 
impact on the US consumerist society and economy.  
The WSJ argued that if developing countries would not adopt binding targets, the 
US products would be expensive and unaffordable. Although the WJS kept 
denying the anthropogenic climate change and its negative impacts, it argued for 
individual state and alternative approaches to make serious responses given that 
the UNFCCC framework and CBDR principle had failed to produce a realistic 
prospect of securing broad international agreement to restrict CO2 by all major 
emitters. 39  Arguing against channelling fund from developed countries to 
developing countries it wrote the developing world needed better governance, not 
funding assistance.40 It also noted that the balance of climate change negotiations 
power was shifting and that China and the developing countries should take 
commitments if the US is also to take them – a Kyoto style agreement would 
make no difference even if fossil fuels were the cause of climate change.41 The 
frames used for agenda setting were mainly focused on ‘US economy’, ‘unleash 
private sector’, ‘no cap-and-trade’, ‘no investment in renewables’, ‘salience of 
Copenhagen consensus’. 
The NYT framed the debate depicting the US (Bush) administration as a villain in 
the climate change negotiations because it did not ratify the KP and walked away 
from attempts to agree to legally binding commitments. It appreciated the other 
developed countries for ratifying the Kyoto and working hard towards sealing 
another deal. It maintained that China, India and other developing countries had a 
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right to develop and they should not be asked to take any binding commitments 
but noted that without the participation of the Chinese and other major emitters 
the objective of emissions reductions would not be achieved. It emphasized 
resolving political, economic and technological issues. It argued that the UN 
climate talks had been chaotic and for real progress small gatherings of big 
players would be necessary because the climate change politics was revolving 
around the EU, the US, Canada, Japan and three rapidly emerging economic 
powers: China, India and Brazil. 42  It framed its news on ‘capping the GHG 
emissions’, ‘investment in low carbon technology’, ‘American leadership’, 
‘Chinese full participation’, and more ‘public education’.  
The GUK framed it news positioning close to the NYT but argued that no 
development should be carried out at the expense of the environment. It put 
significant emphasis on low carbon technologies; it sought American leadership43 
and urged India, China, Japan and Canada to step forward in the negotiation 
process.44 It argued that the KP was weak and inadequate because the US opted 
out of it. It proposed a framework in which the developed world must take 
leadership in funding and technology and in return the developing world would 
reciprocate and accept significant emissions targets.45 The NYT and the GUK also 
tied the issue of combating climate change to economic development and patterns 
of consumption. The GUK news frames were ‘investment in renewable 
technology’, ‘sustainable development’, ‘emission free technologies’, ‘energy 
efficiency’. The GUK and NYT newspapers favoured development of a global 
legally binding agreement, while giving importance to individual responses as 
well.  
The Hindu and China Daily framed their news arguing that climate change was a 
problem of historical exploitation through industrialization in the developed 
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countries. They informed their readers that the North was already developed; it 
was time for the South suggesting if the developed countries attempted to block 
the economic development of the developing countries by imposing binding 
commitments, such attempts must be resisted. They argued that rich countries 
were hypocrites because they ran their industries in China and India for cheap 
labour but blamed them for worsening global warming and climate change. 
Polluting companies in China were owned by Americans, Europeans, Japanese 
and others.46 But there was no suggestion at all that such operations should be 
closed down or relocated back to their countries of origin. Instead, this issue was 
used as a tool of the politics of negotiation.  
While the relocation of manufacturing companies from the developed countries to 
developing countries has increased the amount of GHG emissions, these 
companies have created jobs and promoted economic growth in developing 
countries. China handsomely benefits from its exports, and there is no intrinsic 
reason that responsibility for the emissions should not belong to China. Likewise, 
if the CO2 emissions of international imports and exports are taken into account, 
developing country per capita emissions would decline further whereas the 
developed countries per capita emissions would increase but this notion is 
challenged as the Chinese and Indian middle class populations increase. A similar 
case can be made with other developing countries. However, it should be noted 
that consumers, also, benefit nicely from the ‘externalization’ of many of the 
environmental and social costs associated with the production of goods, and for 
which many people in China pay the price.  
The Hindu and the Daily noted that a great deal for a successful climate 
agreement would depend on the kind of role the US, the EU, China, and India 
articulated in the negotiations and high-level political parleys47 so India and China 
needed to step up efforts to play critical roles at negotiations and focus on 
developing the green economy through climate friendly technologies. On the 
CBDR principle, only one article from the Hindu noted that it required 
reconsideration as the plight of many developing countries were changing in 
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terms of their economies.48 However, their editorials argued that the UNFCCC 
framework was the only suitable framework and the principle of CBDR was the 
best measure to address global climate change challenges. The Hindu framed its 
news on ‘CBDR and HR responsibility’, ‘financial and technological support’, ‘no 
compromise for development’, ‘investment in low carbon technology and their 
deployment to developing countries’. The China Daily framed its news using 
frames such as ‘Western responsibility to fix climate change’, ‘technology 
transfer’, ‘significance of the US and BASIC countries in climate policy’, 
‘voluntary contributions from developing countries’, ‘consumption and 
production’, and ‘transformation of society from consuming to preserving’. 
The arguments of these newspapers covered a wide range of issues and were 
significant in the conduct of climate negotiations as they had diagnosed 
significant changes which had taken place over the previous twenty years for the 
lack of progress towards international climate change governance. They touched 
almost every issue of climate change and the items on the agenda for negotiation 
such as significance of technology, finance, and the possible roles of major 
emitters, which are critical in the debate of climate change burden sharing and the 
need for all inclusive ambitious agreement. They identified the shifting balance of 
power taking place from COP-15 onwards and the national interests of parties as 
they articulated openly over areas of agreements and disagreements. They also 
noted the importance of strong leadership for the success of climate change policy 
making.  
The newspapers’ framing also focused on the developed versus the developing 
countries’ bargaining issue and getting the Kyoto and Kyoto-2 either ratified or 
rejected. Chapters 4 and 5 have shown that there were many complex issues 
attached to climate change negotiations which resulted from the protracted 
bargaining between the developed and developed countries (the US and the EU), 
the developed and developing countries, between developed and major emitters 
from developing countries, and the shifting balance of power (GHG emissions) 
particularly on the issue of making binding commitments. The global climate 
change agreements made clear that developed countries recognized their role in 
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climate change and that developing countries were also serious about it. Despite 
this, there has not been speedy progress because there was no appropriate and 
globally accepted framework and principles to work with. With negotiations 
frequently locked in problems arising from the lack of a workable current 
framework and the principles, this overlooked the potential capacity for global 
societies and technology to contribute to a solution. Lacking were appropriate 
mechanisms, shared visions (locking out of current framework and principles) and 
communication for collective action.  
Instead of attaching blame to countries, the newspapers should have focused more 
on how to solve the problem by looking into what alterations, checks and balances 
were emerging. Economic growth with little harm to the environment is important, 
but there is no point singling out one country when we know that climate change 
is a global problem. In responding to climate change challenges, the environment 
needed to be protected in ways which do not have a damaging impact on the 
economy and ecosystem. On this, the newspapers’ framing advocated more 
investment on innovation of low-carbon technology and technology transfers. A 
challenging dimension emerged in focusing on the subsequent statistics of the 
International Energy Agency (IEA) by country rather than the total average.  
The individual country emission data demonstrates a picture which is linked with 
the carbon intensity of production. The statistics from IEA, Energy Information 
Administration (EIA) and Netherlands Environment Assessment Agency (NEAA) 
show that the developed world’s emissions and carbon per capita are falling since 
there is high technological progress and carbon offsetting in Europe and the rest 
of the developed countries.49 In contrast, the emissions and carbon per capita have 
been rising sharply in developing countries.50 The issue is one of making quick 
progress technologically while, at the same time, deploying the technological 
innovations of the developed world in the developing one. The challenge is the 
use of a shared vision to address climate change to agree on the tools to deploy the 
available technological innovations.  
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Although there is a huge literature that argues that environmental protection and 
cornucopian development is not possible,51 there is also a burgeoning literature 
that argues that environmental protection and economic growth are both possible 
as people understand that climate change matters greatly for present and future 
generations.52 Even the authors of Limits to Growth concurred: “Impressive – and 
even sufficient – technological advance is conceivable, but only as a consequence 
of determined societal decisions and willingness to follow up such decisions with 
action and money”.53 Furthermore, greater shared understanding will promote a 
change in the way of life of the people and also answer the problem of 
overconsumption and waste. Using appropriate low carbon technology in the 
energy hungry developing countries will reduce the reliance on carbon in the 
production of goods and services. The search for and development of new carbon-
neutral technology offers a future when people are no longer reliant on carbon 
energy sources and so limit the amount of the GHG emissions in the atmosphere. 
All the newspapers mentioned the positive aspects of technology but they could 
have pursued the issue strongly to balance growth and environmental protection.  
The UNFCC and KP framework established flexible mechanisms such as the 
emissions trading scheme (ETS), joint implementation (JI), and clean 
development mechanism (CDM) as well as advocating quantified emission targets 
for developed countries.54 The newspapers under study were doubtful about the 
CDM mechanism as a win-win for emission cuts. Chapter 4 discussed why the 
Kyoto mechanisms were ineffective. Newell and Paterson argue that climate 
capitalism “can find ways of doing new business in a way which brings on board 
those that will be doing less business in a low-carbon economy, or at least to 
provide enough growth overall for policymakers to be able to override their 
resistance”.55  
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Clearly, any project to decarbonise the world needs an altogether different model 
of growth, which does not depend on cheap and abundant use of fossil-fuels but 
contributes to the abatement of GHGs. One of the least explored solutions, apart 
from renewable energy available for the current scenario of more than 80 per cent 
use of fossil-fuel energy, is carbon capture and storage (CCS). Lord Hunt, former 
Director-General of the UK Met office and Terry Townshend, the Global 
Legislators Organization for a Balanced Environment, has argued that Gulf 
countries could lead the development and funding of CCS technology to capture 
and store the GHGs exhausts from the combustion of fossil fuels and prevent their 
emissions into the atmosphere.56 The CCS may offer a credible scenario under 
which emissions can be sufficiently reduced over the next 30 years to limit global 
average temperature rise below 3°C by 2100, well above the agreed UN goal of 
2°C if the pilot projects of CCS perform well.57 Nuclear fusion, different from 
nuclear fission which is in current use, is also another potential area to produce 
zero carbon energy as the Sun produces the heat.58  
The major concern of climate change is the emission of GHGs. Previously it was 
the developed countries which were the major emitters, but it is now major 
economies from developing countries which, as demonstrated in chapter 5.4, have 
emitted far more than the developed world as they pull their poor population out 
of poverty. The IEA’s World Energy Outlook 2011 projects that the dynamics of 
energy markets are increasingly determined by countries outside the Organization 
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). Non-OECD countries 
account for 90% of population growth, 70% of the increase in economic output 
and 90% of energy demand growth over the period from 2010 to 2035.59 In the 
same vein, EIA’s International Energy Outlook 2011 projected: 
Much of the growth in energy consumption occurs in countries outside 
the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (non-
OECD nations), where demand is driven by strong long-term 
economic growth. Energy use in non-OECD nations increases by 85 
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per cent in the Reference case, as compared with an increase of 18 per 
cent for the OECD economies.60 
The data demonstrates that the majority of current and future GHGs are being and 
will continue to be produced by developing states. Thus, the UNFCCC approach 
of the KP with its firm commitments only from developed countries will not make 
much difference in the mission of stabilizing the global GHG emissions. Major 
emitters from developing countries cannot be exempted in the name of 
development as Karl Hood, Chairman of Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) 
noted during Durban negotiation in 2011: “Must we accept our annihilation? 
While they develop, we die. Why should we accept this?”61 A core question arises 
about how the developing countries can continue their economic agenda without 
making huge CO2 emissions. The answer is technology for, at least, mid-term 
solutions.  
Newell and Paterson have written on the salience of technology in the fight 
against climate change.62 Development of innovative low carbon technologies in 
the developing countries is, for now, beyond their capacity. To meet their 
incapacity to reduce carbon foot-prints developing countries are in dire need to 
receive technologies from the developed world. In exchange for the redistribution 
of green technology from rich to poor, the developing countries would accept 
significant emissions targets.63 Details need to be worked out because the issue is 
not only about whether there can be progress technologically but also about 
whether we can deploy the technological innovations of the developed world in 
the developing world. It is immensely important to deploy the available low-
carbon technologies to the developing countries to reduce carbon intensity per 
GDP along with the search of carbon-neutral technology. The IEA 2012 reports, 
“No more than one-third of proven reserves of fossil fuels can be consumed prior 
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to 2050 if the world is to achieve the 2°C goal, unless carbon capture and storage 
(CCS) technology is widely deployed”.64  
Another important issue concerning the approach taken by the newspapers for 
solving the complex climate change problem was the continued adequacy of the 
UNFCCC framework. Some papers adopted the argument of their respective 
governments in discussing climate change, such as the WSJ, the Hindu and the 
China Daily. The approach taken by the WSJ resembled the argument of the US 
Senate and Bush administration. For example the Byrd-Hegel Resolution and the 
Bush administration put more emphasis on the US economy and undermined the 
scientific necessity, as was the case of the WSJ as mentioned above.65 The Hindu 
and China Daily editorials consistently argued for sustaining the CBDR principle 
and resistance to Western attempts to transfer the burden to developing countries 
as their governments position them in the climate negotiations.66 The Hindu and 
China Daily favoured the UNFCCC framework, whereas the newspapers from 
developed countries proposed suitable alternative approaches for the possible 
benefits in fostering actions. On the CBDR principle, all concurred on its 
continued salience except for the WSJ. 
The CBDR principle is applicable to the inter-state system because it is founded 
on states’-quotas. However, the principle of CBDR does not provide a clear 
definition and parties interpret it according to their preferences and needs. When 
negotiated in 1992 the GHG emissions and economic conditions of states were 
very different from the current situation and the argument of CBDR had strong 
validity, but today it needs to be re-examined as economic circumstances of some 
powerful developing countries are changing. 67  For instance, the US was the 
largest emitter in the 1990s but now some developing countries have overtaken 
the US. The CBDR principle does not say anything about changes to developing 
countries or whether major emitters from developing countries can still hold their 
right to development at the environmental costs and not take any specific targets 
for GHG emission reductions.  
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Chapter 5 demonstrated that on a basis of per capita income, developing countries 
lag far behind developed countries and, by population per capita, their emissions 
are well below those of the developed countries so they do not want any obstacles 
to their economic growth and development in moving the millions of their 
populations out of poverty. Moving millions of the poor out of poverty is one of 
the goals of MDGs and is very important for developing countries, but successive 
IEA reports “have shown that the climate goal of limiting warming to 2°C is 
becoming more difficult and more costly with each year that passes”.68 
Another principle for tackling climate change was Contraction and Convergence 
(C&C). This idea was developed by the Global Commons Institute, led by concert 
violinist and engaging orator Aubrey Meyer, under which the individual unit of 
analysis is about the maximum atmospheric CO2 concentration to prevent severe 
climate change. 69  It divides the total emissions concentration by the world 
population to give an equal share of emissions for every person. “Contraction and 
Convergence secures survival by correcting fatal poverty and fatal climate 
change”.70 On this model, the right to emit CO2 is treated as a human right and 
allocated on an equal basis to all of humankind.71 On a positive note, the C&C 
proposal provides equal emissions quotas to the people across the world. This 
system could reduce the climate injustice as the rich have to buy emission quotas 
from the poor, the ones who have not used their assigned quotas. It could be 
argued that it is more democratic in the sense of equal distribution of quotas as it 
gives equal quota to individuals across the world irrespective of their natural and 
man-made social circumstances.  
Yet, critics may raise questions about whether a state may try to increase its 
power to build a monopoly for CO2 allowances, or whether the global census 
information can be reliably recorded, and questions about who will make the 
decisions and how it will be done ethically. There are also difficulties over the 
differing requirements for keeping warm in cold climates, and keeping cool in 
warm climates. On the assumption that the unit of analysis in this proposal is the 
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individual, it moves the focus away from the state-centric approach to developing 
an individual-centric structure. Whether this idea would be supported is still 
unclear.  
C&C could help solve the climate problem from a climate justice perspective (as 
will be discussed below) but it begs the question as to why it has not been 
practiced so far and whether it would be ever practiced in the future. While C&C 
is based on the logic of global equal rights and the calculated amount of carbon 
provides the quantum from which an inclusive, global, equal rights per capita 
entitlement of carbon is derived and bestowed to each adult, it is suggested here 
that having so many good qualities in it, contemporary societies of states will be 
the least interested in it. For example, if states were to accept C&C, most of the 
quotas would go to China and India as they have much larger populations.  
Power games and national self-interest have featured throughout the climate 
change negotiations. The pursuit of power, status and wealth is never absent from 
international climate change negotiations and cooperation. 72  Observing their 
positions at climate negotiations, it is hard to imagine that the US and the other 
rich and powerful states would be interested to buy emission quotas from China, 
India and the rest of developing countries. No action can be taken against such 
states as international law holds contradictory provisions of states having the right 
to self-defence and states having the right of actions within its jurisdiction based 
on sovereignty. The C&C proposal is interesting, but as it is, it proffers an 
experiment likely to fail under the present state centric institutional structures 
within the international system. Future research is needed to further clarify the 
proposal, taking geography and specific locations into consideration based on 
their basic need of energy to divide the quotas. 
The CBDR principle has been in practice for more than 20 years but very little has 
been achieved. The newspapers’ arguments for seeking alternative approaches is a 
useful contribution, yet the unit of analysis of their argument was the state and 
according to the WSJ, NYT and GUK what they were suggesting were negotiations 
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between or among a small number of countries such as the Group of 7/8, the 
Group of Twenty (G-20) and Major Economies Forums (MEF).73  
The MEF was launched in March 2009 as a successor to the Bush 
administration’s Major Economies Meeting (MEM) for addressing climate change. 
Under the MEF the 17 major economies are intended to facilitate a candid 
dialogue among major developed and developing economies, help generate the 
political leadership necessary to achieve a successful outcome at the annual UN 
climate negotiations and advance the exploration of concrete initiatives and joint 
ventures that increase the supply of clean energy while cutting GHG emissions.74 
These MEF members are responsible for approximately 80 per cent of global 
emissions, and have provided an arena for major emitting countries to confront 
tricky issues and hammer out viable strategies without entering the labyrinth of 
UN diplomacy.75  
In February 2012, a six-state coalition was established to tackle climate and public 
health risks, posed by short-lived pollutants including methane, hydro 
fluorocarbons, and black carbon (soot). Even these niche fora, however, have 
achieved little and are not immune to political rancour over legally binding 
emissions cuts 76  because the responses required to limit and manage climate 
change could go to the heart of countries’ political and industrial structures.77 
Various international actors work alongside bilateral agencies on climate 
adaptation and mitigation projects in developing countries. Environmental NGOs 
are also fighting the climate cause. The proliferation of actors seeking to address 
climate change reflects the inherent complexity of it, which has substantive 
connections to many issue areas including development, finance, public health, 
energy and security.78  
The newspapers have identified the shifting focus of climate negotiations: the 
developments after Copenhagen 2009 have seen the emergence of small groups of 
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negotiating countries such as BASIC and the US becoming more significant as 
they have turned out to be the major players of energy consumptions and GHG 
emissions. The EU’s role has diminished as its contribution to global emissions 
has been gradually shrinking. Many countries and a large number of 
environmental non-state actors are pressurizing the major players to take action 
but such voices have not been consequential so far.79  
The US has flatly rejected the KP and has not improved its domestic climate 
change policy. China has put in place some effective domestic policies but its 
refusal to international MRV casts doubt on Chinese commitments. India has put 
in place a voluntary national action plan to fight climate change. BASIC is 
looking to the principles of equity, the CBDR and historic responsibility; whereas 
many developed countries, including the US, reject shouldering any burden unless 
all major emitters are on board. If parties remain firm on their stance then any 
proposed alternative approach will do nothing but buy more time for emitting 
more GHGs and producing the lowest common denominator as the outcome.80 
Although these alternative approaches could be significant in achieving the 
climate change goals, more serious efforts to reduce emissions must be made by 
the involved parties.  
The KP established targets to cut emissions from developed countries but it did 
not include the US and provided no meaningful consequences of 
noncompliance. 81  It did not give any firm commitments to major developing 
countries as a result, and it has come under unprecedented strain as Canada 
officially withdrew from the Protocol in December 2011. Canada argued that it 
could only be a part of a binding agreement that included all major emitters as 
parties with quantified targets. Even if the KP was in effect, in 2012 the IEA 
noted:  
Global energy demand grows by more than one-third over the period 
to 2035 in the New Policies Scenario (our central scenario), with 
China, India and the Middle East accounting for 60% of the increase. 
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Energy demand barely rises in OECD countries, although there is a 
pronounced shift away from oil, coal (and, in some countries, nuclear) 
towards natural gas and renewables. Despite the growth in low carbon 
sources of energy, fossil fuels remain dominant in the global energy 
mix, supported by subsidies that amounted to $523 billion in 2011, up 
almost 30% on 2010 and six times more than subsidies to renewables. 
The cost of fossil-fuel subsidies has been driven up by higher oil 
prices; they remain most prevalent in the Middle East and North 
Africa, where momentum towards their reform appears to have been 
lost. Emissions in the New Policies Scenario correspond to a long-term 
average global temperature increase of 3.6 °C.82 
In 2010 the IEA noted:  
The commitments that countries have announced under the 
Copenhagen Accord to reduce their greenhouse-gas emissions 
collectively fall short of what would be required to put the world onto 
a path to achieving the Accord’s goal of limiting the global 
temperature increase to 2°C. 
COP-15 failed to overcome entrenched differences among the major parties and 
did not deliver targeted GHG cuts. COP-16 in Cancun made some strides toward 
effective multilateral action but fell short of promoting needed action to effect 
positive change, including commitments to a post-Kyoto framework.83 In 2011 
COP-17 in Durban showed the depth of the tension between and within developed 
and developing countries over how to interpret the fundamental underpinnings of 
the UNFCCC and KP’s framework – namely, the principle of CBDR among and 
within Annex I and Non-Annex I countries over establishing and achieving 
meaningful quantified and firm mitigation targets.  
In Durban some parties agreed to extend the KP but others such as India, China 
and the US refused to accept legally binding targets. Countries disagreed over the 
issues of financing stipulations and MRV in the KP and other potentially legally 
binding Accords. The Durban Agreement, in an attempt to broaden participation, 
did not mention the CBDR principle.84 Many thought that parties were moving to 
a breakthrough but to their surprise the Doha Climate Gateway, COP-18, in 2012 
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reiterated the central importance of the Convention and its principles. 85  The 
failure to define the principles of the Convention clearly, as discussed in chapters 
4 and 5, raised concerns in future negotiations for making progress from the 
UNFCCC platform. Victor noted that: “Few countries will adopt costly national 
policies aimed at solving global problems unless they are confident that their 
biggest economic competitors are enduring similar obligations”.86 
Climate frameworks struggle to monitor GHG outputs effectively, especially in 
developing countries, many of which lack the domestic capacity to audit their 
total emissions, even if they are able to monitor national levels. Some developing 
countries fear that MRV would encourage international pressure to cap their GHG 
emissions. Article 5 of Copenhagen Accord notes:  
Non-Annex I Parties will communicate information on the 
implementation of their actions through National Communications, 
with provisions for international consultations and analysis under 
clearly defined guidelines that will ensure that national sovereignty is 
respected.87  
Lakoff has pointed out:  
Others, like China, argue that an international monitoring system 
represents an infringement on national sovereignty and that developing 
states should be afforded some leniency in emissions as they are 
currently in critical stages of economic development.88  
It indicates the dominance of state-centric politics during these negotiations and 
newspapers clearly identified this. The primacy of state sovereignty is one of the 
significant points on which governments have focused since Stockholm 1972.89 
The state-centric politics led several states including Canada, Russia, and Japan to 
make it clear that they would not sign the second round of the KP’s commitments. 
New Zealand’s climate change Minister Tim Groser said:  
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There is no question of withdrawing, the issue was always different: 
where would we take our next commitment – under the Kyoto Protocol 
or under the Convention, with the large majorities of economies? We 
have decided that it is in New Zealand's best interests to do the latter.90  
As noted in chapter 6, Todd Stern, the special climate envoy of Obama said, 
“Kyoto is not on the table for the US...The other track is the track that involves all 
parties ... That's the one we are in, that's the one we are the most focused on”.91 
Maintaining consistent economic growth has been the major interest of major 
emitters from developing countries. On November 15, 2012, incumbent Chinese 
President Jinping stressed the need for Chinese economic growth.92  India and 
other emerging economies were on this same approach which was articulated 
right through COP-15 to COP-18. The issue of sovereignty which has been 
referred in almost every document of UNFCCC 93  is often highlighted as 
significant, to the point where it almost caused the collapse of the UN process 
during COP-15.94  
The politics of climate change has been predominantly state-centric95 with the 
international climate change negotiations and policy making caught up in the 
traditional system of power politics of the inter-state system which originated at 
Westphalia in 1648. Climate change is a functional issue requiring a functionally 
based response as articulated by Mitrany who argued it was: “not how to keep 
nations peacefully apart but how to bring them actively together”,96 and proposed: 
“a spreading web of international activities and agencies, in which and through 
which the interests and life of all nations would be gradually integrated”. 97 
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Functionalists98 argue that it is possible to bypass the political rivalries of states 
by building habits of cooperation in non-political economic and social spheres by 
addressing problems requiring international cooperation. 99  But this functional 
approach has not made its way through climate change as we are caught in the 
continued state-centric framework of the UN system and Westphalia. As Hurrell 
and Kingsbury ask: “Can a fragmented and often highly conflictual political 
system made up of over 170 sovereign states … achieve the high (and historically 
unprecedented) levels of cooperation and policy coordination needed to manage 
environmental problems on global scope?”100  
We still live in the post-Westphalian order of state-centric international politics 
thinking that the idea of state sovereignty has delivered, and will continue to 
deliver, solutions to emerging global problems from security to finance to 
environmental threats such as climate change. Ecological, environmental and 
climate change issues are borderless and do not respect the psychological borders 
of nation-states. Each individual, corporation, institution at local, national and 
international levels are integral stakeholders of climate change and environmental 
issues. The politics of the UN is narrow and not about working towards a solution 
to global problems like climate change.101 
Many see the international climate change negotiations platform as multilateral in 
which various actors, such as NGOs and IOs, also participate. Yet, the 
participation of NGOs and IOs has been limited to the role of observers. 102 
Newspapers in this study did not discuss any significant role for non-institutional 
processes or the participatory roles of NGOs, but concentrated on states locked in 
a power-game and upholding national interests. 103  It is only the states’ 
representatives that hold authority to negotiate for consensus. The arguments 
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presented by the newspapers indicated that the CBDR might need to be redefined 
but how was not made clear. Instead, we have been locked into the power games 
of the interstate system with different states holding to their positions and interests 
during these negotiations.  
During negotiations, the powerful states or major emitters were locked into 
national interest defined by power politics. 104  The case studies of Kyoto and 
Copenhagen established that both the principles and the framework were 
inadequate. The negotiation structures used for the last two decades are 
inadequate and “has stuck in gridlock”.105 These structures come from experience 
in managing earlier international problems of security and peace, which have little 
in common with the non-institutional nature of climate change. Although the case 
of ozone negotiations was very successful and global in scope (it dealt with a few 
chemicals, a few producers/companies and solutions were cheaper and easily 
available), using the same model for the highly complicated issues surrounding 
climate change is unrealistic.  
The problem of climate change is that it does not respect national borders with 
tensions between the ecological challenge such as climate change and sovereignty 
due to the fact that the boundaries of states and boundaries of ecosystems do not 
seamlessly coincide.106 There is not only a trade-off between the availability of 
green technologies and the incapacity of the developing countries but also the 
actions of every single human activity. Unless there is concerted and 
unprecedented effort by all states without exclusion of states and non-states actors 
and by taking into account the doctrine of national sovereignty because there is no 
international authority or world government to enforce every country to agree, 
then climate change targets are a pipe-dream. Progress in climate change 
governance will be contingent on finding innovative ways to deal with a variety of 
cognitive, economic, political and institutional hurdles. 
Cutting GHGs drastically without reliable alternative sources of energy available 
and without a broadly shared global vision is almost impossible. The long-
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established state centric, top-down approach in tackling emerging global issues 
will continue because any other framework would be suboptimal under the 
Westphalian system. Hence, we need to develop complementary alternative 
approaches that include global, international, regional, national and local 
communities. Being locked up, as occurred during the Kyoto and Copenhagen 
climate conferences with parties basing their response on state-centric interests 
will not deliver the necessary outcome.107 Further negotiations on this basis will 
not result in progress. A shared vision for our common future and posterity is 
required and it can only be achieved by adopting multiple approaches that are 
global, regional, and local, and calling on the development and deployment of 
carbon neutral/low carbon technology.  
Diamond has set out how societies choose to fail or succeed.108 He suggests that 
more than a single global approach and much greater reliance should be placed on 
small groups of actors such as the US and China, the G-7 or G-20 who are the 
major emitters, and including non-state actors who have a major interest in 
addressing the issues of climate change. As the case studies of Kyoto and 
Copenhagen have shown, only a few member-states played a critical role in 
developing the text.109 Without the support of the major emitters neither Kyoto 
nor Copenhagen could have achieved more. For any ambitious policy to be 
successful requires response from the main stakeholders because states may sign 
treaties but it is the stakeholders who are able to change the behaviours to arrest 
the policy goals.110  
Hence, a multiple approach must be embraced to reach out to all stakeholders. The 
UN inter-state system relies on states’ role which cannot solely accomplish the 
goals of stabilization of GHGs. 111  Multiple approaches offer the prospect of 
success in achieving goals as they are inclusive and are able to reach out to the 
people who are the primary stakeholders of climate change. This would solve the 
problem of democratic decision making on the one hand and make the unit of 
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analysis more responsible to bring the change to others because climate change 
amounts to a collective action problem.  
Arguing in favour of a bottom up approach for democratic decision making, 
Ostrom wrote: “Many analysts – especially in academia, special interest groups, 
governments and the press – still presume that common-pool problems are 
dilemmas in which participants themselves cannot avoid producing suboptimal 
results”.112 She concluded that complex collective problems could be solved when 
communication is free, vision is shared, trust is high and communities are 
mobilized from the bottom up rather than top down.113 This is not an ideological 
position rather it is an empirical one, borne out by case studies originating in 
places ranging from remote fisheries in Turkey, forests in Japan, irrigation 
systems in Spain and the Philippines to fragile ecosystems in the Swiss Alps. This 
perspective challenges the conventional wisdom about prospects for a climate 
friendly world. It injects modesty into singular, universal notions about progress 
and places faith in people, with their ears to the ground, coming up with the best 
answers.  
Knight, in applauding but misinterpreting Ostrom, stated that the Copenhagen 
Accord was a success because it devolved power to states and laid down how the 
temperature limit of 2°C was to be achieved which was then left to domestic 
legislatures to decide how to legislate for it.114 Thinking ambitious climate actions 
would be forthcoming through the voluntary bottom-up approach of nation-states 
through the UNFCCC was another mistake. Such ideas have been presented for 
the last 20 years mainly through UNFCCC 1992, the Kyoto and Copenhagen 
which is where Knight’s analysis is inadequate. Ostrom115 rightly reasoned that 
local projects are more compatible with democracy and are achievable because 
people at the local level are immersed in their milieu, they are serious about their 
problem and know how to solve it. Yet, it should be noted that Ostrom’s idea that 
a ‘bottom up approach’ to address the ‘tragedy of the commons’ and collective 
action problems was/is realistic only in very small scale communities, which 
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limits its applicability to global issues like climate change. For instance, how can 
numerous local initiatives (assuming they do get off the ground everywhere) 
address the big technological changes, the changes in production systems and 
ultimately, the allocation of burden sharing across the world? 
The world is not comprised of average global citizens with the poor in the South 
and the rich in the North, responding differently to the global challenge of climate 
change. Incapacity, limited resources and knowledge of the local initiatives 
present hindrances to local candidates where in both rich and poor states electoral 
challenges emerge from populist opponents, and the withdrawal of business 
funding campaigns can occur.116 For example, in 2005, the mayor of London set 
up an agency with partnership in the private sector to mitigate emissions of the 
city and in return there was an electoral overturn.117 As the unpredictable impact 
of climate change events becomes more frequent, it is clear that the preparations 
and responses of individuals and local communities especially in the developing 
world cannot suffice by themselves alone.118 
The top-down approach of the KP with legally binding firm targets for developed 
countries have only produced imperceptible results with many of the developed 
countries failing to meet their targets. 119  Canada renounced the KP in 2011 
because it was not on track to meet Kyoto targets and major emitters were not part 
of Kyoto. The Canadian Environment Minister Peter Kent said, “Canada was 
invoking the legal right to withdraw and would be saving the country $14 billion 
in penalties for not achieving its Kyoto targets”.120 Thus, the issue concerning the 
appropriate responses to climate change should be initiated at every level: local, 
provincial, state, national, transnational, international, multi-national and multi-
lateral by avoiding ‘free ride’ to act and reduce reluctance.121 The most significant 
issue is that any “multilateralism or minilateralism” 122  must be inclusive to 
                                                 
116 Lever-Tracy, 2011, 92. 
117 Ibid. 
118 Ibid. 
119 See subsequent reports of IEA, 2010, 2011; 2012. 
120 Quoted in Wil Longbottom, ‘The Global Warming Dividend: Canada Abandons Kyoto 
Protocol to Protect its Lucrative Oil Reserves’, Mail Online, December 13, 2011, 
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2073520/Canada-abandons-Kyoto-Protocol-save-14bn-
penalties-missing-greenhouse-gas-targets.html. 
121 Andrew Dobson, Green Political Thought (Oxon and New York: Routledge, 2007), 104. 
122 Eckersley reasons that inclusive minilateralism, which includes the most affected ones and the 
biggest emitters is the right approach to make progress in climate change issue. Eckersley’s 
279 
involve all the major emitters and the representatives of real stakeholders. The 
actors involved should be serious about taking action rather than only attending 
negotiations, smiling and being agreeable with empty words on paper. States, 
particularly the advanced developed countries, have to underscore the significance 
of the deployment of technology in the required parts of the world and an 
incessant search for carbon-neutral technology. This can break the false choice of 
either development or climate change which “means decoupling emissions growth 
from economic growth”.123 
The climate change debate is no longer about developed versus developing, or 
rich versus poor, but about making successful climate change responses for 
common prosperity. The polarization of the climate issue based on North-South 
politics is no longer relevant. As Carter has noted: “It is important to note that the 
simple North-South dichotomy does not capture the complexity of climate change 
politics”. 124  The relevant capacities and positions of the parties are gradually 
altering in terms of economic might, energy consumption, and emissions 
production. This raises a question about the continued adequacy of the CBDR as 
“there has been bitter disagreement over what this means in practice”. 125 
Discussions should now focus on how the complex principles associated with the 
CBDR can be unknotted for future negotiations to move forward collectively.126  
More research and development on all available technologies would be an integral 
aspect for any major initiatives in technological innovation aimed at reducing 
GHGs. The issue of technology transfers must be pursued in which the 
industrialized countries should relax the concerns of intellectual property rights by 
challenging corporate ownership and control of it to achieve greater compliance 
by reducing incapacity of developing countries. Although it may seem 
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aspirational, it has been long due that we should try to determine non-institutional 
approaches to combat global problems such as climate change. Such non-
institutional approaches are bottom up, societies to societies, and inclusive to put 
foundations for Eckersley’s notion of ‘ecological democracy’. 127  For this to 
happen the debate needs to be reframed.  
According to Lakoff:  
Reframing is telling the truth as we see it – telling it forcefully, 
straightforwardly and articulately, with moral conviction and without 
hesitation. The language must fit the conceptual reframing, a reframing 
from the perspective of progressive values. It is not just a matter of 
words, though the right ones are needed to evoke progressive 
frames.128  
For reframed communication to be successful media sources can play a key role 
as has been emerging over time by focusing on strong American, Chinese and 
Indian leadership with the full participation of both developed and the developing 
major emitters. The newspapers’ framing to present climate change issues to 
public and policy makers needs to be delinked from environmental degradation 
and economic growth to stay focused on potential socio-economic transformations 
along with technological innovation, as the media has identified, as key drivers in 
moving from a high carbon world to a carbon-neutral world and from consuming 
society to conserving society.  
7.4 Democracy Debate in the Media 
The framing of news about issues of democracy in the media on negotiations of 
international climate change governance is mostly about inter-state participation 
and deliberation. The news frames of democracy and transparency featured 
prominently during COP-15, with newspapers declaring that the Copenhagen 
Accord procedures were undemocratic, 129  because it was negotiated by the 
personal consultations between the US and the BASIC countries. “The climate 
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summit was far from being a democratic exercise. But the struggle to prevent the 
terrible consequences of climate change must continue”.130 As Ruz observed:  
From the evening of the 17th and the early morning hours of the 18th, 
the Prime Minister of Denmark and senior representatives of the 
United States had been meeting with the Chairman of the European 
Commission and the leaders of 27 nations to introduce to them – on 
behalf of Mr. Obama – a draft agreement in whose elaboration none of 
the other leaders of the rest of the world had taken part. It was an anti-
democratic and practically clandestine initiative that disregarded the 
thousands of representatives of social movements, scientific and 
religious institutions, and other participants in the Summit.131  
The NYT noted that despite two years of advanced work, COP-15 failed to convert 
a rare gathering of world leaders into an ambitious, legally binding action plan for 
reducing GHG emissions even if Obama forged an agreement, as the time was 
running out, with the help of China, India, Brazil and South Africa – that all but a 
handful of the 193 nations present accepted.132 The GUK wrote that developing 
countries were bitterly disappointed with the Accord and quoted one observer 
saying, “It will be almost impossible for the leaders of small countries to stand up 
and be the one to reject it”.133 The WSJ wrote:  
Leaders of the US, China and other major economies said late Friday 
that they had tentatively reached a new climate accord, though they 
said the pact wasn’t aggressive enough to meaningfully curb 
greenhouse-gas emissions and merely set up a future round of 
negotiations to hash out the details.134  
Several developing countries rejected the Accord arguing that it would not 
become a UN blueprint for fighting global warming.135 
The newspapers’ frames focused on democratic participation in terms of 
deliberations of the equal rights of states in consensual decision making, and also 
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on ideas around climate justice. The former is related to the power politics of 
powerful and strong states136 whereas climate justice is a fluid concept which has 
recurring themes. Climate justice was first used in the UN World Summit on 
Sustainable Development in 2002.137 The principles of climate justice prioritized 
ecological debt which means the Northern states and corporations “owe the rest of 
the world as a result of their appropriation of the planet’s capacity to absorb 
greenhouse gases” and confirmed “principles of democratic accountability, 
ecological sustainability and social justice”.138 Its recent critical position is “we 
will not be able to stop climate change if we do not change the neo-liberal and 
corporate based economy which stops us from achieving sustainable 
development”.139 
According to the IPCC:  
As a form of environmental justice, climate justice is the fair treatment 
of all people and freedom from discrimination with the creation of 
policies and projects that address climate change and the systems that 
create climate change and perpetuate discrimination.140  
It argues that with rising temperatures affects human lives, particularly for people 
of colour, low-income earners, and indigenous communities, who are 
compromised in terms of health, financial burdens, and social and cultural 
disruptions. Poor and vulnerable communities are the first to experience the 
negative impacts of climate change.141 Climate justice treats climate change as an 
issue of human rights and environmental justice. 142  From a climate justice 
perspective the media noted that it was not justifiable if the above mentioned 
groups of people suffered from consequences they had not created. This argument 
is linked with the rights of poor people to development and economic growth, the 
eradication of poverty and the improvement of living standards. Although these 
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issues were important, they complicated the negotiations as “opinions divided”143 
over causality and an inability to grapple with the more practical and immediate 
challenges illustrated above.144  
The newspapers strongly criticized the Accord for not setting firm, legally binding 
limits on future carbon emissions for developed countries and not spelling out the 
mechanism for providing financing support for developing countries. The media 
identified, in the debate at Copenhagen, the issue of the economic gap between 
developed and developing countries since most of the developing countries were 
striving to get themselves industrialized and urbanized. The China Daily quoted 
Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Lula Da Silva saying: “People in the developed 
world all have three meals a day, but for people in many African, Latin American 
and Asian countries, three meals a day is still something in the future”.145 The 
media associated the issue of democracy with climate justice and the unbalanced 
global economy while criticizing the Accord and the roles of major emitters and 
economic powers which agreed not to cut emissions drastically.  
The media’s view was that the rich nations should stop running the planet and to 
give way to global democratic solutions. 146  “Global democracy is [however] 
meaningless unless ultimate power resides in a directly elected assembly” 147 
which connects citizens to the decisions that affect them and ensures public 
accountability for those decisions.148 The media, to their credit, pointed to the 
issues of a democratic deficit in climate change governance as raised by Dahl, 
Held, Zurn and others as discussed in detail in Chapter 2. Although it is becoming 
more important to develop a democratic institutional framework for climate 
governance to reduce the democratic deficit, there are not feasible alternatives 
other than to include the non-governmental organizations and other non-state 
actors that represent the more than 7 billion people on the planet. 
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Incongruously, the media was generally unconcerned about the role of non-state 
actors and NGOs. However, the role of formal delegates of states negotiating the 
future of global climate change policies and programmes was highly publicised in 
the media to argue the case that climate change decision making processes were 
undemocratic. Similarly, the attendance and demonstrations by a large contingent 
of NGO groups and concerned citizens from all over the globe was less 
publicized.149 As observed in chapters 4 and 5, NGOs were not able to access 
good information and had difficulty in accessing negotiators to influence their 
positions.150  
The media was critical of the decision making procedures of COP-15 and it was 
important for the media to raise concerns. Nonetheless, the media failed to 
recognize why the parties and NGOs including non-state actors were restricted at 
the final plenary sessions and second week of the conference respectively. It 
would have been a very democratic process of decision making to have included 
them, but practically, it can be argued that current UNFCCC negotiations would 
continue to be exclusive, cumbersome, painstakingly slow and would probably 
not deliver an agreement within the narrow window of time left to prevent 
dangerous climate change.151  
Of course, the scale of enterprise is truly impressive with more than 193 nation-
states and thousands of NGOs involved in the climate change negotiation process. 
Yet, such negotiations had difficulty delivering any agreement or producing 
bargaining that included the lowest common denominator. The media recognized 
the overt use of national self-interest but they failed to recognize the 
circumstances and complexities of climate change negotiations including COP-15. 
It can also be argued that if the five major players had not taken last minute 
political decisions breaking the stand-off, and overrunning the prescribed time, the 
UNFCCC would have collapsed in Copenhagen 2009. But the substantive 
question is whether the Accord founded on state-centric framework achieved 
anything that actually reduces GHG emissions to keep the world below the 2°C 
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relative to pre-industrial age. Databases that monitor CO2 in every subsequent 
research outputs have been reporting the incremental rise in the GHG emissions 
concentration152 which provides the basis for the argument that: 
For all efforts of negotiators and urgency surrounding this issue, 
multilateral [inter-state] treaty-making has consistently failed to 
produce treaties and agreements that effectively address climate 
change. It may be time to concede that there is a mismatch between 
this type of treaty-making and the problem of climate change, that 
global treaty making, as attempted in the last two decades.153 
As the state-centric and undemocratic process has been making scanty progress to 
catalyse the societal and economic transformation needed to avoid the potential 
threats of climate change, this should be materialized as an opportunity for 
thinking differently by framing news differently for making the process inclusive, 
participatory and deliberative. Research findings show that it is more likely that 
the ultimate stakeholders, through growing awareness, training and engagement 
would change their behaviour on the need to arrest climate change.154  
7.5 Conclusion 
The five newspapers framed their news for building an understanding of the issues 
of technology transfers, funding for innovation, and the shape of a possible 
climate agreement by providing information on climate change issues, the role of 
developed countries and developing countries. From the analysis above, it has 
been obvious that the politics of sceptics, or supportive of, mainstream science 
can be found in developed countries, some Western media (in this study WSJ)  
and their political leadership. These disparate and rival media groups played a 
vital role in disseminating the information of climate change science however 
their particular stand, (scepticism of WSJ and doom day prediction of the rest), on 
the climate change information did not provide their readership with objective 
knowledge, but with confusion. Measuring the media’s contribution in terms of 
the hypothesis on the role of the media it is clear that the WSJ failed to move 
                                                 
152 See CDIAC, Monthly Carbon Dioxide Concentration, http://cdiac.ornl.gov/. See also IEA, 
2012a. 
153 Matthew J. Hoffmann, Climate Governance at the Crossroads (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2011), 17. 
154 Martin Patchen, Public Attitudes and Behaviour About Climate Change: What Shapes Them 
and How to Influence Them (West Lafayette: Purdue Climate Change Research Centre, 2006). 
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beyond the debate between sceptics and believers abrogating its public role and 
failing to translate words into actions against climate change. Results may have 
been forthcoming better from the US had the WSJ not become locked into the 
debate between climate deniers or believers. 
Instead of focusing on the substantive issues relating to setting agendas, the 
papers became fixated in a ‘blame game’. The WSJ pointed to China and India in 
accounting for the failure of global climate change negotiations, but did not raise 
objections to American economic and political interests. The NYT, GUK, the 
Hindu and China Daily, in general, saw the US as the obstacle. The papers 
commented on the obstacles of climate change such as scientific complexity, 
distant threats, and the unmanageable number of negotiating parties, national 
interests, and power games. They provided perspectives on climate change and its 
characteristic problems that have intricate links and implications concerning the 
national economic interests of states.  
The papers (except the WJS on very different grounds concerning junk science) 
did not identify the primary deficiencies of the KP including the inflexible and 
counterproductive dichotomy between Annex I and Non-Annex I countries and 
the interpretation of the UNFCCC principle of CBDR. Any Kyoto style agreement 
would include the industrialized countries in their quantified emission reductions 
while exempting the large emerging economies from Non-Annex I countries. 
Although the papers understood the problem created by CBDR and HR principles, 
they agreed that both Annex I and Non-Annex I countries should participate in a 
globally binding agreement, but that the CBDR should be the guiding principle of 
any agreement. The papers largely failed to recognize climate change as a global 
common problem needing full participation, particularly from all major emitters 
for binding emissions-reductions to stick. The data showed that the major emitters 
of the past – the Annex I countries – would not be the largest emitters of the 
future instead the large emerging economies from the Non-annex I countries will 
be the major emitters of the future.155  
The papers from the US and the UK recognized the salience of alternative 
approaches but they failed to critique the unanimously consensual (all 195 
                                                 
155 IEA 2010; 2011a; 2012a; see chapter 5.4. 
287 
members voting in favour in decision making) framework of UNFCCC. 
Copenhagen failed to produce consensus and the Accord was to be ‘taken note of’ 
instead of being adopted. At Cancun 2011, when Bolivia used its veto it was the 
Mexican climate summit Chair, who gavelled the final meeting taking note of the 
Bolivian objection. Notably, negotiations at the meetings kept exceeding the 
prescribed time span because the parties could not agree to the proposed 
agreements, leaving the outcome as the lowest common denominator. 
Another substantive issue that the media could have critiqued on was the 
UNFCCC’s culture of polarizing the climate debate into Annex I versus Non-
annex I. Polarizing every climate change issue into developed (Annex I) and 
developing (Non-Annex I) countries is not part of the solution. The world is more 
diverse than the binary distinction of Annex I versus Non-Annex I. The 
substantive part for any agreement is to generate certain criteria for transferring 
Non-Annex I countries into Annex I as they transition their economies and 
develop diversity. The binary distinctions had become dysfunctional and outdated. 
However, the media rightly suggested that although smaller states could influence 
the course of negotiations, a great deal depended on major actors’ roles, 156 
‘political parleys’157 and the ‘power game’.158 On the changing scenario of global 
GHG emissions, the media recognized that an ambitious climate change 
agreement should include developed and major emitters from developing 
countries – a change in the media’s stand over time – and in return developed 
countries should rapidly deploy energy-efficient low carbon technology to limit 
the temperature increases below 2°C.159 It was the recognition of incapacity of the 
developing countries in terms of technologies but it was also vague because the 
media’s argument (with the exception of the WSJ) was still in line with the KP 
model, following the climate stand of respective governments in the case of the 
WSJ, the Hindu and China Daily. It has become clear that the KP did not work 
and will not work.160 Instead, many (Canada, Russia, Japan, New Zealand) major 
                                                 
156 Broader, December 11, 2011. 
157 Editorial, September 24, 2009. 
158 Liu Junhong, ‘Carbon Rights A Power Game’, China Daily, April 9, 2008. 
159 IEA, 2010. 
160 See chapter 4 for details. 
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emitters from the developed world have opted out from it weakening the KP II 
still further.  
In terms of democratic participation the media’s frames emphasized the 
consensual decision making system surrounding climate change, climate justice 
and global democracy. Combining climate justice issues with poverty and the 
historical responsibility of the rich, the media aimed at putting more burdens on 
richer societies to help support the poor through a redistribution of global wealth 
to balance global economy. Climate justice is very important to arguments 
seeking equality in terms of energy rights, redistributing wealth and alleviating 
poverty while responding to climate change.  
Although many argue that the principle of C&C and climate justice are important 
and a necessary condition for getting anywhere in climate change governance, 
they have also become obstacles for achieving the ambitious emissions reductions. 
While the media’s focus was on the state-centric framework, little had been 
discussed about the UN’s vision of global democracy (multilateralism) in which 
NGOs could play the role of representatives of global citizenry. Their limited 
focus on the roles of NGOs could possibly be either that NGOs are just there, 
which, as Carter has noted, NGOs have exerted a growing but rarely decisive 
influence in environmental diplomacy,161 or that the NGOs themselves are locked 
into the state-centric framework.  
This chapter has shown that the media framed the causes for slow progress by 
raising the concerns of democratic participation, national interest, power 
imbalances, the framework and the principles of climate change negotiations. 
Firstly, the media noted that climate change negotiations suffered from a 
democratic deficit, but it was not difficult to conclude that an ambitious 
agreement would not have come through the consensual deliberative process 
within the prevailing state-centric framework. However, the greater participation 
from non-state actors and global civil society could have pressured states for a 
more ambitious agreement.  
                                                 
161 Carter, 2007, 260. 
289 
Secondly, the media were right to point out the causes of slow progress as 
national self-interest and the CBDR principles, but their suggestions and 
proposals for future negotiations were peripheral, as they (except WSJ) were still 
informed by the Kyoto agreement: seeking participation from all but binding for 
industrialized countries and voluntary for developing countries which no longer 
met the emissions reductions required by climate science. Also the media did not 
explicitly emphasize the changing world’s economic situation and the need to 
break the binary distinction of Annex I and Non-Annex I which directly 
connected to the principles of CBDR and HR.  
Thirdly, the media would have been wiser to have framed many things related to 
climate change negotiations but the WSJ failed to unlock contrasting arguments in 
the interests of ‘balanced’ reporting. Accordingly, it can safely be said that the 
media, to some extent, failed to carry out its responsibilities due to the newspapers 
like WSJ. The substantial problem of international climate change negotiations 
lies in the fact that climate change is a genuinely immediate global problem based 
on the causes of warming and its impact. It is also a problem of ‘common goods’ 
in which the responses of individual states cannot meet global targets; therefore, it 
makes little sense for individual states to reduce their fossil fuel activities by 
imposing higher energy costs on industry when they are incapable of preventing 
climate change on their own and their fellow states are enjoying a 
disproportionate advantage. Based on the argument that the advanced countries 
were responsible for causing climate change, many observers have emphasized 
the responsibility of the advanced countries to lead the actions against climate 
change, which is a positive step from a climate justice perspective. The record of 
achievement, however, is very poor.  
Under the CBDR and HR the KP determined binding targets for advanced 
countries whereas it exempted developing countries from any emissions 
reductions which created problems, particularly the decision of the US to opt out 
and, subsequently, that action being adopted by many other major emitters from 
advanced countries. These principles are key problems and do not address the 
emerging challenges now – with developed countries wanting major emitters to be 
included but major emitters making arguments that they are still developing 
countries – in the interim emissions have been increasing steadily and 
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significantly. This chapter concludes by noting that the main reasons for the slow 
progress are, first, the inability of the media to educate the public in the interest of 
climate friendly policy, secondly, the (ir) relevance of the perennial dichotomy of 
Annex I and Non-Annex I, leading to differentiated and preferred interpretation of 
CBDR and HR principles related to the power games of major players in the state-
centric framework, and, third, little representation of real stakeholders or 
cognizant of their behaviour change. In the next chapter an over-all summary of 
this research will be presented followed by the conclusion. 
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Chapter 8 
Conclusion 
8.1 Introduction 
Little progress has been made in mitigating greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions 
since the world recognised the urgency, risks and opportunities of climate change 
by establishing the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC) in 1992. Chapter 7 noted how international climate change 
negotiations have become the yearly chore of diplomats with the climate change 
policy failing to make much progress. States have long developed strategies in 
response to the challenges of security, in its various forms, seeking to bring order 
and stability to the many challenging issues affecting the world, yet in response to 
the major challenge of climate change states have been singularly unsuccessful to 
date.  This thesis has taken as its starting point the paucity of holistic attention 
paid to working out how and why the UNFCCC climate talks have not made 
progress by drawing insights on the reasons for this from international climate 
change negotiations, major climate agreements and the behaviour of media 
sources and their framing strategies. 
While much of the previous research on climate change has focused on particular 
climate change negotiations, research on the media has been mainly limited to 
Western countries and has been overshadowed by the debate between sceptics and 
believers over climate change. Yet, the communication of climate change 
knowledge, from scientists to policy-makers, and then to the public via the media 
is of immense interest because of its importance in creating public understanding 
about global environmental issues.1 Thus, this thesis assesses behaviour of the 
media communications through newspapers’ articles on the issues of climate 
change and the development of major climate agreements such as the Kyoto 
Protocol (KP) and Copenhagen Accord.  
                                                 
1 See section 2.3 of Chapter 2. See also: Maxwell T. Boykoff and J. Timmons Roberts, ‘Media 
Coverage of Climate Change: Current Trends, Strengths and Weaknesses’, United Nations 
Development Programme Human Development Report, 2007/2008, 
http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/boykoff_maxwell_and_roberts_j._timmons.pdf. 
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The KP and the Copenhagen Accord, major features of international climate 
change negotiations, held out much hope as processes to make substantive 
progress. Yet these hopes have been unfulfilled, with considerable recrimination 
and anger over the processes used and the outcomes which followed. Instead of 
progress on the issue, scientific evidence reports that there is a continuing failure 
to limit emissions, let alone achieving agreement on how to tackle the issue in the 
future. As discussed earlier (see chapters 1 and 2), scholars have noted that 
international agreement toward a credible climate-change framework has 
remained elusive, and in the meantime, emissions and the concentrations of CO2 
in the atmosphere have continued to rise.  
Various propositions have been advanced to explain the lack of progress, 
including the argument that the climate agreements have failed because they did 
not deal with the issues of consumption of carbon, characteristic problems of 
climate change and procedural issues of climate talks. The continuing scientific 
uncertainties surrounding climate change, the differential impact of global 
warming in different countries, and the divisions between North-South politics 
blocking agreement over what needs to be done, have been other explanations. 
There are also uncertainties about the impact and magnitude of climate change 
although there is also a broad scientific consensus that rising temperatures, 
increasing emissions levels and higher concentration of the GHGs and their 
combined impact could potentially lead to the breakdown in the ecosystem.  
There have also been major changes in the social, political and economic 
circumstances of peoples over the two decades since the establishment of 
UNFCCC in 1992. The United States (US) and the European Union (EU) used to 
be the largest emitters in the twentieth century but China’s economic might has 
seen it increase its carbon-footprint exponentially becoming the number one 
emitter. India, Brazil, and South Africa have made huge progress towards 
becoming major economic world powers. Emerging economies of the South have 
become major GHGs emitters in the world. Such changes in global politics and 
economy have raised questions about whether these changes need to be reflected 
in the principles of the UNFCCC and its categorisation of countries into Annex I 
(developed countries) and Non-Annex I (developing countries). Yet, the positions 
of the parties on UNFCCC talks have not changed ever since its establishment.  
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Indeed, the discussion of climate change policy making has become polarised and 
politicised which has contributed to the lack of progress. This research has not 
sought to examine the arguments concerning the origins of, and reasons for, 
climate change but focuses instead on the difficulties the international community 
has had in seeking to address major global issues.  
This concluding chapter brings together the major themes discussed in this thesis 
to account for the slow progress of international climate change policy making. It 
examines the reasons advanced to explain why has there been sluggish progress 
for developing a robust system of governance for addressing climate change, and 
considers the future path of climate change policy making. This study has focused 
on three core and interrelated issues fundamental to the slow progress on climate 
change agreement: democratic deficit, inappropriate institutional frameworks and 
principles based on state-centrism, and the role of media in the communications of 
climate change issues.  
Democratic participation and deliberation is very significant in all areas of policy 
making but it is more important when the real addressees have to change their 
behaviour to bring about the change required. A number of issues influence 
climate change policy making including its scientific certainty, its 
disproportionate causes and impacts, and its costs and benefits in space and over 
time. Economic, social, political, and cultural issues are embedded within climate 
decision making.  
International climate change governance, albeit weak, has so far proposed 
regulation and market based initiatives in response to climate challenges. To 
ameliorate some of the climate change effects through regulatory approaches, 
taxes have been introduced in one form or another to those who have been side-
lined in the climate policy making process. Under competitive market based 
initiatives it is envisaged that the market would take a lead role in making climate 
friendly products and climate neutral technology, but businesses are not included 
in the decision making process because, so far, although by name UNFCCC is 
multilateral but by action it is an inter-state, inter-ministerial and state-centric 
platform in which decisions are to be made by governments, not by other actors.  
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In seeking to account for the lack of progress in climate change management, 
much criticism has been directed at the failure of states to agree to, and 
implement, policies to limit GHG emissions within their jurisdictions. As noted in 
chapters 4 to 7 the developed countries have been identified as giving rise to the 
problem through their practices of industrialisation and, particularly, their heavy 
reliance on fossil fuels to maintain their economic growth. The recently 
industrialising states are now the main producers of GHGs as the industrialised 
societies have stabilised or reduced their emissions. Developed countries have 
declined taking concerted action without similar commitments from emerging 
developing countries. For their part the developing countries have accused the rich 
countries of inaction and refused to take action. While such an approach may well 
have been relevant and important in dealing with territorial issues, it has not been 
effective in dealing with non-territorial issues such as climate change, bio 
diversity loss, environmental degradation and related issues.  
The effects of climate change are a non-institutional issue which are borderless by 
nature and do not respect boundaries such as geographical borders, statehood and 
sovereignty, yet the major approach to tackle the challenges of climate change is 
based on institutions which are mainly state-centric, where nation-states prioritize 
their vested interests rather than implementing the responses required under the 
challenges of global climate conditions. The failure of conventional diplomacy to 
achieve any tangible outcome over the twenty years since the establishment of the 
UNFCCC reveals its diminishing capacity to handle global problems such as 
climate change.  
The media has long been an important aspect of peoples’ lives in helping to form 
opinions.2 Media sources inform, analyse and educate people on short and long 
term concerns, simplifying complex scientific issues into simpler 
communications.3 As one of the current significant issues, climate change has 
featured prominently in the media. The general public does not have a great 
understanding of climate science and relies on the information provided by the 
media. The scientific consensus on climate change is gradually building up to the 
                                                 
2 See section 2.3 of Chapter 2. See also Boykoff and Roberts 2008. 
3 Ibid. 
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point where most climate scientists are agreed that climate change is real and 
happening based on patterns of events and other geographical data.  
Yet the public is not generally unaware of the gravity of the impact of climate 
change.4 The newspapers commented that nobody had successfully challenged the 
urgency of the climate mission, despite the well-financed efforts of some industry 
groups to minimize the warming threat.5 These interest groups have spent much 
on their rhetoric of scepticism.A significant proportion of Americans still dismiss 
the climate change and sustainability agenda as bad science, bad religion, bad for 
business and bad for America. 6  Addressing climate change calls for global 
responses not only from states but also from businesses and individuals from 
around the world to embrace the necessary measures. Any disconnection between 
scientific knowledge and public understanding of climate science, a role in which 
the media can play a major part, hinders progress on international climate change 
governance.  
From these issues, outlined and examined in chapter 2, propositions were 
developed from the literature for assessing in this thesis. The central research 
question of this study asks: Why has there been little progress in the making of an 
effective international climate change governance to prevent climate change? 
This research has set out to assess five propositions to explain this lack of 
progress and account for why, when confronted with such a significant issue, we 
have been unable to agree on what needs to be done and how to effect significant 
change. The following propositions7 were developed from the literature to answer 
the central research question. 
1. The institutional shortcomings of the UNFCCC, and also of the 
democratic processes of the UN and its environmental organizations,  have 
resulted in the lack of progress towards international climate change 
governance. 
                                                 
4 See section 2.3 of Chapter 2. See also: Boykoff and Boykoff , 2004. 
5 Editorial, ‘Remember Global Warming?’ NYT, November 11, 1998, A 26. 
6 James Jones, ‘Face to Faith’, GUK, February 2, 2008, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2008/feb/02/uselections2008.religion?INTCMP=SRCH. 
7 See chapter 2 for details. 
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2. The lack of open and respresentative processes, together with the lack of 
consensual debate and public accountability have resulted in the failure to 
achieve agreement on international climate change governance.  
3. The competitive system of global governance negates efforts to achieve 
an international consensus on international climate change governance.  
4. The state-centric framework of international negotiations on climate 
change governance prevent the prioritisation of saving the global 
commons.  
5. The role of the media in building the trust of the public of the issues of 
climate change science and proposed policies is essential to the 
endeavours of political and policy leaders to come to agreement on climate 
change governance. 
8.1.1 Propositions 1 and 2 
Two propositions were derived from the literature discussed in chapter 2 to assess 
the arguments which focus on the democratic and institutional shortcomings of 
the UN systems. The first proposition is that the institutional shortcomings of the 
UNFCCC, and also of the democratic processes of the UN and its environmental 
organizations,  have resulted in the lack of progress towards international climate 
change governance. The second proposition is that the lack of open and 
respresentative processes, together with the lack of consensual debate and public 
accountability have resulted in the failure to achieve agreement on international 
climate change governance.  
Research in chapters 4, 5 and 7 showed that there were serious issues of 
democratic deficit in the making of climate change agreements. At Kyoto, 
observers were barred from attending meetings or plenary sessions on the 
discretion of the chair of the sessions. The outcome of Kyoto did not reflect any 
goals of environmental non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and other non-
state actors which were excluded from effective participation, deliberation and 
decision making. During Copenhagen many observers were barred from entering 
the Hall particularly in the second week of negotiations. And the final 
negotiations barred more than 100 representatives of the nation-states, leaving the 
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US, Brazil, South Africa, India and China (BASIC) to make the final decisions. 
COP-15 showed that not only were observers such as NGOs denied access but 
also the main negotiators (states) could not deliberate to produce the agreement – 
violating the right of equality and consensual politics provided by the rules of 
procedures of the UNFCCC and the state-centric Charter of the UN. Democratic 
deliberation, representation, participatory decision making, accountability and 
transparency were noticeably absent.  
As discussed in Chapter 2, Dahl noted that international decision making 
processes are not democratic because the governance process is technocratic and 
people are not represented. Held noted that there are representational and 
institutional shortcomings in the UN and proposed a General Assembly of the 
People as the path to making the UN more democratic. Additionally, Baber and 
Bartlett noted that international environmental governance is plagued by a 
democratic deficit because the process is not inclusive and deliberative. Zurn 
stated that climate change governance suffers from democratic and legitimacy 
deficits because the real addressees (people and businesses) are side-lined in the 
process. Attempting to meet these sorts of criticisms, the UN developed its own 
vision of democracy in which it encouraged a partnership among the states, 
international (governmental) organizations (IOs) and non-state actors including 
NGOs, but the states remained the central actors and the rest were observers.8 At 
Kyoto and Copenhagen international climate change governance negotiations 
were restricted to a select few states with non-state actors unable to make any 
effective contributions.  
The research identified concerns about democratic deliberations, institutional 
frameworks, representation, accountability and transparency supporting the 
conclusion that the causes of slow progress were the institutional shortcomings of 
the UNFCCC and also the democratic processes of the UN and its environmental 
organizations.9 The UN and environmental organizations are required to make 
further changes in institutional structures and representation, to ensure there is a 
more inclusive and more deliberative approach which encompasses all 
                                                 
8 See chapter 2. 
9 See chapters 4 and 5 for details. 
298 
stakeholders in a more democratic, legitimate, accountable and transparent 
process.  
Copenhagen 2009 could be considered an unmanageable conference because each 
of the parties was sticking to their positions until the last day, and even the NGOs 
were split on their own role in the climate negotiation process. The number of 
participants was enormous (more than 40,000) and the Bella centre could 
accommodate only 15,000 participants. Opinions were diverse and the available 
time was limited. Thus, one can question whether there would be a viable 
agreement outcome had all non-state actors and all other parties deliberated until 
the end of the conference. In the case of Copenhagen one could say ‘no’ to the 
outcome, but actual progress could have been made had the non-state actors been 
allowed to participate until the last day. Without the protesting and pressuring of 
the many NGOs and other groups, the Copenhagen Accord as it was formulated 
could have not been produced. Those groups reminded the major emitters that the 
world was watching.  
It is apparent that collective decision making processes are less hierarchical and 
more collaborative and can bring about more effective policy outcomes given they 
are the levers of change. In addition to more inclusive top-down approach, the 
bottom-up approaches from NGOs, local governments, and the actual 
stakeholders – people and businesses – need to be encouraged to act collectively 
for climate change policy to be successful at the grass-roots level.10 One of the 
most important features in making climate change policy is to support and give 
effect to the individual consumer/citizen’s role because that is essential in seeking 
to introduce policies carrying sensitive responses. 11  Thus, on the issue of 
democratic deficit, the research concludes that the practice of state-centric 
multilateralism side-lined the actual addressees with the result that the challenges 
of the climate change impasse cannot be met.  
This research analysis affirms the first proposition that the lack of progress 
towards achieving the benefits of climate change was due to the institutional and 
representational shortcomings of the UNFCCC. The UN embraces some 
                                                 
10 See Mathew J. Hoffman, Climate Governance at the Crossroads (Oxford and New York: 
Oxford, 2011). 
11 See chapters 2 and 8. 
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democratic notions and values, but the extent to which it carries these out depends 
on its strong state-centric structure and assumptions about internal and external 
sovereignty. This will be considered under proposition 3 below.  
This research analysis supports the second proposition, that the principles of 
consensual debate and public accountability are required for there to be open and 
representative procedures in developing a process of global governance on matters 
of climate change. The research reveals considerable short-comings over open and 
representative procedures providing serious implications for democratic practices, 
legitimacy and public accountability of the policy making processes. As with 
proposition 1, this conclusion is not limited to the issue of climate change 
agreements. It is a feature of the present structure and processes of the UN, which 
leads to the conclusion that the UN has failed to be an adequate instrument for 
attempting climate change governance. Progress in climate change governance 
will depend on finding ways to deal with existing obstacles of democratic 
participation, representation, and deliberation at decision making process. Future 
reseach can focus on the models or processes of compatible democracy to 
effectively address democratic deficit of climate change governance.  
8.1.2 Propositions 3 and 4 
Two propositions were derived from the literature in chapter 2 to examine the 
arguments which focus on the institutional and state-centric approaches to 
tackling global issues, with particular reference to climate change governance. 
The third proposition is that the competitive system of global governance negates 
efforts to achieve an international consensus on international climate change 
governance. The fourth proposition is that the state-centric framework of 
international negotiations on climate change governance prevent the prioritisation 
of saving the global commons.  
The second theme of the research concerned the prevalence of the state-centric 
framework in promoting and conducting the negotiations. This framework for the 
consideration of climate change was instituted early in efforts to address the issue 
with the establishment of the UNFCCC. It was assumed that climate change was 
an issue for states to deal with under the state-centric framework. Yet, it is argued 
here, that that there is a clear need to critically re-examine the framework used in 
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seeking to come to an agreement able to deliver an effective climate change 
governance to prevent climate change.  
Climate change is a complex issue and while state interests and power 
considerations are important in addressing the matter, they are critical to 
facilitating agreed measures rather than determining what those measures should 
be. The evidence of chapters 4, 5, 6, and 7 clearly shows that states were the 
driving actors of the negotiations and the decision making which resulted, and that 
the agreements made were founded on the state-centric framework. The Kyoto 
and Copenhagen processes simply side-lined the actual addressees. Chapter 4 
outlined how the influential members of the COPs manifested their interests in 
ratifying or rejecting the agreements developed at Kyoto. It showed the confines 
of the state-centric approach by restricting the admission of non-state actors in the 
plenary sessions which resulted in the lowest common denominator manifested as 
an outcome.   
Chapter 5 showed that the Copenhagen conference was a clear example of the use 
of the state-centric approach leading to a deadlock in negotiations as each 
participating state sought to promote its own interests, and major emitters refused 
to accept the required, if ambitious, binding targets. The non-state actors were 
denied access throughout the second week of the conference and finally the 
decision making process was hijacked by the big five emitters in producing an 
agreement of their choice.12 National economic interests, issues of sovereignty 
and power structure played vital roles, affirming that progress on international 
climate change governance was determined by the salience given by participating 
states to environmental concerns. Earlier chapters also showed that the current 
principles of common but differentiated responsibilities (CBDR) and historical 
responsibility (HR) were at the core of the negotiations and that nation-states were 
articulating their national-interests as they used the advantages of the state-centric 
framework in pursuit of their particular concerns.  
Non-state actors, including NGOs, were seeking to make their own contribution to 
the discussions and negotiations, but they were effectively side-lined by those 
who were following a state-centric approach. Hence, the core question is how we 
                                                 
12 See chapter 5. 5 and 5.9. 
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can revise principles to make them acceptable for all working through a situation 
where most participants are operating within their state-centric assumptions and 
leading to a lack of progress. In other words, states were functioning in a self-
defeating framework and its principles. Creating and developing a framework, and 
its principles, which step outside this self-defeating state-centric approach, is the 
task confronting efforts to generate an international climate consensus. Such a 
framework and priniciples would seek to identify and include the main and 
several issues of climate change (such as economic and development 
implications) and also the core parties involved – whether state or non-state – and 
promote outcomes which enjoyed widespread support for an effective agreement 
among the negotiating parties and across the world at large, and about which there 
was acceptance of the proposed changes.  
Within the current framework, the lack of appropriate observation of the rules of 
procedures, consensual deliberations and decision making rights of peer-member-
states gave rise to concerns over accountability and democracy.13 It also showed 
the difficulties in achieving consensual decision making practices within and 
through the UNFCCC. The chapters on the media revealed that although states 
had sovereign equality at the negotiations, the power structure often undermined 
the consensual decision making process. For example, Kyoto was not ratified by 
the US and it failed to engage Australia and others seriously. The Copenhagen 
Accord was blocked by 6 small countries but it succeeded at a functional level 
through the Cancun agreement. One small state (Bolivia) objected to the Cancun 
agreement but it still made its way through the UNFCCC process.  
The language of North-South politics, the developmental rights of the South, and 
the environmental concerns of the North provided sharp contrasts and diverse 
perspectives. The countries of the South declared their intention to continue their 
economic growth at any cost. From the Kyoto to Doha, China, India and other 
emerging economies repeatedly made it clear that they considered the North was 
responsible for the environmental mess and that it should lead by example by 
reducing emissions, whereas emerging economies should be able to continue their 
development initiatives without being required to make emission reductions. The 
                                                 
13 See chapter 5.3 and chapter 8.4. 
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Europeans, and the US were intent on securing a commitment to protect the 
climate from the new economic superpowers, China and India but the new 
economic powers bonded together to argue that they were still developing 
countries.  
 Developing countries have not been willing to slow their economic growth even 
given the environmental costs, creating a fear of losing competitiveness with the 
developed world, while developed countries have been reluctant to make 
substantial funding available in the face of losing competitiveness. Developed 
countries wanted to allocate emissions targets to big emitters based on current 
emissions rates whereas major emitters from developing countries intended to 
overturn this status-quo and others of the least developing countries wanted to 
maintain the status-quo.  
The issues of burden sharing have not been able to balance the conflicting 
interests of the major emitters from developed and developing countries. Now, as 
it is identified that the key to managing climate change and temperature limits lies 
in the economic drivers of a country, countries have been understandably 
unwilling to risk their economies in the name of climate change unless others do 
the same. The state-centric framework is manifestly stronger in the name of 
‘national interest’ and sovereignty.14 Few nation-states will adopt any measures to 
reduce GHG emissions unless they are convinced that their peers are also doing 
so. Nonetheless, the scientists have been urging greater efforts for reductions in 
the face of ever rapidly rising emissions. Climate scientists have claimed that the 
climate impacts being seen around the world should compel us to reduce 
emissions and plan for a ‘changing future’.  
This research examined the principles of CBDR and HR and concluded that they 
are static, lack clarity, and subject to multiple arbitrary interpretations. Countries 
have been changing their interpretations when it suits them politically to do so 
because these principles lack clarity in terms of changing plights of the 
countries.15 These principles need revision and clarity on the issues of contention 
such as taking responsibility, burden sharing, graduation and leadership to avoid 
                                                 
14 See chapters 4, 5 and 8. 
15 See chapters 4 to 8.  
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arbitrary interpretations. The fundamental task of climate change governance is to 
establish clarity on norms and procedures. So far, the negotiation processes dealt 
with a wide range of technical issues16 such as enhanced adaptation, mitigation, 
finance and technology transfers but the clarity on norms about who should be 
involved in legally binding commitments for emission reductions and what 
actions should be taken to combat climate change have been perennially 
postponed. 
As climate change is a global problem which needs a global solution, it does not 
matter where GHGs are emitted because they have equal effect on changing 
climate irrespective of their origin locations. They end up in the shared 
atmosphere. Although the choices are difficult, in stopping the potentially 
irreversible and dangerous impacts of climate change, profound responses from 
every country and everyone according to their ability are required. Burden sharing 
is related to the costs of mitigation and also the costs of adaptation. Making 
appropriate responses to climate change needs the necessary resources such as 
funding for innovations, and knowledge and technology transfers. These resources 
are easily and abundantly available in the rich countries but most poor countries 
lack some or all of these resources, therefore it becomes the burden sharing 
responsibility of the rich countries to transfer required funding, knowledge and 
technology to those lacking the indispensable resources. In return for the support 
of their incapacity, poor countries would move deliberately towards a low-carbon 
life-style as their green industries grow and levels of environmental awareness 
proliferate.  
However, there are questions around how a poor country can become a rich and 
prosperous country in 10 to 20 years’ time and how the transition from a poor to 
rich country can be materialized in terms of taking climate change responsibility. 
South Korea, China and India provide examples of the strong growth of 
developing economies. These economies are fundamentally dependent on fossil-
fuels and would not be a model of development for other developing countries. 
The challenge lies how to affect a rapid transition in the economy while 
maintaining our quality of life. Fostering innovative technologies and cutting edge 
                                                 
16 Lavanya Rajamani, The Copenhagen Agreed Outcome: Form, Shape and Influence (New Delhi: 
Centre for Policy Research, 2009). And see Kulovesi and Gutierrez, 2009. 
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research is a clear option for the North to further stabilize emissions and for the 
South to embrace a new model of green economic development. Complementary 
to it, is encouraging people to live climate friendly life-styles and to invest in low 
carbon services and industries. 
A number of countries are now major emitters through their production processes 
and through consumption as identified in 5.9 section of chapter 5. The US, China, 
India, Russia, Canada, the EU and Australia are currently the major actors and so 
play role in making serious reductions in their emissions. But their domestic 
reality of continous economic growth heavily relies on fossil fuels—the carbon—
the major culprit of climate change. To make progress, emitters such as China and 
India must be supported by the advanced developed countries with technology 
transfers to meet their incapacity and the ambitious targets set down. Nonetheless, 
these emerging economies can still contribute to the mitigation of climate change 
because they are often in better positions than many other developing countries in 
Africa and Asia. Given that states are at differing developmental stages, the 
categories of Non-Annex I countries and Annex I countries used extensively in 
the climate negotiations, need to be reviewed, revised to create more room that 
recognizes the changing status of countries since they no longer capture key issues 
of climate change. 
The principle of CBDR is an important element in addressing climate change but 
it is vague now as noted above. It clearly notes that climate change is common 
problem and countries have differentiated responsibilities but it does not clearly 
stipulate the correlation of countries’ economic growth and development with 
thier burden sharing responsibilities. In general understanding, for the developed 
world, it means that significant contributions are required in addressing climate 
change which has arisen from industrialization processes. For the developing 
world, it means there needs to be development proposals to lift millions of people 
out of poverty. Lifting the lives of the poor in the South out of poverty was 
articulated strongly in the Brundtland Commission’s 1987 report as well as being 
one of the central goals of MDGs.17 Emerging countries whose economies heavily 
depend on older and more polluting technologies argue that they have a right to 
                                                 
17 See chapter 5 for details. 
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development to grow their economies to escape poverty and achieve prosperity. 
They expect a right to the lion’s share of future emissions because CBDR does not 
clarify when a country needs to shoulder the burden of tackling climate change. 
But the poorest and most vulnerable countries do not share the views of emerging 
economies. Karl Hood, Chairman of Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) 
noted during Durban negotiation in 2011: “Must we accept our annihilation? 
While they emerging economies develop, we die. Why should we accept this?”18 
As outlined in chapter 5 and 7, poverty and the environment are not substitutes for 
each other, rather they are enemies. Addressing the serious issues of widespread 
poverty does not mean that the developing world should follow the same path of 
development as that had been followed in the developed countries. This research 
argues that rather than repeating the mistakes of the industrialised countries and 
continuing with business-as-usual, developing countries need to adopt and 
embrace economic development which is appropriate to the current climate for 
climate-friendly world. It means relying increasingly on developing new 
technologies which are not reliant on fossil fuels and climate-friendly production 
and consumption in order to decrease emissions.  
The dominant and current model of development being practised in the South is 
that of reliance on fossil-fuelled technologies. As discussed in chapters 4, 5 and 7, 
recent data reports that despite ever-present climate change concerns, coal fired 
power generation is expanding faster than ever with capacity additions 
experiencing record levels in China and India. Here, the role of technology 
transfers, knowledge transfers and funding transfers is paramount to any success. 
Unless technology like carbon capture and storage and other low-carbon 
technologies are transferred to the developing world, no GHG emissions will be 
abated. The countries of the South generally do not possess many of the high 
technologies available in the North and the North has been unwilling to transfer 
their existing low carbon technology to the South. It is important, as the media 
consistently argued, that there should be a continuing search for zero-carbon 
technology and that the available technology should be transferred to developing 
countries in order to change their carbon footprint based development.  
                                                 
18 See chapter 8 for details. 
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As discussed in chapter 2 above, the competitive system of state-centric global 
governance makes an international climate consensus beyond the reach of current 
negotiations. Future agreements will require that the world develops an all-
inclusive and binding climate change agreement to contain the global temperature 
increase at 2°C. This would mean a top down approach which can come only with 
widespread agreement, particularly of major emitters and consumers. But other 
multiple approaches, including bottom-up, are needed which extend beyond state-
centrism to embrace the active participation and deliberation of the main 
stakeholders. There can be no lasting agreement unless the stakeholders (the 
levers of change) are agreed on the measures to be taken and are willing to 
implement relevant policies at the domestic level.  
The failure of the KP to achieve the lowest denominator targets of 5 per cent 
demonstrated the outcomes which follow when there is only limited cooperation 
between the parties. This research established that a Kyoto-style agreement would 
not be able to achieve the UNFCCC’s objective of stabilizing GHGs, unless major 
emitters from the South are included for binding targets, since the emissions in the 
developed countries were declining while increasing rapidly in non-OECD 
countries. The chapters on media perspectives also demonstrated that without the 
full participation of the US and China, along with other emerging economies, 
emission reductions cannot be established. Four out of the five media sources 
considered the KP to be a milestone, yet it was not able to achieve the objective 
for which it had been established.19 Under the current state-centric framework, 
without the participation of major emitters from the both developed and 
developing countries, emissions can neither be reduced nor climate temperatures 
limited.20 
 GHG emissions have risen significantly, confirming that any legally binding or 
voluntary agreements without firm and serious emission reduction commitments 
from major emitters would be a skeleton without flesh and blood in the fight of 
climate change. The only way to delink fossil fuel emissions from the ups and 
downs of the world economy is to develop a robust alternative to carbon markets, 
more investment in renewable energies and to ensure that alternative power 
                                                 
19 See chapters 6, 7 and 8. 
20 See chapter 5.4 and chapter 8.3. 
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became a credible option. The construction of international climate treaty rests on 
a complex, state-centric process of political bargaining and negotiation among 
nation- states and progress towards an agreement that could reduce emissions 
were stalled because negotiators, particularly from the US and major developing 
countries, were at a stand-off. If major emitting countries such as China, India, 
Brazil, and South Africa, were exempted, even if the remaining Annex I parties 
made 100 per cent reductions, GHG emissions would not be reduced. 
In light of these findings, this research concludes that the reliance on the state-
centric framework and existing principles of the CBDR and HR means that these 
institutions, on which the climate change negotiations have depended, together 
with their norms, are not able to address the challenge of climate change. Progress 
in developing an international climate consensus can only come as the 
international system moves beyond the state-centric framework to the priority of 
saving the global commons and fixing the existing problems of UNFCCC’s 
principles. New institutional designs and norm-setting procedures particularly of 
CBDR and HR need to be established at the international level to incorporate all 
the main international actors and the main stakeholders to address the 
transnational challenge of climate change, together with the development of 
technologies to significantly reduce the reliance on fossil fuels in economic 
planning.  
Indeed, new and creative institutional designs are required to take the climate 
change negotiations process away from a state-centric approach to one in which 
all key actors are part of negotiations designed to reduce emissions and the one 
that can confluence the interests of major emitters as well. Climate policies can be 
negotiated, implemented and enforced by states in the absence of ultimate 
addressees but the levels of compliance and effectiveness remain far beyond the 
goals unless the levers-of-change agree to comply. States are but one of the 
international actors, and certainly important actors given their importance in 
implementing legislation and policies at the domestic level. Yet, states need to 
work closely with societies, communities and businesses in arriving at strategies 
for emission reductions. The societal focus is necessary to ensure local 
communities understand the climatic and environmental dynamics and problems 
at the local level and their impact at all levels. This inclusive participatory 
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deliberative process at the multi-actors negotiation forum, inclusive of states and 
non-state actors, along with enlightened understanding of the issues help cut the 
climate impasse. 
This research shows strong support for the third proposition, that an international 
climate consensus is not possible because of the competitive system of global 
governance. The competitive nature of the international system, operating in a 
state-centric framework, lies at the heart of the failure to make progress on climate 
change governance. The fourth proposition, that progress in developing an 
international climate consensus can only come as the international system moves 
beyond the state-centric framework to the priority of saving the global commons, 
presents the alternative to the present system of international negotiation. But it 
does so with particular emphasis on developing a much more inclusive approach, 
which limits the capacity of veto power on the part of limited and particular 
interests to slow the progress of an effective climate governance.  
This research did not seek to develop and test models on a new framework of 
governance which is beyond the scope of this study but suggests further areas for 
significant research. Instead it emphasises the values of identifying and including 
the major parties – state and non-state – in determining clearly the many complex 
issues associated with climate change, and the implications for economic, social 
and political change. Progress in climate change governance will depend on 
finding the ways to re-invent an international system that focuses more on 
solutions to global common problems than the narrow state-centric national 
interest and power politics. 
8.1.3 Proposition 5 
The final proposition was derived from the literature in chapter 2 to examine the 
arguments concerning the role of the media in facilitating and promoting public 
understanding of the issues and negotiations surrounding climate change. The last 
proposition is that the role of the media in building the trust of the public of the 
issues of climate change science and proposed policies is essential to the 
endeavours of political and policy leaders to come to agreement on climate 
change governance.  
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This research examined the framing of arguments of the selected media or 
newspapers, which has a very important role in educating the public and passing 
information about climate change and negotiations onto the public if there is to be 
progress on climate change management. Chapters 6 and 7 determined that the 
selected media had done their job in informing people about the developments 
around climate change negotiations. The  newspapers, with an exception of WSJ, 
while framing its coverage of the issues of climate change included many of the 
important concerns surrounding climate change, including accounts of 
international climate change negotiations, proposed possible climate deals, such 
as the US leadership and Chinese participation.  
They consistently urged the development of appropriate technology to reduce 
emissions, and advocated the transfer of technology to the developing countries as 
a means of reducing emissions. They also noted the political and economic 
unwillingness of the US, Japan and the EU for technology transfers to keep the 
late comers developing countries at strategic disadvantage for the North’s interest 
of power games and economic development. They touched upon the issues of 
state-centric national interest, undemocratic negotiations processes, climate 
justice, potential roles of major emitters and except the WSJ, the selected 
newspapers warned for the catastrophic impacts of climate change if timely 
actions were not taken. 
Yet as discussed in chapter 2, the WSJ’s balanced but biased reporting failed to 
guide the public out of the confusion of the debate between sceptics and believers 
particularly in the US. The WSJ created confusion by highlighting the contrary 
voices on climate change science rather than assessing what the options were and 
what needed to be done. The NYT, GUK, the Hindu and China Daily attached 
their news stories of climate change to prospects for a scary future without 
showing how the nontangible and invisible GHGs would impact on peoples’ lives 
and what they could do to change themselves, their values, practices and social 
norms. The selected newspapers, with an exception of the WSJ, reported the 
IPCC’s projections of global warming, now accepted by the global political elites 
and the international scientific community, of the threats to economic growth, 
long-term prosperity, and the physical survival of human populations. 
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The analysis of WSJ and NYT made it clear that there were really two different 
stances in the US on climate change. The NYT stance was pro-environmentalist 
and consistently sought for better and more effective climate change policies. The 
WSJ stance was stridently anti-climate change policy and represented only part of 
contemporary American thinking on the issue. Analysis in chapters 6 and 7 note 
that the WSJ stance reflects its anti-regulation, anti-climate views, which lead it to 
an anti-environmentalist stance. Events like climategate may have provided 
politicians and policy makers with the opportunity to delay the agreement and 
leave the public in confusion. Together, these issues have had serious implications 
on the role of media and provide a strong argument for greater public awareness 
and education.  
As discussed in chapter 7, the public in today’s world do not have the time and 
access to read peer-reviewed papers; they are busy to make their livings; taking 
care of their jobs and family. The characteristic problem of climate change is its 
invisibility both in terms of the level of emissions and temperature rise, which is 
difficult to understand even for experts. A portion of the gloal media, such as the 
WSJ, has confused people and policy makers. Polarization is clearly seen in the 
developed world such as the US and Australia. The lack of know-how to adapt to 
climate change is seen in the developing world. The fundamental climate 
solutions lie in societal, economic and energy transformations making public 
education of paramount importance in preparing people to adopt climate friendly 
lifestyles and policies. If people do not understand the nuts and bolts of climate 
change, they are unlikely to work towards a climate friendly world. 
Although the WSJ argued for innovative technological development for economic 
interests, the NYT, GUK, the Hindu and China Daily argued that low carbon or 
zero carbon technology must be incessantly sought and available ‘know-how’ be 
deployed to the developing countries. This thesis has highlighted the concerns of 
energy politics and the politics of resources in chapters 4, 5 and 7. The positions 
on climate change taken by governments, to an extent, depend on their domestic 
political systems and the ‘range and balance’ of powerful economic interests and 
their reliance on fossil fuels.  This is most apparent in the case of the US and it 
also has implications for China and India. The climate change challenge is a 
highly political issue because of the impact on the many interests.   
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At Copenhagen, there was hope that with the inauguration of Obama the US 
would provide a strong leadership role on climate change, and that China’s 
strengthened standing would also show some leadership on climate change. It did 
not translate into reality, with each of the two major emitters seeking excuses for 
their lack of action by using the other’s failure to act, with a weak and limited 
document produced confirming that in the final analysis, only agreements that are 
politically acceptable to national leaders will be approved.21 As the newspapers 
noted, both of these leaders failed to bridge the gap. China was no longer 
presenting as a backward country, and the US was not acknowledging its 
responsibility to help the poor and most vulnerable nations to reduce emissions 
without sacrificing growth.  
Section 4.7 of chapter 4 and 5.9 of chapter 5 articulated the conflicting national 
and political self-interests of the major emitters and their negative impact on 
international climate governance. As China pointed out, although it might produce 
high emissions, these are on behalf of consumers in developed countries, and 
therefore the consumers should pay for the relevant reductions.22 On this line of 
argument it follows that developed countries should pay more for GHG emission 
reductions based on their high consumption ratio.  However, it fails to address the 
fundamental goal of emissions abatement and the issues surrounding the rising 
population and middle class in China, India, and Brazil and their greatly 
increasingly consumption of commodities. In fact, Korea and Mexico joined the 
OECD six months after the adoption of the Kyoto Protocol, but they have still 
remained as Non-Annex I countries. Emerging economies such as China, India, 
Brazil, Korea, Mexico and South Africa had more in common on some key 
economic dimensions with some countries in the so-called developed world than 
they did with the poorest developing countries, such as those of sub-Saharan 
Africa and Asia. 23  Smaller nations do and could influence the course of the 
negotiations but a great deal would depend on the kind of role the US, the EU, 
                                                 
21 Lawrence Susskind, Environmental Diplomacy: Negotiating more Effective Global Agreements 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 12. 
22 Ibid, 19 and Jiahua Pan, Jonathan Phillips and Ying Chen, ‘China’s Balance of Emissions 
Embodied in Trade: Approaches to Measurement and Allocating International Responsibility’, in 
The Economics and Politics of Climate Change, eds., Dieter Helm and Cameron Hepburn, 142-66 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2009). 
23 Ibid.  
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China, and India ended up playing in the negotiations and the high-level political 
parleys.24 
Each government positions itself with its own national/political/economic/energy 
interests and the UNFCCC’s state-centric framework allows them to articulate 
their interests based on their domestic political system and necessity. Newspapers 
operate within these political systems and play an active role in them, from their 
own economic and political-ideological positions. The WSJ, China Daily and the 
Hindu played active roles consistent with their respective countries’ political 
systems and national interests. The WSJ aligned its stance with the fossil fuelled-
industries, the Byrd-Hegel Resolution and Bush Administration.  The Hindu and 
China Daily aligned with the principles of Convention 1992 and the Kyoto 
Protocol and resisted Western attempts to transfer the burden of climate change to 
China and India. These interests are inseparably attached to the state-centric 
framework that sidelines the common interests of addressing climate change. 
The newspapers also acknowledged that there were no ambitious actions against 
climate change at the global and local levels  and some of the newspapers 
concluded that the UNFCCC was not able to deliver the required outcomes.  The 
WSJ, NYT and GUK sought for alternative approaches but the alternative 
approaches they suggested were the forums like the Group of 7/8 (G-7/8) and 
major economic forums (MEF) that were basically centred on an inter-state 
structure, and which had themselves failed to produce any substantive changes. 
The Hindu and China Daily argued that the UNFCCC must be the central 
institution to address climate change and alternative approaches need to be 
supplementary to UNFCCC. The newspapers did not move away from an 
adherence to a state-centric approach and did not question the extent to which it 
was a self-defeating approach. The newspapers offered little analysis about how to 
effectively solve borderless problems of climate change and other emerging non-
territorial challenges of 21st century.  
The newspapers framing of Kyoto as a model of climate agreement, the continued 
adequacy of the state-centrism and institutional frameworks and principles of 
                                                 
24 Editorials, ‘Copenhagen’s Indifferent Start’, The Hindu, December 15, 2009, 
http://www.thehindu.com/2009/12/15/stories/2009121557400800.htm.  
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UNFCCC are important, but over the last twenty years little has been achieved in 
addressing climate change based on these frameworks and principles.  Revisions 
need to address the changing circumstances of states and the ratios of GHG 
emissons so that all major emitters are taking responsibility.  The Kyoto style 
agreement has not helped to reduce GHGs, and the exclusive state-centric 
framework has failed to produce agreement among the main parties in working 
towards a system of an effective climate governance.  
In sum, although the newspapers played their roles by touching upon various 
issues mentioned earlier, the balanced yet selective and biased reporting of the 
WSJ, the dominance of the state-centric framework, and their role as mouthpieces 
of their respective governments (particularly in the case of the WSJ, the Hindu and 
China Daily) did not contribute much to an effective and viable international 
climate change governance. In terms of the role of these three newspapers on 
climate change issues, the respective governments appeared to be writing the 
curriculum instead of climate science and its projections and determining required 
solutions. The newspapers were divided on the causes of climate change, issues of 
agenda setting and in identifying recommendations. Thus, it has important 
implications for the arguments about the role of the media as offering an 
independent voice and commentator on major matters. The role of the media 
needs to fulfil its social responsibility as noted in section 2.3 of chapter 2 by being 
more critical and more investigative to enable the addressees to ‘own’ the problem 
and work towards sustainable solutions.  
This research concludes that the media needs to reframe their frames of arguments 
and structures and to be more critical and investigative in order to provide states, 
societies and businesses with the background and understanding to enable 
appropriate action to be taken. The media is essential in educating the global 
public concerning the debate of – between and within – North-South politics, the 
right to development, and historical responsibility. The KP was but a step along 
the way. By using news frames that emphasize that addressing the climate change 
problem, together with the significant positive policy ramifications for the whole 
world which would follow in addressing climate change, the arguments for the 
transformation of fossil fuelled based dependent societies into a more independent 
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and self-sufficient communities that rely on new modes of energy to by-pass the 
effects of fossil fuel consumption would be strengthened.  
The media needs to educate societies and businesses about the necessity to ‘own’ 
the problem, to show differences in daily weather changes and long term climate 
patterns and to encourage ecologically conscious citizens who are willing to 
change social norms from a ‘consumer society’ to a ‘conserving society’. And as 
individuals and businesses are convinced to prevent climate change as well as 
convincing alternatives become evident, they would be encouraged to reduce their 
GHG footprints and to put pressure on their governments for climate friendly 
policies.  
8.2 Summary 
This research demonstrates that climate change is an increasingly complex issue 
that demands a comprehensive approach to solve problems which has become 
insulated around political, economic and social demands along with uncertainties 
of governance implications for humanity. The UNFCCC talks have been on-going 
for over 20 years but they have yet to effect any change thus far. The five 
propositions analysed through this research elucidated that the process of 
international climate change governance is locked in a non-inclusive, flawed 
institutional framework and principles where not only the primary addressees 
have been excluded from the decision making processes but also states 
perennially debate about taking climate change responsibilities. The institutional 
framework needs to be more inclusive instead of exclusive and the principles of 
CBDR and HR needs to be revisited to accommodate different catgories of states’ 
economic growth and development, and their baggage of political/national 
interests’s that is attached with their positions at international climate change 
negotiations. The divisions among the newspapers as to whether to become either 
environmentalists or anti-environmentalists news outlets did not help break the 
impasse, but rather left the public confused by the dichotomies.  
To effect any substantive change for arresting climate change requires changes not 
only in attitudes of consumers (public) and producers (industries) but also of 
states and the state-centric institutional framework of the UNFCCC that side-lines 
the consumers and producers from the process of negotiations and policy making. 
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The state-centric framework does not engender ownership of the problem or work 
towards positive solutions. The parties have approached CBDR and respective 
capacity differently and have not been able to come to consensus on the best way 
to share GHG emission reductions. Until today, differentiation between the parties 
is fundamentally based on the binary distinction of Annex I (developed countries) 
and Non-Annex I (developing countries) but developed countries have challenged 
this binary distinction and current political and economic realities render this 
approach irrelevant. However, inequalities still remain and must be taken into 
consideration while charting future principles of UNFCCC. It is significantly 
important that climate change policy making be more inclusive, participatory, and 
deliberative especially focused on the ones most at risk and the ones that need to 
change their behaviour. Although the aim of this research is limited to identifying 
the causes of slow progress, it has also opened avenues for further research on 
how international climate change policy making can be made exclusively more 
inclusive and democratic.  
Although newspapers follow the norms of balanced reporting, they need to be 
more thoughtful in communicating climate change because the ‘so called’ 
balanced  reporting in terms of climate change becomes biased reporting. This 
research has demonstrated that these newspapers  did not operate outside the 
domestic and international political systems; rather, they played active role within 
these political systems to articulate their own economic and political-ideological 
positions. The WSJ simply disparaged the KP and any other climate agreement 
and the other newspapers argued for continued relevance of CBDR and HR based 
in this context.  
As argued earlier, while they are important elements of international climate 
change governance, it is inevitable to critically assess how such principles are 
appropriately and effectively used. The newspapers can, indeed, play an important 
role to help assess the existing frameworks, and principles critically. As noted in 
chapter 2, fifty years ago in 1963 Bernard Cohen argued: “The press may not be 
successful much of the time in telling people what to think, but it is stunningly 
successful in telling its readers what to think about.”25 Thus, the newspapers need 
                                                 
25 Bernard Cohen, The Press and Foreign Policy (New York: Harcourt, 1963), 13. 
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to be more critical and more investigative to enable the addressees (states, 
societies, individuals and businesses) to think about climate change, ‘own’ the 
problem and to make international climate change governance successful. 
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Postscript 
More recent climate negotiations have shifted from the debate of the United States 
(US) and European Union (EU), and the developed and developing countries, to 
the US and Brazil, South Africa, India and China (BASIC countries). Together in 
2012, the US, China and India were responsible for more than 51% of total global 
emissions. Since Copenhagen 2009 the BASIC countries have cooperated on 
international climate change governance to present a counterproposal for more 
obligations on rich countries to cut emissions. Three factors explain why these 
four BASIC countries are cooperating together. The first is their G-77 
membership where they have played key roles and formed a common identity. 
The second is their increasing political and economic rise, triggering concerted 
efforts by developed countries to impose an obligation for quantified greenhouse 
gas (GHG) emissions targets on emerging economies. The third is the cooperation 
on climate change negotiations given their high dependence on fossil fuels’ 
energy and their specific national economic interests. 
Although the BASIC countries are working together on the issue of climate 
change, they are four separate entities with different national interests and policy 
priorities, which lead them to be agreement partners on some issues but not on 
others. They have differing views on the understanding of ‘equity’. For India, 
which has a much lower per capita than the other three, ‘equity’ is framed in per 
capita terms, combined with the principles of historical responsibility and the 
capacity to pay. For Brazil and China, which have higher per capita emissions 
than India, the emphasis is on historical responsibility for GHG emissions as the 
key underlying principle. Another important difference is whether all major 
emitters should be subject to legally binding emissions reductions in a future 
climate agreement. In Cancun, South Africa and Brazil hinted that they would be 
open to legally binding targets for major developing countries. India hinted at the 
possibility of accepting legally binding commitments but China remained 
unwilling to discuss the prospect of mandatory reductions.  
The lack of a single policy proposal suggests that it is difficult for them to reach a 
single climate negotiating position yet BASIC countries argued that extending 
Kyoto was a legal obligation, not a bargaining tool to pull further concessions 
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from developing countries. BASIC’s fifteenth Ministerial meeting held from 26 to 
28 June 2013 in South Africa reaffirmed that: 
The Durban Platform is by no means a process to negotiate a new 
regime, nor to renegotiate, rewrite or reinterpret the Convention, and 
that future agreement will be built on institutions and mechanisms, 
including the work carried out by Parties under the Bali Road Map in 
accordance with its principles and provisions.1  
The US and other members of the Umbrella Group such as Canada, New Zealand, 
Japan and Russia have indicated that any new legally binding instrument, if and 
when it becomes necessary, must incorporate symmetrical climate mitigation 
commitments, at least in form, for all significant emitters. The climate positions of 
the BASIC countries will find such equilibrium unpalatable. Copenhagen could be 
a timely reminder for Bonn 2015 as China, India and Brazil did not reciprocate 
any compromise but asserted their freedom of development regardless of 
environmental impacts on the one hand and, on the other hand, the major emitters 
from the Umbrella Group who clarified that they would not make any 
commitments unless emerging economies bind themselves to any forthcoming 
agreements. In contrast, releasing one of its three reports from assessment report 5 
in September 2013, International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) notes that 
human influence on the climate system is crystal clear; sea levels are rising, 
glaciers are melting and temperatures are increasing. 
Recently, Grubb2 argued that there needs to be a vision around solutions to the 
problems. Currently there is a state-centric impasse with the developing countries 
calling for a reduction of 45% by 2020 for industrialized countries, but they and 
the G-77, headed by China, refuse to accept long term reduction obligations. By 
contrast, industrialized countries are asking for reduction obligations from the 
newly emerging economies. The feature of climate governance reflects the 
determination of member states to pay more attention to promoting their 
sovereign rights and self-interests.  
                                                 
1 Department of Environmental Affairs, South Africa, Joint statement issued at the conclusion of 
the 15th Basic Ministerial Meeting on Climate Change (Cape Town: DEA, South Africa, 2013), 
https://www.environment.gov.za/jointstatement_15thbasicministerialmeeting. 
2 Michael Grubb, ‘Durban: The Darkest Hour’, Climate Policy 11, no. 6 (2011): 1269-71. 
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The bitter reality is the Kyoto Protocol, the Copenhagen Accord and the Kyoto II 
emphasized putting caps on greenhouse gas emissions in advanced industrialized 
countries where emissions are stabilizing exempting the countries where 
emissions are rapidly growing. If this reality is not taken into consideration and no 
flexibility is shown by the parties, there will be another gridlock. To arrest the 
increase in global temperature requires flexibility and serious commitments from 
all countries in climate change negotiations and governance. Real vision, 
creativity, leadership as well as mutual understanding of the difficulties of making 
and implementing climate policy are required to lead the world towards a more 
prosperous, sustainable and energy secured future for present and future 
generations.  
Obama’s recent speech on domestic climate policy and the huge domestic 
greening efforts of China are welcomed, but without serious commitments, any 
agreement could result in false promises, or be overtaken by economic and 
developmental interests, such as have been seen in the rapid increase in carbon 
emissions from many advanced and emerging economies. Achieving the 
UFCCC’s ultimate objective of stabilizing the GHG concentrations in the 
atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference 
with the climate system needs the participation of both the industrialized countries 
as well as the major emitters from developing countries. Interests articulated by 
the major players particularly the US and the emerging economies at the 
negotiations determine the future of climate governance for top-down approach 
although other member states do have stakes.  
But other actors such as non-governmental organizations (NGOs), businesses and 
global civil society must be included in the process in order to let them ‘own’ the 
problem and start addressing issues collectively by making necessary changes in 
their socio-cultural and politico-economic styles through a bottom-up approach. 
As mentioned earlier states play a vital role in signing international agreements, 
implementing and enforcing them in national boundaries but for the compliance 
and effectiveness the ultimate addressees ought to be willing to change. By now it 
is clear that the principles of CBDR and historical responsibility, the little 
inclusive interstate framework and the uncritical role of media, as they are, do not 
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contribute much to the pragmatic measures necessary to mitigate emissions by 
breaking the current gridlock. 
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KYOTO PROTOCOL TO THE UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK 
CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE 
 The Parties to this Protocol, 
 Being Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 
hereinafter referred to as “the Convention”, 
 In pursuit of the ultimate objective of the Convention as stated in its Article 2, 
 Recalling the provisions of the Convention, 
 Being guided by Article 3 of the Convention, 
 Pursuant to the Berlin Mandate adopted by decision 1/CP.1 of the Conference of the 
Parties to the Convention at its first session, 
 Have agreed as follows: 
Article 1 
 For the purposes of this Protocol, the definitions contained in Article 1 of the Convention 
shall apply.  In addition: 
1. “Conference of the Parties” means the Conference of the Parties to the Convention. 
2. “Convention” means the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 
adopted in New York on 9 May 1992. 
3. “Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change” means the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change established in 1988 jointly by the World Meteorological Organization and the 
United Nations Environment Programme. 
4. “Montreal Protocol” means the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone 
Layer, adopted in Montreal on 16 September 1987 and as subsequently adjusted and amended. 
5. “Parties present and voting” means Parties present and casting an affirmative or negative 
vote. 
6. “Party” means, unless the context otherwise indicates, a Party to this Protocol. 
7. “Party included in Annex I” means a Party included in Annex I to the Convention, as 
may be amended, or a Party which has made a notification under Article 4, paragraph 2 (g), of 
the Convention. 
Article 2 
1. Each Party included in Annex I, in achieving its quantified emission limitation and 
reduction commitments under Article 3, in order to promote sustainable development, shall: 
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 (a) Implement and/or further elaborate policies and measures in accordance with its 
national circumstances, such as: 
(i) Enhancement of energy efficiency in relevant sectors of the national 
economy; 
(ii) Protection and enhancement of sinks and reservoirs of greenhouse gases not 
controlled by the Montreal Protocol, taking into account its commitments 
under relevant international environmental agreements; promotion of 
sustainable forest management practices, afforestation and reforestation; 
(iii) Promotion of sustainable forms of agriculture in light of climate change 
considerations; 
(iv) Research on, and promotion, development and increased use of, new and 
renewable forms of energy, of carbon dioxide sequestration technologies 
and of advanced and innovative environmentally sound technologies; 
(v) Progressive reduction or phasing out of market imperfections, fiscal 
incentives, tax and duty exemptions and subsidies in all greenhouse gas 
emitting sectors that run counter to the objective of the Convention and 
application of market instruments; 
(vi) Encouragement of appropriate reforms in relevant sectors aimed at 
promoting policies and measures which limit or reduce emissions of 
greenhouse gases not controlled by the Montreal Protocol; 
(vii) Measures to limit and/or reduce emissions of greenhouse gases not 
controlled by the Montreal Protocol in the transport sector; 
(viii) Limitation and/or reduction of methane emissions through recovery and  
use in waste management, as well as in the production, transport and 
distribution of energy; 
 (b) Cooperate with other such Parties to enhance the individual and combined 
effectiveness of their policies and measures adopted under this Article, pursuant to Article 4, 
paragraph 2 (e) (i), of the Convention.  To this end, these Parties shall take steps to share their 
experience and exchange information on such policies and measures, including developing  
ways of improving their comparability, transparency and effectiveness.  The Conference of the 
Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol shall, at its first session or as soon 
as practicable thereafter, consider ways to facilitate such cooperation, taking into account all 
relevant information. 
2. The Parties included in Annex I shall pursue limitation or reduction of emissions of 
greenhouse gases not controlled by the Montreal Protocol from aviation and marine bunker fuels, 
working through the International Civil Aviation Organization and the International Maritime 
Organization, respectively. 
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3. The Parties included in Annex I shall strive to implement policies and measures under 
this Article in such a way as to minimize adverse effects, including the adverse effects of climate 
change, effects on international trade, and social, environmental and economic impacts on other 
Parties, especially developing country Parties and in particular those identified in Article 4, 
paragraphs 8 and 9, of the Convention, taking into account Article 3 of the Convention.  The 
Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol may take further 
action, as appropriate, to promote the implementation of the provisions of this paragraph. 
4. The Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol,  
if it decides that it would be beneficial to coordinate any of the policies and measures in 
paragraph 1 (a) above, taking into account different national circumstances and potential effects, 
shall consider ways and means to elaborate the coordination of such policies and measures. 
Article 3 
1. The Parties included in Annex I shall, individually or jointly, ensure that their aggregate 
anthropogenic carbon dioxide equivalent emissions of the greenhouse gases listed in Annex A 
do not exceed their assigned amounts, calculated pursuant to their quantified emission limitation 
and reduction commitments inscribed in Annex B and in accordance with the provisions of this 
Article, with a view to reducing their overall emissions of such gases by at least 5 per cent 
below 1990 levels in the commitment period 2008 to 2012. 
2. Each Party included in Annex I shall, by 2005, have made demonstrable progress in 
achieving its commitments under this Protocol. 
3. The net changes in greenhouse gas emissions by sources and removals by sinks resulting 
from direct human-induced land-use change and forestry activities, limited to afforestation, 
reforestation and deforestation since 1990, measured as verifiable changes in carbon stocks in 
each commitment period, shall be used to meet the commitments under this Article of each Party 
included in Annex I.  The greenhouse gas emissions by sources and removals by sinks associated 
with those activities shall be reported in a transparent and verifiable manner and reviewed in 
accordance with Articles 7 and 8. 
4. Prior to the first session of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the 
Parties to this Protocol, each Party included in Annex I shall provide, for consideration by the 
Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice, data to establish its level of carbon 
stocks in 1990 and to enable an estimate to be made of its changes in carbon stocks in 
subsequent years.  The Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this 
Protocol shall, at its first session or as soon as practicable thereafter, decide upon modalities, 
rules and guidelines as to how, and which, additional human-induced activities related to 
changes in greenhouse gas emissions by sources and removals by sinks in the agricultural soils 
and the land-use change and forestry categories shall be added to, or subtracted from, the 
assigned amounts for Parties included in Annex I, taking into account uncertainties, transparency 
in reporting, verifiability, the methodological work of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change, the advice provided by the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice in 
accordance with Article 5 and the decisions of the Conference of the Parties.  Such a decision 
shall apply in the second and subsequent commitment periods.  A Party may choose to apply 
such a decision on these additional human-induced activities for its first commitment period, 
provided that these activities have taken place since 1990. 
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5. The Parties included in Annex I undergoing the process of transition to a market 
economy whose base year or period was established pursuant to decision 9/CP.2 of the 
Conference of the Parties at its second session shall use that base year or period for the 
implementation of their commitments under this Article.  Any other Party included in Annex I 
undergoing the process of transition to a market economy which has not yet submitted its first 
national communication under Article 12 of the Convention may also notify the Conference 
of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol that it intends to use an 
historical base year or period other than 1990 for the implementation of its commitments under 
this Article.  The Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol 
shall decide on the acceptance of such notification. 
6. Taking into account Article 4, paragraph 6, of the Convention, in the implementation of 
their commitments under this Protocol other than those under this Article, a certain degree of 
flexibility shall be allowed by the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties 
to this Protocol to the Parties included in Annex I undergoing the process of transition to a 
market economy. 
7. In the first quantified emission limitation and reduction commitment period, from 2008 
to 2012, the assigned amount for each Party included in Annex I shall be equal to the percentage 
inscribed for it in Annex B of its aggregate anthropogenic carbon dioxide equivalent emissions 
of the greenhouse gases listed in Annex A in 1990, or the base year or period determined in 
accordance with paragraph 5 above, multiplied by five.  Those Parties included in Annex I 
for whom land-use change and forestry constituted a net source of greenhouse gas emissions 
in 1990 shall include in their 1990 emissions base year or period the aggregate anthropogenic 
carbon dioxide equivalent emissions by sources minus removals by sinks in 1990 from land-use 
change for the purposes of calculating their assigned amount. 
8. Any Party included in Annex I may use 1995 as its base year for hydrofluorocarbons, 
perfluorocarbons and sulphur hexafluoride, for the purposes of the calculation referred to in 
paragraph 7 above. 
9. Commitments for subsequent periods for Parties included in Annex I shall be established 
in amendments to Annex B to this Protocol, which shall be adopted in accordance with the 
provisions of Article 21, paragraph 7.  The Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of 
the Parties to this Protocol shall initiate the consideration of such commitments at least 
seven years before the end of the first commitment period referred to in paragraph 1 above. 
10. Any emission reduction units, or any part of an assigned amount, which a Party acquires 
from another Party in accordance with the provisions of Article 6 or of Article 17 shall be added 
to the assigned amount for the acquiring Party. 
11. Any emission reduction units, or any part of an assigned amount, which a Party transfers 
to another Party in accordance with the provisions of Article 6 or of Article 17 shall be 
subtracted from the assigned amount for the transferring Party. 
12. Any certified emission reductions which a Party acquires from another Party in 
accordance with the provisions of Article 12 shall be added to the assigned amount for the 
acquiring Party. 
- 5 - 
13. If the emissions of a Party included in Annex I in a commitment period are less than its 
assigned amount under this Article, this difference shall, on request of that Party, be added to the 
assigned amount for that Party for subsequent commitment periods. 
14. Each Party included in Annex I shall strive to implement the commitments mentioned in 
paragraph 1 above in such a way as to minimize adverse social, environmental and economic 
impacts on developing country Parties, particularly those identified in Article 4, paragraphs 8 
and 9, of the Convention.  In line with relevant decisions of the Conference of the Parties on the 
implementation of those paragraphs, the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the 
Parties to this Protocol shall, at its first session, consider what actions are necessary to minimize 
the adverse effects of climate change and/or the impacts of response measures on Parties referred 
to in those paragraphs.  Among the issues to be considered shall be the establishment of funding, 
insurance and transfer of technology. 
Article 4 
1. Any Parties included in Annex I that have reached an agreement to fulfil their 
commitments under Article 3 jointly, shall be deemed to have met those commitments provided 
that their total combined aggregate anthropogenic carbon dioxide equivalent emissions of the 
greenhouse gases listed in Annex A do not exceed their assigned amounts calculated pursuant to 
their quantified emission limitation and reduction commitments inscribed in Annex B and in 
accordance with the provisions of Article 3.  The respective emission level allocated to each of 
the Parties to the agreement shall be set out in that agreement. 
2. The Parties to any such agreement shall notify the secretariat of the terms of the 
agreement on the date of deposit of their instruments of ratification, acceptance or approval 
of this Protocol, or accession thereto.  The secretariat shall in turn inform the Parties and 
signatories to the Convention of the terms of the agreement. 
3. Any such agreement shall remain in operation for the duration of the commitment period 
specified in Article 3, paragraph 7. 
4. If Parties acting jointly do so in the framework of, and together with, a regional economic 
integration organization, any alteration in the composition of the organization after adoption of 
this Protocol shall not affect existing commitments under this Protocol.  Any alteration in the 
composition of the organization shall only apply for the purposes of those commitments under 
Article 3 that are adopted subsequent to that alteration. 
5. In the event of failure by the Parties to such an agreement to achieve their total combined 
level of emission reductions, each Party to that agreement shall be responsible for its own level 
of emissions set out in the agreement. 
6. If Parties acting jointly do so in the framework of, and together with, a regional economic 
integration organization which is itself a Party to this Protocol, each member State of that 
regional economic integration organization individually, and together with the regional economic 
integration organization acting in accordance with Article 24, shall, in the event of failure to 
achieve the total combined level of emission reductions, be responsible for its level of emissions 
as notified in accordance with this Article. 
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Article 5 
1. Each Party included in Annex I shall have in place, no later than one year prior to the 
start of the first commitment period, a national system for the estimation of anthropogenic 
emissions by sources and removals by sinks of all greenhouse gases not controlled by the 
Montreal Protocol.  Guidelines for such national systems, which shall incorporate the 
methodologies specified in paragraph 2 below, shall be decided upon by the Conference of 
the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol at its first session. 
2. Methodologies for estimating anthropogenic emissions by sources and removals by sinks 
of all greenhouse gases not controlled by the Montreal Protocol shall be those accepted by the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change and agreed upon by the Conference of the Parties 
at its third session.  Where such methodologies are not used, appropriate adjustments shall be 
applied according to methodologies agreed upon by the Conference of the Parties serving as the 
meeting of the Parties to this Protocol at its first session.  Based on the work of, inter alia, the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change and advice provided by the Subsidiary Body for 
Scientific and Technological Advice, the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the 
Parties to this Protocol shall regularly review and, as appropriate, revise such methodologies and 
adjustments, taking fully into account any relevant decisions by the Conference of the Parties.  
Any revision to methodologies or adjustments shall be used only for the purposes of ascertaining 
compliance with commitments under Article 3 in respect of any commitment period adopted 
subsequent to that revision. 
3. The global warming potentials used to calculate the carbon dioxide equivalence of 
anthropogenic emissions by sources and removals by sinks of greenhouse gases listed in 
Annex A shall be those accepted by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change and agreed 
upon by the Conference of the Parties at its third session.  Based on the work of, inter alia, the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change and advice provided by the Subsidiary Body for 
Scientific and Technological Advice, the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the 
Parties to this Protocol shall regularly review and, as appropriate, revise the global warming 
potential of each such greenhouse gas, taking fully into account any relevant decisions by the 
Conference of the Parties.  Any revision to a global warming potential shall apply only to 
commitments under Article 3 in respect of any commitment period adopted subsequent to that 
revision. 
Article 6 
1. For the purpose of meeting its commitments under Article 3, any Party included in 
Annex I may transfer to, or acquire from, any other such Party emission reduction units resulting 
from projects aimed at reducing anthropogenic emissions by sources or enhancing anthropogenic 
removals by sinks of greenhouse gases in any sector of the economy, provided that: 
 (a) Any such project has the approval of the Parties involved; 
 (b) Any such project provides a reduction in emissions by sources, or an 
enhancement of removals by sinks, that is additional to any that would otherwise occur; 
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 (c) It does not acquire any emission reduction units if it is not in compliance with its 
obligations under Articles 5 and 7; and 
 (d) The acquisition of emission reduction units shall be supplemental to domestic 
actions for the purposes of meeting commitments under Article 3. 
2. The Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol 
may, at its first session or as soon as practicable thereafter, further elaborate guidelines for 
the implementation of this Article, including for verification and reporting. 
3. A Party included in Annex I may authorize legal entities to participate, under its 
responsibility, in actions leading to the generation, transfer or acquisition under this Article 
of emission reduction units. 
4. If a question of implementation by a Party included in Annex I of the requirements 
referred to in this Article is identified in accordance with the relevant provisions of Article 8, 
transfers and acquisitions of emission reduction units may continue to be made after the  
question has been identified, provided that any such units may not be used by a Party to meet 
its commitments under Article 3 until any issue of compliance is resolved. 
Article 7 
1. Each Party included in Annex I shall incorporate in its annual inventory of anthropogenic 
emissions by sources and removals by sinks of greenhouse gases not controlled by the Montreal 
Protocol, submitted in accordance with the relevant decisions of the Conference of the Parties, 
the necessary supplementary information for the purposes of ensuring compliance with Article 3, 
to be determined in accordance with paragraph 4 below. 
2. Each Party included in Annex I shall incorporate in its national communication, 
submitted under Article 12 of the Convention, the supplementary information necessary to 
demonstrate compliance with its commitments under this Protocol, to be determined in 
accordance with paragraph 4 below. 
3. Each Party included in Annex I shall submit the information required under paragraph 1 
above annually, beginning with the first inventory due under the Convention for the first year 
of the commitment period after this Protocol has entered into force for that Party.  Each such 
Party shall submit the information required under paragraph 2 above as part of the first national 
communication due under the Convention after this Protocol has entered into force for it and 
after the adoption of guidelines as provided for in paragraph 4 below.  The frequency of 
subsequent submission of information required under this Article shall be determined by the 
Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol, taking into 
account any timetable for the submission of national communications decided upon by the 
Conference of the Parties. 
4. The Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol shall 
adopt at its first session, and review periodically thereafter, guidelines for the preparation of the 
information required under this Article, taking into account guidelines for the preparation of  
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national communications by Parties included in Annex I adopted by the Conference of the 
Parties.  The Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol 
shall also, prior to the first commitment period, decide upon modalities for the accounting of 
assigned amounts. 
Article 8 
1. The information submitted under Article 7 by each Party included in Annex I shall be 
reviewed by expert review teams pursuant to the relevant decisions of the Conference of the 
Parties and in accordance with guidelines adopted for this purpose by the Conference of the 
Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol under paragraph 4 below.  The 
information submitted under Article 7, paragraph 1, by each Party included in Annex I shall be 
reviewed as part of the annual compilation and accounting of emissions inventories and assigned 
amounts.  Additionally, the information submitted under Article 7, paragraph 2, by each Party 
included in Annex I shall be reviewed as part of the review of communications. 
2. Expert review teams shall be coordinated by the secretariat and shall be composed of 
experts selected from those nominated by Parties to the Convention and, as appropriate, by 
intergovernmental organizations, in accordance with guidance provided for this purpose by the 
Conference of the Parties. 
3. The review process shall provide a thorough and comprehensive technical assessment 
of all aspects of the implementation by a Party of this Protocol.  The expert review teams shall 
prepare a report to the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this 
Protocol, assessing the implementation of the commitments of the Party and identifying any 
potential problems in, and factors influencing, the fulfilment of commitments.  Such reports  
shall be circulated by the secretariat to all Parties to the Convention.  The secretariat shall list 
those questions of implementation indicated in such reports for further consideration by the 
Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol. 
4. The Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol  
shall adopt at its first session, and review periodically thereafter, guidelines for the review 
of implementation of this Protocol by expert review teams taking into account the relevant 
decisions of the Conference of the Parties. 
5. The Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol  
shall, with the assistance of the Subsidiary Body for Implementation and, as appropriate, the 
Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice, consider: 
 (a) The information submitted by Parties under Article 7 and the reports of the expert 
reviews thereon conducted under this Article; and 
 (b) Those questions of implementation listed by the secretariat under paragraph 3 
above, as well as any questions raised by Parties. 
6. Pursuant to its consideration of the information referred to in paragraph 5 above, 
the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol shall take 
decisions on any matter required for the implementation of this Protocol. 
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Article 9 
1. The Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol  
shall periodically review this Protocol in the light of the best available scientific information 
and assessments on climate change and its impacts, as well as relevant technical, social and 
economic information.  Such reviews shall be coordinated with pertinent reviews under 
the Convention, in particular those required by Article 4, paragraph 2 (d), and Article 7, 
paragraph 2 (a), of the Convention.  Based on these reviews, the Conference of the Parties 
serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol shall take appropriate action. 
2. The first review shall take place at the second session of the Conference of the Parties 
serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol.  Further reviews shall take place at regular 
intervals and in a timely manner. 
Article 10 
 All Parties, taking into account their common but differentiated responsibilities and their 
specific national and regional development priorities, objectives and circumstances, without 
introducing any new commitments for Parties not included in Annex I, but reaffirming existing 
commitments under Article 4, paragraph 1, of the Convention, and continuing to advance the 
implementation of these commitments in order to achieve sustainable development, taking into 
account Article 4, paragraphs 3, 5 and 7, of the Convention, shall: 
 (a) Formulate, where relevant and to the extent possible, cost-effective national  
and, where appropriate, regional programmes to improve the quality of local emission factors, 
activity data and/or models which reflect the socio-economic conditions of each Party for the 
preparation and periodic updating of national inventories of anthropogenic emissions by sources 
and removals by sinks of all greenhouse gases not controlled by the Montreal Protocol, using 
comparable methodologies to be agreed upon by the Conference of the Parties, and consistent 
with the guidelines for the preparation of national communications adopted by the Conference 
of the Parties; 
 (b) Formulate, implement, publish and regularly update national and, where 
appropriate, regional programmes containing measures to mitigate climate change and measures 
to facilitate adequate adaptation to climate change: 
(i) Such programmes would, inter alia, concern the energy, transport and 
industry sectors as well as agriculture, forestry and waste management.  
Furthermore, adaptation technologies and methods for improving spatial 
planning would improve adaptation to climate change; and 
(ii) Parties included in Annex I shall submit information on action under this 
Protocol, including national programmes, in accordance with Article 7; 
and other Parties shall seek to include in their national communications, 
as appropriate, information on programmes which contain measures that 
the Party believes contribute to addressing climate change and its adverse 
impacts, including the abatement of increases in greenhouse gas emissions, 
and enhancement of and removals by sinks, capacity building and 
adaptation measures; 
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 (c) Cooperate in the promotion of effective modalities for the development, 
application and diffusion of, and take all practicable steps to promote, facilitate and finance, 
as appropriate, the transfer of, or access to, environmentally sound technologies, know-how, 
practices and processes pertinent to climate change, in particular to developing countries, 
including the formulation of policies and programmes for the effective transfer of 
environmentally sound technologies that are publicly owned or in the public domain and the 
creation of an enabling environment for the private sector, to promote and enhance the transfer 
of, and access to, environmentally sound technologies; 
 (d) Cooperate in scientific and technical research and promote the maintenance and 
the development of systematic observation systems and development of data archives to reduce 
uncertainties related to the climate system, the adverse impacts of climate change and the 
economic and social consequences of various response strategies, and promote the development 
and strengthening of endogenous capacities and capabilities to participate in international and 
intergovernmental efforts, programmes and networks on research and systematic observation, 
taking into account Article 5 of the Convention; 
 (e) Cooperate in and promote at the international level, and, where appropriate, using 
existing bodies, the development and implementation of education and training programmes, 
including the strengthening of national capacity building, in particular human and institutional 
capacities and the exchange or secondment of personnel to train experts in this field, in particular 
for developing countries, and facilitate at the national level public awareness of, and public 
access to information on, climate change.  Suitable modalities should be developed to implement 
these activities through the relevant bodies of the Convention, taking into account Article 6 of 
the Convention; 
 (f) Include in their national communications information on programmes and 
activities undertaken pursuant to this Article in accordance with relevant decisions of the 
Conference of the Parties; and 
 (g) Give full consideration, in implementing the commitments under this Article, 
to Article 4, paragraph 8, of the Convention. 
Article 11 
1. In the implementation of Article 10, Parties shall take into account the provisions of 
Article 4, paragraphs 4, 5, 7, 8 and 9, of the Convention. 
2. In the context of the implementation of Article 4, paragraph 1, of the Convention, in 
accordance with the provisions of Article 4, paragraph 3, and Article 11 of the Convention, 
and through the entity or entities entrusted with the operation of the financial mechanism of the 
Convention, the developed country Parties and other developed Parties included in Annex II to 
the Convention shall: 
 (a) Provide new and additional financial resources to meet the agreed full costs 
incurred by developing country Parties in advancing the implementation of existing 
commitments under Article 4, paragraph 1 (a), of the Convention that are covered in  
Article 10, subparagraph (a); and 
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 (b) Also provide such financial resources, including for the transfer of technology, 
needed by the developing country Parties to meet the agreed full incremental costs of advancing 
the implementation of existing commitments under Article 4, paragraph 1, of the Convention that 
are covered by Article 10 and that are agreed between a developing country Party and the 
international entity or entities referred to in Article 11 of the Convention, in accordance with 
that Article. 
The implementation of these existing commitments shall take into account the need for adequacy 
and predictability in the flow of funds and the importance of appropriate burden sharing among 
developed country Parties.  The guidance to the entity or entities entrusted with the operation of 
the financial mechanism of the Convention in relevant decisions of the Conference of the Parties, 
including those agreed before the adoption of this Protocol, shall apply mutatis mutandis to the 
provisions of this paragraph. 
3. The developed country Parties and other developed Parties in Annex II to the  
Convention may also provide, and developing country Parties avail themselves of, financial 
resources for the implementation of Article 10, through bilateral, regional and other multilateral 
channels. 
Article 12 
1. A clean development mechanism is hereby defined. 
2. The purpose of the clean development mechanism shall be to assist Parties not included 
in Annex I in achieving sustainable development and in contributing to the ultimate objective 
of the Convention, and to assist Parties included in Annex I in achieving compliance with their 
quantified emission limitation and reduction commitments under Article 3. 
3. Under the clean development mechanism: 
 (a) Parties not included in Annex I will benefit from project activities resulting in 
certified emission reductions; and 
 (b) Parties included in Annex I may use the certified emission reductions accruing 
from such project activities to contribute to compliance with part of their quantified emission 
limitation and reduction commitments under Article 3, as determined by the Conference of the 
Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol. 
4. The clean development mechanism shall be subject to the authority and guidance of the 
Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol and be supervised 
by an executive board of the clean development mechanism. 
5. Emission reductions resulting from each project activity shall be certified by operational 
entities to be designated by the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to 
this Protocol, on the basis of: 
 (a) Voluntary participation approved by each Party involved; 
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 (b) Real, measurable, and long-term benefits related to the mitigation of climate 
change; and 
 (c) Reductions in emissions that are additional to any that would occur in the absence 
of the certified project activity. 
6. The clean development mechanism shall assist in arranging funding of certified project 
activities as necessary. 
7. The Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol  
shall, at its first session, elaborate modalities and procedures with the objective of ensuring 
transparency, efficiency and accountability through independent auditing and verification of 
project activities. 
8. The Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol shall 
ensure that a share of the proceeds from certified project activities is used to cover administrative 
expenses as well as to assist developing country Parties that are particularly vulnerable to the 
adverse effects of climate change to meet the costs of adaptation. 
9. Participation under the clean development mechanism, including in activities mentioned 
in paragraph 3 (a) above and in the acquisition of certified emission reductions, may involve 
private and/or public entities, and is to be subject to whatever guidance may be provided by the 
executive board of the clean development mechanism. 
10. Certified emission reductions obtained during the period from the year 2000 up to the 
beginning of the first commitment period can be used to assist in achieving compliance in the 
first commitment period. 
Article 13 
1. The Conference of the Parties, the supreme body of the Convention, shall serve as the 
meeting of the Parties to this Protocol. 
2. Parties to the Convention that are not Parties to this Protocol may participate as observers 
in the proceedings of any session of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the 
Parties to this Protocol.  When the Conference of the Parties serves as the meeting of the Parties 
to this Protocol, decisions under this Protocol shall be taken only by those that are Parties to this 
Protocol. 
3. When the Conference of the Parties serves as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol, 
any member of the Bureau of the Conference of the Parties representing a Party to the 
Convention but, at that time, not a Party to this Protocol, shall be replaced by an additional 
member to be elected by and from amongst the Parties to this Protocol. 
4. The Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol  
shall keep under regular review the implementation of this Protocol and shall make, within its 
mandate, the decisions necessary to promote its effective implementation.  It shall perform the 
functions assigned to it by this Protocol and shall: 
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 (a) Assess, on the basis of all information made available to it in accordance with the 
provisions of this Protocol, the implementation of this Protocol by the Parties, the overall effects 
of the measures taken pursuant to this Protocol, in particular environmental, economic and social 
effects as well as their cumulative impacts and the extent to which progress towards the objective 
of the Convention is being achieved; 
 (b) Periodically examine the obligations of the Parties under this Protocol, giving due 
consideration to any reviews required by Article 4, paragraph 2 (d), and Article 7, paragraph 2, 
of the Convention, in the light of the objective of the Convention, the experience gained in its 
implementation and the evolution of scientific and technological knowledge, and in this respect 
consider and adopt regular reports on the implementation of this Protocol; 
 (c) Promote and facilitate the exchange of information on measures adopted by the 
Parties to address climate change and its effects, taking into account the differing circumstances, 
responsibilities and capabilities of the Parties and their respective commitments under this 
Protocol; 
 (d) Facilitate, at the request of two or more Parties, the coordination of measures 
adopted by them to address climate change and its effects, taking into account the differing 
circumstances, responsibilities and capabilities of the Parties and their respective commitments 
under this Protocol; 
 (e) Promote and guide, in accordance with the objective of the Convention and 
the provisions of this Protocol, and taking fully into account the relevant decisions by 
the Conference of the Parties, the development and periodic refinement of comparable 
methodologies for the effective implementation of this Protocol, to be agreed on by the 
Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol; 
 (f) Make recommendations on any matters necessary for the implementation of 
this Protocol; 
 (g) Seek to mobilize additional financial resources in accordance with Article 11, 
paragraph 2; 
 (h) Establish such subsidiary bodies as are deemed necessary for the implementation 
of this Protocol; 
 (i) Seek and utilize, where appropriate, the services and cooperation of, and 
information provided by, competent international organizations and intergovernmental and 
non-governmental bodies; and  
 (j) Exercise such other functions as may be required for the implementation of this 
Protocol, and consider any assignment resulting from a decision by the Conference of the 
Parties. 
5. The rules of procedure of the Conference of the Parties and financial procedures applied 
under the Convention shall be applied mutatis mutandis under this Protocol, except as may be 
otherwise decided by consensus by the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the 
Parties to this Protocol. 
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6. The first session of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to 
this Protocol shall be convened by the secretariat in conjunction with the first session of the 
Conference of the Parties that is scheduled after the date of the entry into force of this Protocol.  
Subsequent ordinary sessions of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the 
Parties to this Protocol shall be held every year and in conjunction with ordinary sessions of the 
Conference of the Parties, unless otherwise decided by the Conference of the Parties serving as 
the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol. 
7. Extraordinary sessions of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the 
Parties to this Protocol shall be held at such other times as may be deemed necessary by the 
Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol, or at the written 
request of any Party, provided that, within six months of the request being communicated to the 
Parties by the secretariat, it is supported by at least one third of the Parties. 
8. The United Nations, its specialized agencies and the International Atomic Energy 
Agency, as well as any State member thereof or observers thereto not party to the Convention, 
may be represented at sessions of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the 
Parties to this Protocol as observers.  Any body or agency, whether national or international, 
governmental or non-governmental, which is qualified in matters covered by this Protocol  
and which has informed the secretariat of its wish to be represented at a session of the 
Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol as an observer, 
may be so admitted unless at least one third of the Parties present object.  The admission and 
participation of observers shall be subject to the rules of procedure, as referred to in paragraph 5 
above. 
Article 14 
1. The secretariat established by Article 8 of the Convention shall serve as the secretariat 
of this Protocol. 
2. Article 8, paragraph 2, of the Convention on the functions of the secretariat, and 
Article 8, paragraph 3, of the Convention on arrangements made for the functioning of the 
secretariat, shall apply mutatis mutandis to this Protocol.  The secretariat shall, in addition, 
exercise the functions assigned to it under this Protocol. 
Article 15 
1. The Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice and the Subsidiary Body 
for Implementation established by Articles 9 and 10 of the Convention shall serve as, 
respectively, the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice and the Subsidiary 
Body for Implementation of this Protocol.  The provisions relating to the functioning of these 
two bodies under the Convention shall apply mutatis mutandis to this Protocol.  Sessions of the 
meetings of the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice and the Subsidiary 
Body for Implementation of this Protocol shall be held in conjunction with the meetings of, 
respectively, the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice and the Subsidiary 
Body for Implementation of the Convention. 
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2. Parties to the Convention that are not Parties to this Protocol may participate as observers 
in the proceedings of any session of the subsidiary bodies.  When the subsidiary bodies serve as 
the subsidiary bodies of this Protocol, decisions under this Protocol shall be taken only by those 
that are Parties to this Protocol. 
3. When the subsidiary bodies established by Articles 9 and 10 of the Convention exercise 
their functions with regard to matters concerning this Protocol, any member of the Bureaux of 
those subsidiary bodies representing a Party to the Convention but, at that time, not a party to 
this Protocol, shall be replaced by an additional member to be elected by and from amongst the 
Parties to this Protocol. 
Article 16 
 The Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol shall, 
as soon as practicable, consider the application to this Protocol of, and modify as appropriate, 
the multilateral consultative process referred to in Article 13 of the Convention, in the light of 
any relevant decisions that may be taken by the Conference of the Parties.  Any multilateral 
consultative process that may be applied to this Protocol shall operate without prejudice to the 
procedures and mechanisms established in accordance with Article 18. 
Article 17 
 The Conference of the Parties shall define the relevant principles, modalities, rules and 
guidelines, in particular for verification, reporting and accountability for emissions trading.  The 
Parties included in Annex B may participate in emissions trading for the purposes of fulfilling 
their commitments under Article 3.  Any such trading shall be supplemental to domestic actions 
for the purpose of meeting quantified emission limitation and reduction commitments under that 
Article. 
Article 18 
 The Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol shall, 
at its first session, approve appropriate and effective procedures and mechanisms to determine 
and to address cases of non-compliance with the provisions of this Protocol, including through 
the development of an indicative list of consequences, taking into account the cause, type, degree 
and frequency of non-compliance.  Any procedures and mechanisms under this Article entailing 
binding consequences shall be adopted by means of an amendment to this Protocol. 
Article 19 
 The provisions of Article 14 of the Convention on settlement of disputes shall apply 
mutatis mutandis to this Protocol. 
Article 20 
1. Any Party may propose amendments to this Protocol. 
2. Amendments to this Protocol shall be adopted at an ordinary session of the Conference 
of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol.  The text of any proposed 
amendment to this Protocol shall be communicated to the Parties by the secretariat at least 
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six months before the meeting at which it is proposed for adoption.  The secretariat shall also 
communicate the text of any proposed amendments to the Parties and signatories to the 
Convention and, for information, to the Depositary. 
3. The Parties shall make every effort to reach agreement on any proposed amendment to 
this Protocol by consensus.  If all efforts at consensus have been exhausted, and no agreement 
reached, the amendment shall as a last resort be adopted by a three-fourths majority vote of the 
Parties present and voting at the meeting.  The adopted amendment shall be communicated by 
the secretariat to the Depositary, who shall circulate it to all Parties for their acceptance. 
4. Instruments of acceptance in respect of an amendment shall be deposited with the 
Depositary.  An amendment adopted in accordance with paragraph 3 above shall enter into  
force for those Parties having accepted it on the ninetieth day after the date of receipt by the 
Depositary of an instrument of acceptance by at least three fourths of the Parties to this Protocol.  
5. The amendment shall enter into force for any other Party on the ninetieth day after the 
date on which that Party deposits with the Depositary its instrument of acceptance of the said 
amendment. 
Article 21 
1. Annexes to this Protocol shall form an integral part thereof and, unless otherwise 
expressly provided, a reference to this Protocol constitutes at the same time a reference to 
any annexes thereto.  Any annexes adopted after the entry into force of this Protocol shall be 
restricted to lists, forms and any other material of a descriptive nature that is of a scientific, 
technical, procedural or administrative character. 
2. Any Party may make proposals for an annex to this Protocol and may propose 
amendments to annexes to this Protocol. 
3. Annexes to this Protocol and amendments to annexes to this Protocol shall be adopted at 
an ordinary session of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this 
Protocol.  The text of any proposed annex or amendment to an annex shall be communicated to 
the Parties by the secretariat at least six months before the meeting at which it is proposed for 
adoption.  The secretariat shall also communicate the text of any proposed annex or amendment 
to an annex to the Parties and signatories to the Convention and, for information, to the 
Depositary. 
4. The Parties shall make every effort to reach agreement on any proposed annex or 
amendment to an annex by consensus.  If all efforts at consensus have been exhausted, and no 
agreement reached, the annex or amendment to an annex shall as a last resort be adopted by a 
three-fourths majority vote of the Parties present and voting at the meeting.  The adopted annex 
or amendment to an annex shall be communicated by the secretariat to the Depositary, who shall 
circulate it to all Parties for their acceptance. 
5. An annex, or amendment to an annex other than Annex A or B, that has been adopted in 
accordance with paragraphs 3 and 4 above shall enter into force for all Parties to this Protocol 
six months after the date of the communication by the Depositary to such Parties of the adoption 
of the annex or adoption of the amendment to the annex, except for those Parties that have 
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notified the Depositary, in writing, within that period of their non-acceptance of the annex or 
amendment to the annex.  The annex or amendment to an annex shall enter into force for Parties 
which withdraw their notification of non-acceptance on the ninetieth day after the date on which 
withdrawal of such notification has been received by the Depositary. 
6. If the adoption of an annex or an amendment to an annex involves an amendment to this 
Protocol, that annex or amendment to an annex shall not enter into force until such time as the 
amendment to this Protocol enters into force. 
7. Amendments to Annexes A and B to this Protocol shall be adopted and enter into force 
in accordance with the procedure set out in Article 20, provided that any amendment to Annex B 
shall be adopted only with the written consent of the Party concerned. 
Article 22 
1. Each Party shall have one vote, except as provided for in paragraph 2 below. 
2. Regional economic integration organizations, in matters within their competence, shall 
exercise their right to vote with a number of votes equal to the number of their member States 
that are Parties to this Protocol.  Such an organization shall not exercise its right to vote if any 
of its member States exercises its right, and vice versa. 
Article 23 
 The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall be the Depositary of this Protocol. 
Article 24 
1. This Protocol shall be open for signature and subject to ratification, acceptance or 
approval by States and regional economic integration organizations which are Parties to the 
Convention.  It shall be open for signature at United Nations Headquarters in New York from 
16 March 1998 to 15 March 1999.  This Protocol shall be open for accession from the day after 
the date on which it is closed for signature.  Instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval or 
accession shall be deposited with the Depositary. 
2. Any regional economic integration organization which becomes a Party to this Protocol 
without any of its member States being a Party shall be bound by all the obligations under this 
Protocol.  In the case of such organizations, one or more of whose member States is a Party 
to this Protocol, the organization and its member States shall decide on their respective 
responsibilities for the performance of their obligations under this Protocol.  In such cases, the 
organization and the member States shall not be entitled to exercise rights under this Protocol 
concurrently. 
3. In their instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, regional economic 
integration organizations shall declare the extent of their competence with respect to the matters 
governed by this Protocol.  These organizations shall also inform the Depositary, who shall in 
turn inform the Parties, of any substantial modification in the extent of their competence. 
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Article 25 
1. This Protocol shall enter into force on the ninetieth day after the date on which not less 
than 55 Parties to the Convention, incorporating Parties included in Annex I which accounted in 
total for at least 55 per cent of the total carbon dioxide emissions for 1990 of the Parties included 
in Annex I, have deposited their instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession. 
2. For the purposes of this Article, “the total carbon dioxide emissions for 1990 of the 
Parties included in Annex I” means the amount communicated on or before the date of adoption 
of this Protocol by the Parties included in Annex I in their first national communications 
submitted in accordance with Article 12 of the Convention. 
3. For each State or regional economic integration organization that ratifies, accepts or 
approves this Protocol or accedes thereto after the conditions set out in paragraph 1 above for 
entry into force have been fulfilled, this Protocol shall enter into force on the ninetieth day 
following the date of deposit of its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession. 
4. For the purposes of this Article, any instrument deposited by a regional economic 
integration organization shall not be counted as additional to those deposited by States members 
of the organization. 
Article 26 
 No reservations may be made to this Protocol. 
Article 27 
1. At any time after three years from the date on which this Protocol has entered into force 
for a Party, that Party may withdraw from this Protocol by giving written notification to the 
Depositary. 
2. Any such withdrawal shall take effect upon expiry of one year from the date of receipt by 
the Depositary of the notification of withdrawal, or on such later date as may be specified in the 
notification of withdrawal. 
3. Any Party that withdraws from the Convention shall be considered as also having 
withdrawn from this Protocol. 
Article 28 
 The original of this Protocol, of which the Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian 
and Spanish texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the 
United Nations. 
 DONE at Kyoto this eleventh day of December one thousand nine hundred and 
ninety-seven. 
 IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, being duly authorized to that effect, have 
affixed their signatures to this Protocol on the dates indicated. 
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Annex A 
Greenhouse gases 
Carbon dioxide (C02)  
Methane (CH4)  
Nitrous oxide (N20)  
Hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs)  
Perfluorocarbons (PFCs)  
Sulphur hexafluoride (SF6) 
Sectors/source categories 
Energy 
 Fuel combustion 
  Energy industries 
  Manufacturing industries and construction 
  Transport  
  Other sectors  
  Other 
 Fugitive emissions from fuels  
  Solid fuels  
  Oil and natural gas  
  Other 
Industrial processes 
 Mineral products  
 Chemical industry  
 Metal production  
 Other production 
 Production of halocarbons and sulphur hexafluoride 
 Consumption of halocarbons and sulphur hexafluoride  
 Other 
Solvent and other product use 
Agriculture 
 Enteric fermentation 
 Manure management 
 Rice cultivation 
 Agricultural soils 
 Prescribed burning of savannas 
 Field burning of agricultural residues  
 Other 
Waste 
 Solid waste disposal on land  
 Wastewater handling  
 Waste incineration  
 Other 
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Annex B 
Party Quantified emission limitation or reduction commitment 
(percentage of base year or period) 
Australia 108 
Austria   92 
Belgium   92 
Bulgaria*   92 
Canada   94 
Croatia*   95 
Czech Republic*   92 
Denmark   92 
Estonia*   92 
European Community   92 
Finland   92 
France   92 
Germany   92 
Greece   92 
Hungary*   94 
Iceland 110 
Ireland   92 
Italy   92 
Japan   94 
Latvia*   92 
Liechtenstein   92 
Lithuania*   92 
Luxembourg   92 
Monaco   92 
Netherlands   92 
New Zealand 100 
Norway 101 
Poland*   94 
Portugal   92 
Romania*   92 
Russian Federation* 100 
Slovakia*   92 
Slovenia*   92 
Spain   92 
Sweden   92 
Switzerland   92 
Ukraine* 100 
United Kingdom of Great  
  Britain and Northern Ireland 
  92 
United States of America   93 
     
*  Countries that are undergoing the process of transition to a market economy. 
----- 
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Draft decision -/CP.15 
 
Proposal by the President 
 
Copenhagen Accord 
The Heads of State, Heads of Government, Ministers, and other heads of delegation 
present at the United Nations Climate Change Conference 2009 in Copenhagen, 
In pursuit of the ultimate objective of the Convention as stated in its Article 2,  
Being guided by the principles and provisions of the Convention, 
Noting the results of work done by the two Ad hoc Working Groups,  
Endorsing decision x/CP.15 on the Ad hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action 
and decision x/CMP.5 that requests the Ad hoc Working Group on Further Commitments of Annex I 
Parties under the Kyoto Protocol to continue its work, 
Have agreed on this Copenhagen Accord which is operational immediately.  
1.  We underline that climate change is one of the greatest challenges of our time.  We 
emphasise our strong political will to urgently combat climate change in accordance with the principle of 
common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities. To achieve the ultimate objective 
of the Convention to stabilize greenhouse gas concentration in the atmosphere at a level that would 
prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system, we shall, recognizing the 
scientific view that the increase in global temperature should be below 2 degrees Celsius, on the basis of 
equity and in the context of sustainable development, enhance our long-term cooperative action to 
combat climate change. We recognize the critical impacts of climate change and the potential impacts of 
response measures on countries particularly vulnerable to its adverse effects and stress the need to 
establish a comprehensive adaptation programme including international support. 
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2.  We agree that deep cuts in global emissions are required according to science, and as 
documented by the IPCC Fourth Assessment Report with a view to reduce global emissions so as to hold 
the increase in global temperature below 2 degrees Celsius, and take action to meet this objective 
consistent with science and on the basis of equity. We should cooperate in achieving the peaking of 
global and national emissions as soon as possible, recognizing that the time frame for peaking will be 
longer in developing countries and bearing in mind that social and economic development and poverty 
eradication are the first and overriding priorities of developing countries and that a low-emission 
development strategy is indispensable to sustainable development.  
3.  Adaptation to the adverse effects of climate change and the potential impacts of response 
measures is a challenge faced by all countries. Enhanced action and international cooperation on 
adaptation is urgently required to ensure the implementation of the Convention by enabling and 
supporting the implementation of adaptation actions aimed at reducing vulnerability and building 
resilience in developing countries, especially in those that are particularly vulnerable, especially least 
developed countries, small island developing States and Africa. We agree that developed countries shall 
provide adequate, predictable and sustainable financial resources, technology and capacity-building to 
support the implementation of adaptation action in developing countries.  
4.  Annex I Parties commit to implement individually or jointly the quantified economy-
wide emissions targets for 2020, to be submitted in the format given in Appendix I by Annex I Parties to 
the secretariat by 31 January 2010 for compilation in an INF document. Annex I Parties that are Party to 
the Kyoto Protocol will thereby further strengthen the emissions reductions initiated by the Kyoto 
Protocol. Delivery of reductions and financing by developed countries will be measured, reported and 
verified in accordance with existing and any further guidelines adopted by the Conference of the Parties, 
and will ensure that accounting of such targets and finance is rigorous, robust and transparent.  
5.  Non-Annex I Parties to the Convention will implement mitigation actions, including 
those to be submitted to the secretariat by non-Annex I Parties in the format given in Appendix II  by  
31 January 2010, for compilation in an INF document, consistent with Article 4.1 and Article 4.7 and in 
the context of sustainable development. Least developed countries and small island developing States 
may undertake actions voluntarily and on the basis of support. Mitigation actions subsequently taken and 
envisaged by Non-Annex I Parties, including national inventory reports, shall be communicated through 
national communications consistent with Article 12.1(b) every two years on the basis of guidelines to be 
adopted by the Conference of the Parties. Those mitigation actions in national communications or 
otherwise communicated to the Secretariat will be added to the list in appendix II. Mitigation actions 
taken by Non-Annex I Parties will be subject to their domestic measurement, reporting and verification 
the result of which will be reported through their national communications every two years. Non-Annex I 
Parties will communicate information on the implementation of their actions through National 
Communications, with provisions for international consultations and analysis under clearly defined 
guidelines that will ensure that national sovereignty is respected. Nationally appropriate mitigation 
actions seeking international support will be recorded in a registry along with relevant technology, 
finance and capacity building support. Those actions supported will be added to the list in appendix II. 
These supported nationally appropriate mitigation actions will be subject to international measurement, 
reporting and verification in accordance with guidelines adopted by the Conference of the Parties.  
6.  We recognize the crucial role of reducing emission from deforestation and forest 
degradation and the need to enhance removals of greenhouse gas emission by forests and agree on the 
need to provide positive incentives to such actions through the immediate establishment of a mechanism 
including REDD-plus, to enable the mobilization of financial resources from developed countries. 
7.  We decide to pursue various approaches, including opportunities to use markets, to 
enhance the cost-effectiveness of, and to promote mitigation actions. Developing countries, especially 
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those with low emitting economies should be provided incentives to continue to develop on a low 
emission pathway. 
8.  Scaled up, new and additional, predictable and adequate funding as well as improved 
access shall be provided to developing countries, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the 
Convention, to enable and support enhanced action on mitigation, including substantial finance to reduce 
emissions from deforestation and forest degradation (REDD-plus), adaptation, technology development 
and transfer and capacity-building, for enhanced implementation of the Convention. The collective 
commitment by developed countries is to provide new and additional resources, including forestry and 
investments through international institutions, approaching USD 30 billion for the period 2010  2012 
with balanced allocation between adaptation and mitigation. Funding for adaptation will be prioritized 
for the most vulnerable developing countries, such as the least developed countries, small island 
developing States and Africa. In the context of meaningful mitigation actions and transparency on 
implementation, developed countries commit to a goal of mobilizing jointly USD 100 billion dollars a 
year by 2020 to address the needs of developing countries. This funding will come from a wide variety of 
sources, public and private, bilateral and multilateral, including alternative sources of finance. New 
multilateral funding for adaptation will be delivered through effective and efficient fund arrangements, 
with a governance structure providing for equal representation of developed and developing countries. A 
significant portion of such funding should flow through the Copenhagen Green Climate Fund.   
9.  To this end, a High Level Panel will be established under the guidance of and 
accountable to the Conference of the Parties to study the contribution of the potential sources of revenue, 
including alternative sources of finance, towards meeting this goal.  
10.  We decide that the Copenhagen Green Climate Fund shall be established as an operating 
entity of the financial mechanism of the Convention to support projects, programme, policies and other 
activities in developing countries related to mitigation including REDD-plus, adaptation, capacity-
building, technology development and transfer.  
11.  In order to enhance action on development and transfer of technology we decide to 
establish a Technology Mechanism to accelerate technology development and transfer in support of 
action on adaptation and mitigation that will be guided by a country-driven approach and be based on 
national circumstances and priorities. 
12.  We call for an assessment of the implementation of this Accord to be completed by 
2015, including in light of the Conventions ultimate objective. This would include consideration of 
strengthening the long-term goal referencing various matters presented by the science, including in 
relation to temperature rises of 1.5 degrees Celsius. 
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APPENDIX I  
 
Quantified economy-wide emissions targets for 2020 
 
Annex I Parties  Quantified economy-wide emissions targets for 2020  
 Emissions reduction in 2020 Base year 
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APPENDIX II 
 
Nationally appropriate mitigation actions of developing country Parties 
 
Non-Annex I Actions 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
 
- - - - - 
 GE.11-71657 
Conference of the Parties 
Seventeenth session 
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  Establishment of an Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban 
Platform for Enhanced Action 
 Proposal by the President 
 Draft decision -/CP.17 
The Conference of the Parties, 
Recognizing that climate change represents an urgent and potentially irreversible 
threat to human societies and the planet and thus requires to be urgently addressed by all 
Parties, and acknowledging that the global nature of climate change calls for the widest 
possible cooperation by all countries and their participation in an effective and appropriate 
international response, with a view to accelerating the reduction of global greenhouse gas 
emissions, 
Noting with grave concern the significant gap between the aggregate effect of 
Parties’ mitigation pledges in terms of global annual emissions of greenhouse gases by 
2020 and aggregate emission pathways consistent with having a likely chance of holding 
the increase in global average temperature below 2 °C or 1.5 °C above pre-industrial levels, 
Recognizing that fulfilling the ultimate objective of the Convention will require 
strengthening the multilateral, rules-based regime under the Convention, 
Noting decision X/CMP.7 [Title], 
Also noting decision X/CP.17 [Title], 
1. Decides to extend the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action 
under the Convention for one year in order for it to continue its work and reach the agreed 
outcome pursuant to decision 1/CP.13 (Bali Action Plan) through decisions adopted by the 
sixteenth, seventeenth and eighteenth sessions of the Conference of the Parties, at which 
time the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action under the Convention 
shall be terminated; 
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2. Also decides to launch a process to develop a protocol, another legal instrument or a 
legal outcome under the Convention applicable to all Parties, through a subsidiary body 
under the Convention hereby established and to be known as the Ad Hoc Working Group 
on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action; 
3. Further decides that the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for 
Enhanced Action shall start its work as a matter of urgency in the first half of 2012 and 
shall report to future sessions of the Conference of the Parties on the progress of its work; 
4. Decides that the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced 
Action shall complete its work as early as possible but no later than 2015 in order to adopt 
this protocol, legal instrument or legal outcome at the twenty-first session of the 
Conference of the Parties and for it to come into effect and be implemented from 2020; 
5. Also decides that the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced 
Action shall plan its work in the first half of 2012, including, inter alia, on mitigation, 
adaptation, finance, technology development and transfer, transparency of action, and 
support and capacity-building, drawing upon submissions from Parties and relevant 
technical, social and economic information and expertise; 
6. Further decides that the process shall raise the level of ambition and shall be 
informed, inter alia, by the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change, the outcomes of the 2013–2015 review and the work of the subsidiary 
bodies; 
7. Decides to launch a workplan on enhancing mitigation ambition to identify and to 
explore options for a range of actions that can close the ambition gap with a view to 
ensuring the highest possible mitigation efforts by all Parties; 
8. Requests Parties and observer organizations to submit by 28 February 2012 their 
views on options and ways for further increasing the level of ambition  and decides to hold 
an in-session workshop at the first negotiating session in 2012 to consider options and ways 
for increasing ambition and possible further actions. 
    
